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Abstract
Japan-Republic of China relations under US hegemony: A genealogy of ‘returning 
virtue for malice’
Much of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ (yide baoyuan) postwar Japan 
policy remains to be examined. This thesis mainly shows how the discourse of 
‘returning virtue for malice’ facilitated Japan’s diplomatic recognition of the Republic 
of China (ROC) on Taiwan during the Cold War era. More conceptually, this study re- 
conceptualizes foreign policy as discourse—that of moral reciprocity—as it sheds light 
on the question of recognition as well as the consensual aspect of hegemony. By 
adopting a genealogical approach, this discourse analysis thus traces the descent and 
emergence of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ trope while it examines its discursive 
effect on Tokyo’s recognition of Taipei under American hegemony.
After tracing the emergence of Chiang’s postwar Japan policy as discourse, 
this thesis first delves into the rise of ‘returning virtue for malice’ as it demonstrates 
how the discursive formation of Tokyo’s recognition of Taipei constituted US 
hegemony in East Asia at the inception of the Cold War. Second, this study then 
highlights the heyday of ‘returning virtue for malice’ as it shows how a powerful 
coalition formed around the discourse in the domain of Japanese politics, thereby 
reproducing the recognition of Nationalist China as well as consolidating American
hegemony at the height of the Cold War. Third, this research sheds light on the decline 
of ‘returning virtue for malice’ as it depicts the erosion of the Japanese discourse 
coalition and US hegemony due to the lack of consent between Tokyo, Taipei, and 
Washington as the nature of the Cold War dramatically changed in East Asia.
In short, the discourse of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ 
postwar Japan policy represented Chiang as the benefactor to whom the Japanese 
should repay their ‘debt of gratitude’, thereby making Japan’s recognition of the 
Republic of China on Taiwan possible. In effect, this thesis presents a way of reading 
bilateral relations as it mainly shows how recognition can be constructed by the 
political actors who draw on hegemonic practices from the past—such as moral 
reciprocity—under hegemony.
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SCAP Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
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UK United Kingdom
UKL1M United Kingdom Liason Mission
UN United Nations
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
US United States
VMI Virginia Military Institute
Note on Japanese and Chinese names
For Chinese names, Pinyin is used without tone/diacritical marks except for names of 
individuals living outside of mainland China and commonly used spellings, such as Sun 
Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, and Taipei, which use the Wade-Giles system. Japanese 
names are represented, according to Japanese convention, with the family name first 
followed by the given name. Where the writings of Japanese authors appear in English, 
surnames are placed first.
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Introduction
6Now, when we negotiate with Japan, we claim that we represent the traditional and 
legitimate government o f China. The immediate reaction o f the Japanese is, u Why do 
you need to make such a false claim that you represent China when you are obviously 
in Taiwan? ” It is very difficult for the Japanese to understand and accept our claim. 
The only way we can persuade the Japanese is to remind them that they are indebted to 
Chiang Kai-shek for what he did for Japan in the wake o f the war. We tell them that 
Chiang Kai-shek is the one who strongly campaigned for the restoration o f the 
Japanese nation and economy and that he is the one who insisted China and Japan 
should peacefully cooperate with each other. In this way, we convince them that 
Chiang Kai-shek’s China therefore is the traditional and legitimate government o f 
China to which Japan should repay its debt o f gratitude. The Japanese are able to 
understand and accept this way o f reasoning. That is why we only have one trump card 
to play when we negotiate with Japan. That trump card is President Chiang. ’
(Chang Chun quoted by Huang 1995: 183-4)
1.1 Introduction
In the post-war world, Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist regime on Taiwan had the need 
to compensate its lack of internal legitimacy with its ‘dependence on external 
legitimacy’ (Wakabayashi 1992: 12-14). The lack of internal legitimacy was largely 
due to the government’s bloody crackdown on the Taiwanese uprising of 28 February 
1947 known as the 2-28 Incident (Ibid.; Wachman 1994; Hughes 1997; Rigger 1999; 
Hsiau 2000; Chu and Lin 2001). It also stemmed from the fact that the Taiwanese had 
been de-Sinicized by the Japanese colonial regime which lasted for half a centrny 
(ibid.; Wakabayashi 1992; Wachman 1994; Hughes 2000; Hsiau 2000). Despite this 
lack of internal legitimacy, it was still possible for the Chinese regime in exile to
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legitimate its rule on Taiwan by depending on American military, economic and 
political resources—for the defense of the Taiwan Strait, financial aid, and the 
maintenance of the ‘China seat’ in the United Nations (UN) (Wakabayashi 1992: 13- 
14; Hughes 2000: 65-7).
In the meantime, the Chiang regime faced the challenge of ‘legitimation via 
diplomatic recognition’ in international society (Kim 1994: 149-57). Put differently, 
the ‘politics of competitive legitimation of divided China’ emerged as an extension of 
the Chinese civil war following the outbreak of the Korean War (Ibid.: 149), in which 
Communist China militarily engaged with UN forces led by the United States. 
Consequently, the pursuit of legitimation became the central concern of two Chinas as 
they locked themselves into the competing ‘Cold War systems’ under the Soviet Union 
and the United States respectively (Ibid.). It can be best characterized as a zero-sum 
game in which the legitimation of one Chinese government depended on the de­
legitimation of the other (Ibid.; Hughes 1997: 17). From this perspective, Beijing’s 
intervention in the Korean War was a ‘God-send’ not only for Taipei’s survival but 
also for an overwhelming edge in diplomatic recognition that Washington was able to 
provide for its frontline client in the ‘East Asian Cold War system’ (Kim 1994: 149).
Here, what is often overlooked is the significance of Japan’s diplomatic 
recognition that greatly facilitated the constitution of Chiang’s external legitimacy as 
well as US hegemony in East Asia at the dawn of the Cold War era. More specifically, 
it was Tokyo’s diplomatic recognition which enabled Chiang’s Nationalist China to 
take part in the ‘West’ in April 1952 as US hegemony had been based in Japan, rather 
than China, since the late 1940s (Kennan 1967: 368-96). In fact, by September 1951,
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Washington had largely institutionalized its hegemony by signing the multilateral 
treaty of peace with Japan at San Francisco even in the absence of Chinese 
representation. Furthermore, Tokyo’s diplomatic recognition presented an opportunity 
for Chiang to symbolically observe the ‘retrocession’ (guangfu) of Taiwan despite the 
fact that the Japanese cunningly renounced their claim to the former colony without 
specifying to whom it was being given (Hughes 1997: 17; Tai 2001: Ch. 4; P’eng and 
Huang 1976). This policy of ‘clear ambiguity’ vis-a-vis the status of Taiwan 
concurrently enabled the United States to re-draw the line over the map of Imperial 
Japan. In short, Tokyo’s diplomatic recognition of Taipei was vital for the external 
legitimacy of the Chiang regime on Taiwan as well as the constitution of US 
hegemony during the making of the Cold War in East Asia,
How was it then possible, (1) and indeed commonsensical, for Japan to 
recognize the Chiang regime on Taiwan as the legitimate government of China under 
US hegemony? In spite of the impact the United States clearly had on its client states 
such as Japan, the answer this study provides is that the particular meaning Nationalist 
Chinese and Japanese elites attached to the leader of Nationalist China—through the 
discourse of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ (yide baoyuan) postwar 
Japan policy (2)—also helped to make Japan’s diplomatic recognition of Chiang’s 
Nationalist regime on Taiwan as ‘China’ possible and commonsensical between 1952 
and 1972. In other words, this study sheds light on the role of client states or agents in 
the constitution of hegemony as it shows how Japan (re)produced its recognition of 
Nationalist China (and its own postwar identity), thereby constituting US hegemony in 
East Asia. Here, the production of hegemony, which is often narrowly used to mean
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great-power domination over others, is more broadly conceived as a consensual and 
meaningful process between agents and the hegemon. Moreover, this study highlights 
that recognition between agents that constitute hegemony can be made intelligible by 
moral reciprocity drawn from past hegemonic practices.
More theoretically, in the name of intellectual pluralism, this study shows how 
the standard rationalist account of Japan’s international relations can be complemented 
by a critical constructivist approach (Katzenstein et a l 1998, 1999; Hoph 1998; 
Weldes et a l 1999; Campbell 1998: Epilogue). By adding a critical constructivist 
strand, this study lays bare the constructedness of Tokyo’s recognition of Taipei as the 
legitimate government of ‘China’ under US hegemony. While the standard work on 
Japanese diplomacy rationalistically searches for structural and external factors in its 
attempt to causally explain why Japan recognized Nationalist China, this study shows 
that the critical constructivist approach can help us understand how Tokyo’s 
diplomatic recognition of Taipei as well as US hegemony were constituted through 
meanings and practices in international relations (Keohane 1989: Ch. 7; Hollis and 
Smith 1990; Smith 1995:26-8; Wendt 1999: 77-89).
In this introductory chapter, the author first locates critical constructivism in the 
field of international relations (IR) in general as well as IR in Japan. The author 
surveys the evolution of disciplinary debates in IR in the United States and Europe as 
well as equivalent foreign-policy debates in Japan in order to locate this critical 
constructivist study in terms of Japan’s international relations under US hegemony. 
Secondly, by empirically focusing on Japan’s recognition of ‘China’ under US 
hegemony, the author demonstrates that critical constructivism and the realist variant
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of rationalism answer different types of questions. The author shows that critical 
constructivist ‘understanding’ complements standard realist/rationalist ‘explanation’ as 
he contrasts interpretive and causal analyses in terms of answering ‘how-possible’ and 
‘why’ questions, both of which contribute to knowledge since reasons can also be 
causes (Davidson 1963; Smith 2000a; Wight 2002). Thirdly, the author mainly reviews 
the existing decision-making analyses on Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for 
malice’ postwar Japan policy in terms of his idiosyncratic beliefs as well as rational 
calculations. The author then points out that some of the precursors’ works suggest the 
directions in which studies on ‘returning virtue for malice’ can be extended beyond 
decision-making analysis. Fourthly, in terms of methodology, the author explicitly 
calls for the use of genealogy as discourse analysis in order to re-examine Chiang Kai- 
shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy. The author introduces the 
genealogical method of discourse analysis by defining key concepts, assessing 
advantages and limitations, and discussing the selection of the cases and materials on 
which this study is based. Finally, the author concludes this introduction by sketching 
the chapter outline of this study as a whole.
1.2 Japan’s, international relations under US hegemony: locating critical 
constructivism
1American social science’ today: rationalism v. constructivism. In the field of 
international relations (IR), which has been referred to as an ‘American social science’ 
(Hoffinann 1977; Smith 2000b; Crawford and Jarvis 2001), rationalism stands for the 
‘merging of the long-term rivalry between liberal and realist accounts’ of world
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politics since the interwar period (Smith 2002a: 224). It came into being as a result of 
the so-called ‘neo-neo synthesis’ as the two accounts of international relations 
underwent re-identification under the labels of neo-realism and neo-liberal 
institutionalism in the 1980s (Waever 1996: 163-4). Since then, the two approaches 
have become ‘indistinguishable on the basis of their shared commitment to a rationalist 
research program’ (Schmidt 2002: 15). More specifically, neo-liberal institutionalists 
have agreed to accept the following neo-realist positions: 1) The state is the main unit 
of analysis; 2) It is a rational actor; and 3) International anarchy shapes its behavior 
(Smith 2000c: 36). Such rapprochement was most importantly a product of the 
dominance of rational choice theory within the ‘US model of social science’ (Smith 
2002a: 224-7, 2002b: 33-5). By the 1990s, even though the traces of the ‘neo-neo 
debate’—on whether anarchy can be mitigated by international institutions and 
whether state actors pursue relative or absolute gains—had remained (Ibid., 2002a: 
224-7; Schmidt 2002: 15), neo-liberal institutionalism had been largely ‘swallowed up’ 
by neo-realism under the rubric of rationalism in the United States (Mearsheimer 1995: 
85,1998: 430).
In the meantime, cultural and sociological perspectives known as 
constructivism came to the fore as the ‘neo-neo debate’ was supplanted by the debate 
between rationalism and constructivism in the 1990s (Katzenstein et al 1998, 1999; 
Fearon and Wendt 2002). The emergence of constructivism as a major approach 
virtually coincided with the splintering of what was referred to as reflectivism in the 
late 1980s (Keohane 1989). Before it splintered in the mid-1990s (Hansen 2006: 3-4), 
reflectivism comprised constructivism as well as a variety of critical perspectives that
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highlighted the significance of ‘human reflection5 in world politics. Reflectivists 
emphasized ‘the importance of historical and textual interpretation and the limitations 
of scientific models in studying world politics5 (Keohane 1989: 161). Since then, 
constructivists have attempted ‘seizing the middle ground5 between rationalism and 
reflectivism (Adler 1997). In other words, while constructivists have agreed with 
rationalists that the state is the unit of analysis and that social science is the method to 
study international relations, they have also agreed with reflectivists that ideas or 
collective understandings (as opposed to material conditions) matter more than 
rationalists have claimed (Smith 2002a: 228). Simply put, constructivists have argued 
that ‘the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and 
interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material 
world5 (Adler 1997: 322). In contrast to rationalism that constitutes mainstream IR in 
the US (Waever 1998, 1999; Smith 2000b, 2002b, Crawford and Jarvis 2001), 
constructivism has received a warm welcome in European IR communities (Waever 
1998, 1999; Fierke and Jorgensen 2001).
This study adopts an approach that has been referred to as critical 
constructivism in IR (Katzenstein et a l 1998: 674-8, 1999: 34-8; Hoph 1998: 181-5; 
Campbell 1998: 222-5; Weldes et a l 1999). Critical constructivism is a variant of 
constructivism that came into being as a result of the subdivision of the constructivist 
approach that took place following the fracturing of the reflectivist camp in the 1990s 
(Hansen 2006: 3-4). Like aforementioned conventional constructivists, critical 
constructivists focus on identity issues and analyze how actors and systems are 
constituted and co-evolve (Katzenstein et al 1998: 676, 1999: 36). However, unlike
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conventional constructivists, critical constructivists are more pluralistic about research 
methodologies as they are more skeptical about formulating law-like generalizations 
that dogmatically privilege certain perspectives over others (Ibid.; Price and Reus-Smit 
1998: 271-81). Critical constructivist research thus tends to be ideographic rather than 
nomothetic since it makes more contingent generalizations about particular phenomena 
at particular points in time based on particular evidence (Ibid.; Katzenstein et al. 1998: 
677, 1999: 37). Put differently, the emphasis of critical constructivist research is placed 
on the ‘detailed study of texts to understand the symbolic systems that govern actors’ 
discourses, rather than on an analysis of a large number of cases’ (Ibid.). Such 
emphasis is critical constructivists’ attempt to translate the metatheoretical insights of 
poststructuralism into empirical analyses as they focus on discourse and work closely 
with texts (Ibid.: 37-8,1998: 677-8; Campbell 1998: 222-5; Price and Reus-Smit 1998: 
271, 280-1). Therefore, critical constructivism and poststructuralism are similar to the 
extent that they both critically analyze state discourses in their empirical studies 
(Campbell 1998: 222-3; Waever 2002: 23; Fierke 2001: 120, 135 n. 9). Nevertheless, 
critical constructivism is distinguished from the poststructuralist variant of reflectivism 
to the extent that it has not abandoned the possibility of social science and it is still 
willing to engage with mainstream rationalism in the United States (Katzenstein et al. 
1998: 676-7, 1999: 36-7).
Japanese IR: realism v. idealism. While aforementioned disciplinary debates and 
labels have ensured the central position of American IR theorists and provoked critics 
in European IR communities (Waever 1998, 1999), they have largely failed to mobilize
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the Japanese IR community beyond the classical realist-idealist debate (Kitaoka 1995, 
Fujiwara 1999). Such theoretical ‘immobilism’—the lack of dynamism and proactivity 
that has characterized postwar Japan (Stockwin et al 1988; Stockwin 2003: xxxiv; 
Hook et al 2001, 2005)—can be partially attributed to the fact that Japanese 
intellectuals have been inclined to debate international relations in terms of Japanese 
foreign policy rather than IR theory (Kitaoka 1995). Furthermore, the intellectual 
‘immobilism’ can also be attributed to exogenous events in the realm of international 
relations such as the success, of Japan’s ‘mercantile realism’ under US hegemony 
(Heginbotham and Samuels 1999). In any case, the miraculous growth of the postwar 
Japanese economy has justified the realist scholars who have advised conservative 
governments in Japan under the wings of the United States. Consequently, Japanese IR 
scholars have only needed to produce ‘very little theory in general and much less that 
is not based on American inspiration’ as demonstrated below (Waever 1998: 696; 
1999: 56).
Postwar Japan’s international relations have been dominated by realism in both 
theory and practice (Kosaka 1963, 1995). The dominant position of realism in the 
literature of Japan’s international relations is an epitome of the ‘Americanization of the 
academic community’ in postwar Japan (Hook et al 2001: 101, 2005: 115-6). Japanese 
realists, such as Kosaka Masataka who spent the first two years of the 1960s as a 
young visiting scholar at Harvard University (Kitaoka 1995: 22), began to provide 
‘intellectual sustenance for the government’s policy of bilateralism and close political 
relations with the US’ after the controversial renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty 
in 1960 (Hook et a l 2001: 101, 2005: 115-6). Over the years, the realist account of
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Japan’s international relations—such as that of Tokyo’s recognition of "China’ after 
the war (Kosaka 1964, 1968, 2000)—has been embedded by other ‘American- 
educated’ scholars who have written canonical works on the foreign relations of Japan 
(Iriye 1966, 1991,1997; Ikei 1973,1982,1992; Hosoya 1993; Iokibe 1999,2006).
The prime example of such dominance is the realist construction of the 
‘Yoshida doctrine’ (Nagai 1985)—or the ‘(d)octrine placing high priority on Japan’s 
economic growth and position in the world and low spending and priority on the 
military’ (Hook et a l 2001: xxv, 2005: xxx)—that guided Japan’s foreign policy from 
the Yoshida cabinet of the 1940s to the Miyazawa cabinet of the 1990s (Edstrom 
1999), More specifically, Kosaka’s (1964) seminal article on former Prime Minister 
Yoshida Shigeru not only definitively re-evaluated but also helped to ‘indoctrinate’ 
Yoshida’s diplomacy (Toyoshita 1999: 5-13; Kan et a l 2002: 95-102; Soeya 2005: 94- 
8; Nakajima 2006: 5-8), which had been given ‘terribly unfair’ assessments in Japan 
before 1964 (Kosaka 1964: 78). Thereafter, realist scholars like Kosaka not only 
intellectually supported Yoshida’s bid for the Nobel Peace Prize between 1965 and 
1967 (Mikanagi 1991: 590-1; Hosaka 2000: 434-6), but also advised pupils of the 
‘Yoshida school’ such as Prime Minister Sato Eisaku on international affairs during the 
postwar era (Noda 2000: 594; Kitaoka 1995: 25). In this way, the ‘Yoshida doctrine’ 
has functioned to rationalize Japan’s ‘subordinate independence’ from the United 
States during the Cold War (Dower 1979).
However, before realism gained dominance in the 1960s (Kitaoka 1995: 21-2; 
Hook et al 2001: 101, 2005: 115-6; Inoguchi 2005: 35-6), it was idealism that first 
overwhelmingly influenced Japan’s intellectual circles in the postwar era (Kitaoka
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1995: 13-14, 18). For instance, between March 1949 and December 1950, the Peace 
Issues Discussion Group (Heiwa Mondai Danwakai, hereafter PIDG) led by idealists 
such as Maruyama Masao sensationally published three statements on principles of 
peace in Sekai (Igarashi 1995: 176-96; Hook 1996: Ch. 2), the most influential journal 
in Japan at the time (Kitaoka 1995: 13). Actually, the PIDG modeled these statements 
after ‘Social scientists appeal for peace’, a statement that had been issued in July 1948 
by an international group of scholars in Paris at the request of the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (Ibid.; Hook 1996: 26- 
7; Igarashi 1995: 176-7). In these statements, the PIDG called for ‘peaceful 
coexistence’ and ‘unarmed neutrality’ in terms of signing a peace treaty with all former 
adversaries across the Cold War division, acquiring security through the UN, and 
opposing the use of Japanese bases by a third power such as the United States (Ibid.: 
176-96; Hook 1996: 31-4; Kitaoka 1995: 13-14). These ‘idealistic’ proposals were 
made based on the ‘realistic’ understanding that nuclear weapons had made war an 
outdated means to achieve national goals (Hook 1996: 33-5; Igarashi 1995: 179-80, 
190-2). Although they were not translated into the official policy adopted by the 
Yoshida cabinet, they did nonetheless reinforce the anti-militaristic foundations of the 
Japanese Constitution of 1946 and provided a basis for the Socialist opposition and 
peace movements in postwar Japan (Hook 1996: 38-40). Accordingly, these Japanese 
liberals diametrically opposed Prime Minister Yoshida’s policy to ‘invite’ US forces 
and make ‘separate peace’ with ‘one world’ under American hegemony.
More conceptually, Japanese idealists put forth multiple views of ‘reality’ in 
their attempt to construct an alternative possibility in which such ‘reality’ could be
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transformed (Heiwa Mondai Danwakai 1950, 1995). According to these idealists, there 
are at least two subjective views of ‘reality’: one that is competitive; and the other that 
is cooperative (Hook 1996: 31-2, Heiwa Mondai Danwakai 1950, 1995). The 
competitive view of ‘reality’ centrally focuses on the ‘Hobbesian analogy of 
international society as a war of “all-against-all”, where security must be based on 
military preparations for the “worst-case scenario’” (Hook 1996: 31). According to this 
realist view of ‘reality’, it was inevitable for Japan to be under the American nuclear 
umbrella given the threat of a nuclear attack from the communist camp (Ibid.). On the 
other hand, the cooperative view of ‘reality’ creates the ‘possibility of cooperation 
between states, where security can be based on trust’ (Ibid.). According to this idealist 
view of ‘reality’, it was still possible for Japan to opt for peaceful coexistence with 
‘two worlds’ as well as unarmed neutrality without the American nuclear umbrella 
(Ibid.). The PIDG recommended the latter option by appealing to the Japanese people’s 
‘subjective choice in the form of autonomous action’ rather than “‘objective reality” in 
the form of the communist threat’ (Ibid.: 31-2). In spite of Japanese idealists’ 
recommendation, the cooperative view consequently fell short of becoming the 
‘reality’ that was adopted by the Yoshida government while it was embraced by the 
Socialist opposition as its ‘ideal’ in the 1950s.
However, while Japanese idealists claimed that such ‘reality’ was ultimately 
defined by power (Maruyama 1964: 175-7), they failed to define their own ‘reality’ 
when they came back into power in the 1990s for the first time in five decades. More 
specifically, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) agreed not to oppose Tokyo’s military 
alliance with Washington when it formed a coalition government with the conservative
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Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Harbinger Party in 1994. It could very well be 
characterized as political suicide for pacifism or idealism in Japan (Soeya 2005: 20). 
Facing the need to ‘resuscitate* idealism at this juncture, Murayama Tomi’ichi, the 
Socialist Prime Minister, began to promote Japan as a ‘global civilian power* 
(Inoguchi 2005: 43). The idea of ‘global civilian power’ had been first introduced by a 
German IR scholar and further elaborated by a Japanese diplomatic correspondent in 
an influential American journal (Maull 1990; Funabashi 1991a). Subsequently, the 
‘civilian manifesto* as well as a ‘model of global civilian power’, which theoretically 
and empirically elaborated on the prototype of die concept, appeared in book-length 
works in Japanese and English (Funabashi 1991b, 1994; Hughes 1999). In the 
meantime, Murayama along with the proponents of the ‘global civilian power* 
discourse called for Tokyo’s ‘supportive leadership’ under US hegemony in providing 
collective goods such as foreign aid, democracy promotion, peacekeeping forces, and 
human rights and environmental protection (Funabashi 1991a: 66-9). In this way, they 
argued Japan could ‘enhance its political power through economic strength’—but lnot 
military might’—in an emergent ‘new world order’ (Ibid.: 65). Put differently, 
Japanese idealists called for a ‘more internationalist and actively engaged Japanese 
pacifism’ as they came to accept the American nuclear umbrella in the 1990s (Ibid.).
In addition to the liberal discourse of ‘global civilian power’, it was Ozawa 
Ichiro’s (1993, 1994, 1995) idea of Japan becoming a ‘normal nation’ that represented 
Japan’s international relations in the 1990s (Soeya 2005: 21; Inoguchi 2005: 40-6; 
Kitaoka 1995: 37-40). In contrast to the idealist image of Japan as a ‘global civilian 
power’, Japan as a ‘normal nation’ reflects the realist image of a great power (Soeya
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2005: 21). While the former encourages Japan to be an economic power rather than a 
militaiy one, the latter criticizes that such a mercantilist nation is not a ‘normal nation’ 
by international standards (Ozawa 1993: 104-5, 1994: 94-5, 1995: 463-4). More 
specifically, Ozawa—one of the political leaders who remarkably brought down the 
LDP government in 1993 for the first time in 38 years (Stockwin 2003: 199-201)— 
stresses the need to reconsider the ‘Yoshida doctrine’ under the new circumstances of 
the post-Cold War world (Ozawa 1993: 109-11, 1994: 98-100, 1995: 467-9). In the 
meantime, he also warns that becoming a ‘normal nation’ is not to become a great 
military power in the world, either (Ozawa 1993: 104-5, 1994: 94-5, 1995: 463-4). 
Rather, to be a ‘normal nation’, for Ozawa (1993: 112-26, 1994: 101-12,1995: 469-81; 
2006: 184-92) and his intellectual allies (Kitaoka 2000), is to promptly contribute to 
UN peacemaking operations by collaborating with the US in the making of the ‘new 
world order’. Accordingly, although it is still common sense that the ‘Yoshida 
doctrine’ represents postwar Japan’s international relations today (Inoguchi 2005: 33), 
the ‘doctrine’ has been increasingly called into question since the end of the Cold War 
(Ibid.; Hook et al. 2001: 66, 2005: 73; Nakajima 2006: 7-8). In fact, it has been argued 
that Japan has already been making rapid strides to be a ‘normal nation’ since 11 
September 2001 (Hughes 2004; Inoguchi 2005: 44-6). In any case, while ‘mercantile 
realism’ may have been going through the process of emendation in Japan, the 
American ‘foundations’ of Japanese diplomacy nonetheless have remained 
unproblematized.
This critical constructivist study, drawing on early Japanese idealists’ claim that 
‘reality’ is not only given but also reproduced everyday (Maruyama 1964: 172-3),
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attempts to open additional space for the possibilities in which the ‘reality’ of US 
hegemony can be ‘re-imagined’. In other words, while it accepts the Japanese realist 
and idealist understanding of US hegemony as ‘reality’ that is given, this critical 
constructivist study also lays bare the constitution of US hegemony by highlighting 
otherwise marginalized East Asian constituents of US hegemony such as Japan. That 
is, if American hegemony in East Asia is already given and structuralized across time, 
then analysis of Japan’s choice of its own destiny in international affairs is largely 
dispensable. In fact, postwar Japan’s international relations have been typically 
explained by realists in terms of Washington’s pressure on Tokyo or Tokyo’s 
inevitable choice to follow in the footsteps of Washington. However, by shedding light 
on traditional practices the Japanese state adopted under Chinese hegemony (Brown 
1955), this critical constructivist study multiplies what has been unified as or reduced 
to Japan’s passive reaction under American pressure. Such multiplicity brings out the 
cultural aspect of hegemony in East Asia as a field of possibilities (Walker 1984,1990; 
Weldes et al 1999)—the angle that has been largely overlooked by Japanese realists 
and idealists who have paid more attention to security and economic dimensions. 
Moreover, by bringing East Asian practices back in US hegemony, this critical 
constructivist study helps to bridge area studies and IR to a certain extent. In this sense, 
applying the critical constructivist approach to Japan’s international relations helps to 
overcome the theoretical ‘immobilism’ in Japan and bring Japanese IR face to face 
with the tide of the times as ‘a more regionalized post-Cold War order’ is likely to be 
reflected in ‘IR voices’ in the US, Europe, and Asia (Waever 1998: 688; 1999: 48).
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1.3 Japan’s recognition of ‘China’ under US hegemony: explanation and 
understanding (3)
Unanticipated American pressure: causal explanation o f  recognition. Japan’s 
diplomatic recognition of Chiang Kai-shek’s regime on Taiwan as the legitimate 
government of China is conventionally explained in terms of the price Japan paid for 
peace or regaining sovereignty in April 1952 (Kosaka 1964: 107-8, 1968: 59-64, 2000: 
60-5). Put differently, Tokyo’s diplomatic recognition of Taipei is commonly 
explained as an unanticipated consequence (Ibid.) According to this authoritative 
account, due to the Anglo-American dispute on the ‘China question’, Prime Minister 
Yoshida Shigeru anticipated that Washington would give him a free hand to negotiate a 
peace settlement with China of his own choice (Ibid.). However, John Foster Dulles, 
special representative of President Harry S. Truman in charge of negotiating the 
Japanese Peace Treaty and the Pacific security treaties, so decisively influenced 
Yoshida that he lost his free hand over the ‘China question’ (Kosaka 1968: 61, 2000: 
61). Dulles demanded Yoshida to recognize Nationalist China as he represented the 
powerful ‘China lobby’ and virulent anti-communism in Washington at the time (Ibid., 
1964: 108, 1968: 61). More precisely, as Dulles reminded Yoshida that the Japanese 
Peace Treaty would not be ratified by the US Senate if Tokyo did not agree to 
recognize Taipei, Yoshida had no choice but to agree to recognize Nationalist China 
(Ibid., Kosaka 1964: 108, 2000: 61). As a result, according to this conventional 
rationalist explanation, such unanticipated American pressure ‘sealed’ postwar Japan’s 
China policy for the following two decades (Ibid.).
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First, such a structural explanation deductively over-emphasizes the coercive 
aspect of US hegemony as it attempts to explain Tokyo’s ‘irrational’ action which was 
not inductively driven by its utilitarian national interests—such as having access to the 
market of mainland China (Dower 1979: 414). In fact, client states like Japan had more 
room to maneuver under US hegemony than the structural explanation suggests. For 
example, only three days after committing Tokyo to negotiating a bilateral treaty with 
Taipei by signing the ‘Yoshida letter’ of 24 December 1951 which was addressed to 
and ghosted by Dulles, Yoshida sent another letter to Dulles as he played the US off 
against the UK in order to pursue his ‘two Chinas’ policy (Chen 2000). In the 
meantime, Yoshida used XJS pressure to swing the balance of domestic politics in favor 
of negotiating with Taipei first—the American initiative which was consistent with 
Yoshida’s own intention (Yuan 2001: Ch. 5). Moreover, Yoshida not only requested 
economic aid horn Washington in return but also, ‘to Dulles’s discomfort, argued that 
Japanese businessmen could play a role of “counterinfiltration of Communist China’” 
(Schaller 1997: 43; Kan et a l 2002). Accordingly, these findings indicate that the 
conventional rationalist explanation underrates the role of client states like Japan under 
American hegemony as it reduces the concept of hegemony to coercion.
Second, the structural explanation overlooks the influence of past hegemons, 
like China, on the emergent hegemony of the postwar United States insomuch as it 
fails to historicize hegemony in East Asia. As a result, the impact of Chinese 
hegemonic practices from the past is precluded from the ‘universal’ hegemony of the 
US at present. Nonetheless, US hegemony did not come in a vacuum as the ‘Chinese 
world order’ predates the American ‘Cold War order’ in East Asia (Hook et a l 2001,
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2005). Therefore, when the United States took over the region from Imperial Japan, 
Chinese hegemonic practices had already been embedded over centuries including the 
era of Japanese hegemony. While Washington welcomed them as long as they served 
to legitimate its presence in the region, client states like Nationalist China capitalized 
on those practices to ‘revive’ its hegemonic identity vis-a-vis former subjects such as 
Japan. For example, even after the Japanese Peace Treaty was ratified by the US 
Senate on 20 March 1952, Nationalist China persistently engaged Japan in the 
traditional discourse of Chinese ‘magnanimity’ until it finally compelled Tokyo to sign 
the bilateral Peace Treaty with Taipei on 28 April (Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti 
Yanjiuhui 1966b). The impact of such articulation (4) in terms of traditional practices 
was even inscribed in the Protocol of the Treaty as Chiang-Kai-shek voluntarily 
waived war reparations from Japan as ‘a sign of magnanimity’ (China Hand Book 
Editorial Board 1952; Yu 1970). Simply put, in order to adequately understand Japan’s 
recognition of Nationalist China under US hegemony, it is necessary to pluralize 
hegemony across time and lay bare the present significance of past hegemonic 
practices such as that of Chinese practices in East Asia.
Finally, although the conventional utilitarian explanation makes it seem 
impossible for the Japanese not to have recognized Nationalist China, such ex post 
facto economic rationalization lacks sufficient empirical evidence. More specifically, 
while it suggests that there was a gap between Yoshida’s intention (to recognize 
Beijing by following in the footsteps of Great Britain) and the outcome (granting 
recognition to Taipei as a result of American pressure), this utilitarian account 
nonetheless economically closes the gap by inteipreting it as the ‘price’ Japan paid for
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regaining sovereignly. However, detailed process-tracing analysis suggests otherwise. 
For instance, regarding the nature of a bilateral treaty with a Chinese regime on 
Taiwan, while Dulles demanded Yoshida to sign the peace treaty which was 
territorially limited, Yoshida on the other hand wished to avoid signing such a treaty 
until the ‘China question7 was territorially resolved (Nishimura 1971: 320). In the 
meantime, Yoshida agreed to negotiate an economic treaty or accord which was 
territorially limited exactly as Dulles defined in the ‘Yoshida letter7 of 24 December 
1951 (Ibid.: 315; Yoshitsu 1982: 78; Yuan 2001: Ch.5). These pieces of evidence 
suggest that Tokyo attempted to exercise a ‘two Chinas7 economic policy hand in hand 
with a ‘no Chinas7 foreign policy, even though Japanese delegates in Taipei 
unexpectedly took the road to diplomatic recognition against the will of Yoshida in 
Tokyo in the spring of 1952 (Yoshitsu 1982: 81-2). In fact, Yoshida continued to regret 
the Japanese delegates7 concession to call the accord the treaty ofpeace for many years 
afterwards (Nishimura 1971: 371). As indicated above, the conventional ‘economic 
story7 of Japan's recognition of Nationalist China in terms of the ‘price for peace7 is 
partial at best if it is not inaccurate empirically.
Use o f traditional Chinese practices: constitutive understanding o f recognition. 
Japan's recognition of ‘China' under American hegemony was cultural (5) to the 
extent that it was made possible by the particular discourse of Chiang Kai-shek's 
‘returning virtue for malice7 postwar Japan policy that provided the category through 
which Japan's recognition of ‘China’ under US hegemony was understood. A 
fundamental principle here is that states ‘act towards objects, including other actors, on
19
the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them’ (Wendt 1992: 396-7). In 
concrete, as briefly mentioned above, during the bilateral treaty negotiations of 1952, 
the Nationalist Chinese engaged Japanese delegates in the discourse of moral 
reciprocity known as that of ‘returning virtue for malice’. By representing Chiang Kai- 
shek as the benefactor to whom the Japanese should repay their ‘debt of gratitude’ 
(ongi) for his ‘magnanimous’ postwar Japan policy, the Nationalist Chinese 
successfully re-hierarchicalized ‘Sino’-Japanese relations as they obliged the Japanese 
delegates to restore the moral balance. As a result, the Japanese delegates agreed to 
sign the bilateral treaty of peace, thereby diplomatically recognizing Chiang’s regime 
on Taiwan as the legitimate government of ‘China’ under US hegemony. Accordingly, 
the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ helped to create the possibility of 
recognizing the Chiang regime on Taiwan as ‘China’ under US hegemony and 
preclude other possibilities for postwar Japan. Furthermore, such use of traditional 
practices continued to help reproducing Tokyo’s recognition of Taipei until it was 
undone by Taipei’s announcement of diplomatic severance with Tokyo two decades 
later.
First of all, hegemony, ‘an order in which most of the states (or at least those 
within reach of hegemony) could find compatible with their interests’ {Cox 1996: 65- 
6), is used here to stress the consent of client states such as Japan and Nationalist China 
that girds a leading state like the United States with power (Reus-Smit 2004: 65). 
While rationalists use hegemony to mean the world order in which ‘a single powerful 
state controls or dominates the lesser states in the system’ based materially on 
‘military, economic and technological capabilities’ (Gilpin 1981: 13, 29), it is critically
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used here to mean more than a euphemism for such dominance or coercion (Cox 1994: 
366). Such critical use of hegemony restores ‘the integrity of cultural and other aspects 
of life in a constitutive rather than a deterministic manner’ (Walker 1984: 202). 
Nonetheless, hegemony is still predominantly reduced to mean dominance or coercion, 
neither one of which provides the full account of the concept from the critical point of 
view. Thus, in order to more fully understand the hegemonization of the US in East 
Asia, of which Japan’s recognition of ‘China’ was a critical part, it is essential to take 
into account the consent these client states gave to the hegemon. In other words, the 
concept of hegemony can be more usefully applied as the world order which consists 
of both coercion and consent (Cox 1996: 127; Halliday 2000: 60), and the neglected 
consensual aspect of hegemony is vital for understanding the constitution of US 
hegemony in East Asia.
Secondly, Japan’s recognition of ‘China’ under US hegemony can be 
illuminated by a focus on hegemonic practices of the past, the raw materials out of 
which such recognition was constructed. More specifically, from the seventh century 
to the 17th century (followed by more than two and a half centuries of isolation), Japan 
lay on the periphery of the ‘Chinese world order’ (Fairbank 1968; Garver 1993: 9-15; 
Zhao, S. 1997: Ch.7; Hook et a l 2001: 25-7, 2005: 27-9; Zhang 2001; Kang 2003). It 
was bound loosely together by the Chinese ‘civilization and virtue, particularly the 
virtue of China’s ruler’ (Zhao, S. 1997: 18). Japan was accordingly exposed to such 
Chinese hegemonic practices as moral obligation informed by Confucian values-— 
including social harmony interpreted in terms of the emperor’s virtue (Ibid). In fact, as 
a major actor of the subsequent ‘imperial world order’ during the 19th and 20th
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centuries (Hook et al. 2001: 27-9, 2005: 29-31), Japanese imperialists blended the 
Confucian image of the emperor as the ‘benevolent sovereign, father of his people, and 
moral preceptor of the nation’ with ‘Shinto notions of the divine origins of the imperial 
line’ (Collcutt 1991: 149-52). More strikingly, these traditional practices ‘survived’ 
even after the utilitarian style of US hegemony replaced the Japanese empire at the 
dawn of the ‘Cold War order’ (Hook et al. 2001: 29-32, 2005: 31-4). To be more 
precise, these hegemonic practices from the past were politically ‘revived’ by 
Nationalist Chinese elites in order to construct Japan’s recognition of ‘China’ during 
the hegemonization of the US in East Asia.
Thirdly, Japan’s recognition of ‘China’ under American hegemony was 
consensual to the extent that the ‘incoming’ American hegemon collaborated with 
‘outgoing’ Japanese imperialists in the wake of World War II. On the fatal day of 
Imperial Japan, 15 August 1945, Emperor Hirohito announced to the Japanese nation 
the acceptance of the Postdam declaration and the ‘beginning’ of postwar Japan as the 
following: ‘We have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations 
to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is insufferable’ (Nish 1968: 
192). This famous phrase was inserted by Yasuoka Masahiro (Yomiuri Shinbun 14 
September 2002), one of the most influential Confucian intellectuals who had 
associated with Pan Asianists in the prewar ultra-nationalist movement (Morris 1960: 
451-2). Subsequently, the occupation of Japan led by American troops commenced 
after the surrender instrument was signed on 2 September 1945. General Douglas 
MacArthur then took over the ‘land of the rising sun’ to show the Japanese people his 
*magnanimity coupled with strength’ as he collaborated with Hirohito (Dulles 1952:
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176). In return, as early as September 1947, Hirohito offered Washington Japanese 
military bases in exchange for Tokyo’s recovery of sovereignty at an early date 
(Shindo 1979: 45-50; Miura 1996a: 94-103). Moreover, in the fall of 1950, the US 
began ‘de-purging’ prewar Japanese imperialists just as the Emperor suggested to 
Washington immediately after the eruption of the Korean War (US Department of 
State 1976: 1236-7). Accordingly, as Washington maximized residual Japanese 
hegemonic apparatuses to promote consent, the prewar imperialists were ‘unleashed’ to 
find their way back into Japanese politics as the Cold War ‘watchdogs’ under US 
hegemony. More importantly, while Japanese elites consented to emergent US 
hegemony by ‘inviting’ American forces (Lundestand 1986, 1999: 208), the very 
prewar Japanese imperialists subsequently found their ‘postwar’ mission in 
(reproducing Tokyo’s recognition of ‘China’ under US hegemony.
Finally, it was through the repeated articulation of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘China’ 
to ‘magnanimous’ postwar Japan policy that these prewar imperialists were 
‘converted’ into his agents of Japanese recognition. For instance, as a result of 
‘numbing repetition’ of such articulation, Japanese Plenipotentiary Kawada Isao, a de­
purged cousin of Prime Minister Yoshida’s, agreed to negotiate the bilateral treaty of 
peace with Taipei under the condition that the contents of the treaty undoubtedly stand 
for a magnanimous peace treaty or President Chiang’s spirit o f noble virtue (Zhonghua 
Minguo Waijiao Yanjiuhui 1966b: 25; Yuan 2001: 212; Ishi 1986: 308). After the 
conclusion of the treaty, Kawada then promised Chiang that he would inform the 
Japanese people of the magnanimous nature of the bilateral peace treaty (Chang 1980: 
136). Subsequently, on behalf of Kawada, Prime Minister Yoshida (1957: 72-3; 1967:
23
189) revealed that ‘it was utterly impossible to ignore’ Chiang Kai-shek’s regime on 
Taiwan ‘as the counteipart of the treaty of peace considering the friendship Qogi) it 
demonstrated in the peaceful repatriation of our troops and civilians from China at the 
end of the war’—which since then has been circulated by the Nationalist Chinese as 
part of Chiang’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy. Moreover, Chang 
Chun (1980: 141-3), Chiang Kai-shek’s special envoy to visit Japan following die 
conclusion of the bilateral treaty, even imbued Emperor Hirohito with Chiang’s 
‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy. Chang Chun ‘informed’ Hirohito 
that Chiang had encouraged other leaders of the Allies to preserve the Japanese 
imperial institution at the Conference of Cairo in 1943. Hirohito then caught his breath 
and expressed his utmost gratitude for Chiang’s kindness (Ibid). Hirohito additionally 
expressed his gratitude for Chiang’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ address of 15 August 
1945 as well as the very ‘magnanimous attitude’ that contributed to the conclusion of 
the bilateral peace treaty. Accordingly, the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ 
not only had an impact on Japan’s recognition of the Chiang regime on Taiwan as 
‘China’ but also began diffusing into the Japanese elite—the result of which was the 
subsequent formation of a domestic coalition that reproduced its recognition of ‘China’ 
during the Cold War era.
The Cold War ‘structure’ and ‘agents’ in East Asia: ‘why’ and ‘how-possible’ 
questions. (6) To put the preceding discussions in a nutshell, while the former causal 
explanation of recognition (however incompletely) answers ‘why’ Japan 
diplomatically recognized Nationalist China under the given Cold War ‘structure’, the
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latter constitutive understanding for recognition addresses ‘how’ Tokyo’s recognition 
of Taipei as ‘China’ was made ‘possible’ despite of Tokyo’s alternative ‘two Chinas’ 
policy in the making of US hegemony. More specifically, while addressing the ‘why’ 
question precludes the role of ‘agents’ like Japan as it reduces Tokyo’s recognition of 
Taipei to the consequence of the Cold War ‘structure’ or coercive hegemony of the US, 
answering the ‘how-possible’ question sheds light on the role of ‘agents’ by laying 
bare the constitutive processes of Tokyo’s recognition of Taipei in the making of 
hegemony which consists of both coercion and consent. Furthermore, while answering 
the ‘why’ question in effect (re)produces the ‘universal structure’ of the present or 
coercive nature of US hegemony, addressing the ‘how-possible’ question enables one 
to assess the impact of ‘agents’ with hegemonic pasts, like China and Japan, by 
historicizing hegemony in East Asia. Finally, while answers for the ‘why’ question, 
such as the ‘price for peace’ thesis, have a strong tendency to assume the utilitarian and 
unitary process of Tokyo’s recognition of Taipei without sufficient empirical grounds, 
addressing the ‘how-possible’ question necessitates one to empirically examine the 
process through which Tokyo’s recognition of Taipei was made possible by the 
particular meaning attached to the Chiang regime in terms of traditional Chinese 
practices. As indicates above, this study addresses the latter question in order to 
complement the explanation of the former question—that is, by examining how the 
Chiang regime on Taiwan and the legitimate government of ‘China’ in the eyes of the 
Japanese were ‘fixed’ by the discourse of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for 
malice’ postwar Japan policy for two decades under US hegemony.
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1.4 Studies on ‘returning virtue for malice* (yide baoyuan or ongiron): existing 
decision-making analyses (7) and beyond
Chiang Kai-shek's ‘magnanimous’ decisions: beliefs. In constract to a number of 
works which mention Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan 
policy in passing, Lin Chin-ching (1984: Ch.2, 1987: Ch.l, 1992a, 1992b, 1997) 
provides the most comprehensive account on the subject to date. According to the 
authoritative account provided by Lin who was once referred to as Nationalist China’s 
‘Mr. Japan’ (Riben Xiansheng) for his extensive diplomatic career involving Japan, 
Chiang’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy consists of the following:
1) the preservation of the Japanese imperial institution;
2) the repatriation of Japanese soldiers and civilians from China;
3) the prevention of divisive occupation of Japan;
4) and the relinquishment of war reparations from Japan.
First, Lin argues that Chiang advised Franklin D. Roosevelt to preserve the Japanese 
imperial institution at the Cairo Conference of 1943. Lin further argues that Chiang’s 
view was adopted by pro-Japanese American officials like Joseph C. Grew and Henry 
L. Stimson who pushed for the preservation of the Japanese imperial institution. 
Otherwise, Lin suggests, Japan would have been divided just as Germany. Second, Lin 
argues that Chiang, unlike the Russians who detained Japanese nationals and forced 
them to labor in Siberia, not only swiftly repatriated more than two million Japanese
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soldiers and civilians but also allowed each one of them 30 kilograms of luggage to 
take home. Lin emphasizes that it was the manifestation of Chiang’s ‘returning virtue 
for malice’ speech of 15 August 1945. Third, Lin argues that Chiang prevented the 
Soviet Union from dividing Japan by forfeiting to send Chinese occupation forces to 
the Kyushu region of Japan, which would have encouraged Moscow to send its 
occupation forces to Hokkaido after World War II. Fourth, according to Lin, Chiang 
not only relinquished war reparations from Japan but also dissuaded Philippino 
President Quirino from demanding eight-billion-dollar war reparations from the 
Japanese. As a result, Lin argues, Manila only demanded 550 million dollars from 
Japan while Taipei completely relinquished war reparations in the process of signing 
the bilateral treaty of peace with Tokyo in 1952. In terms of causation, Lin most 
obviously suggests that Chiang’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy 
was derived from Chiang’s beliefs such as Sunist Pan Asianism—which was based on 
Eastern humanism and morality rather than Western utilitarianism and coercion. More 
boldly, Lin even stretches the causal chain to the extent that Chiang’s ‘magnanimous’ 
policy necessarily contributed to postwar Japan’s economic success.
Similar views are expressed by the elite and intelligentsia in both Japan and 
Taiwan, even though their causal mechanisms slightly differ from each other. For 
example, like Lin, Nationalist Chinese leaders such as Chang Chun (1980, 1988), Ho 
Ying-qin (1974), and Ku Cheng-kang (1971) mainly attribute Chiang’s policy to the 
influence of Sun Yat-sen in terms of Pan Asianism. On the other hand, Japanese 
conservative elites—such as Kaya Okinori (1976: 345-6), Nadao Hirokichi (1988), 
Okubo Denzo (1972), and conservative tycoon named Shikanai Nobutaka (1988)—
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state Oriental morality or Confucianism as the cause of Chiang’s decisions. Rung Te- 
cheng (1988), a descendant of Confucius, also invokes Eastern morality based on 
Confucianism as the cause. More inclusively, Furuya Keiji (1975: 22-40, 1992: 357), 
editor of the ‘official’ biography of Chiang Kai-shek in Japanese, mentions anti­
communism in addition to Confucianism and Pan Asianism. Wakamiya Yoshibuni 
(1995: 108-13, 1999: 125-31) also reaches similar conclusions in his work on postwar 
Japanese conservatives as he follows the works of Kaya (1976) and Furuya (1975). 
Chiang Wei-kuo (1991: 14-19), Generalissimo’s adopted half-Japanese son, also 
attributes his father’s behavior to his anti-communist belief. Interestingly, Kishi 
Nobusuke (1982: 142-3) and Ishii Mitsujiro (1976: 400-1), former prime minister and 
vice premier of Japan, reminisce their meetings with Chiang who accredited his own 
policy with such Oriental thought as the Way of Samurai that Chiang learned from Pan 
Asianists like Inukai Tsuyoshi and Toyama Mitsuru in prewar Japan. Yatsugi Kazuo 
(1973: 184), secretary general of the Commission for the Promotion of Sino-Japanese 
Cooperation (Nikka Kyoryoku Iinkai), confirms the very similar accounts of Ishii and 
Kishi who also served the Commission as chair and vice chair respectively. Likewise, 
Shiozawa Minobu (1983: 65) reflects these views of the ‘Taiwan lobby’ in his 
biographical work on Chiang. Matsumoto Ayahiko (1996: 102-6) also mentions 
Chiang’s experience of receiving military training in Japan along with his beliefs like 
Oriental morality and Christian benevolence. In sum, according to these views of 
‘returning virtue for malice’, Chiang’s postwar Japan policy can be attributed to his 
beliefs such as Confucianism, Pan Asianism, anti-communism, and Christianity.
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To reiterate, the proponents of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ thesis 
commonly argue that Chiang Kai-shek’s individual beliefs most robustly explain his 
foreign policy decision-making towards postwar Japan. Although they do not seem to 
agree on which particular set of beliefs influenced Chiang’s decision-making, they 
nonetheless agree that his postwar Japan policy was ‘magananimous’. They tend to 
attribute Chiang’s ‘magnanimous’ decision particularly to Eastern thought rather than 
universally to Western thought and religion—except for anti-communism and 
Christianity to which Chiang gave faith as a result of marrying a Methodist woman. 
Moreover, while Chinese elites tend to emphasize the role of Chiang’s predecessor Sun 
Yat-sen, Japanese elites have a tendency to highlight the impact of Chiang’s 
experience in prewar Japan. Nevertheless, the proponents of the ‘returning virtue for 
malice’ thesis highlight Chiang Kai-shek’s humanistic beliefs rather than the situations 
in which Chiang arguably made the four decisions in a more utilitarian fashion as 
suggested below.
Chiang’s decisions under communist threats: rational calculations for survival. 
Among the. scholars who explicitly challenge the ‘returning virtue for malice’ thesis, 
Zang Shijun (1997) provides the most comprehensive alternative explanations as he 
disputes all four issues of the thesis. First, in regard to the imperial institution of Japan, 
Zang argues that the United States most decisively influenced the preservation of the 
emperor system since it was Washington that single-handedly occupied Japan after the 
war (Ibid.: 35). Therefore, according to Zang, the Japanese imperial institution was 
ensured not because of Chiang Kai-shek, who could neither pay sufficient attention nor
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have his say in the matter since he was preoccupied with the civil war in China (Ibid.). 
Second, regarding the repatriation of Japanese soldiers and civilians from China, Zang 
argues that Chiang swiftly repatriated the Japanese in order to take over their arms and 
resources and to seek the possibility of jointly fighting against the Chinese 
Communists (Ibid.: 35-6). Third, as for preventing Moscow from dividing Japan after 
the war, Zang counter-argues that Chiang declined to send occupation forces to Japan 
because it was simply beyond his ability to do so (Ibid.: 37). Zang argues that Chiang 
was preoccupied with taking over Japanese troops in the midst of the civil war while 
his troops were remotely stationed in the heart of China, Chongqing (Ibid.). Fourth, on 
the relinquishing of reparations, Zang points out that Chiang actually demanded 
reparations, but his demand was turned down by the Japanese on the ground that the 
Nationalist regime did not represent all of China since the mainland was already under 
Communist rule (Ibid.: 36-7). Therefore, for Zang, Chiang’s ‘magnanimous’ postwar 
Japan policy was his strategy to re-align with the Japanese and use their military 
resources against the Chinese Communists (Ibid.: 34-7). In other words, Zang suggests 
that Chiang’s postwar Japan policy was not a product of his beliefs but that of rational 
calculations under the Chinese Communist threat.
By limiting his discussion to the imperial institution, repatriation, and 
occupation issues, Eto Shinkishi (1967: 127-9) also explicitly challenges the ‘returning 
virtue for malice’ thesis. Under the rubric of the ‘debt of gratitude thesis’ (ongiron), 
Eto challenges the thesis by arguing that Chiang’s decisions on these three issues were 
based on Chiang’s rational calculations in the context of the civil war in China. In 
order to defend his argument that Chiang made rational choices under the given
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conditions, Eto highlights the environment in which Chiang revisited his ‘returning 
virtue for malice’ speech in May 1948 and June 1951 respectively. Eto suggests that 
communists threats reflected in the intensification of the Chinese civil war and the 
Korean War explain why Chiang repeatedly made ‘magnanimous’ announcements 
towards Japan. Eto then suggests that Chiang’s decisions on the three issues were also 
situationally constrained. Moreover, Eto deconstructs the ‘returning virtue for malice’ 
thesis based on Chiang’s beliefs by contrasting Chiang’s attitude towards these three 
issues with his stance towards the issue of sovereignty over Okinawa—which Chiang 
never magnanimously renounced at Cairo in 1943 and thereafter. In short, Eto argues 
that Chiang’s decisions—to support the Japanese imperial institution, repatriate the 
Japanese from mainland China, and refrain from sending occupation forces to Japan— 
were not results of his ‘magnanimous’ beliefs, but they were rational choices that 
Chiang made under communists threats.
Similarly, by focusing on the issues of the imperial institution, repatriation, and 
reparations, Otake Hideo (1992: 44-6) and Hatano Sumio (1995: 58-61) engage with 
the returning virtue for malice’ thesis. According to Otake’s alternative explanation, 
Chiang had the need to avoid weakening or rubbing Japan the wrong way because he 
anticipapted conflicts with both Russian and Chinese Communists in the foreseeable 
future. Otake points out that Chiang was neither able to spare a division for duty in 
Japan nor able to play a role as one of four world policemen as expected by Roosevelt. 
Otake then invokes the fact that the mere survival of Chiang’s own regime heavily 
depended on the United States as his evidence for Chiang’s lack of capabilities. 
Similarly, according to Hatano’s alternative argument, Chiang made conciliatoiy
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decisions because his regime needed the United States5 protection as well as Japan's 
cooperation in order to survive and hedge against the Chinese Communists. As to 
secondary sources for his counter-argument on the reparations issue, Hatano cities the 
works of Ishii (1987), Song (1993), and Yin (1994) which reveal that the Chiang 
regime had aggressively demanded a huge amount of reparations earlier at Cairo in 
1943 and at Taipei in 1952. Actually, for the reparations issue alone, Zhu (1992) and 
Kawashima (2000) also argue along the lines of these works. Nevertheless, for both 
Otake and Hatano, Chiang5 s decisions on these three issues were not based on his 
beliefs but rational calculations to survive under the given circumstances of communist 
expansion.
Furthermore, in regard to the imperial institution and repatriation issues, the 
progressive Tokyo trial expert Awaya Kentaro (1994b, 1995) challenges the thesis of 
Chiang Kai-shek's ‘returning virtue for malice5 postwar Japan policy. As to the 
Japanese imperial institution, Awaya (1994b: 60-72) argues that Chiang’s support for 
the emperor system was part of his effort to prevent the expansion of communism in 
Japan and the world at large by collaborating with Washington. In terms of 
repatriation, Awaya (1995:16-17) radically describes the notion of ‘returning virtue for 
malice5 as something ‘extremely bogus5. Awaya refers to the fact that General 
Okamura Yasuiji, Japanese Commander in Chief of the Expeditionaiy Forces in China, 
secretly served as Chiang’s military advisor after Okamura was found not guilty of any 
war crime in China. Thus, Awaya suggests that Chiang delivered his ‘returning virtue 
for malice’ speech and repatriated Japanese troops from China in order to assure that 
the Japanese give up their arms to the Chinese Nationalists rather than the
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Communists. In exchange, as Awaya points out, Japanese military officers were 
acquitted of war crimes in China. Put differently, according to Awaya5 s alternative 
explanation, Chiang adopted the measures to support the Japanese imperial institution 
and repatriate the Japanese from China not because of his altruistic beliefs but because 
of his selfish interests to survive under communist threats.
By the same token, referring to the issues of the imperial institution and 
occupation, Iokibe Makoto (1985: 165-7) invokes the communist threat posed by the 
Soviet Union as the alternative reason why Chiang adopted his postwar Japan policy. 
According to Iokibe, insomuch as Chiang feared Moscow's connections with the 
Chinese Communists, it was not in the interests of Chiang to boost Soviet influences 
by excessively weakening Japan. Iokibe also suggests that Chiang was vigilant enough 
not to have Japan against him unnecessarily with the already imminent Soviet threat, 
against which Chiang obviously sought Washington’s support. Accordingly, like 
others, Iokibe challenges tile ‘returning virtue for malice5 argument by providing his 
alternative explanation that Chiang5 s decisions to support the Japanese imperial 
institution and not to send occupation forces to Japan were rationally calculated given 
the situation in which Chiang faced communist threats across the Sino-Soviet borders.
Finally, regarding the issues of repatriation and occupation, Uno Shigeaki 
(1982, 1995) challenges the ‘returning virtue for malice5 thesis by drawing attention to 
communist threats in the Northeastern region of China where Japanese forces were in 
control for more than a decade. According to Uno (1982: 25-8; 1995: 405-8), although 
Chiang first agreed with Washington to send his occupation forces to Japan, he was 
later forced to cancel the plan as the civil war intensified in China. Instead, Chiang sent
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the forces to the Northeastern region. In terms of repatriation, Uno (1982: 19-21,1995: 
339-401) suggests that Chiang’s decision was made in order to collaborate with the 
Japanese, thereby preventing the Chinese Communists from penetrating into the 
Northeastern region which was militarily beyond Chiang’s control. In fact, Uno’s 
situational logic for repatriation can be nicely complemented by Ishii Akira’s (1998: 
167) finding that the Chinese Communists also repatriated the Japanese from the areas 
in which there were no military conflicts between them and the Nationalists. Moreover, 
Ishii further confirms Uno’s logic by adding that neither Chiang Kai-shek nor Mao 
Zedong was ‘magnanimous’ in the areas of confrontation where large numbers of 
Japanese casualties were ruthlessly piled up. In sum, Uno’s counter-arguments— 
supported by Ishii’s findings—indicate that Chiang’s decisions on the two issues were 
derived situationally from communist threats rather than his ‘magnanimous’ beliefs.
To sum up, these alternative explanations to the ‘returning virtue for malice’ 
thesis commonly attribute Chiang Kai-shek’s Japan policy decision-making to the 
given Cold War environment in which Chiang faced communist threats and calculated 
his choice to survive. First, Chiang supported the Japanese imperial institution because 
it was vital for Chiang to align with the United States and Japan and fight against 
communist threats in and out of China. Nonetheless, his support was not decisive for 
the retention of the Japanese emperor system since it was the United States that had the 
final say in the destiny of the imperial institution. Second, Chiang repatriated Japanese 
soldiers and civilians from mainland China in order to take over Japanese military 
resources and use them against the communists. Third, Chiang could not dispatch 
occupation forces to Japan because he sent them to the Northeastern region of China
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where he raced with the communists to take over Japanese arms. Fourth, Chiang failed 
to receive Japanese reparations because Tokyo refused to compensate for mainland 
China which Chiang lost to the Chinese Communists. In the meantime, Chiang had to 
follow the US policy of abandoning Japanese reparations insomuch as Chiang needed 
Washington’s support to fight against communist threats. Simply put, according to 
these alternative accounts, the ‘returning virtue for malice’ thesis attributes Chiang 
Kai-shek’s postwar Japan policy to his ‘magnanimous’ beliefs spuriously.
Beyond Chiang’s decision-making?: Japan’s indebtedness to the Chiang regime. There 
are other forerunners whose works refer to the effects of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning 
virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy. On the one hand, they come short of centrally 
focusing on Chiang’s ‘magnanimous’ postwar Japan policy or empirically showing 
how its effects were brought into ‘reality’ as they only mention them in passing. On the 
other hand, these works nonetheless suggest that the ‘returning virtue for malice’ 
postwar Japan policy did affect Japan’s China policy as well as the formation of a ‘pro- 
Taipei’ coalition in Japanese politics during the Cold War era. Put differently, in spite 
of their shortcomings, these precursors’ works as heuristic devices show the ways in 
which we can extend the existing studies on Chiang Kai-shek’s postwar Japan policy 
beyond decision-making analysis.
First, Japan’s ‘debt of gratitude’ to Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for 
malice’ postwar Japan policy contributed to blocking the possibility of normalizing 
relations between Tokyo and Beijing for two decades. For instance, as one of the 
reasons why Tokyo ‘failed to adopt a more independent China policy once sovereignty
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had been restored’, John W. Dower (1979: 412-3) points out that the ‘conservative 
Japanese governments professed a sense of obligation to the Kuomintang regime, 
under which Chiang Kai-shek had adopted an exceptionally conciliatory policy toward 
Japan on such critical issues as reparations, war criminals, and maintenance of 
emperor’. More specifically, as Yoshitsu (1982: 68) mentions, Prime Minister Yoshida 
Shigeru ‘felt grateful to Chiang for the early repatriation of Japanese prisoners of war’, 
despite the fact that Yoshida feared ‘any commitment to Taiwan would be at the 
expense of Japan’s future ties to the Mainland’. Similarly, Iguchi Sadao (1971: 110), 
former Japanese ambassador to the Republic of China, attributes a ‘feeling among the 
Japanese people of gratitude and closeness to Nationalist China’ to ‘Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai-shek’s policy of returning Japan’s “malice” with “virtue”’. Wolf Mendl 
(1995: 78-9) also refers to ‘Chiang’s “magnanimity” over the issue of reparations’ as 
one of the examples of the ‘Romatic sentiment’ that accompanied the calculations of 
Realpolitik in the Japanese approach to China after World War II. In addition, Ikei 
Masaru (1974: 46) and Kusano Atsushi (1980: 23, 25, 30) suggest that a sense of 
‘moral obligation’ to Chiang’s postwar policy constrained Japan’s China policy during 
the 1950s. Moreover, Ishii Akira (2002: 367-8) explicitly states that the Japanese ‘debt 
of gratitude to Chiang Kai-shek’ prevented Tokyo from severing relations with Taipei 
and normalizing relations with Beijing in the 1960s. Furthermore, Nathan N. White 
(1971: 659) refers to the ‘sense of obligation felt by many conservative Japanese to 
Chiang Kai-shek for his magnanimous (and shrewd) treatment of the defeated Japanese 
army’ as one of the most valuable assets Taiwan had in order to wield influence on 
Japan between 1955 and 1970. For White, it was Taipei’s asset to ‘ensure that Japan
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does not take any step which might undermine the legitimacy o f the Republic of China 
or suggest an implicit recognition of the legitimacy of the Peking government’ (Ibid.: 
81). Accordingly, Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ generated a ‘sense of 
moral obligation’ among the Japanese, thereby helping to make Tokyo’s recognition of 
Beijing virtually impossible for two decades.
Second, the formation of a ‘pro-Taipei’ political coalition in Japan as well as 
Tokyo’s favorabe policy towards Taipei can also be attributed to Japan’s 
‘indebtedness’ to Chiang’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ policy after the war. For 
example, in examining Japanese conservative leaders’ attitudes towards Taiwan, 
Douglas Mendel (1970: 205) refers to Kaya Okinori, the ‘most pro-Nationalist leader’ 
in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and highlights that ‘Japan is under 
indebtedness to Generalissimo Chiang’. Mendel also presents his interview with Ishii 
Mitsujiro, another influential pro-Nationalist conservative, in 1962 as the following: 
‘The Nationalists do expect Japanese economic aid because of Nationalist leniency on 
the reparations issue, and Prime Minister Ikeda seems well-disposed toward granting 
them economic credits’ (Ibid.: 208). Fukui Haruhiro (1969: 314, 1970: 252), in his 
definitive account of the ‘pro-Taipei group’ within the LDP, refers to the group’s 
‘emotional argument that, at the end of World War n, Chiang Kai-shek treated the 
Japanese in China, including prisoners of war, with unparalleled magnanimity, and that 
the Japanese are morally bound to repay his kindess’. Here, as a typical example, Fukui 
mentions the National Welcome Party that the Japanese government held for Chiang 
Kai-shek’s Special Envoy, Chang Chun, in September 1957 (Ibid.). He then points out 
that the official declaration of this mass rally referred to Chiang’s four decisions as
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‘“magnanimous” acts” towards postwar Japan (ibid.). Similarly, Chae-jin Lee’s (1976: 
52) discussion on the Asian Problems Study Group (Ajia Mondai Kenkyukai\ which 
was organized by pro-Taiwan LDP dietmen, refers to Kaya Okinori’s ststement from 
1966 and invokes Chiang’s postwar Japan policy as the ‘four basic reasons for Japan’s 
“indebtedness” to Nationalist China’. Following in Lee’s footsteps, Phil Deans (2002a: 
90-1) refers to Kaya (1976) and lists the same contents of ‘returning malice with 
virtue’ as ‘four main reasons’ behind supporting Nationalist China. Deans (2002b: 
166-7), again like Lee, also points out that ‘the legacy of Chiang Kai-shek’s 
“generosity” towards Japan at the end of the war’ contributed to membership of the 
pro-Nationalist group in the LDP (Ibid.: 166-7). Deans additionally states that these 
Taiwan supporters in Japan mobilized the ‘central myth of “returning malice with 
virtue” to promote relations between Japan and Taiwan’ (Ibid.: 167). Quansheg Zhao 
(1993: 140) also argues that the ‘support of Taiwan by many old hawks (leader of the 
Asian Studies Group such as Kishi and Kaya, and later the Sato-Fukuda leadership) 
partially came about as a result of their memory of the KMT’s treatment of Japanese 
soldiers in China after 1945, when Chiang declared that China would not retaliate 
against the Japanese for what they did to the Chinese and assured the safe return of 
most soldiers’. Finally, Wakamiya Yoshibumi (1995, 1999) discusses the ‘pro-Taiwan 
faction and “repaying violence with virtue’” and refers to ‘repaying violence with 
virtue’ as factional ‘motto with an anti-communist motive’. In short, these works 
suggest that Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ policy had an impact on 
postwar Japan to the extent that the ‘memory’ of Chiang’s ‘magnanimous acts’ was
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used by Japanese conservative politicians to form a ‘pro-Taipei group’ and wield 
influence on Japan’s China policy.
In sum, from reviewing these existing works that cursorily mention the effects 
of Chiang Kai-shek’s postwar Japan policy, one can get a glimpse of the ways in which 
studies on the policy of ‘returning virtue for malice’ can be extended beyond decision­
making analysis. First, existing works on effects can be substantially expanded by die 
empirical examination of how Japan’s recognition of Beijing was made virtually 
impossible. Second, the existing literature on effects can be also extended further by 
empirically analyzing how the ‘pro-Taipei’ group came to use the ‘memory’ of Chiang 
Kai-shek’s ‘magnanimous acts’ and influence Japan’s China policy. Nevertheless, 
while the existing literature on effects suggests the directions in which studies on 
Chiang Kai-shek’s postwar Japan policy can be extended beyond decision-making 
analysis, they fall far short of showing how it can be done methodologically.
1.5 Methodology: genealogy as discourse analysis (8)
This study adopts discourse analysis in order to address its research question. More 
precisely, die author of the present study draws on the genealogical method of 
discourse analysis in particular (Milliken 1999, 2001). By ‘genealogy’, the author 
means ‘a way of reading history through discourse to find out how power/knowledge 
circulates’ (Carabine 2001: 276). The author refers to ‘discourse’ as ‘a group of 
statements which provide a language for talking about—a way of representing the 
knowledge about—a particular topic at a particular historical moment’ (Hall 1992: 
291; 1997: 44; 2001: 73). This study is a genealogy that highlights how a dominant
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discourse involves the ‘relations of power in which unity with the past is artificially 
conserved and order is created from conditions of disorder’ (Milliken 1999: 243,2001: 
152-3).
This genealogical study focuses on one particular discourse diachronically 
while discourse analysis can also be conducted synchronically examining contending 
discourses (Waever 2002: 41). Generally, the synchronic variant of discourse analysis 
only specifies the multiple possibilities or options framed by contending discourses 
without indicating which possibility or option is more likely to be the final choice or 
‘reality’ (Ibid.: 28). By the same token, the synchronic analysis falls short of showing 
how the choice or ‘reality’ persists or changes across time. Therefore, in order to better 
understand the emergence, persistence, and dislocation of discursive constructions 
(Fischer 2003: 85; Griggs and Howarth 2002: 110), this genealogical study mainly 
examines a single discourse across time rather than multiple discourses at the same 
time.
The point o f  departure: common sense. This genealogical study begins by critically 
examining how Chiang Kai-shek’s regime was articulated in terms of his ‘returning 
virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy. The author uses ‘articulation’ to mean ‘the 
process through which meaning is produced out of extant cultural raw materials or 
linguistic resources’ (Weldes 1996: 284, 1999: 98; Laffey and Weldes 1997: 202-3, 
2004: 28-9). The author first tackles the question of what works as ‘cultural raw 
materials’ and ‘linguistic resources’ in different societies or within a society such as 
Japan and China (Milliken 1999: 239, 2001: 149). More simply, the author addresses
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where discourses—such as Chiang’s ‘magnanimous’ postwar Japan policy—come 
from (Yee 1996: 100). Discourses are first constructed based on the logic that is 
already available in society, and these conceptual codes are subsequently reproduced 
and modified to set conditions for political struggles (Waever 2002: 30-1). Over time, 
dominant discourses reach the point of establishing themselves as common sense. That 
is why this study ‘retroduces’ what has been taken for granted as common sense 
through the empirical analysis of its realization in practices (Laffey and Weldes 2004: 
28).
More specifically, this discourse analysis de-naturalizes the dominant 
representation of Chiang Kai-shek as the benefactor to whom the Japanese must repay 
their ‘debt of gratitude’ for his ‘magnanimous’ postwar Japan policy (Weldes et al 
1999: 19-21). Put differently, it problematizes a particular dominant discursive 
construction by showing that it is contingent and political (Howarth 2000: 134-5). By 
denaturalizing or problematizing the dominant discourse across time, this study 
suggests the transformation of the dominant discursive construction as well as the re- 
imagining of the matter of concern such as Japan’s recognition of the ROC and US 
hegemony (Ibid.; Weldes et a l 1999: 21). In this way, this discourse analysis de­
naturalizes what has been naturalized as common sense over time and ‘challenges 
taken-for-granted understandings and undermine the tendency to reify and solidify 
knowledge’ (Phillips and Hardy 2002: 84).
Power and politics: agents and discourse coalitions. Since discourse analysis is about 
power and politics (Laffey and Weldes 2004: 29-30), this study focuses on the role of
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the political actors who ‘articulate5 or make the ‘fit5 between ‘the general ideological 
context, existing political institutions, and pressing political concerns5 (Hemmer and 
Katzenstein: 596). However, ‘the “fit55 does not just happen5 but it is ‘actively 
constructed5 (Laffey and Weldes 1997: 203). Thus, discourse analysis needs to identify 
‘who is doing the talking and where they are located in the network of social power5 
(Hughes 2002: 2, 2005: 248). Put differently, discourse analysis such as this study 
identifies the ‘intellectuals of statecraft5 and how they politically ‘designate a world 
and “fill55 it with certain dramas, subjects, histories and dilemmas5 (0 5Tuathail and 
Agnew 1992: 194).
Moreover, this genealogical study adopts the concept of ‘discourse coalitions5 
(Fischer 2003: Ch. 5)—whose members share particular ways of thinking about and 
discussing matters of their concern (Ibid.: 107)—in order to account for change over 
time. Many of existing genealogical studies are ‘quasi-structuralist5 to the extent that 
they are largely about how dominant discourses have been ‘continuous5 (Milliken 
1999: 246-8, 2001: 155-7). For example, such ‘quasi-structuralist5 studies that 
retroduce dominant discourses do not help us understand how Chiang Kai-shek5 s 
regime on Taiwan was known to be ‘China5 until 1972—but not after that. It is mainly 
for this overlooked process of de-hegemonization, or dislocation (Howarth 2000; 
Howarth et al 2000), that the present genealogical study adopts the concept of 
discourse coalitions. By identifying the decline of a certain discourse coalition in terms 
of the relationship between political actors and power in domestic politics, this 
genealogical study shows one of the ways in which such disempowerment of one 
particular discourse can take place.
42
Having said that, it is beyond the scope of this study to examine the shared 
beliefs of members of a particular coalition. Discourse coalitions are formed around 
‘narrative storylines’ or discourses—rather than specific facts or cognitive beliefs— 
that attach meanings to events and courses of action in concrete social contexts 
(Fischer 2003: 102-3). Discourse coalitions tell us about ‘how individuals interact with 
other individuals to create webs of meaning with which they can make sense of a 
complex reality’ (Ibid.: 113). The members of discourse coalitions respond to 
simplified storylines or discourses—that are often ‘vague on particular points and, at 
times, contradictory on others’ such as the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’— 
to relate to each other symbolically (Ibid.: 102-3). By the same token, discourse 
coalitions are sustained not by a set of core beliefs but by the reliable and trusted 
members who institutionally arrange their coalitions (Ibid.: 108-9). In this sense, 
(re)producing discourse coalitions is not only about ‘what is said, it is also a matter of 
who said it’ (Ibid.). For that reason, instead of examining the beliefs actually held by 
the members of a particular discourse coalition, this study pays attention to the 
institutional aspect of the discourse coalition.
Cultural code o f intelligibility: moral reciprocity. In terms of the ways in which the 
world is interpreted by different cultures or the Other ways in which ‘people’s being- 
in-the world’ can be transformed (Milliken 1999: 243-4, 2001: 153), this genealogical 
study examines the power of traditional moral discourse—such as the ‘returning virtue 
for malice’ discourse. It does so by probing how political actors of client states use it to 
make sense of each other under hegemony they themselves constitute. The author
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shows that the resonance of moral reciprocity, or a cultural ‘code of intelligibility* 
(Weldes et a t 1999), can be attributed to hegemonic practices of the past—such as 
those from the ‘Chinese world order’ based on moral governance, ‘Confucian-style’ 
Japanese hegemony, and the Sunist roots of ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ during the 
prewar era (Fairbank 1968; Collcutt 1991; Jansen 1954). By looking beneath the 
hegemonic discourse of rational choice in terms of costs and benefits, this study sheds 
light on the parasitic discourse of moral reciprocity—which compels the social debtor, 
such as the Japanese, to repay the social creditor, like Chiang Kai-shek, in order to 
restore moral balance (Lebra 1976).
Cases and materials. In terms of case studies (Chapters 3,4, 5 of this study), the author 
has selected ‘crucial cases’ (Eckstein 1975; George 1979a), in which Japan’s 
recognition of the Chiang Kai-shek regime as the legitimate government of ‘China’ 
was called into question over three decades following the end of World War II (Ikei 
1973, 1982, 1992; Hosoya 1993). Here, the author executes the ‘process tracing’ 
procedure to examine the possible ‘congruence’ between Tokyo’s diplomatic 
recognition of Taipei and the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse (George 1979b; 
George and McKeown 1985; Bennett and George 2001). In this way, as this 
genealogical study reads the history of Japan-‘China’ relations through the traditional 
discourse to find out how power/knowledge circulates as mentioned earlier, it 
efficiently focuses on a small number of the ‘crucial cases’ involving Japan and ‘two 
Chinas’ even though theoretical rigor may nevertheless be sacrificed for historical 
richness to a certain degree (Jervis 1985, 1991).
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As for materials, this study mainly refers to those that have already been 
published since it is beyond the ability of the author to conduct major archival work, 
for which he lacks proper training. Besides, official archives in Japan and the Republic 
of China on Taiwan have not been as accessible as those in Western liberal 
democracies in terms of the declassification of documents. In the meantime, this study 
nonetheless complements such shortcomings as it makes extensive use of official and 
semi-official publications as well as memoirs and oral history in Japanese, Mandarin, 
and English in addition to secondary sources in those three languages. The use of 
materials in Japanese and Mandarin in particular enables this critical constructivist 
study to understand Japan-‘China5 relations under US hegemony through meanings 
and practices in international relations from within East Asia.
1.6 Chapter Outline
In Chapter 2, the author critically introduces the notion of ‘returning virtue for malice5 
by tracing its descent as well as its emergence. After presenting the common sense of 
‘returning virtue for malice5, the author denaturalizes two components of the common 
sense—namely, Chiang5 s ‘foundational5 speech of 15 August 1945 and his four 
decisions concerning postwar Japan. The author then challenges the ‘returning virtue 
for malice5 thesis which attributes Chiang5s ‘magnanimous5 postwar Japan policy to 
his beliefs such as Pan Asianism. Subsequently, the author suggests that Chiang5 s 
‘returning virtue for malice5 postwar Japan policy can be more usefully conceived as 
discourse—a variant of the ‘Sino- Japanese cooperation5 discourse. While the discourse 
of ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation5 can at least be traced back to the 1870s, the author
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emphasizes its ‘Sunist roots’ in the 1920s and 1930s—which provided raw resources 
for Chiang Kai-shek and the construction of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse 
after the war. Finally, the author delineates four points of emergence for the discourse 
of ‘returning virtue for malice’ or ‘magnanimity’ in the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
The author points out that they were Nationalist Chinese attempts to participate in the 
signing of the multilateral peace treaty with Japan, thereby establishing its position as 
the legitimate government of ‘China’ under US hegemony. In conclusion, the author 
recapitulates his arguments on the descent and emergence of the ‘returning virtue for 
malice’ discourse and briefly previews the chapter that follows.
Chapter 3 discusses the rise of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse and 
US hegemony in East Asia between 1948 and 1952. In this chapter, the author argues 
the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ facilitated Japan’s diplomatic recognition 
of Chiang Kai-shek’s regime on Taiwan as ‘China’ under US hegemony in 1952, 
thereby constituting the so-called ‘San Francisco system’. More specifically, while the 
author admits that Washington’s pressure clearly constrained Tokyo, he nonetheless 
argues the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ still played an indispensable role 
since the American pressure did not determine Tokyo’s diplomatic recognition of 
Taipei. First, the author sheds light on the ‘reverse course’ in US occupation policy 
towards Japan by showing how American and Japanese elites collaborated to make 
Japan (rather than China) an American bastion of the Cold War in East Asia as they 
pursued hegemony and independence respectively. In the process, the author draws 
attention to the Anglo-American agreement not to invite ‘Chinese’ representatives to 
the signing of the multilateral peace treaty with Japan as well as the production of the
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so-called 'Yoshida letter* in the making of the 4San Francisco system’. Second, the 
author closely examines the rise of 'returning virtue for malice’ by tracing the 
discursive formation of 'China* in the context of Japan-ROC bilateral negotiations that 
compensated for the absence of 'China* in the multilateral peace treaty signed in San 
Francisco. While the discourse provided the common language for both sides to settle 
various issues, the author highlights the discursive effect on the Japanese to call a 
bilateral treaty the treaty of peace during the negotiations in Taipei—against the will of 
their prime minister in Tokyo. The author also points out the subsequent diffusion of 
the 'returning virtue for malice’ discourse into the Japanese elite. He then concludes by 
summarizing his argument and briefly introducing the following chapter in die 
conclusion.
In Chapter 4, the author demonstrates the discourse of 'returning virtue for 
malice’ as well as the construction of 'China’ under US hegemony were most firmly 
embedded in Japan between 1952 and 1964, thanks to the formation of the hegemonic 
discourse coalition within Japanese conservative hegemony known as the '1955 
system’. In arguing for the heyday of 'returning virtue for malice’, the author first 
traces the gradual formation of the discourse coalition in terms of the resurrection of 
prewar Japanese imperialists in postwar Japan, especially those Sunists. Secondly, the 
author reveals how those prewar Japanese imperialists were 'unleashed’ to represent 
American hegemony and construct Japan’s recognition of 'China’ through the 
hegemonic discourse coalition of 'returning virtue for malice’. Thirdly, the author 
demonstrates the dominance of the 'returning virtue for malice’ discourse and its 
coalition in a crisis of recognition in the 1950s as he shows how they destroyed
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Communist China’s trade relations with Japan by blocking Beijing’s attempt to 
politicize economic relations with Japan. Fourthly, the author examines the role played 
by the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse and its coalition in another crisis of 
recognition in the 1960s. The author sheds light on two versions of the so-called 
‘second Yoshida letter’ of 1964, the production of which saved Tokyo’s diplomatic 
relations with Taipei. Finally, the author concludes by summing up his argument and 
briefly discussing the following chapter.
Chapter 5 discusses the decline of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and US 
hegemony between 1964 and 1972. Put differently, the author traces the degeneration 
of the ‘1955 system’ as well as that of the ‘San Francisco system’, which eventually 
led to Taipei’s de-recognition of Tokyo in 1972. At the same time, in spite of such 
degeneration, the author also stresses the resilience of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ 
discourse and its coalition in terms of their ability to delimit what pro-Beijing Japanese 
elites could say and could not say about Japan-ROC relations. As for the process of 
analysis, the author first describes the gradual erosion of the ‘1955 system’—which the 
‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse and its coalition constituted—and shows how it 
was bifurcated over the ‘China question’ during this period. Here, the author focuses 
on the emergent rivalry between two policy groups within the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party in terms of the pro-Taipei group and the pro-Beijing group. Second, 
the author demonstrates the de-legitimation of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘China’ in the 
international community—which indicated the erosion of the ‘San Francisco system’ 
as well as US hegemony in East Asia—and its impact on the discourse coalition of 
‘returning virtue for malice’ in Japan. The author points out that the hegemonic
48
discourse coalition of ‘returning virtue for malice’ in Japanese politics were seriously 
undermined by the ‘expulsion’ of Taipei from the UN in 1971. The author attributes 
such decline to the lack of Tokyo and Taipei’s clear and timely consent to 
Washington’s ‘two Chinas’ policy at the UN. The author then argues that the severing 
of Japan-ROC relations could very well have been avoided in 1972 if Taipei had 
managed to remain in the UN in 1971. Third, the author highlights the final Japanese 
official visit to Taipei made by Special Envoy Shiina Etsusaburo in September 1972. 
Here, the author re-emphasizes the resilience of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ 
discourse and its coalition as he discusses Japan-ROC relations on the eve of Taipei’s 
de-recognition of Tokyo in the fall of 1972. The author then concludes by stating that 
the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and its coalition lost their power to the 
extent that it was no longer possible for them to fix ‘China’ and Chiang Kai-shek’s 
‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy.
In Chapter 6, the author first summarizes the main argument along with 
theoretical and methodological themes of this study in general terms. He intellectually 
locates the main argument of this critical constructivist work within the field of 
international relations (IR). At the same time, the author highlights the significance of 
this critical constructivist study in the literature of Japanese IR in the context of 
‘regionalization’ that is said to be taking place in the discipline of IR. He also reiterates 
the methodological aspect of this critical constructivist research by referring to the 
literature on Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy. The 
second part of this final chapter more specifically discusses the implications of this 
genealogical study. One of the implications is on the possible transformation of US
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hegemony as well as collaboration between client states like Japan and the ROC under 
American hegemony as this discourse analysis indicates that different groups and 
cultures attach different meanings to what constitutes the world. This genealogical 
investigation also has an implication in terms of a historical lesson vis-a-vis the 
principle of cone China’—that a ‘two Chinas’ policy exercised by the legitimate 
government of China could have a deterring effect on the rival Chinese regime that 
seeks external legitimacy by adhering to the principle of ‘one China’. Finally, this final 
chapter concludes by recommending one of the ways in which further study can be 
conducted.
Notes
1) For ‘how-possible’ questions, see von Wright (1971) and Doty (1993, 1996).
2) By the discourse of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan 
policy, the author means the way of representing Chiang Kai-shek as the benefactor to 
whom the Japanese must repay their ‘debt of gratitude’ for his ‘magnanimous’ Japan 
policy after the war.
3) For explanation and understanding, see von Wright (1971) and Hollis and Smith 
(1990).
4) The concept of articulation, according to Hall (1986: 53), ‘has a nice double meaning 
because “articulate” means to utter, to speak forth, to be articulate....we also speak of 
an “articulated” lony (truck): a lorry where the front (cab) and back (trailer) can, but 
need not necessarily, be connected to one another. The two parts are connected to each 
other, but through a specific linkage, that can be broken.’ Thus, it refers to the
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establishment of links between different linguistic elements, which in turn make up an 
identifiable whole (Weldes 1996: 284, 1999: 98). Through repetition, "these linguistic 
elements come to seem as though they are inherently or necessarily connected, and the 
meaning they produce come to seem natural, come to seem an accurate description of 
reality’ or commonsense (Ibid.: 98-9).
5) For the concept of culture in international relations, see Walker (1984, 1990) and 
Weldes et al (1999). Culture, is used here to mean "the context within which people 
give meanings to their actions and experiences and make sense of their lives’ 
(Tomlinson 1991: 7). Thus, culture provides the "multiplicity of discourses’ or "codes 
of intelligibility’ for understanding the world (Weldes et a l 1999: 1-2,13).
6) It is far beyond the scope of this study to fully engage with the so-called "agent- 
structure debate’ in IR (Adler 2002: 104-6), which is closely linked to "why’ and "how- 
possible’ questions discussed here (Smith 2000a; Wendt 1999, 2000). Rather, the 
author simply draws on the complementary view that there are always two stories to 
tell and that they are driven by two different types of questions in order to locate this 
study intellectually (Hollis and Smith: 1994; Wendt 2000).
7) For foreign policy decision-making, see Snyder et a l (1954, 1962, 2002) and 
Carlsnaes (2002).
8) For applications of discourse analysis across different academic disciplines, see 
Howarth (2000), Wetherell et a l (2001a, 2001b), Phillips and Hardy (2002). As for 
different strands of discourse analysis adopted into foreign policy analysis, see 
Carlsnae (2002: 341-2).
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2
The discourse of ‘returning 
virtue for malice’
2.1 Introduction: "returning virtue for malice’ as common sense
Chiang Kai-shek died on 5 April 1975. (1) All the major Japanese newspapers published 
editorial comments on his death by referring to his ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar 
Japan policy (Ikei 1988: 120-2). Even the most progressive one covered it in the following 
fashion (Asahi Shinbun 7 April 1975, author’s translation): ‘We’d also like to pray for the 
repose of his soul.... At the end of the war, President Chiang Kai-shek addressed his nation 
about “remembering not evil against others and returning virtue for malice” (kio wo 
togamezu, toku wo motte urami ni mukuiyo). As a result, the majority of more than two 
million Japanese soldiers and civilians were able to return home safely from the Continent. 
That is something many of us Japanese still cannot forget today.’ Others also regretfully 
discussed Chiang’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy in conjunction with 
the severing of diplomatic relations with Japan as well as the principle of ‘one China’ 
(Mainichi Shinbun 7 April 1975; Yomiuri Shinbun 7 April 1975),
Subsequently, Japanese people even built a Shinto shrine to deify Chiang Kai-shek. 
According to the ‘Histoiy of the Chiang Kai-shek Shrine’ (Chusei Jinja Yuisho) (2) which is 
written on the signpost in front of the Shrine (author’s translation):
‘This Shinto shrine is to deify the Late President of the Republic of China 
Chiang Kai-shek. His Excellency Chiang Kai-shek at the end of World War 
II announced that “returning virtue for malice {urami ni mukuiru ni toku wo 
motte seyo) is a tradition of the Chinese nation” and took the measures of 
“opposing the divisive occupation of Japan, relinquishing his demand for 
war reparations from Japan, preserving the imperial institution in Japan, and 
immediately repatriating more than two million Japanese soldiers and 
civilians from the Chinese mainland.” As a consequence of these measures, 
Japan is able to thrive today. In retrospect, there was no other head of state 
who took such magnanimous measures towards the defeated nation. We 
must “return gratitude for great kindness” (daion ni mukuiru ni mi wo motte 
subeki). Thus, we construct a Shinto shrine here in token of our sincere and 
everlasting gratitude. “Returning virtue for malice” as a principle of world 
peace will eternally honor His Excellency Chiang Kai-shek’s virtue and 
glorify his magisterial benevolence.’
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More than 11 years after his death, nation-wide memorial meetings were still held 
in Japan to mark the centennial (3) of Chiang Kai-shek’s birth (Goldstein 1986). These 
meetings, in fact, were held in memory of his ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan 
policy (Ibid). On 4 September 1986, more than 5000 people—including 130 members of the 
Japanese National Diet—gathered in Tokyo. It was the first of the five meetings which were 
scheduled to take place in major Japanese cities such as Osaka, Fukuoka, Nagoya, and 
Sapporo in the period running up to Chiang’s birthday of 31 October. Former Prime Minister 
Kishi Nobusuke, who made a toast under Chiang’s portrait for the occasion, addressed that 
‘(t)he Japanese people should never forget the benevolence (Mr.) Chiang showed our nation’ 
(Ibid.). Sato Shinji, a dietman and son of former Prime Minister Sato Eisaku, similarly stated 
that President Chiang’s ‘virtue laid the foundation for today’s prosperity in Japan’ (Ibid.). By 
organizing these memorial meetings, the Japanese also meant to make an implicit apology 
for the abrupt manner in which diplomatic relations between their nation and Chiang’s 
‘China’ were severed (Ibid.).
Furthermore, on 31 October 1986, the very day Chiang Kai-shek would have 
become a centenarian, Japanese people erected a monument to commemorate his ‘returning 
virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy. According to the ‘History’ (Yuisho) of the 
‘Monument for Honoring His Excellency Chiang Kai-shek’s Virtue’ {Shoko Shotokuhi) (4) 
which is engraved on a piece of black granite placed on one side of the wall that surrounds
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the monument (author’s translation):
‘Mr. Chiang Kai-shek was bora in Zhejiang Province of China in 1887. He 
studied at the Shinbu Gakko of the Japanese Army. The Nationalist 
Revolution took place while he was serving in the Regiment of Takada after 
he had completed his preparatory training at the Shinbu Gakko. He 
immediately returned to China to participate in the revolution. Thereafter, he 
endeavored to establish and stabilize the Republic of China. He eventually 
became the paramount leader of China. Although he had been involved in an 
unwanted war with Japan since 1931, he not only immediately made an 
announcement calling for “returning virtue for malice” (yide baoyuan or 
urami ni mukuiru ni toku wo motte seyo) as soon as the war ended in 1945 
but also put it into practice himself. That is: He made efforts to preserve the 
imperial institution of our nation, thereby maintaining the national polity; 
He prevented us from becoming a divided nation by opposing the divisive 
occupation of our nation; He exempted us from paying an enormous amount 
of war reparations; He devoted his energies to safely and swiftly repatriating 
our soldiers and fellow-countrymen from China. As a result, Japan is able to 
thrive today. That is why, we, the Japanese nation, must never forget these
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favors. Particularly, Mr. Chiang’s idea of ‘returning virtue for malice’, 
which is based on Chinese Confucian thought, constitutes the foundation of 
Oriental morality. Mr. Chiang’s great virtue for realizing this idea set the 
moral standard which we Japanese must honor and pass onto posterity as the 
precept. At this centennial of His Excellency Chiang Kai-shek’s birth...he 
has become a patron saint....we have been able to erect this 
Monument...where ancestors of the Emperor are enshrined. We herein honor 
His Excellency Chiang Kai-shek’s great virtue and eternally hand down to 
posterity our wish to repay a debt of gratitude.’
Accordingly, the discourse of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ 
postwar Japan policy has ‘outlived’ Chiang himself. In other words, the discourse has greatly 
resonated among the Japanese over the years that it has been accepted as common sense. As 
shown above, such common-sense status of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse 
among the Japanese has been reproduced through the media, cultural artifacts, political 
rituals, and so on. At the same time, it has been made commonsensical to many Japanese 
people because the Asian nation was already familiar with similar discourses on Confucian 
moral values and Sino-Japanese cooperation. In any case, over the years, Chiang Kai-shek’s 
‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy and Japan’s ‘debt of gratitude’ to Chiang
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have been made commonsensical and placed somewhat beyond question as a result.
It is the purpose of this chapter to call the discourse into question by critically 
examining what has been taken for granted (Weldes et al. 1999: 19-21). First, this chapter 
de-naturalizes Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘foundational’ announcement of 1945. It pluralizes what 
has been unified as the ‘foundation’ by tracing two other contending statements Chiang 
made in the 1920s and 1930s. Second, this chapter problematizes Chiang’s ‘magnanimous’ 
decisions by deconstructing the ‘returning virtue for malice’ thesis that is based on Chiang’s 
individual beliefs such as Sunist Pan Asianism. Third, this chapter re-conceptualizes 
Chiang’s postwar Japan policy as a variant of the ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ discourse. (5) 
Here, it genealogically traces the Sunist roots of ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ to the 1920s 
and 1930s in order to locate the ‘cultural raw materials’ and ‘linguistic resources’ (Weldes 
1999: 98; Milliken 1999: 239, 2001: 148-9)—on which the discourse of ‘returning virtue for 
malice’ was constructed after the war. Moreover, by tracing the rise and fall of the prewar 
Sunist coalition, the author identifies who the main actors were and where the coalition was 
located in the network of social power (Hughes 2002: 2, 2005: 248). Fourth, instead of 
erecting the unified foundation, this chapter delineates four points of emergence for Chiang 
Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ Japan policy as a postwar ‘Sino-Japanese 
cooperation’ discourse to gain Japan’s recognition. Here, again, it identifies the main 
proponents of the discourse and the site from which they circulated it (Ibid.; Hughes 2002:
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2). Finally, this chapter concludes by recapitulating its main arguments regarding the descent 
and emergence of ‘returning virtue for malice’ as discourse. In short, it is the process of 
naturalization this chapter critically examines as it lays bare the constructedness of Chiang 
Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy.
2.2 Denaturalizing the ‘returning virtue for malice’ announcement: prewar 
foundations of the postwar ‘foundation’?
Chiang Kai-shek’s speech of 15 August 1945 has been referred to as the ‘foundation’ of his 
‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy (Furuya 1975: 35-8; Chang 1980: 96; 
Chiang 1991: 17; Lin 1984: 49-54, 1987: 12-14; Chen 1999a: 318; Takeuchi 1993: 124, 
2005: 261; Iechika 1998a: 7, 20 n. 100, 1998b: 250, 2003: 131; Li 2001:245). Nonetheless, 
Chiang never once used the characterization of ‘returning virtue for malice’ as such in the 
‘foundational’ speech (Huang 1996: 40-3, 2004: 224; Iechika 1998a: 20 n. 100, 1998b: 250, 
2003: 131; Kobayashi 2000: 150). Moreover, Chiang’s use of the same or similar Confucian 
language can actually be traced back to the prewar period. More specifically, on 6 March 
1928—more than 17 years before the ‘foundational’ speech of 15 August 1945—Chiang had 
already used such proverbs as ‘remember not evil against others’ (bunian jiue) to describe 
his attitude towards Russia. Furthermore, on 7 July 1938—more than seven years before the 
‘foundational’ speech—Chiang had criticized Japanese militarists for ‘returning hatred for
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kindness’ (yibao baode). As shown below, these pieces of evidence problematize the 
commonsense-status of Chiang’s speech on 15 August 1945 as the ‘foundation’ of his 
‘postwar’ Japan policy.
Chiang Kai-shek's statement o f 6 March 1928: the Sunist foundation o f the foundation ’? It 
took place in Nanjing when Chiang Kai-shek invited a group of Japanese journalists to 
dinner roughly one month before he launched the second phase of the Northern Expedition. 
Chiang stated the following (Furuya 1979: 263, author’s translation):
‘The reason why our Premier Sun made his decision to ally with Russia in 
the past was that Russia demonstrated her willingness to assist our national 
revolution as she became the first power to advocate the cancellation of 
unfair treaties at the time. Thus, we saw her as a friend to collaborate with. 
However, from the time I launched the Northern Expedition until last year, 
the Russians never suited their action to their initial word. Moreover, they 
became even eager to destroy the foundations of the Nationalist revolution 
at any cost. Naturally, they, the Russians, became the enemies of our 
revolution. For that reason, I had no choice but to unflinchingly sever 
diplomatic relations with them (on 14 December 1927)....Nevertheless, the
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severance of diplomatic relations with Russia this time does not necessarily 
mean eternal separation. If she repents her past mistakes and completely 
corrects her action today, obviously we can still resume our friendly 
relations. Confucian maxims such as “remember not evil against others”
(bunian jiue) and “returning justice for malice” (yizhi baoyuan) represent 
the essence of our nation.’
At the same time, through these journalists just as he did through other channels, Chiang 
wooed the Japanese to support the Northern Expedition as follows (Furuya 1981: 239-40; 
Uno 1962: 217):
‘...Japan and China have maintained very close relations....among the 
friendly powers only Japan is in a position to understand the real meaning of 
China’s national revolution. And we are convinced that Japan, instead of 
trying to obstruct the progress of our revolution, wishes us well. We are 
about to resume the Northern Expedition. This is a struggle on which the 
very survival of the Chinese nation depends...We believe that the Japanese 
people want us to succeed.. .the success of our mission will enhance the 
happiness and prosperity of Asia and ensure the peace of the world. It is my
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earnest hope that you will convey my sincere wishes to the Japanese people
and government.’
As shown above, on this occasion, Chiang voluntarily characterized his own attitude towards 
Soviet Russia as 4 returning justice for malice’ (yizhi baoyuan)—which can also be translated 
as ‘meet resentment with upright dealing’ (Waley 1938: 189)—in front of a Japanese 
audience in mainland China (Furuya 1979: 263). Arguably, since Chiang Kai-shek himself 
never directly used the characterization of ‘returning virtue for malice’ as such in the 
‘foundational’ speech (Huang 1996: 40-3, 2004: 224; Iechika 1998a: 20 n. 100, 1998b: 250, 
2003: 131; Kobayashi 2000: 150), his direct reference to ‘returning justice for malice’ on 
that day was as close as he ever got to voluntarily spelling out the former notion in a public 
statement. At any rate, it was the complex and volatile context of the Northern Expedition 
and the need for ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’, in which Chiang Kai-shek played the ‘Russia 
card’ to lure Tokyo as he spoke the traditional language of morality to Japanese journalists. 
Interestingly, in the following year, ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ was realized as Japan 
diplomatically recognized Chiang Kai-shek’s regime.
Chiang Kai-shek's message o f 7 July 1938: another foundation o f the foundation’? It was 
six months after Japanese Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro made the infamous
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announcement of ‘not to deal with the Nationalist government’ (Kokuminto wo aite to sezu) 
that Chiang Kai-shek delivered the following ‘message to Japanese people’ on 7 July 1938— 
the first anniversary of China’s war of resistance against the aggression of Japanese 
militarists (Woodhead 1939: 418; Chiang 1947: 10-11, 1967: 86-7):
‘China and Japan are brother nations closely bound with ethnological and 
cultural ties. Your country has absorbed much civilization in respect of 
philosophy, literature, religion and art, from ours ever since the Sui and 
Tang dynasties...you have preserved to the present much resemblance to the 
cultural mother country....As a result of the teachings of their sages, the 
Chinese people are peace-loving and regard all human beings within the 
four seas as brothers. Naturally, the Japanese, on both ethnological and 
historical considerations as mentioned above, are much closer to our bosoms. 
Militarists of your country, however, being driven on by their false 
ambitions, have chosen to return hatred for kindness (yibao haode). On the 
other hand, the Chinese people bore the outrages successively committed on 
them with the most magnanimous patience, hoping that the Japanese 
militarists would one day be brought to their better senses so that peace in 
the Far East could be maintained... Well, if we change our positions and let
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us do to you what you have done to us, would you bear it? Just think of it 
with remorse!’
It was Chiang Kai-shek’s testimony to the relative decline of those who endeavored to 
realize ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’, which had gradually been taking place especially since 
the Manchurian Incident of 18 September 1931 (Jiu-yi-ba Shibian or Manshu Jihen). More 
specifically, it was his testimony against the Japanese military that had been subverting the 
legitimacy of the Sunists in Japan as well as Chiang himself. While Chiang Kai-shek had 
managed to stay on top of twists and turns over the years, some of the Japanese Sunists had 
fallen before the militarists’ ‘rule of Might’ (Badao or Hado) which the Sunist ‘rule of Right’ 
or ‘Kingly Way’ (Wangdao or Odo) stood against (Jansen 1954: 211, 1970: 58; Wilbur 1976: 
272; Chen and Yasui 1989: 41-80; Fujii 1966: 226-71; Yu 1989: 367-71; Lee 1992; Chu 
1993: 392-3; Takatsuna 1997: 59). Simply put, Chiang Kai-shek spoke the traditional moral 
language of ‘returning hatred for kindness’ (yibao baode)—or ‘returning violence for 
virtue’—to describe his frustration towards Japanese militarism and the deterioration of 
Sino-Japanese cooperative relations. In any case, Chiang Kai-shek again came closer to 
spelling out ‘returning virtue for malice’ than he did in the ‘foundational’ announcement of 
15 August 1945.
In short, the common sense that Chiang Kai-shek’s announcement of 15 August 
1945 was the ‘foundation’ of his ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy is 
problematic. First, Chiang never once alluded to the trope ‘returning virtue for malice’ (yide 
baoyuan) in the ‘foundational’ announcement. Second, Chiang’s other announcements— 
those of 6 March 1928 and 7 July 1938 in which Chiang identically or similarly used 
traditional phrases such as ‘remember not evil against others’ (bunian jiue), ‘returning 
justice for malice’ (yizhi baoyuan), and ‘returning violence for virtue’ (yibao baode)— 
predate the ‘foundational’ announcement of 15 August 1945. Third, Chiang’s ‘returning 
virtue for malice’ policy was also adopted for Russia. For these reasons, it is inappropriate to 
assume that Chiang’s announcement of 15 August 1945 was the ‘foundation’ of his 
‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy.
2.3 Denaturalizing ‘returning virtue for malice’ as decisions based on beliefs
Having denaturalized the 15 August 1945 ‘foundational’ announcement of Chiang Kai- 
shek’s postwar Japan policy, the author now problematizes the common sense of ‘returning 
virtue for malice’ as foreign-policy decisions that Chiang made based on his beliefs. More 
particularly, in this section, the author falsifies Lin Chin-ching’s causal analyses (1984: Chs. 
1-2, 1987: Introduction and Ch. 1) that have helped standardize Chiang’s ‘returning virtue 
for malice’ postwar Japan policy as four decisions Chiang made based on Pan Asianism. By
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falsifying Lin’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ thesis which attributes the four decisions to 
Chiang’s Weltanschauung, the author implicitly calls for an additional appmach to the 
conventional decision-making analysis of Chiang’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar 
Japan policy.
Therefore, it is not the purpose of this section to provide alternative explanations to 
Chiang Kai-shek’s decision-making towards postwar Japan. As the literature review in 
Chapter 1 shows, many of predecessors’ works already provide convincing alternative 
explanations within the foreign policy decision-making framework despite the fact that they 
rarely cover the four decisions all at once. For that reason, instead of providing more 
alternative explanations in vain, the author critically examines Lin’s analyses on all of the 
four decisions in this section, thereby laying bare the constructedness of his ‘returning virtue 
for malice’ thesis. More simply, it is the goal of this section to deconstruct the ‘returning 
virtue for malice’ thesis by showing that postwar Japanese history would have remained 
unchanged even without Chiang’s Sunist belief in Pan Asianism.
Chiang Kai-shek’s belief in Pan Asianism and four ‘magnanimous’ decisions. One of the 
most comprehensive accounts of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ thesis is authoritatively 
provided by Lin Chin-ching (Ibid.). The main components of Lin’s argument can be 
summarized as follows: 1) The Japanese nation would have disintegrated if Chiang Kai-shek
65
had not advised US President Franklin D, Roosevelt to preserve the Japanese imperial 
institution at the Cairo Conference in 1943 and if Chiang’s ‘magnanimous’ view had not 
been adopted by such American policy-makers as Joseph C. Grew and Henry L. Stimson 
who pushed for the preservation of the emperor system after World War II; 2) Unlike the 
Russians who detained the Japanese and forced them to labor in Siberia after the war, 
Chiang ‘magnanimously’ repatriated more than two million Japanese soldiers and civilians 
and allowed each one of them 30 kilograms of luggage to take home; 3) Japan would have 
been divided by the Soviet Union if Moscow had not been discouraged by Chiang’s 
‘magnanimous’ decision not to send his occupation forces to Japan immediately after the 
war; and 4) Chiang ‘magnanimously’ relinquished war reparations from Japan and dissuaded 
Philippine President Quirino form demanding eight billion dollar war reparations from the 
Japanese, which consequently led Manila to demand only 550 million dollars from Tokyo. 
Most importantly, Lin argues that all of these decisions can be attributed to Pan Asianism— 
the belief Chiang Kai-shek ‘inherited’ from Sun Yat-sen.
The imperial institution. Would the Japanese nation have disintegrated as Lin suggests if 
Chiang Kai-shek had not advised President Roosevelt to preserve the Japanese imperial 
institution and if Chiang’s view had not been adopted by pro-Japanese American officials 
like Under Secretary of State Grew and Secretary of War Stimson at the end of World War
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II? Why did Chiang Kai-shek show his support for the preservation of the Japanese imperial 
institution after the war? How powerful is Lin’s explanation based on Pan-Asianism which 
Chiang ‘inherited’ from his predecessor Sun Yat-sen?
Before proceeding, a caveat is needed. Lin (1984: 44-5, 1987: 6) claims that Chiang 
indicated ‘the form of the Japanese government should be determined by the wishes of the 
Japanese people themselves after the war’ in response to Roosevelt’s inquiry regarding the 
postwar treatment of the Japanese imperial institution during a bilateral talk (without the 
presence of British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill) on the evening of 23 November 
1943 in Cairo. However, according to Ishii (1987a: 39 n. 9) and Feis (1957: 247), there 
exists ‘no complete or orderly’ record of the talk other than that in the Chinese language. 
The record that exists in the United States, according to Ishii (1987a: 39 n. 9), is the English 
translation of the Chinese record that was sent to the State Department in 1956.
Nonetheless, Lin (1984: 45) attempts to provide evidence of Chiang’s support for 
the preservation of the Japanese monarchy by mentioning Chiang’s ‘New Year’s radio 
address to the Chinese people’ in 1944. In this statement, according to Lin, Chiang referred 
to his talk with Roosevelt in Cairo and reiterated his own position that ‘the future of Japan, 
the form of its government, including the problem of the emperor system, should be decided 
by the will of the Japanese people.’ Lin further argues that Chiang’s view on the ‘form of 
government’ in terms of the ‘will of the Japanese people’ was reflected in the Article 12 of
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the Potsdam Declaration on 26 July 1945, which was promoted by Grew and Stimson (Ibid., 
1987: 6). According to Lin (1984: 45), on 28 May 1945, Grew especially quoted ‘Chiang’s 
message to his own troops’ (rather than Chiang’s comments in Cairo) as he advised 
President Truman that assuring the Japanese the retention of the imperial institution would 
urge them to surrender at an early opportunity. Nevertheless, Lin admits that the Potsdam 
Declaration did not touch upon the Japanese imperial institution per se since the issue was 
omitted altogether in favor of Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s objection to Stimson’s idea 
of including it in the text of the Declaration (Ibid.: 46, 1987: 7). In the meantime, Lin 
suggests that the Japanese bargained with the Allied Powers by trading their acceptance of 
the Potsdam Declaration for the prerogatives of His Majesty as the Sovereign Ruler of Japan 
(Ibid., 1984: 46). Lin then concludes that the imperial institution was consequently retained 
as the Allied Powers settled with the Japanese condition by indicating that the authority of 
the Emperor and the Japanese government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme 
Commander of the Allied Powers (Ibid., 1987: 7).
Obviously, Lin’s argument that the Japanese imperial institution was preserved as a 
result of Chiang’s advice to Roosevelt in Cairo, which was subsequently reinforced by pro- 
Japanese American policy-makers like Grew and Stimson, is flawed. Following Lin’s 
argument, one cannot find any definitive connection between Chiang’s comments to 
Roosevelt in Cairo and the retention of the Japanese emperor system after the Potsdam
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Declaration. In addition to the disruption caused by the death of Roosevelt and insufficient 
evidence for Chiang’s comments in Cairo, Lin further fails to show that Grew’s pro-Japanese 
stance on the question of the Emperor was derived from Chiang’s position in Cairo. In fact, 
even four months before the Cairo Conference, in the summer of 1943, Grew had already 
advocated that the United States should collaborate with ‘liberal elements’ in Japan and that 
it should keep the institution of the Throne to take advantage of it (Schonberger 1989: 21). 
Moreover, even before Chiang was quoted in May 1944, Grew had already publicly revealed 
his view on the Japanese imperial institution in December 1943 by quoting his friend Sir 
George Sansom—the Western authority on Japan, who later became the British 
representative to the Far Eastern Commission (Schonberger 1989: 23; Nakamura 1989: 42, 
1992: 24). Besides, in contrast to Lin’s (1984: 48; 1987: 9) claim that Chiang’s ‘continuous’ 
support for the Japanese imperial institution was derived from Sunist Pan-Asianism, 
Nationalist China’s anti-Japanese propaganda in the United States in 1944 was led by the 
then President of the Legislative Yuan, Sun Ke or Sun Fo (1944)—the son of Sun Yat-sen— 
who condemned Grew ‘for advocating the preservation of the “Mikado” after Japan’s 
surrender’ (Nakamura 1989: 55-60, 1992: 31-4). In addition, Lin defeats his own argument 
by stating that another pro-Japanese American official Stimson was outmaneuvered by Hull 
in regard to the question of the Emperor. Lin even indicates that the retention of the Japanese 
monarchy was ultimately a product of bargaining between Japan and the Allied Powers led
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by the United States. As a matter of fact, records show that Chiang only passively agreed 
with US policy towards the Japanese condition for accepting the Potsdam Declaration (Lin 
1984: 47, 1987: 8; Ishii 1987a: 27). Simply put, it was Chiang who followed US Japan 
policy rather than the other way around.
In short, postwar Japan would not have been thrown into chaos since the imperial 
institution of Japan would have been preserved even without Chiang’s questionable advice to 
Roosevelt and the representation of his view by American policy-makers. First, in regard to 
pro-imperial advice to the American President, Sir George Sansom had already given 
Washington the same kind of input on the form of government in Japan as demonstrated 
above. Besides, due to close Anglo-Japanese ties from the past as well as strategic 
calculations, there were still other influential British (like Geoffrey Gorer, Sir Robert Craigie, 
John Morris, and Hugh Byas) ‘wishing to see the emperor system maintained and used’ 
anyway (Nakamura 1989: 118, 1992: 64; Ito 1995: 272-3). Secondly, as for Chiang’s 
‘magnanimity’ based on Sunist Pan Asianism, the claim that it positively influenced the 
American decision-makers to preserve the Japanese emperor system is seriously 
contradicted by the fact that Chiang’s Nationalist China campaigned against Grew and the 
idea of preserving the Japanese imperial institution as mentioned above. In the final analysis, 
Chiang’s ‘magnanimous’ beliefs such as Pan Asianism was not necessary for the Americans 
(and their allies) to preserve the Japanese imperial institution. In any case, records show that
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Chiang was not prepared to deviate from any American initiative towards the Japanese 
emperor system—whether it was magnanimous or not.
Repatriation, Why did Chiang Kai-shek swiftly repatriate Japanese soldiers and civilians 
from mainland China after World War II unlike the Russians who detained the Japanese for 
forced labor in Siberia? Was it due to Chiang’s ‘magnanimous’ attitude derived from Sun 
Yat-sen’s Pan-Asianism as Lin argues?
According to Furuya (1975: 17-18), disarming Japanese troops was one of the 
serious problems Chiang had to resolve in accepting Japanese surrender. It was a problem 
created by the ‘miraculous’ event of Japanese surrender (Tong 1952: 427). It was 
‘miraculous’ because ‘undefeated’ Japanese troops still occupied a vast area of mainland 
China without any decisive damage (Tong 1952: 426; Furuya 1975: 18). As far as Chiang 
Kai-shek was concerned, accepting Japan’s surrender was a ‘problem’ at least in two 
respects. For one, the Japanese could refuse to disarm (especially within their own sphere of 
influence) and still make desperate resistance to the Nationalists (Tong 1952: 426; Furuya 
1975: 18). For another, it was a great opportunity for the Chinese Communists to requisition 
the area occupied by the Japanese for their arms before the arrival of the Nationalists (Ibid.: 
20). In fact, according to Ishii (1998: 144), the Communists—who were constantly marching 
away from Nationalist troops and attacking the rear of the Japanese who were going after
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the Nationalists—had a geo-strategic advantage over the Nationalists based remotely in the 
Southwestern city of Chongqing. Accordingly, from the moment of Japanese surrender, the 
next act of the Chinese ‘race’ for Japanese arms had already begun with the Communists5 
head-start from behind (Nomura 1997: 379-83).
Under such circumstances, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered General Albert 
Wedemeyer, commanding general of the American forces in China and chief of staff to 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, to ‘assist the Central Government in the rapid transport of 
Chinese Central Government forces to key areas in China5 (Westad 1993: 100). In fact, 
‘Jiang (Chiang) had asked for U.S. landings and for assistance with troop transports5 (Ibid.: 
101; Kato 1995: 117, 123). From the American point of view, transporting ‘five 
Guomindang (GMD) or Nationalist armies by air and sea5 and ‘the landing of U.S. Marines 
on the coast of North China5 would “‘strengthen the position of the Nationalist Government55 
against both domestic and foreign adversaries5 (Westad 1993: 103). Although ‘a speedy 
evacuation of the Japanese forces was to prevent them from supplying arms to the CCP 
(Chinese Communist Party)5, as Westad (Ibid.: 102) refers to American archives, ‘(p)ublicly 
Chinese and American officials explained the operation as an effort to speed up the 
disarming and repatriation of Japanese troops still in China5 (Ibid.: 103). Thus, the assistance 
to Chiang was ‘part of the general U.S. effort5 derived from the view that the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) was ‘an agent for Soviet policies5 (Ibid.: 117). More importantly,
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‘the repatriation of Japanese soldiers was a cover for their overriding preoccupation with 
finding a way to prevent Soviet aggression in China’ (Ibid.: 117; Uno 1982: 23, 1995: 403).
Interestingly, under the same circumstances, the Chinese Communists also 
repatriated the Japanese from the area under their control as they propagated the protection 
of the Japanese through the production of labels and signs (Ishii 1998: 167). However, as 
Ishii (1998: 167) further points out, neither Communists nor Nationalists were 
‘magnanimous’ enough to repatriate the Japanese from the areas of conflict where the 
number of Japanese casualties was great. In other words, neither Communists nor 
Nationalists were in control of China proper, however both of them were eager to repatriate 
the Japanese from the areas under their control.
Simply put, Lin’s (1984, 1987) ‘magnanimity’ argument is misleading for it implies 
that only the Nationalists under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek altruistically and single- 
handedly repatriated the Japanese from China. First of all, out of his own self-interest, 
Chiang was mainly concerned with the requisition of the area under Japanese control for 
their arms. Secondly, Chiang’s troops were not physically capable (geo-strategically and 
logistically) of repatriating (or detaining) the Japanese from China at the time of Japanese 
surrender. Thirdly, the repatriation of the Japanese from China was made possible by 
American assistance in accordance with American policy. Fourthly, under the same 
condition, the Communists led by Mao also repatriated the Japanese from China just as the
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Nationalists led by Chiang. Accordingly, it can be argued that the Japanese would have been 
repatriated from China anyway even without Chiang’s ‘magnanimous’ beliefs derived from 
Sun Yat-sen’s Pan-Asianism. Likewise, Lin’s ‘magnanimity’ argument should be treated 
with scholarly skepticism.
Occupation. Would Japan have been divided if Moscow was not discouraged by Chiang Kai- 
shek who declined to send his occupation forces to Japan after the war as Lin argues? Why 
didn’t Nationalist China occupy Japan after the war? Most of all, how powerful is Lin’s 
‘returning virtue for malice’ thesis based on Chiang’s altruistic beliefs such as Pan 
Asianism?
Richard B. Finn (1992: 155), a former Foreign Service officer during the US 
occupation of Japan, points out that Chiang Kai-shek ‘decided in 1947 that because of the 
worsening situation in his war against the Chinese Communists, he could not spare a 
division for duty in Japan’, even though ‘the Republic of China (ROC) accepted 
Washington’s offer in late 1945 and made plans to send a Chinese division in early 1946’. 
Uno (1982: 28; 1995: 408) further points out that Chiang instead sent the division to the 
battle field of Northeastern China in the summer of 1946. In fact, according to Ishii (1987a: 
29-30) who refers to George C. Marshall’s memorandum dated 19 October 1945, Chiang 
had already told his chief of staff General Wedemeyer that Chinese domestic affairs
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involving the Communists have priority over the dispatch of his occupation forces to Japan. 
Concurrently, Chiang told Wedemeyer that some delay in the dispatch of the occupation 
forces was to be expected. As for the Japanese side, as early as November 1945, Chiang’s 
assessment was somewhat confirmed by the postwar liaison officer Arisue Seizo (1987: 204- 
5) who recalls that Chiang canceled the mission of his powerful 19th Division to the Nagoya 
area of Japan conceivably due to the domestic instability of China. In short, although Chiang 
initially planned to occupy Japan, he was later forced to abandon his plans because of 
domestic instability in China (Takemae 1992: 41).
In regard to the possibility of sending Russian occupation forces to Japan, Harry S. 
Truman (1955: 440) recalls that Generalissimo Joseph Stalin requested the Northeastern half 
of Hokkaido (in addition to the Kurile Islands) to be surrendered to the Commander in Chief 
of the Soviet Forces in August 1945. Truman agreed to the Soviet occupation of the Kuriles 
but insisted in the course of negotiations that General Douglas MacArthur would accept 
Japanese surrender on ‘all the islands of Japan proper’ including Hokkaido (Ibid.: 441). 
Truman already suspected that ‘Stalin was trying to bring to Japan the same kind of divided 
rule which the circumstances and necessities of the military situation had forced upon’ the 
United States and its allies ‘in Germany’ (Ibid.: 443). Likewise, in Tokyo, MacArthur 
‘turned down “point blank’” the Russian appeal for a zone of occupation in Hokkaido (Finn 
1992: 69). Aforementioned Arisue’s (1987: 204-5) recollection again somewhat confirms it
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as he quotes (MacArthur’s long-time intelligence officer) General Charles A. Willoughby 
that MacArthur turned down the Soviet Union’s alternative request to occupy a central area 
near Tokyo. Accordingly, in this context of Soviet-American rivalry, ‘the Truman 
administration acted to keep the Red Army out of Japan, and as far north on the Korean 
peninsula as possible’ because it was ‘(u)pset over Soviet policy in Europe, and over Stalin’s 
unwillingness to accept the American position in Manchuria’ (Westad 1993: 99). As for the 
Russians, like Schaller (1985: 18), Finn (1992: 70) analyzes that Stalin ‘decided tacitly to 
recognize the American position in Japan in return for U.S. recognition of the Soviet- 
supported situations in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary’. Moreover, according to Wada 
(1999: 179), Stalin was willing to accept Truman’s rejection vis-a-vis the Soviet occupation 
of a part of Hokkaido proper in exchange for the Kurile Islands off the tip of Hokkaido. 
Nevertheless, Finn (1992: 69) argues that c(h)ad Truman agreed to Stalin’s proposal, Soviet 
forces or their communist agents would no doubt have controlled at least part of Hokkaido’. 
In other words, as the bifurcation of the world began to unfold between the two global 
powers after the war, the Soviet occupation of Japan proper was traded off for Russian 
dominance in other parts of the world—the Kuriles, Eastern Europe, and Manchuria in 
addition to her share in a divided Germany.
However, according to Beloff (1953: 120), ‘the Soviet Military Mission existed’ and 
‘it was considerably larger than any other mission, numbering about 500 persons as against
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150, for instance, in the British mission’. He further points out that ‘although it did not get 
itself accredited to the headquarters of the Supreme Commander, its expenses were paid by 
the Japanese Treasury on orders form SCAP (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers)’ 
(Ibid.). The Mission was keen on mobilizing pro-Soviet propaganda—working in concert 
with the Soviet delegate to the Allied Council in Tokyo as well as the Japanese 
Communists—while they clashed with the occupation authorities (Ibid.: 119-21). Its size, 
according to Beloff, was not reduced until SCAP deferred payment to the Russians who 
refused to submit their accounts for the sums they spent (Ibid.: 120). Nonetheless, even in 
the absence of a Chinese military mission—although Chang Chun (1980: 96) seems to refer 
to it interchangeably with the Chinese mission to the Allied Council in Tokyo—the Russians 
did in fact dispatch their military mission to Japan.
In sum, in contrast to the implications of Lin’s ‘magnanimity’ argument, Chiang 
neither altruistically declined to occupy Japan because of Pan Asianism nor discouraged the 
Russian occupation of Japan as demonstrated above. Likewise, as history has it, Japan would 
not have been divided even without Chiang’s beliefs such as Pan Asianism. Therefore, unlike 
Lin’s ‘magnanimity’ argument, Chiang’s decision based on his beliefs such as Pan Asianism 
was neither necessary nor sufficient for the territorial integrity of postwar Japan.
Reparations. Why did Chiang Kai-shek forfeit war reparations from Japan? How potent is 
Lin’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ explanation based on the Generalissimo’s beliefs such as 
Pan Asianism? Since the answer to the former can be found in the negotiation process of the 
Japan-ROC Treaty of Peace, as examined in Chapter 3 of this study, it is the answer to the 
latter that is briefly and argumentatively presented here.
In the spring of 1952, in the course of signing the bilateral Treaty of Peace, the 
Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan led by Chiang Kai-shek relinquished war reparations 
from Japan. Yet, what is not widely known is the fact that it was the relinquishment of 
Taipei’s demand for war reparations. In other words, Chiang Kai-shek did not forego 
reparations from the very beginning. In fact, Taipei did not decline to demand reparations 
until the US ratification of the San Francisco Treaty of 1951—to which neither Beijing nor 
Taipei was invited—became imminent on 19 March 1952 (Ishii 1985: 75, 1986: 309-12, 
1989: 85-90; Ku 1989: 305-8). More interestingly, Taipei had most anxiously demanded the 
largest portion—40 percent of the total amount available for the Allied Powers in May and 
August 1947—of war reparations among the members of the Far Eastern Commission, 
whose demand from Japan far exceeded the total of 100 percent as it reached 204.5 percent 
in May 1947 and 189 percent in August 1947 respectively (Records of the Far Eastern 
Commission, 1945-1955; Blakeslee 1953: 138-51; Chang 1948: 513-4; Xingzhengyuan 
Xinwenju 1948: 9). Furthermore, the Chinese Nationalists had already received a half (15
78
percent of the whole compensation which was equivalent to 20 million US dollars) of 
‘advance transfers of Japanese reparations’ between 1947 and 1949 in the form of machinery 
and industrial equipment (Blakeslee 1953: 135-41; Finn 1992: 155-6; Zhu 1992: 28-9; 
Urano 1999: 11-12).
However, one may still point out that the Nationalists’ Government Information 
Office subsequently made a statement expressing Taipei’s intention to relinquish war 
reparations on 15 October 1951 as argued by Hsu (1991: 205). In any case, one can hardly 
make any causal link between the continuity of Chiang’s beliefs such as Pan Asianism and 
change in his action—that is, demanding and partially receiving war reparations up to May 
1949, dropping his demand for reparations between 1949 and 1951, demanding again in 
February and March of 1952, and dropping the demand again in April 1952. Moreover, 
another relinquishment of Japanese war reparations by India in the same year of 1952 
further deconstructs the ‘returning virtue for malice’ argument just as Communist China’s 
relinquishment of reparations in 1972 (Nagano 1999: 3). These cases consequently emboss 
how decision-making over the foregoing of reparations was constrained by factors other 
than idiosyncratic elements such as Chiang Kai-shek’s individual beliefs.
In sum, Chiang’s beliefs did not have any causal link with his renunciation of war 
reparations from Japan. Put differently, as briefly demonstrated above, Lin’s causal 
explanation for Chiang’s decision based on Pan Asianism is spurious. In order to adequately
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understand Chiang’s decision on this issue, it is necessary to trace the process of bilateral 
negotiations for the Treaty of Peace between the ROC and Japan as conducted in Chapter 3.
2.4. ‘Returning virtue for malice’ beyond belief: the ‘revival’ of ‘Sino-Japanese 
cooperation’ and the Sunist coalition
‘My fellow countrymen know that to “remember not evil against others”
(bunian jiue) and “do good to all men” (yuren weishan) are the highest 
virtues taught by our own sages. We have always said that the violent 
militarism of Japan is our enemy, not the people of Japan. Although the 
armed forces of the enemy have been defeated and must be made to 
observe strictly all the terms of surrender, yet we should not for a 
moment think of revenge or heap abuses upon the innocent people of 
Japan....Permanent world peace can be established only upon the basis 
of democratic freedom and equality and the brotherly cooperation of all 
races and nations. We must march forward on the great road of 
democracy and unite and give our collective support to the ideals of 
lasting peace.’ (6)
Chiang Kai-shek delivered this speech to his nation ‘in the hour of victory’ on 15 August 
1945. This announcement (7) was made in the midst of a race between the Chinese 
Nationalists and Communists to fill in the power vacuum the Japanese left behind in the 
Northeastern region of China after World War II (Nomura 1997: 379-83). It has been 
referred to as the ‘foundation’ of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar 
Japan policy (Furuya 1975: 35-8; Chang 1980: 96; Chiang 1991: 17; Lin 1984: 49-54, 1987: 
12-14; Chen 1999: 318; Takeuchi 1993: 124, Takeuchi et al. 2005: 261; Iechika 1998a: 7, 20 
n. 100, 1998b: 250, 2003: 131; Li 2001: 245).
The notion of ‘returning virtue for malice’—which has been utilized to dub the 
original phrases of ‘remember not evil against others’ and ‘do good to all men’ in the 
speech—derives from philosophical and ethico-religious systems of China such as 
Confucianism and Daoism (Waley 1938: 189). In fact, Furuya Keiji (1975: 38) points out 
that it draws on Book XIV, 36 of Lunyu (the Analects of Confucius). Furthermore, Kishi 
Nobusuke (1982: 159 n. 4).and Okubo Denzo (1972: 116-19) additionally refer to Chapter 
63 of Laozi’s Dao De Jing (The Way and its Power) as another classical foundation of 
Chiang Kai-shek’s speech. For instance, Book XTV, 36 of Lunyu refers to de as ‘inner power’ 
and yuan as ‘resentment’ in the following fashion (Waley 1938: 189): ‘Someone said, What 
about the saying “Meet resentment with inner power”? The Master said, In that case, how is 
one to meet inner power? Rather, meet resentment with upright dealing and meet inner
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power with inner power.’ The word de interpreted here as ‘inner power’ corresponds closely 
to virtus in Latin, and it is of great importance to note that de distinctively implies ‘moral 
force’ rather than ‘physical force’ or li (Ibid.: 33). The saying yide boayuan (8) translated 
here as ‘Meet resentment with inner power’ thus connotes the nobility of governance with 
moral virtue rather than physical violence (Ibid.: 189).
By the same token, the ‘foundational’ speech by Chiang Kai-shek can also be 
interpreted as a manifestation of moral force rather than physical force. More specifically, by 
resorting to the moral force of traditional practices, Chiang attempted to pave the way for the 
Japanese troops in Manchuria to surrender their arms to his own Nationalists rather than 
Mao Zedong’s Communists. It was thus intended to prevent Communist instigation in the 
Northeastern region of China, which was physically beyond the control of Nationalist forces 
in the summer of 1945 (Furuya 1977: 202). In other words, it was Chiang’s call for ‘Sino- 
Japanese cooperation’ in order to morally engage Japanese troops and dissuade them from 
giving up their arms to the Communists before the Nationalists arrived in the region (Zang 
1997: 35-6). Accordingly, Chiang Kai-shek’s use of traditional resources on 15 August 1945 
can be understood as the ‘revival’ of ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ discourse drawn on the 
moral governance of Chinese hegemony from the past.
In this section, the author thus re-examines Chiang’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ 
postwar Japan policy as a variant of the ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ discourse rather than
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‘magnanimous’ decisions based on beliefs such as Pan Asianism. In the process, the author 
genealogically traces the ‘Sunist roots’ of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ 
postwar Japan policy to the prewar period in terms of the ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ 
discourse and its coalition that sutured the ‘prewar’ and ‘postwar’ periods. The author shows 
that Chiang Kai-shek utilized the ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ discourse in order to gain 
Japan’s recognition of his regime as ‘China’ insomuch as he attempted to legitimate himself 
as the successor of Sun Yat-sen during the prewar era. Sun had famously called for ‘Sino- 
Japanese cooperation’ in his speech on ‘Pan Asianism’, which he delivered in Kobe, Japan in 
November 1924—less than four months before his death (Jansen 1954: 211, 1970: 58; 
Wilbur 1976: 272; Chen and Yasui 1989: 41-80; Fujii 1966: 226-71; Yu 1989: 367-71; Lee 
1992; Chu 1993: 392-3; Takatsuna 1997: 59). Just as Sun’s Nationalist revolution was 
strongly supported by Japanese collaborators, Chiang Kai-shek subsequently struggled to 
gain Japan’s recognition by collaborating with Pan Asian ‘friends’ of Sun’s and their 
descendants in Japan—not only in the prewar period but also in the postwar era.
Put differently, it is the rise and fall of the prewar ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ 
discourse and the Sunist coalition—the ‘cultural raw materials and linguistic resources’ 
(Weldes 1999: 98; Milliken 1999: 239, 2001: 148-9), on which the Nationalist Chinese later 
grafted die image of Chiang Kai-shek as a benefactor in terms of his ‘returning virtue for 
malice’ postwar Japan policy—the author demonstrates in this section. Moreover, by tracing
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the prewar Sunist coalition of ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’, the author identifies who the 
actors were and where they were located in terms of power relations (Hughes 2002: 2, 2005: 
248). More particularly, the author first traces the prewar roots of the postwar discourse in 
relation to the consolidation of Chiang Kai-shek’s internal legitimacy in China, his struggle 
for external legitimacy through informal diplomacy with Japan, and Japan’s subsequent 
recognition of the Chiang regime in June 1929. Secondly, the author shows how the Sunist 
roots of ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ eroded as their legitimacy was challenged in both 
China and Japan following the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident of September 1931. 
Thirdly and finally, the de-facto diplomatic severance initiated by Konoe’s ‘aite to sezu’ 
statement of January 1938 marked the fall of the tradition and discourse that had been 
utilized by the Sunists in China and Japan respectively. In other words, although the 
Sunists—like Sun Ke (Fo), Inukai Tsuyoshi, Inukai Takeru (Ken), Kayano Nagatomo 
(Chochi), Miyazaki Ryusuke, Yoshizawa Kenkichi, Chang Chun, and Chiang Kai-shek— 
attempted to reproduce their project of ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ in the 1930s, their 
efforts were dispersed by the lack of internal legitimacy both in China and Japan. 
Consequently, this gradual degeneration of the Sunist roots unfortunately led to the 
severance of diplomatic relations between China and Japan in 1938—until they resumed as 
the Sunist roots were ‘revived’ after the war.
The Sunist roots o f ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’: Chiang Kai-shek’s struggle for recognition. 
As Chiang Kai-shek strove to unify China in the fall of 1927, he ‘privately’ visited Japan in 
order to legitimate himself as the successor of Sun Yat-sen and call for ‘Sino-Japanese 
cooperation’ in hopes of legitimating him as the paramount leader of China and preventing 
Imperial Japan from interfering with his Chinese revolutionary forces. Upon his arrival in 
Tokyo, Chiang Kai-shek made the following plea cTo the Japanese people’ (Furuya 1981: 
224):
‘The late Dr. Sun Yat-sen was fond of calling China and Japan “fraternal 
countries.”...For this reason, I believe that the Japanese people should be 
more concerned about the independence of the Chinese nation than any 
other people in the world....There are those powers which...with little 
concern for the peace and security of East Asia, and attracted by short term 
profits to be obtained, do not hesitate to utilize the militarists to oppress the 
Chinese people; to stunt the growth of the new revolutionary forces; and to 
deepen and exacerbate the existing antagonism and animosity between our 
two peoples.. J  earnestly hope that the 70,000,000 Japanese people, who 
share with the Chinese people linguistic and racial affinities, will be able to 
have a thorough understanding of the Chinese revolutionary movement and
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extend to it their moral and spiritual support.’
Chiang’s visit to Japan was made possible by his first ‘retirement’ of August 1927, which 
was a product of factional politics within the Nationalist Party. More specifically, it was 
made possible because Chiang’s prestige within his party was tarnished militarily by the 
allied forces of Northern warlords such as Sun Chuan-fang (9) and Chang Tsung-chang, 
which defeated Chiang’s revolutionary forces (Eastman 1986: 117; Uno 1962: 203-5; Seki 
1963: 291; Usui 1971: 89; Kamimura 1971a: 188). As a result, Chiang was forced to clear 
the way for such leaders of the Guangxi (or Guixi) faction as Li Tsung-ren and Pai Ch’ung- 
hsi to take over the Nanjing government (Ibid.: 189; Eastman 1986: 117). Furthermore, 
Chiang’s retirement was expected to facilitate the re-unification of what used to be his 
regime at Nanjing now led by one of the Guangxi generals, Li Tsung-jen, and another leftist 
Nationalist regime at Wuhan (also known as Hankou) led by Wang Ching-wei. At any rate, 
in September 1927, Chiang Kai-shek took advantage of this adversity to visit Japan for 40 
days and prepare for the second phase of the Northern expedition by reconstructing his 
power base.
In terms of internal legitimacy, the purpose of Chiang Kai-shek’s visit to Japan was 
to reconstruct his political status as the successor of the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the leader 
of the Nationalist revolution by marrying Sun’s younger sister in law, Soong Mei-ling
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(Nomura 1997: 59-60; Hosaka 1999: 133-4, 2003: 208). That was why Chiang Kai-shek, 
who was accompanied by T. V. (Tzu-wen) Soong, visited Soong’s mother at the Arima 
Hotsprings near Kobe in order to seek her consent to his marriage with T. V.’s sister (Furuya 
1981: 222). This marriage, which was going to be Chiang’s ‘fourth’ (Nomura 1997: 59-60; 
Hosaka 2003: 209-13), had significance in terms of symbolic politics for Chiang and many 
other Chinese who attached importance to personal ties based on blood, birthplace, and 
brotherhood (Ibid.: 208; Nomura 1997: 59). More realistically, this marriage had the 
potential of tipping the balance of power within the Nationalist Party since Sun Yat-sen’s 
widow Soong Ching-ling, her capitalist brother T.V. Soong, and Sun Yat-sen’s son (from 
his marriage with Lu Mu-chen) Sun Fo had all sided with Wang Ching-wei’s regime at 
Wuhan. Eventually, as a successful result of Chiang’s visit to Japan, on 1 December 1927, 
Chiang Kai-shek, who was 40 years old, and Soong Mei-ling, who claimed to be 27 years 
old at the time despite the fact that she had already reached the age of 30 (Seagrave 1985: 
268), had a Christian wedding in Shanghai (Chiang subsequently became a Methodist on 23 
October 1930). Chiang consequently managed to engage the Soong clan along with the 
tycoon H. H. (Hsiang-hsi) Kung, who had been married to the eldest of the Soong sisters 
Soong Ai-ling, (10) as high officials of his regime after his political comeback. However, 
Chiang failed to win the political support of Soong Ching-ling, the second of the Soong 
sisters, who had rejected his proposal to marry her after her husband, Sun Yat-sen, passed
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away in 1925 (Ibid.: 214-5). More privately, Chiang had to persuade his ‘third wife’, Chen 
Chieh-ju (1993: 239-40, 251-2), to go to the United States and ‘study’ for five years. 
Nevertheless, Chiang Kai shek’s marriage with Soong Mei-ling after all meant that he had 
reconstructed his domestic power base by politically legitimating himself as Sun’s successor 
as well as financially allying with Chinese capitalists based in Shanghai and Zhejiang 
Province by the end of 1927 (Hosaka 1999: 133-4; Uno 1962: 208).
In terms of external legitimacy, the most important item on Chiang Kai-shek’s 
itenerary (11) for his trip to Japan was the meeting with Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi, 
which took place on 5 November 1927 (Furuya 1981: 222-5; Chang 1980: Ch. 3). There are 
at least two accounts of how this meeting came into being. According to one account (Seki 
1963: 297), Tsukuda Nobuo—a China adventurer or ronin who had collaborated with 
Toyama Mitsuru, Uchida Ryohei, Miyazaki Toten (or Torazo), Kayano Nagatomo (or 
Chochi), and other ‘Pan Asianists’ to provide shelter for Sun Yat-sen as well as other Asian 
revolutionaries like Kim Ok-kyun, .Ras Behari Bose, and Aguinaldo to name a few (Storry 
1957: 313; Norman 1944, 1970; Jansen 1954; Eto and Jansen 1982; Takeuchi 1963; Hatsuse 
1980; Yomiuri Shinbun Seibu Honsha 2002)—twisted Chiang’s arm and brought him from 
Kobe to see Tanaka in Tokyo. In addition to his friendship with Sun Yat-sen, Tsukuda was 
able to relate to Chiang Kai-shek since he was from Takada (currently known as Joetsu), 
Niigata Prefecture where Chiang had served in the 19th Field Artillery Regiment of the 13th
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Division (of the Japanese Army) between 1910 and 1911 (Yoshizawa 1958: 94; Furuya 
1975: 204-28, 249-53). Tsukuda was also reliable to the extent that he had been urging 
Japanese elites to support the Chiang regime as much as he had been expressing his 
opposition to Chiang’s retirement (Seki 1963: 297). However, according to another account 
(Tobe 1999: 83), it was Chiang’s former Chief Advisor Chang Chun who managed to set up 
the Chiang-Tanaka meeting. According to this version (Ibid.), Chang Chun, who along with 
Chiang Kai-shek had received military training in Japan and joined Sun Yat-sen’s 
revolutionary movement there, followed Chiang’s instructions and contacted such Japanese 
military officers as Suzuki Teiichi and Matsui Iwane in order to arrange the meeting. In any 
case, thanks to Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary roots in Japan, Chiang Kai-shek was able to 
seize an opportunity to personally persuade the Japanese Prime Minister to support his 
leadership in China.
In this meeting with Tanaka Giichi, which was held in the presence of Chang Chun 
and Major General Sato Yasunosuke (12) who interpreted for Chiang and Tanaka 
respectively, Chiang appealed that Japan should cooperate with China by supporting his 
regime rather than Chang Tso-lin’s regime at Beijing. Chiang reasoned that Tokyo’s support 
for the Chang Tso-lin regime was the cause of anti-Japanese sentiments in China (Furuya 
1981: 225-6). In addition to suggesting how anti-Japanese sentiments in China could be 
mitigated, Chiang advocated the ‘Manchurian-Mongolian problem’ (13) would be solved if
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Tokyo chose to support his regime (Kamimura 1971a: 196-7; Iriye 1965: 158; Wilbur 1983: 
161). In fact, Chang Chun, who stayed in Japan to continue informal talks after Chiang 
returned to China, eventually made a secret agreement with Tanaka in January 1928. 
According to this agreement, Tokyo would pressure Chang Tso-lin to leave Beijing for 
Fengtian (or Mukden which is presentlhy known as Shenyang) if Chiang Kai-shek promised 
not to pursue Chang Tso-lin beyond the Great Wall (Seki 1963: 298; Morton 1980: 107; 
Wilbur 1983: 180; Tobe 1999: 83). In this way, Chiang Kai-shek boldly took the initiative to 
bring ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ into reality by offering Manchuria and the mitigation of 
anti-Japanese sentiments in exchange for Japan’s support for his regime in China.
After getting ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ under way, Chiang subsequently severed 
diplomatic relations with Moscow in December 1927. As Chiang later took the time to 
discuss the severing of Russo-Chinese relations with Japanese journalists in terms of 
traditional morality (Furuya 1979: 263), he obviously intended to play Tokyo against 
Moscow as he endeavored to unify China. Domestically, Chiang had just been reactivated as 
Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Revolutionary Army in the last preparatory 
conference (14) for the Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee. Chiang 
immediately held the Soviet Union responsible for the communist-led uprising in 
Guangdong (or Canton) and the establishment of the so-called ‘Canton commune’, which he 
destroyed after three ‘bloody’ days of crackdown (Furuya 1981: 232-5; Uno 1962: 213-4;
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Eto 1968: 27-52; Wilbur 1983: 164-70). In connection with this uprising, Chiang Kai-shek’s 
leftist rival Wang Ching-wei—who had left the coalition government of the Nationalist Left 
and Communists at Wuhan to re-establish a Nationalist regime in Guangdong—was 
consequently forced to go back into exile in France since his political position was 
irreparably damaged by the loss of his power base (Ibid.: 163, 170; Uno 1962: 207). More 
interestingly, Chiang’s unilateral announcement of diplomatic severance (which Soviet 
consuls in North China ignored and continued to operate business as usual until the Chinese 
Eastern Railway dispute took place in 1929) was made when Soong Ching-ling, the pro­
communist widow of Sun Yat-sen, was visiting Moscow. Subsequently, Soong Ching-ling 
decided to stay there and ‘protest’ against Chiang’s ‘faithless and suicidal policy’, which she 
claimed was against the will of the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the Soviet Union (Wu 1950: 
197; Ding and Song 2000: 399). Nevertheless, Chiang chastised the Chinese Communists as 
well as their leftist allies within the Nationalist Party and steered clear of the Soviet Union. 
As a result, Chiang Kai shek re-emerged more powerfully as an anti-communist candidate to 
assume the leadership of ‘a central government in China with a promise of stability, standing 
against the Soviet Union’—which nicely fit the picture of the ‘Washington Conference 
system’ at the time (Eto 1986: 112).
Among the ‘Washignton powers’, it was Japan that had begun taking its initiative to 
take over Moscow’s dominant position in China (Iriye 1965: 123-223). For Japanese Prime
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Minister Tanaka Giichi, who was against a unified China as long as it included the 
Manchuria-Mongolia region, there was nonetheless no contradiction between sponsoring an 
anti-communist regime led by Chang Tso-lin in Manchuria-Mongolia and supporting a 
central and anti-communist government ruled by Chiang Kai-shek for the rest of China 
(Baba 1983: 143, 162; Seki 1963: 288). In fact, Japan sought ‘a new era of Sino-Japanese 
coprosperity as a guarantee for protecting Japanese interests in China and Manchuria’ during 
this period (Iriye 1965: 3). For example, in the summer of 1927, it was Tanaka (Kamimura 
1971a: 194), who dispatched Minister Plenipotentiary Yoshizawa Kenkichi (15) as the first 
Japanese minister ever to pay a visit to Chiang Kai-shek (Iriye 1965: 157). Interestingly 
enough, Yoshizawa (1958: 88-9)—who had just participated in the Tokyo meeting of the 
notorious Eastern Conference along with the hard-line ‘combination’ of Vice Foreign 
Minister Mori Tsutomu and Consul General of Fengtian Yoshida Shigeru—made a detour to 
see Chiang on his way to the Lushun (or Port Arthur) session of the Conference. In return, 
taking advantage of a brief period of ‘retirement’ in the fall of 1927, Chiang Kai-shek not 
only paid a visit to Tanaka and personally appealed for his support but also left Chang Chun 
behind in order to seek rapproachement with Tokyo as mentioned earlier. Notwithstanding 
such elite efforts toward ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ without contradicting the ‘unification’ 
of China and ‘separation’ of Manchuria-Mongolia, one could hardly rule out the possibility 
of military conflict between the two—especially considering Japan’s lack of a clearly
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defined chain of command as well as the composite forces of the Nationalist Revolutionary 
Army at the time.
By 3 June 1929, Chiang’s plea for ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ was nonetheless 
realized to the extend that Tokyo authorized Minister Plenipotentiary Yoshizawa Kenkichi to 
diplomatically recognize the regime of Chiang Kai-shek who had successfully concluded the 
Northern Expedition. Tokyo’s recognition came after other ‘Washington powers’ such as the 
United States and the United Kingdom, which had recognized the Nanjing government in 
the winter of the previous year. It was a diplomatic victory not only for Chiang Kai-shek but 
also for Tokyo considering the two military crises—the Jinan Incident and assassination of 
Chang Tso-lin of 1928—by which the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations 
between the two had been bogged down.
More specifically, the Japanese and Chiang Kai-shek successfully managed to 
overcome the crises by rediscovering the ‘useful past’ of the Japanese and Sun Yat-sen. Most 
notably, they capitalized on the last rites for Sun Yat-sen—the ‘patron saint of Chinese 
nationalism’ (Jansen 1954: 1)—to create a convincing representation of ‘Sino-Japanese 
cooperation’. Among the thousands who assembled in procession over two miles (Ibid.), 
there were more than 70 foreign mourners most of whom were Japanese (Yomiuri Shinbun 
Seibu Honsha 2001: 62). The group of Sun’s Japanese ‘relatives’ included Toyama Misuru, 
Inukai Tsuyoshi, Inukai’s son Takeru (Ken), Inukai’s son-in-law and Special Envoy
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Yoshizawa Kenkichi, Kayano Nagatomo (Chochi), Kojima Kazuo, and the surviving family 
of Miyazaki Toten (Torazo) along with others (Jansen 1954: 1-5; Chigono 1984: 125-6; 
Kamimura 1971a: 299-300; Yomiuri Shinbun Seibu Honsha 2001: 61-2). Toyama and Inukai 
were among the few who were allowed to enter the mausoleum (Yomiuri Shinbun Seibu 
Honsha 2001:62). Toyama, the protege of legendary Saigo Takamori and doyen of Japanese 
‘ultra-nationalists’, had extended hospitality to Sun Yat-sen in exchange for Sun’s 
‘cooperation with Japan’ in ‘driving Western interest and influence out of Asia’ (Norman 
1944: 274). Inukai, the ‘god of constitutional government’ (kensei no kamisama) who was a 
staunch supporter of Sun Yat-sen, had ‘sympathized with Sun’s position (in China) that was 
similar’ to the way ‘popular Parliamentarians were oppressed by power cliques and clans’ in 
Japan (Inukai 1988: 24). Inukai, who later became the Prime Minister of Japan in 1931, even 
held a place of honor next to Chiang Kai-shek inside the mausoleum (Jansen 1954: 2; 
Chigono 1984: 125). Accordingly, Chiang Kai-shek not only finished Sun’s ‘unfinished 
revolution’ but also picked up the Pan-Asian ‘Kingly Way’ of ‘benevolence, justice, and 
morality’ (Jansen 1954: 211, 1970: 58; Wilbur 1976: 272; Chen and Yasui 1989: 41-80; Fujii 
1966: 226-71; Yu 1989: 367-71; Lee 1992; Chu 1993: 392-3; Takatsuna 1997: 59), where the 
Japanese and Sun Yat-sen had left off.
Thus, Chiang Kai-shek’s use of traditional discourse such as ‘remember not evil 
against others’ and ‘returning justice for malice’ in the late 1920s as mentioned earlier was
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only the initial re-formulation of the Sunist ‘Kingly Way’ in which Chiang later got 
accustomed to demand Japan’s ‘cooperation’—that is, Tokyo’s diplomatic recognition of his 
regime over others. Indeed, when Japan recognized the Chiang regime in June 1929, the 
Sunist coalition and their project of ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ had reached their prewar 
peak that was unfortunately followed by frustrating events of the 1930s.
'Sino-Japanese cooperation ’following the Manchurian Incident o f 1931: the erosion o f the 
Sunist roots. The erosion of the Sunist ‘rule of Right’ was conspicuously marked by the 
assassination of Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi on 15 May 1932. Over the years, Inukai had 
developed his own view on Manchuria. He believed that it was impossible to separate 
Manchuria from China proper in the long run because the Chinese nation had historically 
always recovered its integrity from temporary separation (Yoshizawa 1958: 141-2). Thus, 
Inukai’s initiative for the settlement of the Manchurian Incident was to economically 
integrate Japan and China on the premise that Tokyo recognized Chinese sovereignty over 
Manchuria (Tominomori 2000: 61; Inukai 1984: 183; Furuya 1976: 200-1). Conceivably, it 
was partly for this reason that Genro Saionji Kinmochi believed Inukai would settle the 
Manchurian Incident diplomatically rather than militarily (Tominomori 2000: 61). 
Accordingly, Inukai was recommended by Saionji to form a cabinet. On the contrary, Inukai 
was concurrently advised not to take office by Toyama Mitsuru (Storry 1957: 108, 121-2)—
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whose close associates like his own son Hidezo, his secretary Honma Kenichiro, and the 
guru of Pan Asianism Okawa Shumei were later arrested for funding and conspiring the so- 
called May 15 Incident (Go-ichi-go-Jiken) (Ibid.: 120-3). In spite of Toyama’s warning, 
Inukai courageously formed his cabinet on 13 December 1931. At the same time, Prime 
Minister Inukai cunningly assumed the post of Foreign Ministership just for one m onth- 
prior to appointing Yoshizawa Kenkichi, his son-in-law and the then Ambassador to France, 
as his successor. It was Inukai’s move to prevent the militarists from accusing him of 
‘stepping beyond his proper functions’ as he prepared to make his diplomatic overture to 
China (Storry 1957: 109). Two days later, Inukai informally requested Kayano Nagatomo (or 
Chochi)—the Japanese ‘relative’ to whom Sun Yat-sen had once given power of attorney for 
raising funds, purchasing equipment, and obtaining supplies in Japan (Inukai 1988: 25)—to 
go to China and discuss his diplomatic initiative with the Nationalists (Kayano 1946: 82; 
Inukai 1984: 183-5; Tominomori 2000: 61; Furuya 1976: 200, 1981: 368; Storry 1957: 109).
On 24 December 1931, under the auspices of Chu Cheng, who was a senior 
member of the Guangdong (or Canton) faction, Kayano (1946: 84) met with Sun Fo—Sun 
Yat-sen’s son who was to become the Premier of the new Nationalist regime in five days. At 
the time, Chiang Kai-shek was in his second ‘retirement’. It was Chiang’s move to deflect 
domestic discontent against him—like massive student demonstrations and criticisms from 
competitors including Mao Zedong’s ‘Chinese Soviet Republic’—for adopting the policy of
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‘first internal pacification, then external resistance5 {annai rangwai) and not fighting the 
Japanese (Furuya 1976: 62-6, 128-31, 1981: 375-6; Nomura 1997: 148-60; Uno 1962: 278- 
82). Chiang’s ‘retirement5 in turn paved the way for the re-unification of his Nationalist 
regime and two Guangdong factions—one led by Wang Ching-wei who was back in 
Shanghai and the other under the leadership of Hu Han-min in Guangdong (Kayano 1946: 
83; Nomura 1997: 152-3; Furuya 1981: 341-7; Tong 1952: 158-70; Hosaka 1999: 154-7). It 
was in the midst of this re-unification that Kayano (1946: 84) met with Sun Fo and 
passionately persuaded Sun in terms of ‘Pan-Asianism5 which his father Sun Yat-sen 
advocated seven years earlier in Kobe, Japan. As a result, Sun Fo expressed his support for 
the resolution of the Manchurian Incident and left the matter up to Chu Cheng (ibid.; Inukai 
1984: 183). On the next day, Chu took the initiative in discussing the issue in the First 
Plenary Session of the Fourth Central Executive Committee which was in progress. In 
addition to appointing the new Chairman, Lin Sen, and the new Premier, Sun Fo, the Central 
Executive Committee approved Chu Cheng of being the Chair of the Political Affairs 
Committee in Northeast China. According to one of Kyano5s (1946: 85) cryptograms to 
Inukai, Chu5s new job was to take over the administration of the Northeast from Chang 
Hsueh-liang and to de-militarize the region by negotiating with the Japanese. Thus, thanks to 
Chu Cheng, on the day after Kayano5s meeting with Sun, Inukai5s initiative for ‘Sino- 
Japanese cooperation5 was already institutionalized within the ‘newly re-united5 Nationalist
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administration.
Chu Cheng subsequently provided Kayano with an opportunity to see some 50 
Chinese dignitaries. Kayano had known these ‘old comrades’, who by then were either 
‘bald-headed or gray-haired’, for 26 years since he helped Sun Yat-sen and Huang Hsing 
found the Chungkuo T’ung-meng hui (Chinese Revolutionary Alliance) in 1905 (Ibid.). More 
specifically, it was the summer of 1905 that the Japanese—like Kayano himself, Miyazaki 
Toten (or Torazo), and Hirayama Shu—and Sun Yat-sen established the alliance of Chinese 
revolutionary organizations in Japan. This merger had been planned and prepared at the 
home of Uchida Ryohei (Jansen 1980: 370-1; Yu 1989: 101-2; Fujii 1966: 43)—Toyama 
Mitsuru’s protege and the head of the ‘ultra nationalist’ organization Kokuryukai (Amur 
River Society) which was founded to eliminate ‘Russia from the sphere south of the Amur’ 
(Jansen 1954: 110). In any case, present among the ‘old comrades’—who enthusiastically 
expressed their concerns for Asia and showed their unanimous support for Sino-Japanese 
mutual cooperation and prosperity—were Chang Chun and other members of the Chiang 
Kai-shek faction (Kayano 1946: 85). On behalf of Chiang Kai-shek who had just left 
Nanjing and gone into ‘retirement’ 12 days earlier (on 15 December 1931), Chang Chun and 
others expressed their regret that the Incident consequently cost Chiang his leadership and 
bilateral relations with Japan. (Ibid.). They wished that Kayano had arrived earlier to inform 
Chiang of the cooperative intention of the Inukai cabinet (which came into power on 13
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December) as well as Kayano’s own view with which they sympathized (ibid.). Nonetheless, 
many of these Chinese Nationalists celebrated what they thought was the ‘dawn of the 
peaceful settlement of the Manchurian problem’ (Ibid.).
Meanwhile, there were also those Nationalists who were unhappy with Kayano’s 
overtures. For instance, Wang Ching-wei, who later went down in history as a traitor of the 
Han Chinese (hanjian) for collaborating with the Japanese, surprisingly rejected the proposal 
for the diplomatic settlement of the Manchurian Incident (Kayano 1946: 87). When Chu 
Cheng orally presented it to him in person, Wang insisted that the Chinese Nationalists 
should fight the Japanese fairly and squarely (Ibid.). For another example, Chang Hsueh- 
liang—who had been seeking his revenge on the Japanese since the Kwangtung Army (or 
Kantogun) assassinated his father Chang Tso-Iin in June 1928 (Wang Shujun 2001: 649, 
692)—propagated against Kayano’s mission. It was evident in the editorial of his newspaper, 
which warned the Chinese not to be deceived by Kayano (Ibid.). Accordingly, from the very 
beginning, there was much formidable opposition to the diplomatic settlement of the 
Manchurian problem even within the Nationalist Party of China. These cases epitomized that 
the ‘Kayano mission’ was closely intertwined with intra-party politics and its ‘success’ 
consequently depended on the new administration of the Nationalist Party under Lin Sen and 
Sun Fo. Unfortunately, Lin and Sun ended up resigning less than a month later as the 
Shanghai Incident—in which the Japanese militarists attacked Shanghai to divert attention
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from Manchuria—began to unfold in January 1932.
In the meantime, Kayano (1946: 88) had been recalled by Prime Minister Inukai in 
January 1932. It was largely due to the fact that Kayano’s cryptograms to Inukai had been 
intercepted by Mori Tsutomu (or Kaku), the hard line Chief Cabinet Secretary, and his 
militarist allies (Storry 1957: 114, 1960: 191; Inukai 1984: 183-5; Tominomori 2000: 61; 
Shimada 1962: 102; Kayano 1946: 86). Subsequently, Mori—the principal organizer of the 
infamous Eastern Conference of 1927, who nonetheless had been of financial service to Sun 
Yat-sen’s revolutionary cause while he worked for Mitsui & Co. in Shanghai and Tokyo 
earlier—and leaders from three Ministries (of Foreign Affairs, the Army, and the Navy) met 
behind Prime Minister Inukai’s back (Ibid.). Although Inukai appointed Mori as his Chief 
Cabinet Secretary ‘to keep him close at hand since it was dangerous to keep him loose’ 
(Yoshizawa 1958: 145-6), Mori nonetheless was determined to eliminate the Prime 
Minister’s opposition to the interest of the Army in Manchuria (Kayano 1946: 86; Storry 
1957: 114). In fact, Mori threatened Inukai’s son, Ken (or Takeru), by stating that the Army 
was highly indignant with the cryptograms which had been sent to the Prime Minister from 
Shanghai (Ibid.; Inukai 1984: 183-5). At any rate, Kayano (1946: 87) was notified of 
possible interception as he received a message from Inukai Ken on 4 January 1932. In this 
cryptogram he sent on behalf of his father, Inukai Ken also asked Kayano to change his code 
(Ibid.). Kayano immediately did so and notified Inukai Ken by sea mail on the next day
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(Ibid.: 88). Kayano then sent a telegram to Prime Minister Inukai using the new code. He 
disclosed his plan to go to Fengtian (or Mukden which is known as Shenyang today) and 
wait for the Prime Minister’s son-in-law, Yoshizawa Kenkichi, who was expected to arrive 
in Fengtian from Paris before assuming the post of Foreign Ministership in Tokyo (Ibid.). 
Kayano wanted Yoshizawa to accommodate Chu Cheng with the settlement of the 
Manchurian problem (Ibid.). However, on the same day or 5 January to be exact, Kayano 
unexpectedly received a code telegram in which Prime Minister Inukai urged him to return 
to Japan (Ibid.). Hence, Kayano requested Chu Cheng to postpone his trip to Manchuria 
while he prepared to go back to Tokyo (Ibid.).
According to Kayano, the fact that he was suddenly recalled was also due to the 
‘jealousy’ of Japanese diplomats—most notably Minister Plenipotentiary Shigemitsu 
Mamoru (Ibid.). Shigemitsu had been furious ever since he found out about the mission on 
the day after Kayano arrived in Shanghai (Ibid.: 83). In fact, Shigemitsu soon advised a Vice 
Foreign Minister in Tokyo to confront the Prime Minister about the possibility of bypassing 
formal diplomatic channels (Ibid.: 87). However, since the outbreak of the Manchurian 
Incident on 18 September 1931, there had not been any substantial diplomatic relations 
between China and Japan other than having multilateral debates in the League of Nations 
(Shigemitsu 1997: 121-9; Furuya 1976: 64-5; 1981: 443-4; Kayano 1946: 85). Even in terms 
of informal bilateral relations, more than three months had already passed since
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Shigemitsu’s own effort on the day after the Incident-through his neighborhood connection 
with Chiang Kai-shek’s brother-in-law, Vice Premier T. V. Soong (or Sung Tzu-wen) 
(Shigemitsu 1997: 85)—unfortunately turned out to be ‘too late’ for the rapid escalation of 
the conflict (Gaimusho 1954: 104; Furuya 1976: 41-2; Shigemitsu 1997: 123-5). 
Notwithstanding this failure of its own informal diplomacy less than four months earlier, the 
Foreign Ministry interfered with the ‘Kayano mission’ by publicly denying the official 
capacity of the mission by 6 January 1932 (Kayano 1946: 88). As a result, Kayano was 
subsequently inundated with Japanese journalists in Shanghai (Ibid.). Kayano then 
grudgingly departed for Japan two days later on 8 January 1932 (Ibid.). Accordingly, 
Shigemitsu blocked the ‘Kayano mission’ as much as he thwarted the Guangdong faction’s 
scheme to use the Japanese—by capitalizing on the Manchurian problem and appealing to 
Sun Yat-sen’s ‘Pan-Asian’ connection with Inukai via Kayano—against Chiang Kai-shek 
and Chang Hsueh-liang in their domestic power struggle (Uno 1962: 280-1).
In summary, the failure of the ‘Kayano mission’ was due to the following: 1) the 
ephemerality of the pro-Japanese Sun cabinet; 2) the pressure on Prime Minister Inukai 
exerted by the alliance of Mori Tsutomu and the military; and 3) Shigemitsu’s bureaucratic 
interruption as well as his propaganda against the ‘Kayano mission’. With hindsight, the 
second factor was most decisive since Inukai’s peace initiative was eternally terminated by 
the hands of young officers less than five months after this initial setback. The assassination
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of Inukai also meant that Inukai fell short of keeping his promise with Emperor Hirohito and 
the last Genro Saionji that he would discipline the military for its unwarranted intrusion into 
politics (Inukai 1984: 182-3; Connors 1987: 105; Storry 1957: 109). Ironically, as mentioned 
earlier, these young officers were instigated and funded by the associates of Toyama 
Mitsuru—who not only participated in the People’s Right movement but also supported Sun 
Yat-sen’s revolutionary cause along with Inukai. Coincidentally, Mori was Toyama’s favorite 
to be the next prime minister (Storry 1957: 121). Moreover, Toyama knew that the ‘Kayano 
mission’ was in progress since he had been informed by Kayano himself (Kayano 1946: 83). 
As a matter of fact, Kayano was a member of Toyama’s Genyosha (Dark Ocean Society) 
(Yomiuri Shinbun Seibu Honsha 2001: 61, 89)—‘the prototype of the right-wing nationalist 
societies’ that ‘started out precisely as a gathering of ex-samurai who were disaffected to the 
Meiji Government’ (Maruyama 1960: xxiv). At any rate, Inukai’s death was a great loss for 
the project of ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ including the settlement of the Manchurian 
Incident. For Chiang Kai-shek, who had already come out of his six-week ‘retirement’, it 
was an ironic consequence that his mentor’s Japanese ‘relatives’ resorted to mutual 
destruction for the dangerously slippeiy ideal of ‘Pan Asianism’—wherein both solidarity 
{rental) and encroachment {shinryaku) inseparably lie on the same continuum (Takeuchi 
1963: 11; Matsumoto 2000: 117; Hatsuse 1980: 23).
‘Sino-Japanese cooperation'following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident o f1937: the further 
deterioration o f the Sunist roots. More recently, immediately after the Marco Polo Bridge 
Incident of 7 July 1937, (Qi-qi Shinhian or Rokokyo Jiken), Prime Minister Konoe 
Fumimaro—after his attempt to fly to Nanjing and see Chiang Kai-shek was interfered by 
the militaiy (Inukai 1984: 335, 405; Matsumoto 2001: 74)—decided to send Miyazaki 
Toten’s son, Ryusuke, to arrange a meeting between Konoe and Chiang Kai-shek (Ibid.; Eto 
1968: 254; Tobe 1983: 32). Konoe had been advised, indirectly by Ishiwara Kanji who 
belonged to the anti-expansionist faction (fukakudaiha) of the military (Ibid.: 254-5; 
Matsumoto 2001: 74; Inukai 1984: 335, 404-5), to meet Chiang in person before the Incident 
escalated any further. Ishiwara, the anti-Russian strategist and leading conspirator of the 
Manchurian Incident six years earlier, had come to believe that Tokyo’s only hope for 
fortifying her position in the Far East lay in cooperating with the Chinese and founding the 
East Asia Federation based on the principle of the Righteous or Kingly Way (Odo) (Morris 
1960: 442). It was derived from Ishiwara’s calculation that the war with China would 
necessarily lead to the over-extension of Japan’s military power (Ibid.). In any case, on 24 
July 1937, when Miyazaki went on board a ship bound for China from Kobe, he was 
unfortunately arrested by military policemen (Matsumoto 1988: 74). It was just an epitome 
of prewar Japan under militarism, the escalation of which had even been accelerating since 
the 26 February Incident (Ni-ni-roku Jiken) of 1936—in which key members of the Okada
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cabinet such as two former Prime Ministers, Saito Makoto and Takahashi Korekiyo, were 
assassinated by young officers. The arrest of Miyazaki by Japanese militarists was 
regrettable especially because Chiang Kai-shek had already agreed to see Miyazaki in 
Nanjing (Ibid.: 74), despite the fact that Chiang had domestically been forced to reverse his 
own policy and adopt Chang Hsueh-liang’s policy of ‘first external resistance, then internal 
pacification’ (rangwai annai) as a result of the Xian (or Sian) Incident of 12 December 1936 
(NHK Shuzaihan and Usui 1995: 188-9; Wang Shujun 2001: 641, 657, 685; Hosoya et al. 
1971: 295-9; Matsumoto 2001: Ch. 2). Accordingly, just as other civilian efforts to make 
peace with China in 1937—such as German Ambassador Oskar Trautmann’s mediation 
which was mutilated by the fall or ‘rape’ of Nanjing on 13 December—Miyazaki Ryuzo’s 
effort to carry out his father Miyazaki Toten’s (1967) ‘thirty-three years’ dream did not come 
true either.
During the same period, the Chiang regime was also anxious to make informal 
contact with Tokyo as the Japanese forces relentlessly continued to expand southward on the 
Chinese continent (Li etal. 1995: 67-71; Kamimura 1971b: 206-7). As early as 31 July 1937, 
Chiang Kai-shek had tacitly approved Kao Tsung-wu—Chief of the Asian Department of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was bom in the Province of Zhejiang (or Chekiang) and 
educated in Japan just as Chiang Kai-shek—to be the ‘representative to negotiate with 
Japan’ in the presence of Wang Ching-wei (Li et al. 1995: 69-70; Boyle 1972: 172; Chen
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1995: 151-2). The meeting between the three was made possible by the recommendation of 
Hu Shih. Hu knew Kao very well from the cLow Key Club’ (Didiao Julebu) which used to 
meet informally for lunch and discussions of national affairs at the home of Chou Fo-hai— 
the Japanese educated Deputy Director of Propaganda (Boyle 1972: Ch. 9; Bunker 1972: 28- 
9, 90; Li et al. 1995: Ch. 7; Chen 1995: 142-8; Inukai 1984: 56, 384-5). On the very same 
day of the meeting with Chiang and Wang, Kao made his contact with Nishi Yoshiaki, 
former Japanese special service officer who was then attached to the Nanjing Branch Office 
of the South Manchurian Railroad (Boyle 1972: 172-3; Chen 1995: 152; Li et al. 1995: 69- 
70). Kao’s meeting with Nishi was arranged by another Japanese educated figure, Wu Chen- 
hsiu, who was the President of the Nanjing Bankers Association or ‘ambassador 
extraordinary of the Zhejiang bankers to the Nanjing government’ (Ibid.: 69; Boyle 1972: 
172-3). By early August, thanks to informal efforts from the Japanese side involving Chief 
of the East Asia Bureau Isii Itaro (1960) and former Foreign Minister Yoshizawa Kenkichi 
(Liu 1995: 84-5), Kao’s peace-making initiative had come through the channel of Funatsu 
Shin’ichiro—former Consul General in Shanghai (Eto 1968: 257-60; Hata 1961: 146-7; 
Kamimura 1971b: 104-10; Tobe 1983: 32-3; Liu 1995: 80-91; Boyle 1972: 66; Chen 1995: 
152). On 9 August 1937, after meeting with Funatsu, Kao negotiated the possibility of 
‘peace’ with Japanese Ambassador Kawagoe Shigeru who met with Kao in his ‘official’ 
capacity. It was Kawagoe’s attempt to equalize Funatsu’s hitherto ‘unofficial’ effort as
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Kawagoe ignored Tokyo's official order not to intervene in its ‘unofficial’ operation (Eto 
1968: 258; Hata 1961: 147; Kamimura 1971b: 110; Tobe 1983: 32-3). To make matters 
worse, the break-through between Funatsu and Kao was further interrupted by the fighting 
which broke out in Shanghai on the same day (Eto 1968: 258; Hata 1961: 147; Kamimura 
1971b: 110; Boyle 1972: 173). Nonetheless, this ‘peace movement’ by Kao under the wings 
of Chiang Kai-shek and the Zhejiang financial clique—which converged with the ‘Funatsu 
operation’ (Funatsu kosaku) by Japanese sympathizers such as Sun Yat-sen’s ‘relative’ 
Yoshizawa Kenkichi—laid the foundations for informal ‘peace-feelers’ to seek ‘Sino- 
Japanese cooperation’ in the late 1930s and early 1940s (Tobe 1983, 1991).
Having said that, the feet that it subsequently led to other ‘peace-making operations’ 
(wahei kosaku) conversely attests the further degeneration of the Sunist roots at the time. 
Such degeneration of ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ was marked by Japanese Prime Minister 
Konoe Fumimaro’s ‘not dealing with the Nationalist government’ (Kokuminseifu wo aite to 
sezu) statement of 16 January 1938. Subsequently, as both Chinese and Japanese 
Ambassadors—Hsu Shih-ying and Kawagoe Shigeru—were recalled by their governments, 
formal diplomatic ties between ‘China’ and Japan were cut off. This ‘diplomatic severance’ 
was an ironic consequence of Konoe’s announcement because the ambiguous phrase of ‘not 
to deal with’ {aite to sezu), rather than de-recognizing {hiniri) or bringing negotiations to a 
close {kosho wo uchikiru), was intentionally used in order to withstand foreseen pressure
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from the Japanese military and keep the possibility o f ‘peace’ alive (Kamimura 1971b: 201- 
2). Nevertheless, the Japanese militarists ruthlessly continued to intensify their Southward 
expansion on the Chinese continent as they circulated the discourse of ‘forcing China to 
surrender with one more blow’ (tai-Shi ichigeki-rori) (Tobe 1999: 198-9; Hosaka 1999: 207- 
9). Such escalation of the ‘incident’ and unsuccessful ‘peace-making operations’ eventually 
led to Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning hatred for kindness’ message on 7 July 1938.
In sum, diplomatic relations between Japan and Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘China’ during 
the prewar era came full circle in 1938. As demonstrated above, just as Chiang’s use of 
traditional discourse was coupled with his plea for Tokyo’s ‘co-operation’—which 
eventually took the form of Tokyo’s diplomatic recognition of Chiang’s ‘China’ in June 
1929—Chiang condemned Japan’s de-recognition of his regime as well as unsuccessful 
peace-making operations similarly in terms of Oriental morality in July 1938. However, in 
1938, neither the Japanese nor Chiang Kai-shek knew that these eight and a half years of 
diplomatic relations only constituted the first act of another 20 and a half years after April 
1952, during which Tokyo was again first wooed and later admonished by Chiang’s moral 
discourse.
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2.5 The emergence of ‘returning virtue for malice’ as discourse
In this section, the author identifies four points of emergence for Chiang Kai-shek’s 
‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy as discourse: 1) Chiang Kai-shek’s 
inaugural address of 20 May 1948; 2) Chang Chun’s statement of 11 September 1948; 3) Ho 
Ying-chin’s speech of 19 January 1951; and 4) Chiang’s speech of 18 June 1951. These four 
points marked the renewal of the ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ discourse in the name of 
Chiang Kai-shek’s regime which struggled to gain Japan’s recognition under American 
hegemony during the Cold War era. These points of departure indicate that the Nationalist 
Chinese defined Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘China’ in terms of his ‘magnanimous’ postwar Japan 
policy. Such articulation of ‘China’, as the rest of this study shows, subsequently facilitated 
Japan’s diplomatic recognition of the Chiang regime as ‘China’ under US hegemony for two 
decades.
Chiang Kai-shek’s revisits to 15 August 1945 and his policy o f 'magnanimity’. After 
delivering the ‘foundational’ speech on 15 August 1945, Chiang Kai-shek revisited his 
‘policy of magnanimity’ or ‘generous policy’ on two occasions—20 May 1948 and 18 June 
1951 (The China Handbook Editorial Board 1952: 148-9).
First, on 20 May 1948, in his inauguration address as the President of the Republic 
of China (ROC) under the new Constitution, Chiang himself referred to the aforementioned
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speech of 15 August 1945 as his ‘policy of magnanimity5 (ibid.). The speech was delivered 
in the midst of the formation of US policy towards East Asia centering on Japan (rather than 
China). For instance, George F. Kennan had just visited Tokyo for the re-evaluation of 
Washington’s policy in February before materializing the National Security Council (NSC) 
document NSC 13/2 of October 1948 (Kennan 1967: Ch. 16; Hosoya 1993: 113-5). 
Domestically, the newly elected Republican Chinese President, who was already militarily 
cornered by Mao Zedong’s Communist forces, made this inaugural statement rather 
disappointingly as his own candidate Sun Ke (the son of Sun Yat-sen, who is also known as 
Sun Fo) had been defeated by Li Tsung-jen in the vice presidential race (Furuya 1977b: 88- 
91). Under these unfavorable circumstances, Chiang Kai-shek nonetheless made reference to 
his own speech of 15 August 1945 as he discussed Nanjing’s foreign affairs in terms of 
peace treaties with Germany and Japan as the following (The China Handbook Editorial 
Board 1950: 284-5):
‘.. .concerning China’s attitude toward the conclusion of peace treaties. At 
the time of Japanese surrender, I declare that China would not seek revenge 
for what Japan had inflicted on the Chinese people. It has been my belief 
that, both toward Germany and Japan, members of the Untied Nations 
should one and all adopt a policy o f magnanimity. . ..reasonable magnanimity
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points the road to the attainment of our lofty ideals...the Allied powers 
should do their best to foster the growth of truly democratic forces in Japan, 
so that there could be a genuine change in that nation’s political and social 
systems and in the thoughts of the Japanese people with a view to uprooting 
Japanese militarism. Whether our policy o f magnanimity will prove fruitful 
depends on whether our efforts are realistic.... As Dr. Sun Yat-sen pointed 
out to us, the Chinese people should discharge their duties and enjoy their 
rights as befitting a civilized nation. This means that internationally we 
should seek to strengthen ourselves by our own efforts and externally to 
secure equality for China in the community of nations and at the same time 
to offer cooperation to the other nations. In this spirit, our country shall 
make its contributions toward upholding international righteousness and the 
preservation of world peace.’
Second, on 18 June 1951—the day before the Anglo-American compromise 
agreement to sign the Japanese Peace Treaty without Chinese representation was officially 
reached—Chiang Kai-shek again referred to his own address of 15 August 1945 as 
‘generous policy’ {kanda zhence) towards Japan. In this speech, Chiang protested against the 
possibility of having no Chinese representation in the conclusion of the Japanese Peace
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Treaty as the following (Office of the Government Spokesman 1952: 88; Zhonghua Minguo 
Xingzhengyuan Xinwenju 1952; Chang and Huang 1968: 346):
‘Only through the sincere cooperation of the two neighboring Asiatic 
countries, China and Japan, may the future security of Asia be assured.
Since V-J Day I have repeatedly stated that China would not adopt an 
attitude of vengeance (bucaiqu baofu zhuyi) against Japan. On various 
occasions, I have, both directly and indirectly, stressed the necessity of the 
early conclusion of a treaty of peace with Japan on the basis of a reasonably 
generous policy (kuanda zhengce). The recent efforts of the U.S. 
Government, despite the obstructionist tactics of the USSR, in promoting 
the early conclusion of peace with Japan are timely and are in accord with 
the policy of Chinese Government. Should the Republic of China denied the 
right of equal participation in the conclusion of the treaty of peace with 
Japan, it would not only dishearten the people now living in Free China, but 
also dim the hopes of millions of mainlanders who await emancipation from 
Communist rule. The ultimate effect of such an unjust act will not be limited 
to the effectiveness of the peace treaty, but may seriously damage the 
traditional friendship between the Chinese and American peoples.’
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Accordingly, on both occasions, Chiang Kai-shek stopped short of referring to the speech of 
15 August 1945 as part of his ‘returning virtue for malice’ Japan policy. Moreover, there is 
no evidence that Chiang’s ‘policy of magnanimity’ towards postwar Japan produced any 
discursive effect at this early stage. Nonetheless, the articulation of Chiang Kai-shek’s 
‘China’ to his ‘generous* Japan policy had clearly emerged by then. As indicated above, 
such articulation was closely related to the issue of Chinese representation and the signing 
of the multilateral treaty of peace with Japan. Likewise, the discourse of ‘returning virtue 
for malice’ as such also emerged at the dawn of the Cold War as Chiang Kai-shek 
dispatched his Japan hands to Tokyo as indicated below.
Chiang Kai-shek’s Japan hands and the dissemination of ‘returning virtue for malice It 
was Chiang’s Japan hands—namely, Chang Chun and Ho Ying-chin—who marked two 
other points of emergence for the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse as Washington’s 
hegemonic project of the ‘Cold War’ unfolded in East Asia. Both Chang and Ho, like 
Chiang Kai-shek and many other followers of Sun Yat-sen whose revolutionary cause was 
strongly supported by many Japanese, received military training in Japan. They also had 
been involved in the Sunist project of ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ during the prewar era. As 
for the timing of dissemination, both Chang and Ho visited Tokyo when an early peace with 
Japan came up on agenda in Washington in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Interestingly
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enough, they linked their discourse o f‘returning virtue for malice’ or ’magnanimity’ with the 
peace treaty with Japan.
First, from 21 August to 13 September 1948, Chang Chun (1980: Chs. 8 and 9)—the 
former Premier who had been handling Chiang Kai-shek’s relations with Tokyo since they 
served the 19th Artillery Regiment (or Takada Regiment for it was stationed in Takada which 
is presently known as Joetsu City, Niigata Prefecture) of the 13th Division of the Japanese 
Army together for the cause of Sun Yat-sen’s Nationalist revolution—revisited Japan. 
During this visit, Chang Chun circulated Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘magnanimous’ postwar Japan 
policy into the Japanese elite while he promoted the significance of ‘Sino-Japanese 
cooperation’ for the regional economy and collective security of Asia in a radio broadcast to 
the Japanese nation (Zhong-Ri Guanxi Yanjiuhui 1991: 40, 122, 232; Ku 1968: 15). 
Furthermore, Chang Chun held a press conference to conclude his visit and express 
Nationalist China’s support for the conclusion of the Japanese Peace Treaty at an early date 
in terms of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘magnanimous’ postwar Japan policy such as his 
announcement at the end of the war (Asahi Shinbun 12 September 1948). In this way, Chang 
Chun not only grafted the moral discourse on the prewar Sunist roots of ‘Sino-Japanese 
cooperation’ but also linked it to the possibility of concluding the Peace Treaty with Japan as 
the legitimate government of China.
Second, in January 1951, General Ho Ying-chin made eight speeches to advocate
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‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ (Chu-Nichi Teikei-ron) during his four-month stay in Japan 
(Zhao 1997: 332-40). Ho’s extensive visit to Japan interestingly coincided with the 
negotiation tour of John Foster Dulles who served as the Special Representative of US 
President Harry S. Truman in charge of negotiating the Japanese Peace Treaty and the 
Pacific security treaties at the time. During this visit, Ho delivered a speech entitled ‘Sino- 
Japanese cooperation and the collective security regime in the Far East’ {Chu-Nichi gassaku 
to Kyokuto no shudan anzenhoshosei) on 19 January 1951. In this speech, Ho paraphrased 
Chiang’s speech of 15 August 1945 by replacing the original phrase of ‘do good to all men’ 
with the idiom of ‘return(ing) virtue for malice’ as follows (Ho 1974: 187-9, author’s 
translation):
‘...we knew that war between China and Japan, from the beginning to the 
end, was ‘‘a quarrel between brothers”. We knew we would still make up for 
it and join hands to cooperate once the fight was over. That is why Chairman 
Chiang, at the Conference of Cairo, made every effort to advocate for the 
preservation of the national policy of Japan and the implementation of 
democracy. After the war was over, Chairman Chiang repeatedly ordered his 
nation to ‘remember not evil against others and return virtue for malice’ in 
dealing with the Japanese. Since then, my government’s policy towards
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Japan has unfailingly followed that principle. In regard to my own 
operations of receiving the surrender and repatriating Japanese prisoners of 
war, I also adhered to that guideline strictly as I carried out my duties at the 
time...my government did not even hesitate to instruct our own people to 
avoid taking trains and steamships so that they could be made available 
especially for Japanese expatriates who were anxious to get home. Speaking 
of the Japanese civilians, although there was a weight limit for the luggage 
they could take at the time of repatriation, I pragmatically instructed my 
men to allow them to carry as much luggage as possible. As for the Japanese 
prisoners of war...Once Shanghai was in the state of emergency as the 
Communists forced their way in the vicinity of the capital, I immediately 
obtained the consent of the Commander of the Allied Powers in China to 
repatriate some 250 principal Japanese prisoners of war remaining in 
Shanghai...from the Nationalist government’s point of view, as soon as the 
war was over, we regained the spirit of brotherhood with your nation. Now, 
we are prepared to do everything in our power to overcome difficulties and 
promote the early conclusion of the peace treaty with Japan...In the 
future...China and Japan could act closely in concert and sincerely 
cooperate with each other in order to solve minor difficulties between the
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two nations and face the greater challenge of saving the whole world from 
the current crisis through the establishment of peace in East Asia.’
It is important to note that* in addition to linking his own duty of repatriating Japanese 
nationals from mainland China with Chiang’s original speech of 15 August 1945, Ho further 
mentioned Chiang’s role at the Conference of Cairo for the preservation of the Japanese 
emperor system after the war. Accordingly, Ho not only attempted to construct Japan’s 
recognition through the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ but also built two new 
components onto Chiang’s original address of 15 August 1945. These efforts eventually 
amounted to the representation of Chiang Kai-shek—as the benefactor to whom the 
Japanese must repay a ‘debt of gratitude’—that facilitated Japan’s recognition of the Chiang 
regime as ‘China’ under US hegemony for two decades.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, the author denaturalized Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ 
postwar Japan policy which has long been taken for granted as common sense in Japan. First, 
the author denaturalized Chiang’s ‘foundational’ announcement of 15 August 1945 by 
providing two more ‘foundational’ speeches from 6 March 1928 and 7 July 1938. Second, 
the author further denaturalized Chiang’s ‘magnanimous’ decision-making towards Japan
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based on his beliefs by counter-arguing that it did not have any decisive impact on the 
restoration of Japan after the war. Third, the author re-conceptualized Chiang’s postwar 
Japan policy as a variant of the prewar ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ discourse—a discourse 
which had served Chiang’s ‘China’ to gain Tokyo’s diplomatic recognition—as he traced the 
Sunist discourse coalition which sutured the ‘foundations’ of 6 March 1928 and 7 July 1938. 
Fourth, the author delineated four points of emergence for the postwar discourse of 
‘returning virtue for malice’ as Chiang’s Nationalist China struggled to take part in the 
conclusion of the Japanese Peace Treaty—the apparatus of US hegemony in East Asia, 
which eventually took form in San Francisco in the fall of 1951.
In effect, this chapter called for the re-conceptualization of Chiang’s postwar Japan 
policy as discourse as it denaturalized the common sense of ‘returning virtue for malice’. In 
other words, this chapter showed that there are limits to studying Chiang Kai-shek’s 
‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy as decisions that he made based on his 
beliefs. This chapter thus additionally showed that re-conceptualizing ‘returning virtue for 
malice’ as discourse could help us shed new light on a range of possible foundations, 
networks of power, discursive practices, and points of emergence that have been precluded 
by the causal decision-making approach to Chiang Kai-shek’s postwar Japan policy. 
Moreover, by analyzing the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ beyond Chiang’s 
individual belief, this chapter showed the representation of Chiang as a benefactor even
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‘outlived5 Chiang himself as it resonated among the Japanese through the media, cultural 
artifacts, political rituals, and so on. In the chapters that follow, this study further traces the 
‘life’ of ‘returning virtue for malice’ by analyzing the rise, heyday, and decline of the 
discourse in connection with Japan’s recognition of ‘China’ under US hegemony between 
1948 and 1972.
Notes
1) Chiang Kai-shek was bom on 31 October 1887. Therefore, he was turning 88 in 1975. 
However, if one follows Chinese convention to count the year one was born, Chiang 
Kai-shek was 89 years old when he died.
2) The Shrine is located in a town called Koda, which is part of Nukata County, Aichi 
Prefecture, Japan. It stands on the premises of the headquarters of the Yamakage sect of 
Shinto called Kireigu.
3) Again, they are following the Chinese convention here. In other words, on Western 
calendar, Chiang would have been 99 years old.
4) The Monument stands on the premises of a Shinto shrine called the Iseyamako Daijingu 
of Miyazaki-cho, Nishi-ku, Yokohama, Japan.
5) The discourse of ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ originated from Japanese scholars of the 
late Tokugawa era (Oka 1970: 3). As the famous phrase ‘the raging billows of Western
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advance’ (seiryoku tozeri) indicates, those scholars had learned their ‘lesson that Western 
imperialism in neighboring China could spread and that it threatened great danger’ to 
Japanese national independence (Ibid.: 3-4). By the early Meiji period, many Japanese 
had begun to feel ‘some sense of solidarity with China’ (Ibid.: 4). These ‘(s)upporters of 
Sino-Japanese cooperation believed that together the two countries could defend their 
independence and resist the pressure of Western imperialism’ (Ibid.). For instance, in 
February 1875, Iwakura Tomomi, who was the principal advocate of the idea which was 
then known as the Nisshin teikei-ron (Kwan 1974: 10-18), argued that ‘Russia was the 
country to fear most among the various foreign powers. If China were annexed by 
Russia, the independence of Japan would be endangered’ (Oka 1970: 4). For another 
example, the direct influence of the argument for an ‘alliance’ against Western 
imperialists can be seen in Article 2 of the Treaty and Commercial Regulations between 
the Ching empire and Japan signed on 13 September 1871 (Ibid.; Sato 1974: 26; 1992: 
37). It provided ‘mutual good offices in case of a conflict of either with a third power’ 
(Tsiang 1933: 11-12). Interestingly, it was the Chinese side—especially Li Hung- 
chang—that was more enthusiastic about putting the ‘good offices’ article on paper 
(Ibid.: 10-14). The Japanese—like Plenipotentiary Date Muneki who started official 
negotiations in July 1871 and Foreign Minister Soejima Taneomi who exchanged 
ratifications in April 1873—had been pressured by Western powers, especially the
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United States, to get rid of the Article (Ibid.). Similarly, ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ was 
later tested again as Japan was approached by France for the possibility of forming a 
France-Japan alliance against the Ching empire during the Franco-Chinese conflict of 
1883-5. In spite of ‘very considerable temptation’ (Sims 1998: 3), the Japanese Foreign 
Minister, Inoue Kaoru, rejected the French overtures (Ibid.: Ch.5; Sims 1995, 1973: 42). 
In any case, apart from the fact that the Ching empire enjoyed military supremacy over 
Japan on paper (Sims 1998: 128), it can be argued that Japan’s foreign policy in the 
Meiji period was (at least partially) constrained by the discourse of ‘Sino-Japanese 
cooperation’ until the eruption of war between the two empires in July 1894. In fact, 
Western powers, such as France in the 1890s (Ibid.: 179-81), remained suspicious of 
Japan’s ‘special relationship’ with China—which was ‘inspired by the fact that Japan had 
extensively inherited Chinese culture in the past centuries and that the two countries 
belong to one race as distinct from the white Western nations’ (Kwan 1974: 10-11).
6) The Christian Century 39: 1803; for a slightly shorter English translation of the speech, 
see Furuya (1981: 830); for the official Chinese text of the speech, see Zhonghua 
Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui (1966a: Introduction); for semi-official Chinese and 
Japanese texts, see Chiang (1971a: 11-14, 1971b: 123-7, 1984: 3271-2; 1993: 126-30; 
2005: 261-6); for an early Japanese translation entitled ‘Do not return violence for 
violence’ (Bo wo motte bo ni mukuyuru nakare), see Chiang (1947: 3-8); for a later
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Japanese version with the title ‘Returning malice with virtue’ (Urami ni mukuvuru ni 
toku wo motte seyo\ see Inaba (1970: 10-12); for the Japanese versions misusing 
‘returning virtue for malice’ in the place of ‘do good to all men’—very much like Ho’s 
(1974: 187-9) 19 January 1951 speech in Japan, George K. C. Yeh’s 20 February 1952 
statement to the Japanese delegation (Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui 1996b: 
4; Chang and Huang 1968: 351), and Chang Chun’s (1980: 128-9) 24 February 1952 
speech act towards the Japanese plenipotentiary—see Okubo (1972: 111-15), Lin (1984: 
50-3), Nakamura (1995: 59), and Matsumoto (1996: 96-100).
7) There have been mixed views on the question of who wrote this speech. On the one hand, 
Chiang Kai-shek wrote in his diary that he had to take up his own pen on the late night 
of 14 August 1945 due to his speech writer Chen Pu-lei’s sickness (Furuya 1975: 37-8; 
Huang 1994: 429; Nomura 1997: 368). On the other hand, Chiang’s former chamberlain, 
Zhang Lingao (1995: 35), later recalled that it was written by Chen Pu-lei, Director of 
the Second Department of the Office of Chamberlains. According to Zhang (Ibid.), after 
the speech, Chen Pu-lei commented that writing a speech had never been smoother in his 
entire career than this time. At any rate, as Wang Dongfang (1992: 36) points out, 
although Chen Pu-lei was the ‘organizer and processor of Chiang’s thoughts’, many of 
important documents of the Nationalist Party nonetheless were written by Chiang 
himself. Customarily, Chiang used to either orally bounce his ideas off Chen who then
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processed them on paper or first draft his ideas on paper so that Chen could subsequently 
edit them for him (Ibid.). In any case, statements were never finalized without Chiang’s 
approval (Ibid.).
8) Here, the author translates *yide baoyuan' as ‘returning virtue for malice’ rather than 
‘meet(ing) resentment with inner power’ (Waley 1938: 189), ‘requiting injury with 
kindness’ (de Bary et. al 1960: 26), ‘retum(ing) good for evil’ (Hsu 1990: 48; Rose 
2005: 44), ‘repaying violence with virtue’ (Wakamiya 1999: Ch. 7), or ‘returning malice 
with virtue’ (Iguchi 1971: 110; Deans 2002a: 91; 2002b: 167). He does so because of the 
following reasons: 1) The word ‘de1 is generally translated in English as ‘virtue’ rather 
than ‘inner power’ (which is Waley’s innovative translation), ‘kindness’ (which can be 
more reasonably translated as lreri* or ‘erf in one Chinese character), or ‘good’ (for 
which the character ‘shari1 is more suitable); 2) As for the interpretation of ‘yuan', while 
the word ‘malice’ compensates the moral aspect which ‘resentment’, ‘injury’ (for which 
a more appropriate Chinese character would be ‘shang’), and ‘violence’ (the Chinese 
equivalent of which would be the character ‘bao’) lack, it still somewhat highlights the 
dialectical nature of the Chinese proverb without falling into the trap of using ‘evil’ or 
‘vice’ (both of which can be better represented by the character V); 3) The use of the 
verb ‘return’ and the preposition ‘for’, instead of ‘repay’ and ‘with’, prevents one from 
reversing the original order of Chinese characters—that is, ‘de' or ‘virtue’ followed by
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yuan’ or ‘malice’.
9) In connection with proponents of ‘returning virtue for malice’, it is interesting to see that 
Okamura Yasuji at the time served as military advisor for Sun Chuan-fang who was 
Okamura’s student at the Japanese Militaiy Academy (Inaba 1970: 2-3; Tobe 1999: 38). 
In other words, during the Northern Expedition, Okamura helped Sun defeat Chiang Kai- 
shek, for whom Okamura later not only inculcated the discourse of ‘returning virtue for 
malice’ but also secretly organized a group of Japanese military advisors—the white 
group (baituan)—after the war (Nakamura 1995; Yang 2000). However, at an earlier 
stage of the Expedition, Okamura had attempted to bring rapprochement between Sun 
and Chiang (Hatano 1988: 230).
10)Soong Ai-ling had not only professionally served Sun Yat-sen as his aide but also 
personally dated him before she left the post for her younger sister Ching-ling who 
eventually married Sun by overcoming a generation gap between them (Seagrave 1985: 
136; Chen 1993: 237; Kamimura 1971a: 55; Hosaka 2003: 208). Interestingly, it was 
also she who went between Chiang Kai-shek and her youngest sister Mei-ling (Seagrave 
1985: 258; Hosaka 1999:130; Chen 1993: 238).
11) In addition to those names mentioned in my main text, Chiang Kai-shek’s itinerary 
included meetings with his own contacts in Japan—such as his former superior General 
Nagaoka Gaishi—as well as Sun Yat-sen’s ‘old friends’—like Akiyama Teisuke, Umeya
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Shokichi, Shibusawa Eiichi, Mori Tsutomu (Kaku), and Yamamoto Jotaro (Chang 1980: 
22; Furuya 1981: 224-5; Hosaka 1999: 131; Uno 1962: 206).
12) For the minutes of the talk taken by Sato, see Kamimura (1971a: 192-7). For the Chinese 
translation of Sato’s minutes published in the May 1928 issue of the Japanese journal 
Seikai Orai, see Chang (1980: 26-33). For a much briefer Chinese version which slightly 
differs from the Japanese version both in emphasis and tone, also see Chang (Ibid.; 23-4) 
and Tong (1952: 117-8).
13) It is interesting to note that Chiang Kai-shek met with President of South Manchurian 
Railway Company Yamamoto Jotaro on more than one occasion during his stay in 
Japan—for example, on 6 November 1927, the day after Chiang met Tanaka to discuss 
issues related to Manchuria-Mongolia and Chang Tso-lin (Chang 1980: 25). Yamamoto 
was the one whom Tanaka had sent to Beijing a month earlier in order to negotiate the 
Manchuria-Mongolia issue privately with Chang Tso-lin. The so called ‘Yamamoto- 
Chang agreement’—on the construction of five new railroads and a purchasing plan for 
the railroads in the Three Eastern Provinces (Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning) which were 
then under Russian influence—had been secretly reached as a result in October 1927 
(Kamimura 1971a: 224-30; Seki 1963: 294-6; Iriye 1965: 173-84; Morton 1980: 103-6). 
Interestingly enough, upon his return from Japan, Chiang Kai-shek, like Sun Yat-sen, 
stated that he would consider Japan’s special status in Manchuria (Seki 1963:297).
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14) The conference was held at the new home of Chiang Kai-shek and Soong Mei-ling. The 
site of this preparatory conference was just an epitome of the polarization of power 
around Chiang Kai-shek at the end of 1927.
15) In terms of those Japanese who eventually managed to survive in the postwar era as 
proponents of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ Japan policy, it is 
noteworthy that Minister Plenipotentiary Yoshizawa Kenkichi—Sun Yat-sen’s ‘old 
friend’ Inukai Tsuyoshi’s son-in-law and (later) foreign minister—played an important 
role in connection with this historical context. In the spring of 1928, it was the job of 
Yoshizawa—who paid a visit to Nanjing as the first minister ever to do so in August 
1927 in the midst of the notorious Eastern Conferences of 1927 (Iriye 1965: 156-7; 
Kamimura 1971a: 194; Yoshizawa 1958: 88-9)—to persuade Chang Tso-lin to leave 
Beijing for Fengtian (Shenyang) before the second phase of Chiang Kai-shek’s Northern 
Expendition reached Beijing (Yoshizawa 1958: 89-91; Kamimura 1971a: 252-9; Seki 
1963: 304-5; Iriye 1965: 210-11; Morton 1980: 123; Wilbur 1983: 182; Usui 1971: 127- 
8; Ikei 1982: 156; Gaimusho 1954: 99). Subsequently, in the spring of 1929, it was 
Yoshizawa who diplomatically settled the Jinan Incident of May 1928—a clash between 
Chiang’s Northern Expedition troops and Tanaka’s Second Shandong Expedition forces. 
Interestingly, as Yoshizawa prepared for negotiations, he was assisted by two other 
advocates of ‘returning virtue for malice’, namely, Okazaki Katsuo and Iguchi Sadao—
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Foreign Minister and Vice Foreign Minister of the Yoshida cabinet, who were behind 
bilateral peace negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek's regime on Taiwan in April 1952—at 
the Japanese Consulate in Shanghai (Yoshizawa 1958: 93). Moreover, it was through the 
good offices of the aforementioned ronin Tsukuda Nobuo—whose hometown, like 
Yoshizawa, was Takada (Jyoetsu), Niigata Prefecture where Chiang Kai-shek received 
his military training—that Yoshizawa’s (1958: 94-5) negotiations with Chiang’s regime 
accelerated. Soon after the settlement of the Jinan Incident Yoshizawa servedas Japanese 
Plenipotentiary when Tokyo diplomatically recognized Chiang Kai-shek’s regime on 3 
June 1929. Furthermore, one year after being depurged, Yoshizawa (Ibid.: 296-7) 
resumed his diplomatic career as the first Japanese Ambassador to Taipei in 1952 at the 
request of Foreign Minister Okazaki Kazuo, the former junior colleague of Yoshizawa’s 
as mentioned above.
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3
The rise of ‘returning virtue 
for malice’ and US 
hegemony in East Asia 
1948-52
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the author argues that Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ 
postwar Japan policy as discourse made Nationalist China on Taiwan culturally 
intelligible for the Japanese (Walker 1984, 1990; Weldes et al. 1999), thereby 
facilitating Tokyo’s diplomatic recognition of Taipei as the legitimate government of 
China in 1952. In the process of making his argument, the author shows that Japan’s 
diplomatic recognition of the Nationalist regime on Taiwan as ‘China’ constituted a 
major component of the Cold War in East Asia under US hegemony. Put differently, 
this chapter traces the hegemonization of the United States in East Asia and the 
indispensable role the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse played at the inception of 
the Cold War.
However, it is not the intent of this chapter to suggest that the discourse 
constituted the necessary and sufficient condition for Japan’s recognition of the 
Republic of China (ROC) as the legitimate government of China in 1952. For instance, 
in addition to Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘prestige’, American influence such as John Foster
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Dulles’ staunch anti-communism also played a crucial role in bringing the conclusion 
of the bilateral Treaty of Peace into reality (Chang 1980: 127; Chen 1999: 323). 
Similarly, in addition to President Chiang’s ‘magnanimous’ consideration (Yoshida 
1957: 71-2,1967: 136-8), such American pressure as the ratification process of the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty in the US Senate constrained Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru 
to make his ‘greatest sacrifice’ for regaining Japan’s independence—namely, the 
recognition of Nationalist China (Ibid.; Kosaka 1968: 60-1, 2000: 61-2). In fact, Taipei 
attempted to put pressure on Tokyo via Washington at every critical juncture of 
bilateral negotiations (Chen 2000), although such ‘external pressure’ from Washington 
was arguably used by Tokyo to achieve its own goal of choosing Taipei over Beijing in 
any case (Yuan 2001). Moreover, the controversial ‘Yoshida letter’ as ‘a product of 
American pressure’ also constrained Japan to negotiate peace with Taipei (Lee 1976: 
26-28), even though Tokyo still could have pulled out of bilateral negotiations after 
having its independence confirmed by the ratification of the San Francisco peace treaty 
in the US Senate on 20 March 1952 (Eto 1980: 184, 2004: 243). Furthermore, 
American influence in terms of ‘the key to Japanese economic growth’ was most 
decisive for Japan’s recognition of Nationalist China while there were several other 
factors at work (Dower 1979: 413; Yin 1996). In short, although the American 
influence in the context of the Cold War clearly constrained Tokyo as the dominant 
interpretation suggests, it nonetheless did not determine Japan’s recognition of 
Nationalist China. Therefore, in this chapter, the author complements the dominant 
interpretation by claiming that it would have been more difficult for Tokyo to 
recognize Taipei without the discursive effect of ‘returning virtue for malice’.
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In order to defend this argument, the author first describes the constitutive 
process of the making of the ‘San Francisco system’—‘the international posture Japan 
assumed formally when it signed a peace treaty with forty-eight nations in San 
Francisco in September 1951 and simultaneously aligned itself with the cold-war 
policy of the United States through the bilateral Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
Security’ (Dower 1993b: 4)—that subordinated the independence of Japan to US 
hegemony in East Asia (Ibid.: 11-12). The author highlights how American and 
Japanese elites collaborated to construct the Cold War in East Asia, through which 
Washington and Tokyo pursued hegemony and independence respectively. More 
specifically, the author describes how the ‘reverse course’—or the ‘(c)hange around 
1948 in US Occupation policy from placing priority on the demilitarization and 
democratization of Japan to making Japan a bastion against communism in the Far 
East’ (Hook et a l 2001: xxv, 2005: xxix)—was interconnected with the 
‘independence’/‘revival’ of Japan and the outbreak of the Korean War during the 
formation of the ‘Western bloc’ in East Asia. The author then points out ironic 
consequences of the Korean War in Japan before demonstrating how the subsequent 
acceleration of the ‘reverse course’ led to an Anglo-American agreement not to invite 
‘China’ to the San Francisco Peace Treaty in the fall of 1951. The author then turns to 
the ‘Yoshida letter’ of 24 December 1951—which, much like the discourse of 
‘returning virtue for malice’, was a by-product of the Anglo-American ‘agreement to 
disagree’ over ‘China’. The author subsequently sheds light on the ‘Yoshida letter’ as 
an American instrument to facilitate the ratification of the San Francisco Peace Treaty 
and to outmaneuver the British rival in influencing Tokyo’s selection of ‘China’ for a
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complementary bilateral-peace treaty. Here, the author shows how the text mostly 
drafted by an American lawyer named John Foster Dulles territorially (re)defmed 
‘China’ in terms of modern or Western sovereignty and how it constrained Tokyo to 
negotiate with Taipei. Moreover, the author highlights how Prime Minister Yoshida 
himself took advantage of ‘his letter’ to meet domestic and international challenges he 
faced at the time. In short, the author focuses on the ‘reverse course’ and its 
implications for the multilateral segment of the ‘San Francisco system’ in the making, 
the ongoing process of which was followed by the bilateral arrangement between 
Tokyo and Taipei, at the inception of the Cold War in East Asia.
More importantly, the author subsequently shows how the discourse of 
‘returning virtue for malice’ facilitated Japan’s recognition of ‘China’ under US 
hegemony, thereby bridging the bilateral and multilateral processes of the ‘San 
Francisco system’ in the making. The author does so by closely examining the bilateral 
Treaty of Peace negotiations between the Republic of China and Japan in the spring of 
1952. The author traces the rounds of talks between the two sides that utilized the 
representation of Chiang Kai-shek as the benefactor to whom the Japanese must repay 
‘a debt of gratitude’ for his ‘magnanimous’ postwar Japan policy. More specifically, 
the author demonstrates how the moral discourse provided a common language with 
which the two sides discussed issues such as the naming of the bilateral treaty, 
Japanese war reparations, and the scope of applicability in relation to the sovereignty 
of ‘China’. While the author shows the moral discourse played an indispensable role 
for settling these key issues, he particularly stresses the significance of its effect on 
naming the bilateral agreement ‘the Treaty of Peace'. Here, the author mainly draws
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on former Chief of the Treaty Bureau Nishimura Kumao’s account (1971: 320, 371) as 
well as Michael M. Yoshitsu’s work based on his interviews with Japanese officials 
including Nishimura (1982: 81-2). The author in turn shows how the discourse of 
‘returning virtue for malice’ helped to make the Japanese delegation agree to name the 
treaty that of peace—thereby virtually granting its recognition to the Nationalist 
regime as the legitimate government of China—against the will of Prime Minister 
Yoshida. In a sense, the author contrasts the aforementioned ‘Yoshida letter’ with the 
‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse that articulated Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘China’ in 
terms of traditional or Eastern morality. In this way, the author traces the process of 
‘naturalizing’ Japan’s diplomatic recognition of Chiang Kai-shek’s regime on Taiwan 
as ‘China’ in the making of the Cold War in East Asia. Finally, this main discussion is 
followed by the conclusion in which the author reiterates his argument and briefly 
previews the following chapter.
3.2 The ‘San Francisco system’ in the making: ‘Asianizing’ the Cold War
The Cold War in East Asia: the ‘reverse course * from China and NSC 13/2. In March 
1947, the United States began to delineate the ‘Cold War’ with the enunciation of the 
so-called Truman doctrine which was designed to ‘contain’ Soviet quest for world 
domination. Similarly, the National Security Council (NSC) on George F. Kennan’s 
advice issued NSC 13/2 for the Asia-Pacific in October 1948 (Kennan 1967: 368-96). 
NSC 13/2 set in motion the remilitarization of Japan as the bastion of US security 
policy in East Asia, rather than China, in order to fight against Moscow and
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communism (Ibid.; Hosoya 1993: 114; Drifte 1983: 50-6; Buckley 1992: 30-1; Tanaka 
1997: 34-8; Sakamoto 2000: 4-7).
In terms of international relations in East Asia, the shift of emphasis in 
American security policy can be attributed to American frustration and pessimism 
towards China. It largely resulted from George C. Marshall’s unsuccessful attempt to 
get Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong to a cease-fire and form a coalition government 
(Tsou 1963; Kubek 1963). Whether or not there was a Tost chance’ for Washington 
and Mao to reach an accommodation (Tucker 1996: 217-8; Cohen et al. 1997: 71-115), 
the frustration and pessimism eventually took the form of the so-called China White 
Paper which was announced by Washington in August 1949. In the meantime, Mao’s 
Chinese Communist party (CCP) rose to power in mainland China as Chiang’s 
Ruomintang (KMT) or Chinese Nationalist Party retreated to Taiwan. In October 1949, 
one month after Moscow destroyed Washington’s monopoly on nuclear weapons as it 
set off its first atomic explosion, Mao finally proclaimed the birth of the Peoples’ 
Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing. Furthermore, in February 1950, Beijing and 
Moscow signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance 
against the West—that is, ‘the resumption of aggression and violation of peace on the 
part of Japan or any other state that may collaborate with Japan’ (Goncharov et al. 
1993: 260). By then, the aforementioned NSC 13/2 was well under way only to be 
accelerated by the Korean War.
In terms of the US occupation of Japan, NSC 13/2 can be characterized as a 
manifestation of the so-called ‘reverse course’ (1) (Welfield 1988: 71; Schonberger 
1989: 150; Schaller 1997: 17; Aldous 1997: 215). The term ‘reverse course’ (gyaku
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kosu) was first coined by the Japanese press in late 1951. Over the years of 
contestation (Ibid.: 5-6; Dower 1993b: 5 n. 2; Finn 1992: 348-9 n. 17), the ‘reverse 
course’ has been generally accepted as change in the emphasis of Washington’s 
occupation policy from promoting democracy to remilitarizing Japan as ‘a bastion 
against communism in the Far East’ (Hook et al. 2001: xxv, 2005: xxix). This change 
was ‘a gradual modification’—rather than ‘a sharp U-tum’—of US occupation policy 
towards Japan, which Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) General 
Douglas MacArthur subtly adopted under increasing pressure form Washington (Sims 
2001: 258). In this gradual process, conservative power elites in Japan ‘worked deftly 
through American individual and organizations pursuing compatible agendas to 
counter Occupation reform efforts they considered excessive or ill-advised’ (Angel 
2001: 77). It was this ‘interconnection’ between the ‘domestic’ and the ‘international’ 
(Dower 1993b), through which the Japanese elite and a powerful American 
organization like the American Council on Japan (ACJ) were able to influence Kennan 
and the production of NSC 13/2 (Welfield 1988: 71; Schonberger 1989: 150; Schaller 
1997:17).
In sum, the ‘reverse course’ form China was the path on which Washington 
constructed the ‘Cold War’, and it was interwoven with the Japanese project of 
‘independence’. Therefore, NSC 13/2, which sketched the ‘Cold War’ in the Asia- 
Pacific, was the constitutive product of such interaction. By the same token, the 
outbreak of the Korean War—the first ‘hot’ war in Cold War history—on June 25, 
1950 can also be interpreted in ibis light.
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The 'reverse course ’ to the Korean War: the constitution o f  the ‘independence ’ and 
‘revival' o f Japan. The North Korean assault on the South—which had been planned 
since March 1949 (Goncharov et at, 1993: 213)—was partially motivated by the 
‘revival of Japan’ and its economic and military relations with South Korea under 
American auspices (Cumings 1993:48). Similarly, the ‘Japan problem’ held high 
priority among the factors favoring Chinese Communist intervention in the Korean 
War (Whiting 1960: 157). In fact, Premier of the CCP Zhou Enlai listed holding an 
international conference for a peace treaty with Japan as one of five conditions for a 
peaceful settlement of the Korean War (Chen 2001: 89). Furthermore, Washington’s 
‘decision to proceed independently to the conclusion of a separate Japanese peace 
settlement, involving the indefinite retention of an American military presence in Japan 
in the post-treaty period’, in Kennan’s view (1967: 395), ‘had an important bearing on 
the Soviet decision to unleash the attack in Korea’. Accordingly, Japan’s independence 
under American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific posed a serious threat to Pyongyang as 
well as Beijing and Moscow, which formed a Sino-Soviet alliance against Japan and its 
collaborators as mentioned earlier. Put differently, the ‘revival of Japan’ or ‘reverse 
course’ in the hands of the Americans was a ‘problem’ for the communist camp, and it 
was one of the reasons why the Cold War turned ‘hot’ for the first time in history.
With hindsight, the origins of the ‘revival of Japan’ can arguably be traced back 
to the key role Ashida Hitoshi played in the 1940s. First, in 1946, Ashida—the then 
chairman of the lower house committee reviewing the draft of the postwar Japanese 
Constitution (eventually promulgated in November 1946 and put into effect in May 
1947)—played a significant role in altering the ‘peace clause’ or Article 9 on the
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renunciation of war by dexterously inserting two phrases into the original draft of the 
Constitution (McNelly 1987; Sissons 1961; Stockwin 1999: Ch.10; Welfield 1988: 63- 
5; Drifte 1983: 40; Pyle 1996a: 8-11; Otake 1992: 93-7). The so-called ‘Ashida 
amendments’ were intended to make possible the interpretation that war and a resort to 
force are not forbidden for self-defense purposes (Ashida 1951: 21-3). Secondly, in 
September 1947, Ashida—who assumed the post of Foreign Minister in the Katayama 
coalition-govemment—‘invited’ Washington to keep its military bases in Japan in 
exchange for Japan’s recovery of sovereignty as stated in the so-called ‘Ashida 
memorandum’ (Shindo 1979, 1986b; Hata 1976; Drifte 1983; Miura 1996a; Tanaka 
1997; Sakamoto 2000). Although it was a failed attempt by Ashida (2), who 
corresponded with General Eichelberger in the name of his liaison officer (Suzuki 
1973), it in effect set terms for the US-Japan security arrangement four years later 
(Yoshida 1957: 114). In this sense, Ashida paved the way for the ‘reverse course’ by 
which Japan’s quest for independence and US hegemonic interest in the Asia-Pacific 
constituted the Korean War.
By January 1950, as Ashida intended, General Douglas MacArthur in Tokyo 
publicly announced the ‘new interpretation’ of Article 9 of the Constitution (Ikei 1982: 
240). In his Message for New Year’s Day, MacArthur reiterated that the renunciation 
of war does not negate the right of self-defense against unprovoked attack. 
Subsequently, following in the footsteps of Ashida, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru 
also pursued Japan’s ‘subordinated independence’ from the Allied occupation in May 
1950 (Dower 1979: 369-414; Miura 1996b: 288-90). Yoshida instructed Finance 
Minister Ikeda Hayato (3), who was heading for Washington on an economic
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mission—to secretly offer the United States ‘the possibility of post-treaty bases’ in 
Japan in exchange for the conclusion of an early peace treaty (Dower 1979: 374). On 
May 3, Ikeda had a confidential meeting with Joseph M. Dodge (4)—an architect of 
the ‘reverse course’—in Washington. In this meeting, held less than three weeks after 
Washington issued its famous NSC 68 of April 14, 1950 (5) Ikeda not only conveyed 
but also embellished Yoshida’s message as he even attempted to ‘pressure the United 
States into a peace treaty by veiled references to the possibility that the Soviets might 
offer a peace treaty in advance of the United States and include in that offer the return 
of Sakhalin and the Kuriles’ (Schonberger 1989: 244; Miyazawa 1991: 38). 
Accordingly, just as the communist leaders in East Asia constructed their insecurity in 
terms of a ‘resurgent’ Japan under the wings of American ‘imperialism’, Japan 
certainly had begun to link its ‘sovereignty’ to the American hegemonic project of the 
‘reverse course’/ ‘containment’ in the Asia-Pacific.
At the same time, the United States was encouraged by the initiatives from 
Tokyo. From June 17 to 27 in 1950, Washington dispatched John Foster Dulles— 
Advisor to Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson—to Japan and South Korea. Dulles 
was accompanies by John M. Allison, Director of the Bureau of Northeast Asian 
Affairs, and Harry F. Kern who was the principal organizer of the influential American 
Council on Japan (ACJ). (6) His mission was ‘to get a first hand grasp of the 
complexities of security policy in the Pacific in order to proceed with the peace treaty’ 
with Japan (Schonberger 1989: 246). On June 22, ‘the most important development’ in 
US-Japan relations during the visit, as Dulles described to Kern who set it up (Cumings 
1992: 48-9; Toyoshita 1995: 115, 1996: 166), began to unfold. It was on the same day
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Dulles had a frustrating meeting with Yoshida, who was unrushed and reluctant to 
discuss security issues seriously. Yoshida had already begun to think that Tokyo had 
committed a rash act by playing the trump card of post-treaty bases (Watanabe 1999: 
172-4). Nevertheless, Dulles was far from returning empty-handed. Through Kern’s 
arrangement in Tokyo, Dulles had an opportunity to informally discuss ‘Japan’s role in 
the Cold War structure of Asia’ with the ‘well-informed Japanese’ (Davis and Roberts 
1996: 39-41), who represented a broad spectrum of the Japanese elite such as the 
Imperial Household, the National Rural Police, the Ministry of Finance, and the 
Minitry of Foreign Affairs. (7) Concurrently, Dulles persuaded General MacArthur to 
give up his idea of maintaining American troops on a ‘temporary’ basis as the first step 
to create a neutral Japan and start facing the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s demand—that was 
‘to use Japan as a primary base in case of a global war with the Soviet Union’ 
(Miyasato 1990: 197-8). Consequently, on June 23 or two days before the outbreak of 
war in Korea, MacArthur prepared a memorandum which stated that ‘(t)he entire area 
of Japan must be regarded as a potential base for defensive maneuver with unrestricted 
freedom reserved to the United States’ (US Department of State 1976: 1227). This 
memorandum laid the foundation of American strategy towards the Pacific during the 
Cold War (Schonberger 1989: 247). The subsequent outbreak of war in Korea 
embossed this reality of an already-divided Asia, which had been latent for some time. 
Therefore, in this sense, the Korean War integrated the Asia-Pacific into the Cold War 
that had first emerged in Europe (Yahuda 1996,2004; Gaddis 1997: 54-84).
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The Korean War reversed: the domestication o f the Cold War in Japan. The irony of 
the Korean War was the fact that the communist camp paradoxically fostered the 
‘revival of Japan’ which it attempted to contain by resorting to force. In other words, 
the ‘reverse course’ in US occupation policy towards Japan accelerated as a result of 
the Korean War. It was in this paradoxical sense that the international war was 
domesticated in Japan as shown by the following consequences of the Korean War 
(Igarashi 1985; Sakamoto 1987; Takemae 1992: Ch. 5).
First, Japanese Emperor Hirohito’s ‘oral message’ regarding the ‘purged’ was 
sent to Dulles in Tokyo on 26 June 1950—the second day of the Korean War. It was 
conveyed by Marquis Matsudaira Yasumasa, one of the ‘well-informed Japanese’ with 
whom Dulles had a meeting four days earlier (Schonberger 1989; Davis and Roberts 
1996; Cumings 1993; Bix 2000; Hata 1994; Toyoshita 1995, 1996; Miura 1996a; 
Masuda 1999; Masumi 1998). In this message, Hirohito suggested Dulles utilize ‘the 
older people, the majority of whom have been purged’ for the ‘most valuable advice 
and assistance’ on ‘the detailed provisions of a peace treaty’ (US Department of State 
1976: 1236-7). In fact, the de-purging of prewar Japanese elites by the American 
authorities in Tokyo started taking place in the fall of 1950. Interestingly, the de­
purged, many of whom were well aware of their raison d ’etre as Cold War ‘watch­
dogs’, subsequently found their way back into Japanese politics to accommodate 
themselves to US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific for decades to come. The other side of 
the same coin was the so-called ‘Red purge’—the massive elimination of left-wing 
officials from government and labor unions, which coincided with the aforementioned 
‘de-purge’ of militarists and ultra-nationalists. The ‘de-purge’ and ‘Red-purge’ of
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Japanese elites following the outbreak of the Korean War was a vivid manifestation of 
the acceleration of the ‘reverse course5 that dictated US occupation policy in Japan at 
the time (Baerwald 1959: 99).
Secondly, violence on the Korean Peninsula—a security dilemma involving 
Japan—accelerated the ‘remilitarization’ of Japan under occupation. Most obviously, 
in August 1950, despite the ‘peace clause’ of the Constitution, Japan established a 
75,000-man paramilitary force called the Police Reserve Corps that included many ‘de­
purged’ Imperial Army officers (Wada 1995: 227-8). The Police Reserve Corps was 
later enlarged to become the Safety Force in 1952 and finally renamed the Self- 
Defense Forces (SDF) in 1954. Here, one of the ‘well-informed Japanese’ by the name 
of Kaihara Osamu, who had discussed security issues with Dulles a couple months 
earlier, interestingly played a key role in the process of forming the Police Reserve 
Corps (Davis and Roberts 1996: 42). Kaihara later assumed the post of Secretary- 
General of the National Defense Council. Accordingly, the Korean War triggered ‘the 
“reverse course” of police reform’ in Japan under occupation (Aldous 1997: 215).
Thirdly, the eruption of the Korean War also discredited communist 
sympathizers in Japan, who advocated that an ‘overall peace’ and trade with mainland 
China were indispensable for the independence of the Japanese economy (Sakata 1986). 
Mao’s entry into the War further reinforced this negative effect (Ibid.). As a result, the 
conflict in Korea weakened the position of influential opposition-groups such as the 
National Diet Members’ League of Sino-Japanese Trade Promotion (Chunichi Boeki 
Sokushin Giin Renmei) that had just passed a bill to promote trade with Communist 
China in April 1950 (Ibid.: 94). As mentioned earlier, pushing Japan to sign the
140
‘overall-peace’ treaty, which the Japanese opposition strongly supported, was one of 
reasons why the communist camp resorted to force in Korea (Cumings 1993: 48-51; 
Wada 1995: 230-3; Igarashi 1985: 48-50; Whiting 1960: 156, Chen 2001: 89; Kennan 
1967: 395). However, the mobilization of the Korean War ironically tipped the balance 
of Japanese domestic politics towards signing the ‘separate peace’ treaty—that is, 
without the participation of the communist countries.
In short, the Korean War mobilized at least partially against the ‘revival of 
Japan’ brought ironic consequences in Japan. First, leftist officials were massively 
‘purged’ while militarists and ultra-nationalists were ‘de-purged’ by the occupation 
authorities. Second, remilitarization was further carried out in the name of the Police 
Reserve Coips. Third, the communist sympathizers who called for an ‘overall’ peace 
were politically undermined while the political position of those who promoted a 
‘separate peace’ was boosted. As a result, the ‘revival of Japan’ or the ‘reverse course’ 
in US occupation policy was accelerated to make a Japanese ‘bastion’ against 
communism in the Far East.
‘China' on the ‘reverse course ’ from San Francisco: the ‘Dulles-Morrison agreement \ 
In the fall of 1950, Washington embarked on institutionalizing the ‘reverse 
course’/4Cold War in the Far East’. In September, US President Harry S. Truman 
officially announced that he had authorized the State Department to open discussions 
with other nations regarding a peace treaty with Japan based on seven principles 
delineated by Dulles—including the waiver of reparations claims and omission of all 
restrictions on Japanese rearmament among others. In January 1951, Dulles, now
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Special Representative of the President in charge of negotiating the Japanese Peace 
Treaty and the Pacific security treaties, left Washington on an extensive negotiation 
tour. His mission was ‘to secure the adherence of the Japanese nation to the free 
nations of the world, and to assure that it will play its full part in resisting the further 
expansion of communist imperialism5 (Welfield 1988: 49-50). For instance, on 6 
February 1951 in Tokyo, following Hirohito5s advice mentioned above, Dulles 
consulted three purgees (although Ishii had already been depurged)—Hatoyama Ichiro, 
Ishibashi Tanzan, and Ishii Mitsujiro, the first two of whom later became Prime 
Minister except for Ishii who became Deputy Prime Minister—about Japan's security 
under the auspices of the ACJ (Ishii 1976, 1998; Masuda 1993). However, it was in 
London that the ‘reverse course’ to San Francisco got bumpy for Dulles. It was at this 
juncture that the ‘reverse course5 from China seemed to come full circle as Washington 
once again grappled with the old ’China question5. Fortunately, Washington had 
learned its lessons from its own experience in the 40s and it was prepared to tackle the 
‘question5 much more cunningly this time.
Nevertheless, Washington and London could not reach any agreement as to 
which ‘China5—either the PRC in Beijing or the ROC in Taipei—should be invited to 
sign the multilateral peace treaty with Japan (Hosoya 1982, 1984; Lowe 2000, 2001). 
Unlike the majority of international society which recognized Chiang Kai-shek’s 
Nationalist regime in Taipei, Britain had already recognized Mao Zedong’s 
Communist regime in Beijing as the legitimate government of China in January 1950. 
On the other hand, the United States was the linchpin of Chiang Kai-shek’s legitimacy 
in international society, even though the utility of the Nationalist regime had declined
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significantly in the eyes of the Americans since late 1947. More hazardous for 
Washington was the fact that Mao had already crossed the Yalu to fight the US-led 
United Nations (UN) forces. By the same token, Sino(PRC)-American relations had 
already been severely strained by Truman’s earlier decision to ‘neutralize’ the Taiwan 
Strait on 27 June 1950. To Mao’s surprise, Truman dispatched his Seventh Fleet to the 
Strait, thereby forestalling Mao’s plan to ‘liberate’ Taiwan as early as July 1950 
(Tucker 1983; Chen 2001). Accordingly, there still was a great distance to be covered 
between Washington and London, and Anglo-American negotiations over the old 
‘China question’ inevitably came to a deadlock by June 1951.
It was on 19 June 1951 Prime Minister Clement Atlee and his cabinet finally 
approved the ‘answer’ for this ‘question’ which Dulles and British Foreign Secretary 
Herbert S. Morrison had agreed in London on 6 June (Schonberger 1986: 64-5; Yuan 
2001: 146). In the so-called ‘Dulles-Morrison agreement’ (Hosoya 1982, 1984, 1986), 
it had been agreed to invite neither Beijing nor Taipei to sign a multilateral peace- 
treaty with Japan and to let Tokyo come up with its own answer for the ‘China 
question’. According to this arrangement, the Chinese—who had fought the Japanese 
for eight years—were not to be included among the 52 nations invited to the San 
Francisco Peace Conference in the fall of 1951. Consequently, the fact that London 
could not push Beijing in the Peace Treaty Conference made the British ‘realize that 
they must function within boundaries decided in Washington’ (Lowe 2000: 182). In 
return, Washington had to ‘placate’ London by agreeing with Great Britain that neither 
the PRC nor the ROC be invited to the Peace Conference (Schaller 2001: 40). Due to 
the multilateral nature of the Treaty Conference, it was in the best interest of the
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United State not to be excessively dictatorial with such an important ally as Great 
Britain (Lowe 2000: 182).
Nonetheless, in this agreement to disagree over ‘China’ so to speak, the United 
States still emerged with the upper hand over Great Britain. More specifically, rather 
than endowing the Allies’ Far Eastern Commission with the authority to decide the 
Chinese counterpart for Tokyo’s bilateral peace, London was outmaneuvered to make 
a concession to Washington’s position—giving Tokyo the ‘freedom’ to make peace 
with a Chinese government of its own choice (Dingman 1975: 124-6; Hosoya 1984: 
73-5, 1986: 11-3; Yuan 2001: 146-7). In fact, it was exactly where Dulles wanted the 
negotiations to settle since he already had the Japanese agree to sign a treaty with 
Taipei prior to the Anglo-American negotiations (Schonberger 1986: 63; Chen 2000: 
27). To this end, the ‘trump card’ Dulles played was to remind his British counterpart 
‘that the peace treaty would not only have to be signed but also ratified by the U.S. 
Senate’ (Lowe 2001: 74). In effect, as indicated above, this ‘trump card’ helped Dulles 
shelve the ‘China question’ for the time being and pass the buck to Tokyo.
Thanks to Dulles’ successful separation of the Japanese peace treaty from the 
‘China question’, the road to San Francisco was cleared. On 8 September 1951, the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty was singed between Japan and 49 countries. It was not an 
‘overall peace’ since three nations—the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia— 
refused to endorse the Peace Treaty without the presence of Communist China. 
However, in this ‘separate peace’ settlement, Nationalist China on Taiwan was 
informally involved as it was consulted by Washington in the process of drafting the 
Treaty (Rankin 1964: 116; Dower 1979: 402). Furthermore, on the same day the Peace
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Treaty was signed, the Japanese delegation had to move hastily to the next location in 
the same city and sign the US-Japan Security Treaty with Washington. Due to the 
divided realities of Japanese domestic politics (Masumi 1988: 175, 1995: 21; Iwanaga 
1985: 23; Igarashi 1985: 51), only Yoshida from the Japanese ‘supra-partisan5 
delegation actually signed the Security Treaty along with the Americans at an 
American presidio. In the eyes of the British, such arrangement was merely the 
continuation of ‘the violent change in American policy, from preaching radical reform 
and disarmament to advocating rearmament and castigating all signs of weakness in 
combating communism’ (Lowe 2000: 187). For those Japanese who contributed to 
such violent change, on the other hand, sharing a ride on the ‘reverse course’ with the 
Americans meant a short cut for regaining their ‘sovereignty’ after six years of 
American occupation. Hence, Japan’s ‘independence’ was nimbly taking form and 
shape even though there still remained the burden of stopping the buck called the 
‘China question’.
The Dulles-Morrison ‘agreement’ reversed: Anglo-American rivalry Japanifled. 
Neither London nor Washington subsequently left Tokyo alone with the ‘China 
question’ as they had agreed. In fact, they both competed to influence Tokyo’s decision 
on which ‘China’ it should choose. Although Britain’s role in the process of peace­
making with Japan was secondary to Washington’s, its significance can hardly be 
dismissed (Kibata 1986: 185). The British attitude towards the ‘China question’ was 
‘the biggest factor’ which held Washington in check (Ibid.). More importantly, such
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Anglo-American conflict over Sino-Japanese relations had a significant impact on 
Japan’s decision to recognize a Chinese government (Schonberger 1986).
For example, Ester Dening, Head of the United Kingdom Liaison Mission 
(UKLIM) in Tokyo, in October 1951, suggested to Yoshida that Japan ‘establish a 
modus vivendi both with the authorities in Formosa (Taiwan) and with China proper’ 
(Cortazzi 2001: 61). Later in the same month, Yoshida informed the National Diet that 
the Japanese government would consider setting up overseas agencies in Shanghai as 
well as in Taipei mainly for the purpose of trade (Dower 1979: 405-6; Schonberger 
1986: 67; Yuan 2001: 148-9). This threw Washington into consternation. Under the 
pressure of Taipei’s immediate complaint and the pro-Taiwan members of the Senate 
(Yuan 2001: 190-1; Dower 1979: 406), the Truman administration sent Dulles on a 
mission to Japan again in December 1951. Dulles, accompanied by two influential 
Senators, forcefully ‘rolled back’ Tokyo’s earlier position in the form of the ‘Yoshida 
letter’ discussed below (Hosoya 1984: 291-294).
These attempts were derived from the different nature of British and American 
Asia policies. In terms of security, while the American ‘Cold War framework’ 
assumed that the Soviet Union and Communist China were inseparable, the more 
traditional British ‘power politics framework’ held that a coalition between Beijing and 
Tokyo could be played off against the ‘Russian threat’ (Hosoya 1982: 76-7; 1984: 288- 
9). As for economic considerations, on the one hand, the Americans facilitated the 
utilization of Japanese reparations as a means of gaining access to the resources and 
markets in Southeast Asia and compensating for Tokyo’s opportunity cost with 
mainland China (Yahuda 1996: 238-9, 2004: 195; Schaller 1985: 292-5). In contrast,
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the British were anxious to get Tokyo involved with mainland China since London 
perceived renewed Japanese competition in Southeast Asia as a threat to its economic 
interests (Lowe 2000: 179-81, 2000: 68-9; Hosoya 1982: 77, 1984: 289). Simply put, 
Washington drew the line between Tokyo and Beijing while London wanted Japan and 
mainland China to be tied both strategically and economically.
Thus, the Dulles-Morrison agreement began to drag anchor soon after the 
conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. While London hoped that 
rapprochement with Beijing would bring a peace-treaty with Japan and a truce in 
Korea, Washington perceived London as an element of instability for Sino-Japanese 
relations in the future (Dingman 1975: 134). It was this Anglo-American rivalry in 
East Asia which provoked the ‘China lobby’ in Washington and prompted Dulles to 
produce the ‘Yoshida letter’ of 24 December 1951 (Ibid.: 134-5).
The ‘Yoshida letter’: the ‘cast-iron guarantee’for ‘China’ on the ‘reverse course’. The 
turning point for Japan’s bilateral peace treaty with ‘China’ on the ‘reverse course’ 
came with the so-called ‘Yoshida letter’ of 24 December 1951, which Dulles ghosted 
for Yoshida to sign and. send back to him in Washington (Nishimura 1971; Hosoya 
1982, 1984, 1986; Hoopes 1973; Dingman 1975; Dower 1979; Yoshitsu 1982; Lee 
1976). It was handed to Yoshida when Dulles visited Japan with Senators John J. 
Sparkman and H. Alexander Smith of the Far Eastern subcommittee of the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, who had both arrived in Tokyo via Taipei. Although 
Dulles later accepted minor revisions requested by the Japanese (Finn 1992: 308; Yuan 
2001: Ch. 5), the notorious letter nonetheless had much resemblance to Dulles’ draft
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that was written in consultation with the Nationalist Chinese (Ishii 1986; Yin 1995, 
1996; Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui 1966a). The ‘Yoshida letter’ 
expressed Tokyo’s preparedness to conclude a bilateral treaty with Nationalist China, 
which occupied the ‘China seat’ in the United Nations, in conformity with the 
principles set out in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The letter also clarified that Japan 
had no intention to conclude a bilateral treaty with Communist China, which was in the 
midst of military confrontation with the UN in Korea. Furthermore, the ‘Yoshida 
letter’ significantly set the terms of the bilateral treaty in the following fashion:
‘The terms of such bilateral treaty shall, in respect of the Republic of 
China, be applicable to all territories which are now, or which may 
hereafter be, under the control of the Government of the Republic of 
China’ (US Department of State 1977: 1466; Nishimura 1971: 318-19; 
Yoshizawa 1973: 203-4).
The italicized phrase above consequently sowed the seeds of discord between Taipei 
and Tokyo during their bilateral-treaty negotiations in the spring of 1952, which nearly 
aborted because of the very wording regarding the scope of application. In any case, 
such a letter was necessary for Dulles to get himself out of the ‘sodden bog of 
McCarthyism and the “loss of China” frenzy’, which were mobilized by the ‘China 
lobby’ in Washington at the time (Dower 1979: 405).
It was such domestic pressure that prompted Dulles, a Republican ambassador 
appointed by the Democratic administration to represent ‘bipartisan’ politics in
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Washington, to hold Japan in check (Hosoya 1984; Umemoto 1986; Dingman 1975; 
Dower 1979). For instance, the robustness of such domestic pressure was demonstrated 
by a letter drafted by ‘Senator for Formosa’ William F. Knowland, who vehemently 
requested President Truman to clarify that a bilateral treaty between Japan and 
Communist China would be adverse to the best interests of both Japan and the United 
States. It quickly resonated in the Senate and was signed by 56 senators within 24 
hours. Moreover, such American agents of ‘Chinese’ influence as Senator H. 
Alexander Smith severely criticized the Truman administration from failing to 
coordinate Anglo-American policies toward the ‘China questions’, which allowed 
Yoshida to play them off against each other. In fact, Senator Sparkman, who had 
stopped over in Taipei before he joined Dulles in Tokyo to deliver the ‘Yoshida letter’, 
had already informed Foreign Minister George K. C. Yeh of Washington’s plan to play 
its ‘ratification card’ to outmaneuver London and persuade Yoshida to commit himself 
to a peace treaty with Taipei (Ku 1989: 263-4). Similarly, as in the case of the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty, Dulles consulted the Nationalist regime on Taiwan in the 
process of drafting the ‘Yoshida letter’ (Ishii 1986; Yin 1995, 1996; Zhonghua Minguo 
Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui 1966a). In short, the ROC influences on American politics 
combined with the virulent anti-communism of the period were central to the 
production of the ‘Yoshida letter’.
As for its implications for the status of Taiwan, the ‘Yoshida letter’ reflected 
the United States’ own security interests and its intention to reign in the Asia-Pacific. 
The Sino(ROC)-Japanese dispute over the word or in the aforementioned text was 
triggered by Dulles who switched it from the original word and between Taipei and
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Tokyo at the preparatory stage of bilateral negotiations sponsored by Washington 
(Chen 2000: 64-5). More specifically, although the Untied States had already agreed to 
the Nationalist Chinese use of the word and in the process of drafting the ‘Yoshida 
letter’ (Ibid.: 91; Yin 1995: 179-83, 1996: 232-43; US Department of State 1985: 
1241), Washington presented the text with the word or when Dulles handed it to 
Yoshida (Yin 1995: 184, 1996: 300). In addition, unlike Vice Foreign Minister Iguchi 
Sadao’s recollections (Yuan 2001: 162-3; Sakamoto 2001), Tokyo never
problematized the use of the word or with Dulles (Yuan 2001: 158-9). In the end, 
Taipei had to agree to disagree with Tokyo (and Washington) by producing Agreed 
Minutes stating that the expression ‘or which may hereafter be’ permits the 
interpretation 'and which may hereafter be’. This was the epitome of Washington’s 
‘clearly ambiguous’ position, that was to support Japan for renouncing its claim to 
Taiwan without specifying to whom it was being given (Hughes 1997: 17; Tai 2001: 
Ch. 4; P’eng and Huang 1976). In fact, in its preparatory talks with Taipei earlier in 
1951, the United States had clearly rejected the Nationalists’ initiative of ‘reverting’ 
Taiwan to the ROC (Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui 1966a: 297; Ishii 
1986: 29). At the same time, Washington had also rebuffed the British initiative of 
‘reverting’ Taiwan to Communist China (Hosoya 1984, 1986; Chen 2000; Yuan 2001). 
At any rate, American policy of ‘renouncing without reverting’ enabled Washington to 
(re)draw the line over the map of Imperial Japan.
For Yoshida, however, the game of ‘dividing and ruling’ was not over with the 
letter of 24 December 1951. Only three days after he sent the letter to Dulles, on 27 
December 1951, Yoshida quickly turned the issue over to General Matthew H.
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Ridgway—who had taken over from MacArthur as Supreme Commander—by 
conveying a memorandum for Dulles without any signature as he had been accustomed 
to fly a kite before putting sensitive policy into practice since the MacArthur era (Chen 
2000: 72-3; Yuan 2001: 159-60). It controversially expressed the dilemma posed to 
Tokyo by the lack of Anglo-American consensus on the ‘China question’ as well as the 
inevitability for an independent Japan to adopt its own China policy. (8) Yoshida 
purposely chose an informal path to evade taking formal responsibility for his action 
(Ibid.). In fact, when Sebald conveyed Dulles’ warning that grave consequences would 
follow if Yoshida deviated from the position stated in the letter of 24 December 1951, 
the Prime Minister casually dismissed it by playing dumb (ibid.). It was arguably 
Yoshida’s attempt to have more leeway for Japan’s ‘two Chinas’ policy or the 
‘separation of politics and economics’ in the future (Deans 1997; Chen 2000; Yang 
1992; Hosoya 1993; Soeya 2001).
At the same time, Yoshida utilized the letter of 24 December 1951 as a ‘double- 
edged’ instrument to simultaneously meet demands at the ‘two levels’ of domestic and 
international politics (Putnam 1988; Evans et al. 1993). Domestically, it was put to 
political use as gaiatsu (Yuan 2001: Ch. 5)—foreign pressure that provided support for 
Prime Minister in his struggle ‘to swing the balance in favor of controversial policy 
change’ (Schoppa 1997: 4). In other words, Yoshida used the letter, which was 
consistent with his own view (Yoshida 1957: 74), to realize his own China policy 
without taking any blame for it (Yuan 2001: Ch. 5). Like Washington, Tokyo desired 
to ‘carve’ East Asia so that Taiwan was separate from mainland China as demonstrated 
in the controversial wording regarding the scope of applicability mentioned earlier. In
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fact, some Japanese elites felt that the aforementioned ‘renouncing without reverting5 
approach would give Tokyo the casting vote on the status of Taiwan once Washington 
and London come to an agreement on the ‘China question5 (Chen 2000: 101). However, 
in the wake of domestic turmoil over the nature of Tokyo's peace treaty—that was 
whether to make peace with ‘one world5 or ‘two worlds5 (Watanabe 1985)—it was in 
the best interests of the Yoshida cabinet to prevent further domestic instability. In 
terms of the ‘China question5, it enabled Yoshida to avert domestic opposition which 
was constructing the ‘fear that Japan could not prosper without close relations with 
China5 proper (Dower 1979: 414; Sakata 1986). That is why Yoshida used the letter to 
blame the American hegemon for choosing to negotiate a bilateral treaty with 
Nationalist China, which nonetheless had been his own choice at the time (Yuan 2001: 
Ch. 5). More cunningly, Yoshida reversed this domestic fear for his own advantage in 
international negotiations with Washington. He demanded and successfully attained 
alternative economic benefits such as preferential access to the US-led global market 
for Japan's opportunity cost in mainland China (Ibid.: 156; Dower 1979: 413-4). 
Accordingly, Yoshida took full advantage of ‘his letter5 to meet both domestic and 
international challenges he faced at the time.
In any case, the ‘Yoshida letter5—Japan's ‘cast-iron guarantee5 to negotiate a 
bilateral treaty with Taipei rather than Beijing (Buckley 1992: 45)—was sent to 
Washington and received by Dulles on 7 January 1952. However, as he promised 
Yoshida (Ku 1989: 264; Schonberger 1986: 68-9), Dulles kept it private until the day 
after new British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill and Foreign Minister Anthony 
Eden left Washington where they had held talks regarding the ‘China question5. The
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letter was thus dexterously made public on 16 January 1952. In the eyes of Dulles, the 
new British Conservative regime ‘would not press the UK position strongly on Japan 
or expect it to prevail or feel aggrieved at the Japanese Government if it did not follow 
the UK line9 (Dulles Papers 1952), even though Eden afterwards complained that the 
publication of the ‘Yoshida letter9 immediately after their visit to Washington gave the 
wrong impression that they had agreed to its contents (Eden 1960: 22). The letter was 
revealed just in time for committee hearings on the ratification of the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty at the US Senate. Eventually, the Treaty was ratified on 20 March 1952. 
As a result, the ‘Yoshida letter9 greatly lost its credibility as Tokyo's ‘cast-iron 
guarantee9 to negotiate a bilateral treaty with Taipei more than one month before the 
conclusion of the bilateral treaty. Henceforth, it was the discourse of Chiang Kai- 
shek's ‘returning virtue for malice9 postwar Japan policy that helped to engage Tokyo 
in negotiation with Taipei. Put differently, the moral discourse helped to bridge the 
multilateral San Francisco Peace Treaty and the bilateral treaty between the Republic 
of China and Japan, the negotiations of which took place between 20 February and 28 
April 1952, as demonstrated below.
3.3 The discourse of * returning virtue for malice’: bridging San Francisco and 
Taipei
On 20 February 1952, the first day of Japan-ROC treaty negotiations in Taipei, 
Nationalist Chinese Foreign Minister George K. C. Yeh made his opening statement by 
referring to Chiang Kai-shek9 s ‘returning virtue for malice9 postwar Japan policy as
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follows (Chang and Huang 1968: 351-2; Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui 
1966b: 4-5, author’s translation):
‘In the past, my government explicitly pronounced its wish to make 
early peace with Japan on a number of occasions. Back on 15 August 
1945, in a radio broadcast to national and international audiences, 
President Chiang urged the Chinese nation to remember not evil against 
others (bunian jiue) and return virtue for malice (yide baoyuan) as he 
foresaw the necessity of Sino-Japanese friendship after the war. In a 
speech delivered on 18 June 1951, President Chiang also reiterated the 
policy advocated by Mr. Sun Yat-sen that stability in Asia would only be 
achieved if China and Japan—the two great neighboring powers of 
Asia—sincerely cooperate with each other. President Chiang said:
“Since V-J Day I have repeatedly stated that China would not adopt an 
attitude of vengeance against Japan. On various occasions, I have, both 
directly and indirectly, stress the necessity of the early conclusion of a 
treaty of peace with Japan on the basis of a reasonably generous policy”
The fact that we have a conference today is a clear indication of how we 
share the wish to restore peace between the two nations. We consider 
Far Eastern peace to be an indispensable part of world peace....The 
bilateral peace treaty that we hope to sign in the spirit of the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty would lay the foundation for future cooperation 
between the two nations.’
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Subsequently, it was also through the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice* that
Plenipotentiary of Japan, Kawada Isao, (9) replied to Foreign Minister Yeh (Ibid.: 5-6;
Chang and Huang 1968: 352, author’s translation):
‘In the past, unfortunate incidents successively took place between Japan 
and China. We certainly regret that they escalated into war against the 
will of the two peoples who sincerely wished for peace. Nonetheless, 
when the war finally ended, President Chiang nationally and 
internationally called for treating the enemy nation with a magnanimous 
attitude exactly as Plenipotentiary Yeh has just mentioned. Since then, 
the people of my country have been deeply moved and soberly reflective.
On behalf of my government and people, I’d like to take this opportunity 
to express sincere appreciation to the Chinese officials and people who 
genuinely responded to President Chiang5s call and treated Japanese 
expatriates with magnanimity and kindness. We firmly believe that 
making every effort to bring stability in Asia—especially through our 
contribution to the full economic recovery and prosperity of East Asia—
is the best way of returning President Chiang's noble virtue While the
contents of this treaty will be in conformity with the principles set out in 
the San Francisco Peace Treaty, we strongly hope to keep them as 
concise as possible...The San Francisco Peace Treaty is expected to 
have great political repercussions on peace and stability in East Asia
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once it comes into effect. Therefore, a speedy settlement of the bilateral 
treaty concerned is highly desirable.’
Kawada’s reply mainly reflected Tokyo’s apprehension about signing a bilateral treaty 
on the same terms as the San Francisco Peace Treaty. From the viewpoint of Tokyo, 
such a bilateral treaty as stated in Article 26 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, was not 
yet feasible in the absence of international consensus on the issue of Chinese 
representation (Nishimura 1971: 315). Thus, what the Japanese had in mind instead 
was to sign a ‘concise’ trade accord with the authorities of Formosa (Taiwan) and the 
Pescadores (Penghu) by settling ‘the disposition of property of Japan and of its 
nationals in the areas’ and its connection to ‘reparations’ as stated in Articles 4(a) and 
21 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty (Ibid.; Yoshida 1957: 76). Accordingly, there 
was a considerable gap between what Tokyo intended to return for Chiang Kai-shek’s 
virtue and what the Nationalist Chinese benefactor expected from the Japanese debtor.
It was for this gap that Japanese and Nationalist Chinese delegations spent 
more than two months of their time to fill in before they finally concluded the bilateral 
treaty on 28 April 1952. In fact, such a ‘Rashomon effect’—that ‘different states see 
the same situation very differently’ (Jervis 1996: 228)—was even reflected in the 
naming of the negotiations. While the meeting was referred to as the Sino-Japanese 
Peace Conference (Zhong-Ri Heping Huiyi) in Mandarin and English, it was called the 
Japan-ROC Treaty Conference (Nikka Joyaku Kaigi) in Japanese (Zhonghua Minguo 
Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui 1966b: 2; Ishii 1986: 308; Chen 2000: 79; Yuan 2001:206-7). 
Even though such an interpretive gap made the following negotiations thorny, a
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common language was fortunately provided by the discourse of ‘returning virtue for 
malice’ which in turn helped to bring an amicable settlement in the end. The mitigation 
of differences was informally carried out by former Premier Chang Chun, (10) Chiang 
Kai-shek’s Japan hand who was the de facto negotiator behind the scenes (Fu 1993: 
150; Chang 1980: 128; Zhong-Ri Guanxi Yanjiuhui 1991: 128; Chen 1999: 323; Ishii 
1989: 79). More specifically, it was Chang Chun’s narration of ‘returning virtue for 
malice’ with the Japanese that got the negotiations under way in February—by 
critically helping to define the bilateral treaty of peace—and put them back on the right 
track again in March. Put differently, it was the discourse of ‘returning virtue for 
malice’ through which both parties modified their differences and ultimately agreed to 
disagree as shown on the pages that follow.
The first round: an overall peace treaty v. a limited treaty. In late February 1952, as 
was the case with the naming of the conference, the two sides disputed whether or not 
they should use the word peace in the title of the bilateral treaty they were about to 
negotiate. On the one hand, Taipei wished to sign an ‘overall peace treaty’ with Japan 
and gain Tokyo’s recognition as the legitimate government of China proper with the 
same privileges as had been granted to the Allied Powers in the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty (Yuan 2001: 206-9). On the other hand, Tokyo insisted on a ‘limited treaty’ so 
that it could keep alive the possibility of normalizing relations with Beijing in the 
future while it attempted to ensure the ratification of the San Francisco Peace Treaty at 
the US Senate by going into negotiation with Taipei (Yoshitsu 1983: 77-8). Thus, the 
Japanese delegation entered the bilateral treaty negotiations with a six-article trade
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document roughly ‘patched together’ in less than a week (Yoshitsu 1983: 80; Ishii 
1988). In stark contrast with the ‘limited’ Japanese draft, Taipei drafted 22 articles for 
an ‘overall’ peace treaty (Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui 1966b: 8-22). 
While the Japanese draft did not necessarily contradict such contents of the ‘Yoshida 
letter’ as ‘the principles set out in the multilateral Treaty of Peace’, the Chinese draft 
closely followed the provisions of the San Francisco Peace Treaty (Yuan 2001: 211). 
Accordingly, the negotiations between the two governments stagnated from the very 
beginning over the title of the bilateral treaty. Obviously, they needed more than the 
‘standard’ language of English for the bilateral treaty to be constructively negotiated.
At this juncture, on 24 February 1952, Plenipotentiary Kawada consulted 
Chang Chun for a possible way out of the stalemate (Yuan 2001: 253 n. 34). In return, 
Chang Chun attempted to naturalize the bilateral treaty of peace for Kawada through 
the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ in the following way (Chang 1980: 128- 
32, author’s translation):
‘China and Japan are brother nations... .Father of China Mr. Sun Yat-sen 
along with President Chiang has led the Chinese Nationalist revolution 
and laid the foundation for long-term friendly cooperation between 
China and Japan. They have sought coexistence and mutual prosperity of 
the Asian peoples and pursued further to contribute to the idea of world 
peace.,,.President Chiang, in a radio broadcast, called for returning 
virtue for malice instead o f acting in retaliation towards the Japanese.
This kind of policy... was based on the traditional values of humaneness
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and righteousness held by the peoples of the Orient... The Sino-Japanese 
bilateral peace-treaty negotiations taking place this time are presenting 
us with an opportunity to reconstruct long-term cooperative relations 
between our nations by closing the wrong historical path from the past.
It can be achieved in a dignified manner—that is, through the traditional 
value of grand righteousness held by the peoples of the Orient. The 
authorities from both sides should be grateful for this invaluable 
opportunity. At the same time, we should be well aware of our great 
responsibility.5
Furthermore, Chang Chun took this opportunity to express Taipei’s indignation 
towards Prime Minister Yoshida5 s provocative comment about setting up overseas 
agencies both in Taipei and Beijing from the previous year (Dower 1979: 405-6; Yuan 
2001: 148-9)—which had resulted in Dulles5 visit to Tokyo with two influential 
members of the US Senate and the production of the ‘Yoshida letter5. Chang Chun 
strongly criticized Prime Minister Yoshida5s comment that had challenged Taipei’s 
legitimacy by referring to Oriental moral values as follows (Chang 1980: 128-32, 
author’s translation):
‘...Prime Minister Yoshida’s incoherent reply in the National Diet and 
his letter to Mr. Dulles seemed to come from two different individuals.
This kind of diplomatic quibbling by the Japanese authorities gave my 
government and people no choice but to hold your sincerity in deep
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suspicion...From the viewpoint of Oriental moral values, it is certainly 
difficult to understand how the Japanese authorities could inflict wounds 
on the most friendly state in need—the Government of the Republic of 
China—by making a contemptuous comment accusing it of being a 
province, thereby rejecting its status as the sovereign state of China 
proper.’
Chang Chun then set the following conditions for the bilateral treaty negotiations on 
behalf of his government (Chang 1980: 131, author’s translation):
‘During the bilateral treaty negotiations, the Japanese government must 
respect the following two points: 1) The Republic of China is the 
sovereign state of China proper, a member of the Allies which defeated 
Japan, and its international status must not be taken lightly as it has been 
incorrectly regarded as a provincial government by Japan; 2) The Treaty 
of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan must be based on the 
text of the San Francisco Peace Treaty both in name and reality, and it 
must be an overall peace treaty as the Republic of China sees fit rather 
than a limited treaty as Japan has insisted.’
Kawada expressed no objection to Chang Chun (1980: 132). Two days later, when the 
formal negotiations resumed on 26 February, Kawada secretly agreed to use the word 
peace if the contents of the treaty as a result of negotiation doubtlessly constituted a
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magnanimous peace treaty or President Chiang’s spirit o f noble virtue (Zhonghua 
Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui 1966b: 25; Yuan 2001: 212; Ishii 1986: 308). By 1 
March, Kawada formally agreed to the use of the word peace in the title of the treaty 
(Ishii 1986: 306-7; Yuan 2001: 218; Chen 2000: 80).
In Tokyo, despite the pressure Taipei attempted to exert on Yoshida via 
Washington (Chen 2000: 80-1), the Prime Minister was furious about the concession 
Kawada made without prior consultation (Yoshitsu 1983: 81). While Yoshida’s anger 
might have been about losing a ‘trump card’ to get concessions from Taipei (Chen 
2000: 80; Yuan 2001: 212), such discontent could also have been a manifestation of 
Tokyo’s effort to follow the terms set by the ‘Yoshida letter’ of 24 December 1951 
(Ibid.: 215; Ishii 1989: 82). The letter had only specified Tokyo’s preparedness to 
negotiate a bilateral treaty with Taipei, but not necessarily the bilateral treaty of peace 
between Japan and ‘China’ (Yoshitsu 1983: 78; Ishii 1988: 206; 1989: 80-1). In fact, 
the possibility of negotiating the ‘bilateral peace treaty’ had been discussed between 
John Foster Dulles and Yoshida in December 1951 (Yoshitsu 1982: 77), but Yoshida 
had not completely agreed with Dulles (Ishii 1989: 80-5). While Yoshida had agreed 
with Dulles that Tokyo would negotiate a bilateral treaty with Taipei, Yoshida had 
only wished to sign a ‘concise’ treaty to resume economic relations with Nationalist 
China (Nishimura 1971: 315; Yoshitsu 1982: 78; Yuan 2001: Ch. 5). For that reason, 
Tokyo had only conditionally authorized Plenipotentiary Kawada to negotiate the 
bilateral treaty of peace. More specifically, although the Japanese delegation in Taipei 
was authorized to negotiate the treaty of peace, it nonetheless had been instructed to 
request Tokyo’s prior consent (Ishii 1989: 85; Yuan 2001: 216).
161
More significantly, Plenipotentiary Kawada’s concession to negotiate the 
bilateral treaty of peace in Taipei—without Prime Minister Yoshida’s approval in 
Tokyo (Yoshitsu 1982: 81-2)—had long-term consequences on Japan’s China policy. 
The discursive formation of the Japanese Plenipotentiary’s concession to negotiate the 
bilateral treaty of peace made it practically impossible for Tokyo to settle with a 
bilateral treaty that is ‘limited’ to economic issues between Japan and ‘the authorities 
of Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores (Penghu)’. Put differently, while Prime 
Minister Yoshida wished to avoid signing the treaty of peace until the ‘China question’ 
was territorially resolved (Nishimura 1971: 320), Plenipotentiary Kawada’s concession 
to repay a ‘debt of gratitude’ to Chiang Kai-shek made it more difficult for Tokyo to 
conclude the treaty of peace with ‘one total China’ in the future (Lee 1976: 28; 
Yoshida 1957: 76; Yoshitsu 1982: 82-3). That is why, for many years, Yoshida 
regretted that Kawada had made such a critical concession without his approval 
(Nishimura 1971: 371). Accordingly, the Japanese Plenipotentiary’s concession in 
Taipei—to which the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ contributed—played a 
critical role for making Tokyo’s recognition of Taipei possible as it closed off Tokyo’s 
option to enjoy trade relations with both Taipei and Beijing without having diplomatic 
relations for the time being.
The second round: 'reparations’ v. ‘China’ as an ‘Allied Power\ The Chinese 
Nationalists’ successful use of ‘returning virtue for malice’ also taught the Japanese to 
conversely mobilize the discourse for their own advantage. In fact, the Chinese 
Nationalists were hoist by their own petard to the extent that they themselves were
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forced to practice what they rhetorically disseminated in the first place. More 
specifically, as demonstrated in the following texts, Tokyo’s repetitious reference to 
Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘magnanimous’ Japan policy facilitated Taipei’s renunciation of its 
claim to war reparations in exchange for Tokyo’s legitimation of the Nationalist 
regime on Taiwan. Put differently, the diffusion of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ 
discourse in forming ‘China’ under American hegemony was not linear and uni­
directional, but curvilinear and multi-directional.
In concrete, such reverse diffusion of the discourse during the negotiations can 
be traced back to 7 March 1952. On the grounds of the ‘magnanimous attitude towards 
the Japanese’ and the necessity of future Sino-Japanese cooperation, Chief Delegate 
Kimura Shiroshichi demanded that Taipei delete the whole article on war reparations 
from (the ROC draft of) the Treaty as the following (Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti 
Yanjiuhui 1966b: 90-1; Yuan 2001: 226; Yin 1996: 260-1, author’s translation):
‘...not because we deny our responsibility to pay reparations, but 
because the application of this Article (12 of the ROC draft) is 
problematic. Most of the issues concern the (Chinese) Continent. Time 
is not yet ripe for us to discuss these matters. Prime Minister Yoshida, in 
his letter to Dulles, has already indicated the difficulty involved in 
immediately applying the Treaty of Peace under negotiation to the 
Continent....It does not, however, call into question the status of your 
government as the sovereign state of China proper and the legitimate 
government of China. Besides, Article 21 (rather than 26) of the San
163
Francisco Peace Treaty especially provides that China is entitled to the 
benefits of Articles 10 and 14(a)2 (on Japan’s renunciation of special 
rights and interests in China and Japanese reparations to the Allied 
Powers). We feel that Chinese interests are already appropriately treated 
by the San Francisco Treaty. Thus, it is unnecessary for us to re­
prescribe them here.... Article 14(a)2 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty 
already clearly prescribes that Japan renounce most of its property, 
rights, and interests in the territories of your nation. The burden thrown 
upon Japan by this Article (14(a)2 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty), 
from the Japanese people’s point of view, is already more than they can 
bear. If the Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan re­
prescribes such an Article, it would be more than enough to disturb the 
Japanese people. Therefore, on the ground of your magnanimous 
attitude towards the Japanese and in consideration of the necessity of 
future Sino-Japanese cooperation, we request you to delete this Article 
(12 of the ROC draft).’
Subsequently, on 14 March, Kimura’s effort to reverse the circulation of the 
'magnanimity’ discourse was followed by Chief of the Asia Bureau of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. The Chief, Wajima Eiji, had just arrived in Taipei a few days earlier. 
He had brought with him Tokyo’s second draft of the Treaty composed of 13 articles 
that accompanied the original six trade-related articles of the first draft (Chen 2000: 
81-2; Yin 1996: 257-73; Ishii 1988, 1993: 84-6; Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti
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Yanjiuhui 1966b: 113-4; Yuan 2001: 212-5). As in the case of the ‘Yoshida letter’, his 
delivery of the new draft can be interpreted as a product of American pressure on 
Tokyo originating from Taiwan (Chen 2000: 80-2). It is especially plausible 
considering the fact that the new draft was conspicuously inclined towards Taipei’s 
position compared to other Japanese drafts, even though the Japanese dexterously 
managed to submit another pressure-free draft by the time they resumed negotiations in 
Taipei (Yuan 2001: 215). Nonetheless, Wajima, dispatched as a ‘trouble-shooter’ to 
speed up the hitherto sluggish negotiations, paid a visit to Chang Chun and expressed 
his view on the issue of reparations. In this meeting (Ishii 1989: 86), Chang narrowed 
the agenda down to the two remaining issues in dispute: 1) Japanese war reparations; 
and 2) Article 21 of (the ROC draft of) the Treaty, which Taipei drafted after Article 
26 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty to attain the same advantages granted for the 
Allied Powers, In return, Wajima demanded that Taipei delete the provisions 
concerning war reparations and offered to give economic aid in exchange as follows 
(Ishii 1989: 86-7; 1993: 85; Yin 1996: 275, author’s translation):
‘The formula of Article 14 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty is not 
workable in reality. Therefore, we would like China to judge form 
President's magnanimous mind unveiled at the end of the war. It would 
deeply move our people. At the same time, it would enable the 
Nationalist government not to necessarily dwell on the concept of 
reparations and consider the intention behind Article 2 of our original
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draft (on economic cooperation between Japan and the Republic of 
China on Taiwan).’
However, on this occasion, Chang Chun not only brushed it off by pointing out the 
stubborn character of the Chinese people from the Continent but also counter-argued 
that Taipei could not waive its claim for reparations when none of the other Allied 
powers had done so (ibid.).
Nevertheless, by 17 March, the ‘magnanimity’ discourse slowly began to take 
effect on the Chinese Nationalists. In concrete terms, Plenipotentiary Yeh this time 
offered to shelve the reparations issue by deleting (not the whole clause as requested 
by the Japanese but) the word promptly from Article 12, thereby preserving the right to 
demand the reparations in the future (Zhonghua Minguou Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui 
1966b: 117-8; Yin 1996: 268). In return, Kawada, like his colleagues, attempted to 
reverse the diffusion of the ‘magnanimity’ discourse in the following fashion (ibid.: 
119-20; Ishii 1987: 167, 1989: 88; Yin 1996: 269, author’s translation):
‘...We have always thought that a huge amount of the property we left 
behind on the continental part of your country, which was worth tens of 
billions of US dollars, would sufficiently cover the reparations. If you 
now demand that we compensate for the cost of repairing the damage 
done by making available the services of our people in production, 
salvaging, and other work for your nation, then it is certainly not
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consistent with the magnanimous intention towards Japan that you 
publically claim time after time.’
Yeh subsequently replied that his government’s magnanimous intention towards Japan 
was manifested by the very fact that his government was only demanding as much 
reparations as other Allied Powers even though the war against Japan cost his nation 
more than any other Allied Power in terms of damage and suffering (Zhonghua 
Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui 1966b: 120; Yin 1996: 269). Kawada then proposed 
the following ‘face saving’ solution to the reparations problem, as suggested by Chang 
Chun on 15 March (Ishii 1989: 87, Yin 1996: 279), in terms of the ‘magnanimity’ 
discourse (Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui 1966b: 121, author’s 
translation):
‘If you now demand that we fulfill the obligation to compensate for the 
cost of repairing the damage done by making available the services of 
our people in production, salvaging, and other work for your nation, then 
it would be difficult for our people to believe that you are magnanimous.
This would obviously have tremendous influence on Sino-Japanese 
relations in the future...// would still be possible for us to first 
acknowledge that we are under obligation to pay reparations to your 
nation. You could then, in a separate statement, voluntarily declare that 
you have the right to demand reparations. However, you could also
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voluntarily waive the benefit o f  the service compensation in the same 
statement. ’
For the time being, Yeh sarcastically replied that the service compensation essentially 
meant no reparations in the first place (ibid.). On the same day, Yeh demanded 
American Ambassador Karl L. Rankin to put pressure on Tokyo via Washington (Chen 
2000: 83-4; Yuan 2001: 220, 227-8; Yin 1996: 273-4). Unfortunately, Taipei could not 
convince Washington to press Tokyo because the United States did not want to be held 
responsible for the reparations issue by those states still preparing to negotiate bilateral 
treaties with Japan (Chen 2000: 84). Besides, very much like Tokyo, Washington never 
intended to support Taipei on the provisions that might benefit Communist China in 
the future (Yuan 2001: 251). Nevertheless, there remained only three days before the 
US Senate was to ratify the San Francisco Peace Treaty. More simply, Japan’s ‘cast- 
iron guarantee’ to negotiate a bilateral treaty with Taipei as expressed in the ‘Yoshida 
letter’ was about to become null and void. As an influential ‘constituent’ in 
Washington in its own right, Nationalist China readily realized that Japan’s postwar 
‘independence’ was just around the comer with or without ‘free China’. For that reason, 
Chang Chun urgently contacted Kawada on the late evening of 18 March in order to 
see him on the next morning (Yin 1996: 276). Especially after the unsuccessful attempt 
to resort to American pressure, the informal role Chang Chun played in contacting 
Kawada proved to be critical in jump-starting the negotiations on the next day.
On 19 March 1952, as the result of Chang Chun’s input from his meeting with 
Kawada earlier on the same day (Chen 2000: 83-4; Ishii 1989: 88; Yin 1996: 276-7;
Yuan 2001: 228), Plenipotentiary Yeh ‘magnanimously’ offered to make the ‘utmost 
concession’ to the Japanese. He did it by ‘surreptitiously’ bargaining with his Japanese 
counterpart Kawada as follows (Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui 1996b: 
131; Yin 1996: 277-8, author’s translation):
‘The purpose of my proposal is to break the deadlock so that we can 
expect to conclude the Treaty at an early date. I have not yet requested 
instructions from my government regarding this proposal. Therefore, I 
hope you will strictly keep this secret by all means. Ever since we 
started negotiating the Treaty of Peace, you have repeatedly asked us to 
sympathize with the Yoshida cabinet in having to deal with domestic 
difficulties. We have also wanted to express magnanimity and friendship 
to the Japanese people. Nonetheless, the difficult situation in which my 
government has had to cope with various domestic affairs has been no 
different from yours....This is to express our greatest sincerity towards 
the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace. Moreover, it arises from the sense 
of responsibility that I have as a man entrusted with a mission to 
negotiate the Treaty. I thus solemnly propose the following to 
Plenipotentiary Kawada: 1) We are willing to voluntarily forfeit our 
demand for the “service compensation” under the condition that you 
accept our claims on the rest of the unsettled matters in the draft of the 
Treaty; 2) If you accept the above proposal, it must be phrased in such 
way that you first acknowledge you are under obligation to pay
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reparations as well as the “service compensation ”, the benefit o f which 
we wnll voluntarily waive afterwards. I must re-emphasize that the 
foregoing formula is yet to be suggested to my government. However, I 
firmly believe that it would not be difficult for my government to agree 
to each item of such a formula if you can unconditionally accept it. As 
Plenipotentiary Kawada is well informed, the aforementioned formula 
by which we waive the benefit of the service compensation is the utmost 
concession that we could ever make.’
In contrast to his indifferent reaction to the same initiative taken by Kawada two days 
earlier, Yeh this time turned around and took a ride on the common Confiician 
language of ‘magnanimity’ in order to conclude the Treaty of Peace. Yeh did it by 
practically repeating Kawada’s initiative, which consequently obliged Kawada to meet 
Yeh’s conditions in exchange. More specifically, on the day before the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty was to be ratified by the US Senate, Taipei was so anxious to close the 
deal with Tokyo that it offered the ‘utmost’ trade-off between such unsettled issues as 
Tokyo’s war reparations and Taipei’s status as the legitimate government of China as 
well as an Allied Power (Gaimusho Hyakunenshi Hensan Iikai 1969: 813; Ishii 1985: 
75, 1986: 309-10; 1989: 88; Yin 1996: 276-9; Yuan 2001: 228-9; Chen 2000: 84; Zhu 
1992: 29; Lo 1999: 159-60). It was clear to Taipei that Japan was coming off the hook 
of the ‘Yoshida letter’, the ‘cast-iron guarantee’ to negotiate a bilateral treaty with the 
Nationalist regime on Taiwan, once the San Francisco Treaty was ratified in 
Washington. Therefore, for Taipei, the renunciation of war reparations was the
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‘utmost’ strategy to gain recognition as ‘China’ in the international community. For 
Tokyo, it was an opportunity to favorably settle the reparations issue once and for all 
by taking advantage of divided realities between Taipei and Beijing (Yuan 2001: 233; 
Yin 1996: 297-8). It was, however, the discourse of ‘magnanimity’ or ‘returning virtue 
for malice’ that provided the common language for both sides to negotiate 
constructively and come to an agreement with the 25 March 1952 communique.
The third round: Taiwan *and’ China v. Taiwan ‘or’ China. Unfortunately, the 
Japanese authorities in Tokyo turned the tables on the agreement reached between the 
two parties in Taipei. With hindsight, the authorities in Tokyo were most intransigent 
vis-a-vis the ‘limited’ scope of applicability as stated in the ‘Yoshida letter’ of 24 
December 1951. More particularly, on the evening of 27 March 1952, Tokyo ordered 
its delegation in Taipei to demand the deletion of the following italicized phrase in the 
‘Note from the Japanese Plenipotentiary to the Chinese Plenipotentiaiy’ (Zhonghua 
Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui 1966b: 174-5; Yu 1970: 56):
‘In regard to the Treaty of Peace between Japan and the Republic of 
China signed to-day, I have the honor to refer to the understanding 
reached between us that the terms of the present Treaty shall, in respect 
of the Republic of China, be applicable to all the territories which are 
now, and which may hereafter be, under the control of its Government, 
and the understanding shall not in any way prejudice the sovereignty o f 
the Republic o f China over all its territories.’
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Tokyo’s disapproval of the agreement reached in Taipei demonstrated that the 
bargaining position of Nationalist China had been greatly undercut after Washington 
ratified the San Francisco Peace Treaty on 20 March 1952 (Dower 1979: 411; Yan 
1996: 305). More specifically, Washington’s guarantee for Japan to regain its 
‘sovereignty’ gave Tokyo a free hand to opt for granting only ‘limited’ recognition to 
the Nationalist regime on Taiwan (Ibid.; Dower 1979). At the same time, such 
disapproval by the Japanese authorities revealed a perceptual gap over the reparations 
issue between Tokyo and its delegates in Taipei (Yin 1996: 285). In sum, Tokyo’s 
disapproval reflected its ambition to achieve both the waiver of reparations and 
‘limited’ recognition of the ROC (Yuan 2001: 235), rather than trading the latter for 
the former as had been agreed in Taipei. In a sense, it was Tokyo’s comeback to untie 
what had been tied by the discourse of ‘magnanimity’ or ‘returning virtue for malice’ 
in Taipei.
Thus, when Plenipotentiary Kawada visited Chang Chun to explain the 
situation on 28 March 1952, Chang (1980: 133-5) again attempted to make a knot 
through the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’. As usual, he first framed the 
context in which the moral discourse could be circulated to have preferred effects. This 
time, Chang first made an objection to the Japanese officials’ provocative behavior that 
had been taking place in Tokyo such as the following (Ibid., author’s translation):
‘A few days ago, after he returned to Tokyo, Bureau Chief Wajima held
a talk with Chen Yan-tong, Advisor to the Chinese Mission in Japan.
Bureau Chief Wajima said, “There are many Japanese who are against
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signing a bilateral treaty with the Nationalist government. They think 
that the Nationalist government has already been forced to leave the 
Continent and cornered in Taiwan. They think that the international 
status of Taiwan is still unclear. Besides, there are no grounds that the 
Taiwanese are the people (nation) of the Nationalist government (state).
There are also quite a few members of the National Diet who think that 
it is not really a good idea, at this time, to sign a bilateral treaty with the 
Nationalist government. At the same time, internationally speaking, 
there are also quite a few countries that do not recognize the Nationalist 
government. Great Britain, which has close relations with Japan, is a 
prime example. Prime Minister Yoshida has dispatched Mr. Kawada 
Isao to Taipei to negotiate a bilateral treaty for he wished to express 
sympathy and friendship, but the Chinese side has not responded 
sympathetically to the Japanese side. If that is the case, Japan can also 
follow in the footsteps of Great Britain, and so on.” He then asked 
Advisor Chen to convey the contents of this talk to our government. As 
far as we’re concerned, all these statements were made to threaten us so 
to speak....’
Subsequently, Chang played the ‘history card’ by quantifying the damage and 
suffering the Chinese experienced during the war as follows (Ibid., author’s 
translation):
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‘In retrospect, China and Japan have had two wars in the (last) century.
The last war lasted for 14 years. Between 18 September (1931) and the 
end of the war (15 August 1945), the losses China suffered—speaking of 
just material losses for it is always difficult to estimate the immaterial— 
reached 30 million in terms of direct and indirect casualties among the 
Chinese people. The Legislative Yuan has already set up a committee to 
investigate property losses. According to its initial statistics, the figure 
has reached 80 billion US dollars. In addition, the deep involvement of 
Japanese troops made it possible for the Communist International to 
expand on the Continent. China was always the first to bear the brunt of 
all these influences of the war. It certainly is unbearable not only for 
China but any nation to meet with such calamity.’
Chang then put the collar of ROC-Japan cooperation on Kawada by emphasizing 
Chiang Kai-shek’s long-term vision and spinning specific points of dispute onto the 
discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ in the following fashion (Ibid., author’s 
translation):
‘...the traditional policy of Mr. Sun Yat-sen and President Chiang—who 
led the Chinese Nationalist revolution for several decades—was 
intended to end historical animosity between China and Japan and 
restore a hundred years of friendly and cooperative relations. President 
Chiang, on the ground of this national policy, unhesitatingly took the
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magnanimous line o f  ‘returning virtue for malice’ (yide baoyuan zhi 
kuanda fangzhen) towards Japan at the dawn of victory. How could he 
have made such an exceptional decision if he had not considered the 
long-term future and centennial interests of the two nations? His grand 
wishes should obviously be realized by our joint effort to conclude the 
bilateral Treaty of Peace this time. The Chinese side has already made a 
significant concession in order to reach an agreement. It can no longer 
make any concession. What it demands from the Treaty of Peace 
absolutely does not exceed the principles set out in San Francisco. On 
the other hand, the Japanese side not only wants to cancel or reduce the 
effects of the articles provided by the San Francisco Peace Treaty which 
the Chinese side is following, but also wishes to change their nature by 
inserting provisions that are not even provided by the multilateral Treaty. 
Prime Minister Yoshida9 s behavior has been ambiguous to say the least 
and the Japanese Foreign Ministry has been trifling with the contention 
of technical wording....To make the long story short, my government’s 
position on the bilateral Treaty of Peace has always been to make the 
following three points: 1) It must be the treaty of peace both in name and 
reality; 2) It must respect the status of full sovereignty that my 
government claims; and 3) It must provide for my nation the same terms 
as those provided for the Allied Powers, which are signatories of the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty. Ever since the end of the war, our President 
Chiang has always wished that the Treaty of Peace between China and
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Japan would make a good start for cooperative relations between the two 
nations and serve their long-term interests. However, President Chiang 
has been surely and deeply disappointed by the attitude of the Japanese 
government thus far....’
Accordingly, through the discourse of moral reciprocity, Chang Chun once again 
attempted to persuade Kawada to repay Japan’s ‘debt of gratitude’ to Chiang Kai- 
shek’s virtue and restore the moral balance between Nationalist China and Japan. More 
specifically, Chang Chun effectively mobilized the discourse of ‘returning virtue for 
malice’—which is reciprocal but ‘asymetric by design’—by going back to a particular 
point in history that put Chiang Kai-shek on the creditor’s side of the moral balance. In 
this way, Chang Chun morally ‘hierarchicalized’ ROC-Japan relations with Chiang 
Kai-shek as the creditor and the Japanese as the debtor. Apparently, Chang Chun’s 
narration of the discourse had an impact on the Japanese Plenipotentiary as he was 
deeply moved by it (Chang 1980: 136).
In fact, when Tokyo subsequently dispatched Wajima Eiji to Taipei again to 
reinforce its position in early April, Kawada did not fully conform to instructions from 
Tokyo. Here, Kawada stopped short of demanding Taipei delete all the provisions 
referring to the Continent and an article (Article 12) granting the ROC advantages 
provided by the provisions of the San Francisco Peace Treaty (Yuan 2001: 223-4). 
Instead, Kawada attempted to persuade Wajima and the authorities in Tokyo to modify 
their new (third) draft (ibid.). In the meantime, on 5 April, Taipei ‘threatened’ to 
oppose the American initiative to disband the Allied Council for Japan unless the
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Treaty of Peace was signed (Chen 2000: 86-7; Yuan 2001: 248; Yin 1996: 285). By 8 
April, the Japanese side took the initiative to kick-start bilateral talks by setting the 
agenda in terms of major and minor points to be negotiated (Yin 1996: 287). By 16 
April, both parties had already resolved all three major points that had been in dispute:
1) Article 12 regarding the ROC’s Allied-Power status; 2) Protocol on the treatment of 
Japanese war reparations; and 3) Exchange of Notes in regard to the scope of the 
applicability of the bilateral Treaty of Peace (Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti 
Yanjiuihui 1966b: 207-9). For the first point, Kawada agreed to refer to the relevant 
provisions (rather than principles) of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in exchange for 
re-phrasing the article in a more passive tone (Yuan 2001: 224; Zhonghua Minguo 
Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuihui 1966b: 168, 214-5). As for the second and third points, 
without Tokyo’s instructions (Ibid.: 256; Ishii 1986: 311; Yin 1995: 184, 1996: 301), 
Kawada accepted Taipei’s insistence to use the word and in the phrase of ‘be 
applicable to all the territories which are now, and which may hereafter be’ in 
exchange for Taipei’s concession to waive ‘all’ claims for reparations (Chen 2000: 91- 
2; Yuan 2001: 231; Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuihui 1966b: 243-7). 
Additionally, Taipei made the concession of dropping the aforementioned phrase of 
‘and the understanding shall not in any way prejudice the sovereignty of the Republic 
of China over all its territories’ from the same paragraph stating the scope of 
applicability (Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuihui 1966b: 218-20; Ishii 1986: 
311). Kawada then requested the authorities in Tokyo to approve the trade-off he had 
single-handedly made with Taipei (Ibid.: 285; Yuan 2001: 239; Yin 1996: 301-2). 
Nevertheless, on the following day— 11 days before the San Francisco Peace Treaty
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was to come into effect, the Japanese authorities in Tokyo disapproved Kawada’s 
request. Kawada tenaciously attempted to persuade his government again on the 
following day (Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuihui 1966b: 288), but Tokyo 
insisted on the precise terms set by the ‘Yoshida letter’ and prepared to dispute the 
scope of applicability with Taipei (Yuan 2001: 239-40).
At this moment of crisis, on 22 April, Prime Minister Yoshida—who was 
concurrently serving as Foreign Minister at the time—and Cabinet Secretary Okazaki 
Kazuo decided to send an ‘ultimatum’ to the Nationalist government while some high 
officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommended them to recall the whole 
Japanese delegation from Taipei (Ibid.: 240). More specifically, Yoshida and Okazaki, 
in consultation with Chief of the Treaties Bureau Nishimura Kumao, decided to permit 
Taipei’s interpretation of the scope of application using the word and in the Agreed 
Minutes while leaving the word or unchanged for the Exchange of Notes (Zhonghua 
Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuihui 1966b: 295-6). Such an iridescent (tamamushiiro) 
arrangement was engineered so that the Yoshida cabinet could escape any deliberation 
on the use of the word and in the National Diet (Chen 2000: 92). Accordingly, Tokyo’s 
‘ultimatum’ was designed to duck Japanese domestic scrutiny regarding the sensitive 
issue of the scope of application.
At the same time, the production of the ‘ultimatum’—for continuing rather than 
terminating the bilateral negotiations—was indirectly enforced by the pressure Taipei 
put on Tokyo via Washington once again (Ibid.). It is plausible especially considering 
the conciliatory nature of the ‘ultimatum’ as discussed above. More precisely, although 
Washington was hesitant to pressure Tokyo (Yuan 2001: 247-51), Tokyo was still
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sensitive to any possibility of exacerbating US-Japan relations in the future (Chen 2000: 
92). In fact, Washington was very much interested in seeing the early conclusion of the 
bilateral treaty between Taipei and Tokyo even though it did not directly express it to 
Tokyo until 24 April (Ibid.; Yuan 2001: 248-50). However, such American influence 
on Tokyo after the ratification of the San Francisco Peace Treaty should not be 
overrated for it merely produced the Japanese ultimatum, which the Chinese 
Nationalists found extremely distasteful and unacceptable.
Thus, when Plenipotentiary Kawada visited Chang Chun on 24 April 1952, 
Chang complained about the jingoistic style of Japanese diplomacy and took a gloomy 
view of further negotiations. According to the following excerpt from Kawada’s 
telegram to Tokyo (Yin 1995: 184-5; 1996: 302, author’s translation), Chang Chun 
deplored the fact that:
c... the Japanese government does not even authorize you to revise any 
wording (of the text). Moreover, you (Plenipotentiary Kawada) cannot 
even agree to any revision at all by the other side....Now, the Japanese 
government expects us to. reply to the ultimatum in terms of “all or 
nothing”. This kind of approach forces the Chinese side to lose face , and 
it reminds me of Japan’s China policy from the prewar era...unless the 
Japanese side changes its attitude, China must reconsider whether it is 
appropriate to continue negotiating with Japan. By the same token, I am 
extremely pessimistic about the conclusion of the treaty.’
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Subsequently, on 26 April, Kawada sent a telegram to Yoshida and advised him to 
make the following concession to meet Taipei’s demand (Yin 1995: 185; 1996: 302-3, 
author’s translation):
‘...in regard to finding a way out of the present deadlock by giving face 
to the Chinese side, the Nationalists government is anxious to have an 
arrangement that would allow it to make an announcement regarding the
thmaterialization of an overall compromise by the 28 (of April, 1952). In 
view of this arrangement, Japan would have to compensate for the 
ROC’s political loss if  the signing of the treaty does not take place by 
the above date. As for the Nationalist government’s counterproposal (for 
the scope of applicability), the Nationalist government wishes it to be 
relayed to the Japanese government. At the same time, the Nationalist 
government welcomes our comments as well as further negotiations on 
the matter of concern. The Nationalist government is confident as it has 
implied that it could easily have the support of the United States on the 
issue of the present dispute.’
On 27 April, following Kawada’s telegram, Tokyo sent its final compromise to its 
delegation in Taipei. On the one hand, Tokyo rejected Taipei’s counterproposal— 
which required Kawada to make a statement (regarding the scope of applicability using 
neither and nor or) rather than merely answering a question posed by the Chinese side 
(Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuihui 1966b: 313; Yuan 2001: 241; Chen
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2000: 93). On the other hand, it nonetheless accepted Taipei’s demand to delete such 
words as concern and no foundation from the ‘ultimatum’ which Kawada had 
presented to Yeh just four days earlier (Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuihui 
1966b: 314; Yuan 2001: 211-2). The ‘ultimatum’ had proposed that the following 
statement be made:
‘Chinese Delegate:
It is my understanding that the expression “or which may hereafter be” 
in the Note concerning the scope of application of the Treaty permits the 
interpretation “and which may here after be”.
Japanese Delegate:
I assure you that the concern expressed by you with regard to the 
expression in question has no foundation. It is my understanding that the 
Treaty is applicable to all the territories under the control of the 
Government of the Republic of China.’
On the same day—that is, one day before the deadline which Taipei set for Tokyo to 
save Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘face’—Japan finally agreed to the following revised version 
of its ‘ultimatum’ (The China Handbook Editorial Board 1952: 159; Yu 1970: 105-6; 
Takeuchi 1993:170; Takeuchi etal. 2005: 305):
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‘Chinese Delegate:
It is my understanding that the expression “or which may hereafter be” 
in the Notes No. 1 exchanged today can be taken to mean “and which 
may hereafter be”. Is it so?
Japanese Delegate:
Yes, it is so. I assure you that the Treaty is applicable to all the territories 
under the control of the Government of the Republic of China.’
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that Taipei had already agreed to show its ‘magnanimity’ 
and waive ‘all’ claims to reparations in paragraph 1(b) of the Protocol of the Treaty 
and Agreed Minutes No. 4 as follows (The China Handbook Editorial Board 1952: 156, 
159-60; Yu 1970: 98, 106-7; Takeuchi 1993: 161, 171-2; Takeuchi et a l 2005: 302, 
307):
‘As a sign of magnanimity and good will towards the Japanese people, 
the Republic of China voluntarily waives the benefit of the services to be 
made available by Japan pursuant to Article 14(a) 1 of the San Francisco 
Treaty.’
Japanese Delegate:
It is my understanding that since the Republic of China has voluntarily waived 
the service compensation as stated in paragraph 1(b) of the Protocol of the 
present Treaty, the only benefit that remains to be extended to her under Article
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14(a) of the San Francisco Treaty is Japan’s external assets as stipulated in
Article 14(a)2 of the same Treaty. Is it so?
Chinese Delegate: Yes* it is so.
Accordingly, the Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan, 
which was composed of 14 articles in the end, was signed on 28 April 1952. It was 7 
hours before the San Francisco Peace Treaty took effect. As a result, Japan became the
tVi47 state to recognize Nationalist China on Taiwan (as opposed to 26 countries that 
recognized Communist China on the mainland). Moreover, it precisely fell on the 
deadline Chiang Kai-shek had set for the conclusion of the bilateral treaty just as he 
wrote down his instructions on his translated-copy of the ‘Yoshida letter’ (Ishii 1986: 
312; Yin 1995: 182). The conclusion of the Treaty of Peace was the product of more 
than two months of turbulent negotiations in the Conference Room on the Second 
Floor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Taipei—which ironically happened to be 
the very room Plenipotentiary Kawada had used as his office during the Imperial era 
(Fu 1993: 142). In any case, Chiang Kai-shek’s face as the benefactor was saved by the 
moral debtor—the Japanese who returned Chiang’s virtue with virtue. Put differently, 
in return for Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘magnanimous’ policy towards Japan after World War 
II (now including the waiver of all claims to reparations), Tokyo ‘legitimated’ 
Chiang’s Nationalist regime on Taiwan by ‘iridescently’ recognizing it as ‘China’ 
under US hegemony.
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The end/beginning: the naturalization o f returning recognition for virtue. The 
conclusion of the Treaty of Peace was ritualized again in terms of Chiang Kai-shek’s 
‘magnanimous’ policy towards postwar Japan by Plenipotentiary Yeh in the following 
fashion (Zhunghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui 1966b: 331-2; Chang and Huang 
1968: 354-5, author’s translation):
‘Mr. Sun Yat-sen, Father of the Republic of China, advocated that 
stability in Asia could only be achieved by means of sincere cooperation 
between China and Japan—the two great neighboring powers of Asia.
On 18 June 1951, by following this policy, President Chiang stated:
“Since V-J Day I have repeatedly stated that China would not adopt an 
attitude of vengeance against Japan. On various occasions, I have, both 
directly and indirectly, stress the necessity of the early conclusion of a 
treaty of peace with Japan on the basis of a reasonably generous policy.”
Over the course of the negotiations which led to the signing of the 
Treaty of Peace today, I also followed their examples and approached 
the Japanese delegation with the same magnanimous spirit.’
Kawada replied as follows (Ibid.: 355-6, author’s translation):
‘...most importantly, the magnanimous manner of President of the 
Republic of China, His Excellency, is already well expressed in the 
provisions with which we have especially been concerned. I would be 
delighted to assure His Excellency that the Japanese people will be
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extremely grateful for such a magnanimous gesture, which they will 
never forget.’
Two days later, on 30 April 1952, Kawada paid a visit to Chiang Kai-shek, the 
benefactor, and ‘showed his respect for President’s great character and noble virtue’ 
(Chang 1980: 136). Subsequently, Kawada told Chiang that the provisions of the 
Treaty of Peace had been stated so magnanimous that not only he was deeply moved 
but the Japanese people would be similarly grateful (Ibid.). Chiang Kai-sheck replied 
by demonstrating his ‘magnanimity’ to Kawada once again as the following (Ibid., 
author’s translation):
‘You deserve this. The relations between China and Japan are different 
from those between other states. China never wanted to impose a harsh 
treaty on Japan.’
In return, Kawada thanked Chiang and told him that he would publicly inform his 
fellow-countrymen of this intention as soon as he returned to Japan (Ibid.). Chiang then 
re-emphasized the ‘special’ relationship between China and Japan as follows (Ibid.: 
136-7, author’s translation):
‘Sino-Japanese relations are special and much different from those 
between other Allied Powers and Japan. For that reason, it was all the 
more significant that we signed a peace treaty separate from the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty, in which China could not participate. Thanks to 
Mr. Kawada’s effort, we have been able to lay good foundations. The 
relationship between the two nations is extremely close...China and
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Japan must co-prosper without being self-complacent. We can enjoy 
peaceful stability in East Asia as a whole only if the two nations 
embrace liberty and prosperity.’
Kawada then repeatedly expressed admiration for Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘virtue’ and his 
long-term vision for Japan-ROC relations before moving on to discuss the issue of 
bilateral economic cooperation in the future (Ibid.: 137).
After the conclusion of the Treaty, Kawada faithfully kept his promise and 
informed his countrymen of Chiang’s ‘virtue’. For instance, Prime Minister Yoshida 
(1957: 72-3; 1967: 189) reflected on the signing of the bilateral Treaty of Peace with 
‘China’ by revealing that ‘it was utterly impossible to ignore’ Nationalist China on 
Taiwan ‘as the counterpart of the peace treaty considering the friendship it 
demonstrated in the peaceful repatriation of our troops and civilians from China at the 
end of the war’. Similarly, Okazaki Katsuo, Yoshida’s Chief Cabinet Secretary and 
spokesperson for the Japanese government at the time, justified the conclusion of the 
Treaty of Peace with the Nationalist regime on the ground of appreciation for Chiang 
Kai-shek’s ‘magnanimous’ announcement towards Japan at the end of the war (Yuan 
2001: 161). Furthermore, Iguchi Sadao (1971: 109-110), former Ambassador to the 
ROC who served as Vice Foreign Minister in Tokyo in 1952, celebrated the ‘special’ 
relationship between Japan and the ROC and attributed it to ‘Generalissimo Chiang 
Kai-shek’s policy of returning Japan’s “malice” with “virtue”’. Accordingly, the 
discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ began to diffuse into Japan following the 
conclusion of the Treaty of Peace with Nationalist China and to form a Japanese 
‘regime of truth’ about ‘China’ for decades to come.
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3.4 Conclusion
This chapter shed light on the discursive aspect of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue 
for malice’ postwar Japan policy. It demonstrated that the ‘magnanimity’ discourse 
made Chiang Kai-shek’s regime on Taiwan culturally intelligible for the Japanese, 
thereby facilitating Japan’s recognition of the Chiang regime as ‘China’ under US 
hegemony in East Asia. Put differently, this chapter showed that the Cold War meant 
different things in different parts of the world (Westad 2000: 19), and Sino-Japanese 
relation in the making of the ‘Cold War order’ were interestingly understood in terms 
of practices from the ‘Chinese World order’ (Fairbank 1968; Garver 1993: 9-15; Zhao, 
S. 1997: Ch. 7; Zhang 2001; Hook et al 2001: 25-7, 2005: 27-9; Zhang 2001, Kang 
2003).
More specifically, while the ‘Yoshida letter’ territorially defined ‘China’ and 
legally constrained Japan to legitimate Nationalist China in terms of the Western state- 
system, the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse on the other hand morally obliged 
Tokyo to recognize Taipei by articulating Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘China’ in terms of the 
old East Asian order. Here, it is noteworthy that both the ‘Yoshida letter’ and the 
‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse were responses to the same Anglo-American 
discord on the ‘China question’ during the making of US hegemony in East Asia or the 
‘San Francisco system’. Both of them are obviously vital for one to understand Sino- 
Japanese relations under American hegemony during the Cold War era. In this chapter, 
the author particularly emphasized the discursive effect of ‘returning virtue for malice’ 
on Japan’s recognition of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘China’—such as making a bilateral 
treaty the treaty of peace which the ‘Yoshida letter’ did not specify—by demonstrating
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how it bridged the multilateral San Francisco Peace Treaty and the bilateral Treaty of 
Peace between the Republic of China and Japan.
Finally, this chapter emphasized the consensual aspect of US hegemony by 
tracing how East Asian constituents like Japan and Nationalist China gave their 
consent to the ‘San Francisco system’ at the dawn of the Cold War. While Tokyo gave 
its consent in order to re-gain its ‘independence’ by taking advantage of the ‘reverse 
course’ in US occupation policy, Taipei gave its consent so that it could take part in the 
‘San Francisco system’ as ‘China’ and compensate the lack of its internal legitimacy in 
Taiwan. As for Japan, ruling elites even ‘invited’ Washington to keep its military bases 
on their own soil (Lundestad 1986, 1999). In this way, after China was Tost’, the 
United States found its major collaborator in East Asia as Japan made itself available 
as a ‘bastion’ of the Cold War in East Asia. Such consent was essential for the rise of 
US hegemony in East Asia in the early 1950s as indicated conversely by the absence of 
consent and the decline of US hegemony in the early 1970s, which will be discussed in 
Chapter 5. In the meantime, the following chapter will first show how the constitution 
of US hegemony was consolidated by the discourse coalition of ‘returning virtue for 
malice’—formed by those ‘watch dogs’ the American authorities ‘de-purged’—in the 
domain of Japanese politics in the 1950s and 1960s.
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Notes
1) For the discussion of the ‘reverse course’, also see Dower (1979, 1993a, 1993b, 
1999), Schaller (1985), Davis and Roberts (1996), Pyle (1996), Baerwaid 
(1959), Masumi (1988), Shindo (1999) among others.
2) It has been pointed out that Ashida consulted Emperor Hirohito regarding the 
memorandum that was conveyed to Eichelberger (Miura 1996a: 94-103). In 
fact, by following Shindo’s work (1979), Miura revealed that Hirohito 
subsequently produced a memorandum identical with Ashida’s and transmitted 
the message to Washington through more reliable channels—from Sebald to 
MacArthur, then from MacArthur to Marshall, and finally from Marshall to 
Kennan. Ashida’s consultation with Hirohito and Hirohito’s message following 
up on Ashida make sense if one follows Drifte’s (1983) argument, which has 
been confirmed by McNelly (1987), that Article 9 of the Constitution was 
designed to protect the imperial institution.
3) Yoshida’s ‘one man’ role in the so-called ‘Ikeda mission’ has recently been 
called into question by Toyoshita’s ‘dual diplomacy’ thesis (1995, 1996). He 
conjectures that the message Ikeda conveyed was not from Yoshida but from 
Hirohito. Toyoshita bases his account on ‘two background factors’ (Bix 2000: 
640): 1) In February 1950, the Soviet Union had reopened the issue of 
Hirohito’s war criminality by demanding that he be brought to trial; 2) In April 
1950, John Foster Dulles was appointed to be a special advisor to Secretary of 
State Dean Achenson, fueling speculation in Tokyo and Washington that the 
peace treaty negotiations would start moving forward again. In other words,
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Hirohito took advantage of the latter in order to overcome the threat posed by 
the former. More simply, for his own survival, Hirohito pushed Japan’s de- 
facto peace with the ‘Western bloc’ excluding the ‘Communist bloc’. That is 
why, (following Toyoshita’s logic) Hirohito ‘bypassed’ MacArthur—who was 
conceivably still dwelling on Japan’s unarmed neutrality when he met with 
Hirohito on 18 April 1950—and directly contacted Washington through the 
‘Ikeda mission’.
4) Since February 1949, Joseph M. Dodge—President of the Detroit Bank whom 
US President Truman appointed as Financial Advisor to the Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers—had begun setting the economic side of the 
‘reverse course’ known as the ‘Dodge line’ in Japan (Schonberger 1989: 198- 
235; Finn 1992: 210-28). Dodge implemented ‘a stringent economic 
stabilization program’ (Stockwin 1999: 48), which was similar to the one he 
prescribed for the German economy as part of the Marshall Plan (Buckley 1992: 
24; Davis and Roberts 1996: 72; Ikei 1973,1982, 1992: 236).
5) Although NSC 68—which ‘argued that by the mid 1950s the United States 
“must have substantially increased general air, ground and sea strength, atomic 
capabilities, and air and civilian defenses to deter war and to provide reasonable 
assurance, in the event of war, that it could survive the initial blow and go on to 
the eventual attainment of its objectives’” (May 1992: 222)—was composed by 
Paul H. Nitze after Kennan’s resignation, Kennan was nonetheless consulted in 
the drafting process as well as on the final document (Gaddis 1982: 89-126).
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Therefore, it was an elaboration of, rather than a deviation from, Kennan’s 
earlier policy such as NSC 13/2.
6) For the discussion of the ACJ—an informal pressure group that constituted the 
core of the so-called Japan lobby in American diplomacy between 1948 and 
1953, which was largely responsible for the implementation of the ‘reverse 
course’, see Schonberger (1989), Davis and Roberts (1996), Dower (1979, 
1993a, 1993b, 1999), Schaller (1985, 1997), Welfield (1988), Bix (2000), 
Angel (2001), Hata (1994), Toyoshita (1996), Miura (1996a), Masumi (1998), 
Masuda (1999).
7) Namely: Marquis Matsudaira Yasumasa—the then Grand Master of 
Ceremonies in the Imperial Court and a member of the Mitsui family, who had 
served as secretary to Count Kido Koichi, Lord Keeper of Privy Seal; Sawada 
Renzo—former Vice Foreign Minister and a member of the Mitsubishi family, 
who later served as Japan’s Ambassador to the United Nations; Kaihara 
Osamu—the then Chief of Planning for the National Defense Council; and 
Watanabe Takeshi—a Finance Ministry official handling liaison with SCAP 
and working under Fukuda Takeo who later became Prime Minister. Watanabe, 
the grandson of a former Finance Minister and son of a member of the Privy 
Council later assumed various influential posts in international finance such as 
the Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Director of the World 
Bank, President of the Asian Development Bank, and Chairman of the 
Trilateral Commission.
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8) Recent declassifications of diplomatic archives in Japan have spawned mixed 
views on Yoshida’s ‘two Chinas’ policy. For instance, in the 29 May 2000 
edition of The Mainichi Shinbun, Eto Shinkichi confirmed the ‘two Chinas’ 
policy by referring to his own interview with Yoshida in 1967. In this interview 
with Eto, Yoshida apparently admitted that he operated such a policy and took 
one issue at a time under the given circumstances. On another occasion of 
declassification, as reported by The Asahi Shinbun on 15 November 2001, 
Tanaka Akihiko along with Sakamoto Kazuya and Kan Hideaki was 
dumbfounded by Yoshida’s apparent anti-communist beliefs that had been 
overshadowed by his realistic approach to diplomacy. Consequently, they 
called for the reconsideration of the ‘two Chinas’ thesis that other scholars had 
argued in regard to Yoshida’s China policy. For the full text of this discussion, 
see Kan et ah (2002).
9) Plenipotentiary Kawada, Prime Minister Yoshida’s relative, had served as the 
Minister of Finance as well as President of Taiwan Takushoku Incorporated 
during the prewar era (Ishii 1989).
10) Chang Chun (1980: 127-8) had a meeting with Chiang Kai-shek earlier and 
declined to be Plenipotentiary of the ROC in spite of Tokyo’s request. It was 
plausibly due to Tokyo’s failure to meet Taipei’s request for Inukai Takeru (or 
Ken) (Ishii 1989: 78-80), former President of the Democratic Party and son of 
former Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi—one of the Japanese supporters of Sun 
Yat-sen and his Nationalist revolution in the early days. Yoshida instead 
appointed his own relative Kawada Isao as Plenipotentiary of Japan. This
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appointment was conceivably the extension of an earlier Japanese plan to 
dispatch Kawada to Taipei as Chiang Kai-shek’s financial advisor once he was 
de-purged (Chen 2000: 35). In any case, Inukai still played a supervisory role in 
Tokyo.
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4
The heyday of ‘returning 
virtue for malice’ and US 
hegemony in East Asia
1952-64
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the author argues that the discourse of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning 
virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy made Nationalist China on Taiwan culturally 
intelligible for Japanese elites, thereby helping to reproduce Japan’s recognition of 
‘China’ under US hegemony between 1952 and 1964. The author refers to this period as 
the heyday of such construction of ‘China’ in Japan thanks to the so-called ‘reverse 
course’ (1) in Washington’s postwar Japan policy—which ‘required the resurrection of 
the civilian old guard’ as much as ‘the old guard required the cold war to enlist U.S. 
support against domestic opponents’ (Dower 1993b: 15). More specifically, the 
hegemonic position of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse was mainly derived 
from Japanese conservative hegemony known as the ‘1955 system’. The ‘1955 
system’—or ‘a concatenation of political and socioeconomic developments in 1955, 
including the establishment of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) which governed 
Japan uninterruptedly over the ensuing decades’ (Ibid.: 4)—was a product of the 
‘reverse course’ just as the ‘San Francisco system’ (Dower 1993b). Put differently, it
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was through the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and its discourse coalition (2) 
among ruling Japanese elites—which constituted the ‘1955 system’—that Tokyo’s 
recognition of Taipei as ‘China’ was made commonsensical and reproduced during this 
period.
Nonetheless, it is not the intent of this chapter to deny other factors at work such 
as Washington’s pressure on Tokyo under the circumstances that Communist China 
fought against the UN in Korea and both Taipei and Beijing adhered to the principle of 
‘one China’. In.fact, after regaining ‘independence’ in the midst of the Korean War, 
Japan was locked into Washington’s economic containment of Beijing (Dower 1993a: 
192). A major element of Washington’s basic policy towards Tokyo at tihe time was ‘to 
prevent Japan from becoming dependent on China and other communist-dominated 
areas for essential food and raw material supplies (and to) encourage Japanese 
contribution to the economic development of countries of South and Southeast Asia’ 
(US Department of State 1985: 1300-8). By September 1952, Japan had agreed to an 
embargo prescribed by the China Committee (CHINCOM), an adjunct of Coordinating 
Committee for Export to Communist Areas (COCOM), which Washington designed to 
control the exportation of strategic items to Communist China (Hosoya 1989: 22). 
Accordingly, Tokyo was undeniably constrained by Washington’s containment policy 
towards Beijing.
Notwithstanding such American pressure, Tokyo still maneuvered to ameliorate 
the situation by adopting a policy of ‘separating economy from politics {seikei bunrif 
(Hosoya 1989: 22), the idea of which originated from Beijing (Kishi et a t 1981: 213; 
Matsumura 1999: 304). For example, the Japanese desire to open trade with mainland
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China had materialized in the conclusion of the first private trade agreement with 
Beijing as early as June 1952 (Ibid.). This semi-official agreement was signed between 
Nan Hanchen, chair of the China Committee for the Promotion of International Trade 
(Zhongguo Guojimaoyi Cujin Weiyuanhui), and Kora Tomi, Hoashi Kei, and Miyakoshi 
Kisuke, progressive members of the Japanese National Diet. Hoashi and Miyakoshi, in 
particular, were influential members of the Dietmen’s League for the Promotion of 
Japan-China Trade (Nitchu Boeki Sokushin Giin Renmei) (Nitchu Yuko Kyokai 2000: 
40-2; Shimada and Tian 1997: 113-5). In any case, they were the first three Japanese 
politicians to visit mainland China after the war (Ibid.: 115; Furukawa 1988: 2), and the 
private trade agreement they signed laid the foundation for subsequent trade agreements 
Japan and Communist China semi-offlcially reached in the 1950s and 1960s (Soeya 
1995, 1998). As shown in this chapter, these ‘private’ trade agreements triggered 
diplomatic crises between Taipei and Tokyo as Beijing began to politicize economic 
relations. Hence, American pressure alone was not sufficient for completely blocking 
Tokyo’s economic relations with Beijing, nor was it sufficient for preventing diplomatic 
crises from taking place between Taipei and Tokyo in the 1950s and 1960s. For that 
reason, in addition to the American pressure which obviously constrained Japan to a 
certain extent, it is necessary to look for another factor that also helped to reproduce 
Japan’s recognition of the Chiang regime on Taiwan as ‘China’ during this period.
Thus, in this chapter, the author additionally shows how the reproduction of 
Japan’s recognition of Nationalist China on Taiwan as ‘China’ was facilitated by the 
discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and its coalition in Japanese domestic politics. 
First, in pursuit of identifying who was doing the talking and where they were located in
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the network of social power (Hughes 2002: 2, 2005: 248), this chapter traces the prewar 
imperial channels of the discourse and demonstrates the consolidation of US hegemony 
in terms of the ‘resurrection’ of prewar Japanese imperialists. Second, this chapter 
continues to identify and locate the discourse coalition by further tracing the diffusion of 
the discourse into the core of Japanese power or the ‘1955 system’. It highlights how it 
was disseminated among the leaders of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party as well as 
the powerful Committee for the Promotion of Sino-Japanese Cooperation. Third, this 
chapter examines the dominance of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse and its 
coalition as it shows how the prewar imperialists overcame the first crisis of recognition 
in 1958—which broke out of the fourth private trade agreement and the Nagasaki flag 
incident over Beijing’s right to fly its national flag in Japan. It demonstrates how 
powerfully they deconstructed Beijing’s attempt to gain Tokyo’s recognition of the 
national flag of ‘China’. Fourth, this chapter probes how the discourse and its coalition 
helped overcome the second crisis of recognition that was triggered by the sale of the 
Kurashiki Rayon Company’s vinylon plant to Communist China in the summer of 1963 
and the Zhou Hongqing incident of October 1963. Here, in conjunction with the 
discourse and its coalition, this chapter analyzes not only the so-called ‘second Yoshida 
letter’ of 7 May 1964 but also another ‘second Yoshida letter’ of 4 April 1964 which 
has been overlooked by the existing literature in the English language. Finally, this 
chapter concludes by recapitulating the main argument and briefly going over the next 
chapter.
4.2 US hegemony Japanified 1952: prewar imperialists and postwar gratitude
American hegemony was Japanified to the extent that prewar Japanese imperialists— 
including Sunists—were allowed to go back into politics as ‘watchdogs’ and sustain 
Tokyo’s recognition of the Chiang regime as the legitimate government of ‘China’ at the 
height of the Cold War. Just as Plenipotentiary Kawada promised Chiang Kai-shek that 
he would inform the Japanese of Chiang’s ‘virtue’ following the conclusion of the 
bilateral peace treaty (Chang 1980: 136), the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ 
began to diffuse into postwar Japan through prewar imperial channels. The diffusion of 
the discourse was significant as it laid the foundation for the subsequent formation of 
the discourse coalition of ‘returning virtue for malice’ in postwar Japan. The following 
section sheds light on the aforementioned imperial points of contact as Ogata Taketora, 
Nemoto Hiroshi, Emperor Hirohito, and Yoshizawa Kenkichi and trace how the 
discourse diffused into the Japanese elite as Japan regained ‘independence’ in 1952 as a 
result of the conclusion of the bilateral Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China 
and Japan.
Nine days after the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace, on 7 May 1952, Prime 
Minister Yoshida Shigeru dispatched his special envoy, Ogata Taketora, to Taipei. 
Ogata had served Imperial Japan as Minister of State (Kokumu Daijin). Thus, after the 
end of the war, Ogata was purged from public office, for more than five years. At the 
time of his visit to Taiwan, Ogata had only been de-purged for nine months. 
Interestingly, it was one of Sun Yat-sen’s old Japanese friends (Jansen 1954), Kojima 
Kazuo, who recommended Ogata to Prime Minister Yoshida (Kobayashi 1991: 79). 
Ogata also had a long relationship with another Japanese ‘relative’ of Sun’s, Toyama
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Mitsuru, who had served as matchmaker of Ogata’s marriage in 1915 (Ogata Taketora 
Denki Kankokai 1963). In any case, Ogata and his entourage (3) were warmly received 
by Ho Ying-ching, Chang Chun, and Chiang Kai-shek in Taipei (Ogata Taketora Denki 
Kankokai 1963: 180-1). During this six-day visit to Taiwan, Ogata held two rounds of 
talks with President Chiang who began to inculcate one of the future founding fathers of 
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) with his moral discourse (Ibid.). In fact, by the time 
Ogata later became one of four acting presidents of the newly formed LDP just before 
he suddenly died in January 1956, he had already become a proponent of Chiang’s 
‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy (Ono 1962: 178-9).
On 25 June 1952, former Lieutenant General Nemoto Hiroshi, who served as the 
Commander of the Japanese North China Army and the Japanese. Army in Mongolia, 
returned to Japan after training Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist forces for more than three 
years (Nakamura 1995). Nemoto was the leader of the first group of Chiang Kai-shek’s 
Japanese military advisors known as the White Group (.Baituan)—as many as 83 
members of which clandestinely served Chiang between 1949 and 1969 (Ibid.; Yang 
2000; Ogasawara 1971). Nemoto was one of the Imperial Japanese Army’s China hands 
known as the shinatsu who sympathized with the Chinese Nationalist Revolution and 
dreamed of collaborating with China in the struggle against Western imperialism (Tobe 
1999: 5). In fact, Nemoto took command of pro-Nationalist campaigns against the 
Soviet Union in Mongolia and the Chinese Communists in North China as he waited for 
the arrival of the Nationalist and American forces from the South immediately after the 
war (Nakamura 1995: 32). At the same time, Nemoto helped Chiang Kai-shek to 
repatriate 350,000 Japanese soldiers and 450,000 Japanese civilians from the Chinese
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mainland (Ibid.; Yang 2000: 8). By collaborating with Chiang whom he had met in the 
late 1920s, Nemoto acquainted himself with other Nationalists leaders like Li Tsung-jen, 
Ho Ying-chin, Shang Chen, and Fu Tso-i (Ibid.). Consequently, Nemoto was set free 
from war criminal charges and given the privilege of returning to Japan in August 1946 
(Ibid.). Thus, it is not surprising that Nemoto took action when Commander Fu Tso-i 
sent a messenger and a letter in the name of Chiang Kai-shek to request for Nemoto’s 
assistance in the spring of 1949 (Ibid.). Nevertheless, when he returned to Tokyo three 
years later, Nemoto described his ‘debt of gratitude’ in the following fashion (Nakamura 
1995: 46, author’s translation): ‘The reason why I went to Taiwan is that President 
Chiang Kai-shek defended the polity of Japan (kokutai) when it was called into question 
at the Conference of Cairo during World War II. The phrase in the Potsdam Declaration 
“in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people” was the reflection 
of his defense. In other words, the Japanese imperial institution was saved because of 
President Chiang. Repaying a debt of gratitude (go-ongaeshi) to him for that was always 
on my mind. That is why I could not leave Mr. Chiang in the lurch when he was forced 
to resign as President (in January 1949). I decided to put my life on the line to go to 
Taiwan because I thought the moment to repay the debt of gratitude had come.’ 
Accordingly, former Imperial Japanese military elites like Nemoto became proponents 
of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and constituted a major force behind the ‘Taiwan lobby’ 
in postwar Japan (Tai 1988: 149-53).
On 18 September 1952, Japanese Emperor Hirohito received Special Envoy 
Chang Chun (1980: Ch. 11) whom Chiang Kai-shek dispatched in order to return Ogata 
Taketora’s earlier official visit to Taiwan in May. On this occasion, Hirohito expressed
200
his appreciation for Chiang Kai-shek’s address of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and the 
very ‘magnanimous attitude’ that Hirohito believed contributed to the conclusion of the 
Treaty of Peace on 28 April 1952 (Ibid.: 142). In reply, Chang Chun additionally 
pointed out how Chiang Kai-shek had also encouraged other leaders of the Allies to 
preserve the Japanese imperial institution at the Conference of Cairo (Ibid.). It is 
interesting to see how Chang Chun mentioned the issue of the postwar Japanese 
emperor system just as Nemoto Hiroshi—whom Chang Chun had welcomed in Taiwan 
(Nakamura 1995: 31)—did less than three months earlier. In any case, Hirohito caught 
his breath and expressed his utmost gratitude for Chiang Kai-shek’s kindness (Chang 
1980: 143). As shown above, even Hirohito himself began to understand the 
‘reincarnation’ of the Japanese emperor system in terms of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning 
virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy as the discourse diffused through the core of the 
Japanese nation.
On 1 October 1952, the first Japanese ambassador to the Republic of China on 
Taiwan, Yoshizawa Kenkichi (1958: Ch. 11), arrived in Taipei. Yoshizawa was former 
Foreign Minister of Imperial Japan and Sun Yat-sen’s staunch supporter former Prime 
Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi’s son-in-law, who had attended Sun’s last rites in the 1920s. 
Yoshizawa was from Takada (currently known as Jyoetsu), Japan—where Chiang Kai- 
shek and Chang Chun received military training more than four decades earlier (Ibid.: 
300). More importantly, Yoshizawa was the first Japanese minister ever to pay a visit to 
Chiang Kai-shek in the late 1920s even before Tokyo officially recognized his regime 
(Iriye 1965: 157). After the war, Yoshizawa was purged from public office for more 
than five years like Ogata. In addition to Foreign Minister Okazaki Katsuo’s request, (4)
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it was Ogata Taketora’s encouragement that convinced Yoshizawa to become the first 
Japanese ambassador to the Republic of China on Taiwan after the war (Yoshizawa 
1958: 296-7). Prior to Yoshizawa’s departure for Taipei, on 26 September 1952, 
Emperor Hirohito gave him the following message for Chiang Kai-shek: T can never 
forget the fact that tens of thousands of our soldiers and civilians were able to return 
safely from China because President Chiang ordered his subordinates to “return good 
for evil” (ada ni mukuyuru ni on wo motte seyo) when the Japanese army was defeated 
on the Chinese continent. When you have a meeting with President Chiang, I would like 
you to tell him that I am deeply thankful to him for that’ (Ibid.: 299-300, author’s 
translation). On 6 October, Yoshizawa faithfully conveyed Hirohito’s message to 
Chiang who expressed his appreciation for the message (Ibid.: 300). Henceforth, 
Yoshizawa resumed his public life of promoting ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ and made 
a practice of repaying a ‘debt of gratitude’ to Chiang Kai-shek during the Cold War 
(Huang 1995: 189-90).
Accordingly, prewar Japanese elites ‘resurrected’ in postwar Japan with a ‘debt of 
gratitude’ to Chiang Kai-shek—the benefactor who took ‘magnanimous’ measures 
towards postwar Japan in spite of its ‘malign’ acts during the war. More specifically, 
following the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace in 1952, the discourse of ‘returning 
virtue for malice’ immediately began penetrating the prewar Japanese elites—like 
Ogata, Nemoto, Hirohito, and Yoshizawa—many of whom were ‘unleashed’ to 
consolidate the Japanese bastion of US hegemony in East Asia during the Cold War era. 
Their endeavor to reproduce postwar Japan’s recognition of ‘China’ under US 
hegemony, thereby reflexively reproducing themselves as Cold War ‘watchdogs’, can
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be traced by the further dissemination of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse and 
the formation of its discourse coalition in the ‘1955 system’ as shown below.
4.3 The ‘1955 system* and the discourse coalition of ‘returning virtue for malice*
The diffusion of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse into the ‘1955 system’ 
consolidated the Japanese bastion of US hegemony in East Asia. The Nationalist 
Chinese discourse was disseminated among some of the most influential Japanese 
political actors who re-entered active politics and founded the LDP—the core of the 
‘1955 system’. At the same time, these prewar elites formed what can be referred to as 
the discourse coalition—‘whose members share a particular way of thinking about and 
discussing’ matters of concern (Fischer 2003: 107)—of ‘returning virtue for malice’, 
which greatly overlaps with the ‘1955 system’. The formation of such a discourse 
coalition can be traced by the following events that largely coincided with the formation 
of the hegemonic apparatus in the mid 1950s.
In August 1955, Ono Banboku (1955: 52-3), the Liberal Party’s Chairman of the 
Executive Board, visited Taiwan with 11 other members of the National Diet. Ono, who 
went on to become one of four Acting Presidents (along with Hatoyama Ichiro, Ogata 
Taketora, Miki Bukichi) of the newly formed LDP three months later, took this 
opportunity to report to Chiang Kai-shek that the Japanese people deeply respected him 
for addressing ‘returning love for malice’ {uramini mukuyuruni aiwo motteseyo) after 
the war (Ibid.). In addition, Ono, who represented the interests of the World War II 
Veterans War Bereavement Association or Izokukai (Kobayashi 1991: 53), wished that 
Chiang would recover mainland China at an early date (Ono 1955: 52). Interestingly,
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many of the veterans that Ono represented had ‘allied5 with the US and Nationalist 
China to battle against Chinese Communist forces on the mainland immediately after 
the war (Schaller 1990: 112; Pepper 1999: 9-16). In reply to Ono5s thanks and 
encouragement, Chiang Kai-shek tapped on his knee in excitement and stressed the 
importance of a trilateral anti-communist alliance between Japan, South Korea, and 
Nationalist China (Ono 1955: 52). Chiang was conceivably gratified by Ono5s support 
especially because Chiang had just survived a coup attempt Washington had plotted 
with a Virginia Militaiy Institute (VMI) educated general named Sun Li-jen in the same 
month following the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1954-5 (Yang 2000: 88-91; Hoon 1988). 
Moreover, whether or not Chiang knew Ono5s prewar affiliation with the Seiyukai and 
Pan Asianism (Welfield 1988: 130-1; Kobayashi 1991: 51-68; Tominomori 2000: 192- 
4), Chiang expressed his wish to visit the graves of such Pan Asianists affiliated with the 
Seiyukai as Toyama Mitsuru and Inukai Tsuyoshi who had strongly supported Sun Yat- 
sen's nationalist revolution (Jansen 1954, 1980; Fujii 1966; Yu 1989; Chigono 1984; 
Chen 1999: Ch. 1; Lee 1968: 63-89). At any rate, despite the fact that Ono incorrectly 
referred to the discourse as that of ‘returning love for malice5, Ono’s exchange with 
Chiang indicated that the discourse coalition of ‘returning virtue for malice5 had already 
begun forming in postwar Japan and it was built on prewar Sunist roots.
In August 1956, Ishii Mitsujiro, the ruling LDP's Chairman of the Executive 
Board, paid a visit to Chiang Kai-shek with a letter from Prime Minister Hatoyama. On 
this occasion, Ishii, who had spent five years in Taiwan as a civilian secretary to 
Governor-General Ando Sadami between 1916 and 1921, led a 26-member delegation 
of Japanese politicians, businessmen, and cultural figures. The former purgee had
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greatly contributed to the birth of the LDP, the core of the ‘1955 system’, as Ogata’s 
surrogate and one of four main negotiators—along with Ono Banboku from the Liberal 
Party and Miki Bukichi and Kishi Nobusuke from the Democratic Party (Masumi 1988: 
206-9). In his meeting with Chiang Kai-shek, Ishii (1976: 400-1) expressed his gratitude 
to Chiang for three (5) counts of ‘indebtedness’ (ongi): 1) Chiang’s strong support for 
the preservation of the Japanese imperial institution at the Conference of Cairo; 2) 
Chiang’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ address and the repatriation of Japanese soldiers 
and civilians from mainland China after the war in accordance with the Potsdam 
Declaration; and 3) Chiang’s objection to the partition of Japan as a plan for occupation 
after the war. Furthermore, it was during this trip that the idea of establishing the 
Committee for the Promotion of Sino-Japanese Cooperation (CPSJC, Nikka Kyoryoku 
Iinkai, or Zhong-Ri Hezuo Cejin Weiyuanhui) (6) was discussed and agreed (Ishii 1976: 
402-3; Yatsugi 1973: Ch. 2; Chang 1980: Ch. 17; Ku 1968; Ikei 1980: 3-7; Takemi 
1984: 81-91; Welfield 1988: 126-7). Like Ono and Kishi who subsequently took part in 
the CPSJC and became the counterparts of Chang Chun and Ho Ying-chin as advisors 
(Yatsugi 1973: 38; Ikei 1980: 5), Ishii later contributed his share to the CPSJC as chair 
of the general meeting as well as chief of the Japanese delegation (Ibid.: 15-6; Yatsugi 
1973: 38). Accordingly, Ishii took the lead in Japan’s relations with Taiwan as requested 
earlier by former Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru (Ishii 1976: 402-3), who suggested 
Ishii to take the lead in Japan-ROC relations with Kishi’s help while Kishi takes charge 
of Japan-Korea relations with Ishii’s assistance. (7) Most importantly, the discourse of 
‘returning virtue for malice’ described here as Japan’s ‘indebtedness’ provided the
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common ground on which pro-Taipei (rather than Beijing) Japanese elites like Ishii 
could form the ‘conservative establishment’s pro-ROC coalition’ (Takemi 1994: 2-3).
In the spring of 1957, the CPSJC was formerly established in March and its first 
four-day general meeting was successfully concluded in Tokyo in April (Yatsugi 1973: 
Ch. 3; Ikei 1980; Horikoshi 1957). According to one of the participants, Secretary 
General of Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) Horikoshi Teizo 
(Ibid.: 17, author’s translation), the first general meeting used the following storylines:
1) ‘We, the Japanese, must not forget that we owe President Chiang Kai-shek a “debt of 
gratitude” (ongi) for his “magnanimous treatment” (kandaina shochi) of our fellow 
countrymen immediately after the war’; 2) ‘Similarly, we must not forget that there are 
seven million people on Taiwan, who miss us the Japanese.’ Moreover, Horikoshi’s 
(Ibid.: 14-5) report disclosed that one of the reasons why the CPSJC was founded had a 
great deal to do with the latter. In concrete, the CPSJC was originally contrived to make 
Japanese newspapers and magazines available for the Taiwanese since some of them 
had earlier complained to members of the ‘Ishii mission’ about the shortage of 
information as well as great difficulties involved in learning the new language of 
Mandarin after half a centuiy of Japanese colonial rule (Ibid.: 14; Yatsugi 1973: 16). 
Therefore, it turned out to be a nice surprise for the Japanese delegation led by Fujiyama 
Aiichiro—Head of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Prime Minister Kishi’s major 
financial supporter at the time, who became Kishi’s Foreign Minister three months 
later—when it was informed that the Nationalist government had already conditionally 
approved the importation of Japanese newspapers and magazines at this general meeting 
in Tokyo (Horikoshi 1957: 14-5). On the other hand, the first storyline was reinforced
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by the Chinese delegates’ deed that matched Chiang Kai-shek’s word—to Ono Banboku 
who had thanked Chiang for his ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy— 
expressing his wish to visit the graves of Toyama Mitsuru and Inukai Tsuyoshi less than 
two years earlier. On the morning of 3 April 1957, following their visit to the Yasukuni 
Shrine, the Chinese delegation ‘revived’ the sense of ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ by 
(re)paying Chiang’s debt of gratitude to the graves of the Japanese collaborators of the 
Nationalist revolution as well as the grave of another ‘old friend’ Ogata Taketora who 
had suddenly passed away in Januaiy 1956 (Ikei 1980: 9-10; Ishii 1976: 395-7). 
Accordingly, the discourse coalition was founded on prewar roots and postwar 
storylines were put into practice. Henceforth, the CPSJC began to reign as the Japanese 
domestic political foundation that firmly maintained and regularly gave priority to 
relations with Taipei over those with Beijing between 1957 and 1971 (Takemi 1994: 3).
In June 1957, the new prime minister of Japan, Kishi Nobusuke, (8) further 
consolidated the discourse coalition of ‘returning virtue for malice’ by paying a historic 
visit to Taipei. On this occasion, Kishi became the first Japanese prime minister ever to 
pay an official visit to ‘China’—that is, Chiang Kai-shek’s regime on Taiwan (Mendl 
1978: 19; Kishi 1982: 141-2). For Kishi, the 61-year-old Pan-Asianist who was a major 
force behind the establishment of the CPSJC three months earlier, it was part of his first 
overseas tour to South East Asia, by which he attempted to raise his value as an Asian 
leader before visiting his patron, the United States (Hara 1995: 189-90, 2003: 131-5). 
Kishi, former Minister of Commerce and Industry of the Tojo cabinet, had been indicted 
as a Class A war criminal by the American occupation authorities immediately after the 
war and interned in Sugamo Prison for more than three years before making his way
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back into politics. In any case, on 2 June, Kishi (1982: 141) met President Chiang Kai- 
shek for the first time at the President’s residence in Taipei. In this meeting, Kishi 
immediately thanked the 70-year-old President for adopting a ‘returning virtue for 
malice’ policy and safely repatriating two million Japanese soldiers and civilians from 
mainland China at the end of the war (Ibid.: 142). In reply, Chiang customarily referred 
to the prewar Sunist roots of his special relationship with Japan as follows (Ibid., 
author’s translation): ‘As a young Chinese student and revolutionary in Japan, I was 
trained by Mr. Toyama Mitsuru and Mr. Inukai Tsuyoshi. My “returning virtue for 
malice” policy was the manifestation of the way of Japanese knighthood {Bushido). 
Since these Japanese predecessors were the ones who impressively taught me the way, 
you should express your appreciation to their graves rather than me.’ While Kishi later 
admitted that Washington wielded more influence on the preservation of the Japanese 
imperial institution and the prevention of the divisive occupation of Japan than Chiang 
Kai-shek, he still stuck with the stoiyline that it was Chiang’s decision to repatriate two 
million Japanese safely from mainland China (Ibid.: 148-9). Nevertheless, this historic 
state visit by Kishi—the peak of the ‘Taiwan lobby’ in Japan (Honzawa 1998: 112-6)— 
symbolized the hegemonization of the discourse coalition which constructed the 
representation of Chiang Kai-shek as the ‘benefactor’ to whom the Japanese nation must 
repay a ‘debt of gratitude’ (Kishi 1982:155).
On 19 September 1957, the hegemonic position of the ‘returning virtue for 
malice’ discourse in Japan was demonstrated by the National Welcome Party (Kokumin 
Kangeikai) for Special Envoy Chang Chun who was dispatched to Tokyo in order to 
return Kishi’s state visit to Taipei. It was impressively attended by many of the most
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powerful Japanese elites such as Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, Speaker of the House 
of Representatives Masutani Shuji, President of the House of Council Matsuno 
Tsuruhei, Chairman of Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) 
Ishizaka Taizo, and former Ambassador to the Republic of China Yoshizawa Kenkichi 
among others (Chang 1980: 159). On behalf of the Japanese nation, they announced an 
official statement in token of gratitude for Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘understanding and 
sympathy’ (rikai to dojo) towards postwar Japan (Ibid.: 159-60, 164-5; Zhong-Ri 
Guanxi Yanjiuhui 1978: 148-9; Horikoshi 1959: 32-3; Fukui 1969: 314-5, 1970: 252-3; 
Chen 1971: 272-3, 282-4): 1) When the Japan problem was discussed at the Conference 
of Cairo in November 1943, President Chiang helped us Japanese to overcome our 
national crisis by firmly insisting against Western leaders that the future of the Japanese 
national polity should be decided by the will of the Japanese people; 2) As the Japanese 
Emperor announced his acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation on 15 August 1945, 
President Chiang shared with us Japanese the ultimate expression of his political 
philosophy and the essence of Oriental morality—‘benevolence’ (fin)—by immediately 
calling on the Chinese people by radio to return (Chinese) virtue for (Japanese) malice;
3) In stark contrast to retaliation by some government after the war, President Chiang 
swiftly repatriated millions of Japanese civilians and prisoners of war and promptly 
released Japanese war criminals; 4) Despite the enormous damage Japan did to China 
that was the main battlefield of the war, President Chiang continued to show ‘great 
benevolence’ and announced that he would decline to demand war reparations from 
Japan in June 1951, thereby making the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese peace treaty 
possible in 1952. The Japanese government concluded by stating that these ‘words and
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deeds’ (genko) of President Chiang should set the moral standard for every country in 
the world as international ‘morality and friendship’ (dogi to yujo) and that they should 
not be forgotten for a moment regardless of the rise and fall of national destiny (Ibid.; 
Zhong-Ri Guarnci Yanjiuhui 1978: 149; Horikoshi 1959: 32-3). The audience responded 
enthusiastically and chanted incessantly, ‘Long live President Chiang, long live the 
Republic of China!’ (Chang 1980: 159). Some participants, like Matsuno, were moved 
to tears in the meantime (Ibid.; Chen 1971: 273, 283). In return, Chang Chun suggested 
that such manifestations of Oriental morality as Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for 
malice’ postwar Japan policy and Japan’s repayment of a ‘debt of gratitude’ to Chiang 
Kai-shek would be indispensable for ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ for many years to 
come (Zhong-Ri Guanxi Yanjiuhui 1978: 99-101). As depicted above, by the fall of 
1957, the discourse coalition of ‘returning virtue for malice’ to facilitate Tokyo’s 
recognition of Taipei had gained such a dominant position that it could largely be 
equated with the Japanese state despite the fact that details of the discourse remained 
inconsistent as the issue of occupation was left out of the official statement.
In sum, the aforementioned series of events show that the formation of the 
discourse coalition of ‘returning virtue for malice’ greatly coincided with the formation 
of the ‘1955 system’. The discourse coalition significantly sutured the political, 
financial, and bureaucratic bases of power in postwar Japan—the ‘iron triangle’. 
Politically, the discourse coalition consolidated as its members established the LDP in 
1955 and formed the CPSJC and the Kishi cabinet in 1957. The Kishi cabinet ultimately 
hegemonized the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and its coalition by 
announcing the statement of September 1957. As a result, the storyline that Chiang Kai-
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shek is the benefactor to whom the Japanese must repay a ‘debt of gratitude’ became 
official in spite of inconsistency in factual details. Hence, the discourse coalition 
occupied the hegemonic position to help reproduce Japan’s diplomatic recognition of 
‘China’ under US hegemony by making it culturally intelligible for the Japanese nation. 
Nevertheless, as shown below, the hegemonic position of the discourse coalition was 
subsequently challenged by the crises of recognition over the ‘China question’ in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s.
4.4 The heyday of ‘returning virtue for malice91: deconstructing ‘China’ in the 
1950s
The fourth private trade agreement and Nagasaki flag incident 1958. The first 
recognition crisis took place in the spring of 1958 as the fourth private trade agreement 
was reached between Tokyo and Beijing on 5 March and all business dealings between 
the two nations were subsequently canceled as a result of the so-called Nagasaki flag 
incident of 2 May. While these events set prime examples of Beijing’s ‘use of trade as a 
political tool’ in persuading and pressurizing Tokyo to recognize Beijing (Rose 1998: 
44-5; Jain 1982: 39), they also exemplified the powerful coalition of the ‘returning 
virtue for malice’ discourse in Japan at the time. In fact, the power of the discourse and 
its coalition was demonstrated by the fact that the two events ended in the suspension of 
economic relations between mainland China and Japan, which had been informally 
under way since the first private trade agreement of June 1952 (Besshi 1983). 
Communist China’s unilateral cancellation of all trade contacts with Japan was due to 
the fact that the Japanese government did not take any legal action against two Japanese
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youths who desecrated the five-star flag of the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) at a 
Chinese exhibition hosted by the Japan-China Friendship Association {Nitchu Yuko 
Kyokai) in Nagasaki, Japan (Furukawa 1988: 153-59; Nitchu Yuko Kyokai 2000: 119- 
23; Ikei 1974: 84-5; Shimadaand Tian 1997: 157-9; Lin 1997: 118-20). Arguably, such 
unilateral severance was Beijing’s retaliation against the ‘Tokyo-Taipei “plot”’ (Zhao 
1993: 26), in which the Chiang Kai-shek regime ‘hired’ the Japanese right wingers to 
set a precedent for Kishi’s rejection of the part of the fourth private trade agreement that 
had allowed the Communist Chinese trade mission to fly its national flag in Japan 
(Chen 2000: 32). In any case, the Nagasaki flag incident merely reiterated the 
deterioration of trade relations that had already taken place—over such issues as 
Beijing’s right to hoist its national flag at its trade representative office in Japan—as 
Beijing had canceled the fourth private trade agreement as early as 13 April (Ikei 1974: 
84; Kusano 1980: 21; Furukawa 1988: 150). Therefore, this section puts more emphasis 
on the fourth private trade agreement than the Nagasaki flag incident as it highlights 
how Kishi’s de-recogntion of Beijing’s five-star flag was made possible—or how 
‘China’ was deconstructed—by the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and its 
coalition in the spring of 1958.
Conventionally, Kishi’s decision not to recognize the Communist Chinese flag is 
explained in terms of the pressure that Washington and Taipei exerted on Kishi’s policy 
of the ‘separation of politics and economics’ {seikei bunri) towards Beijing (Zhao 1993: 
26; Ikei 1982: 299; Shimada and Tian 1997: 155; Lin 1997: 116-7). By such separation, 
Kishi meant to promote his nation’s trade with mainland China without establishing 
diplomatic relations between the two (Hara 2003: 159). Nevertheless, the United States
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was displeased with the informal trade that had been developing across the ideological 
border in the midst of the Cold War (Zhao 1993: 26). By the same token, the Chiang 
regime was also dissatisfied with Japan’s promotion of economic relations with the Mao 
regime (Ibid.). Taipei’s dissatisfaction even escalated to the unilateral severance of 
economic relations with Tokyo at one point. Therefore, it was under the pressure of 
Washington and Taipei that Prime Minister Kishi and his Cabinet Secretary Aichi Kiichi 
officially responded to the fourth private trade agreement by presenting a letter to the 
three signatory organizations on the Japanese side (9) and making a supplementary 
announcement in Tokyo on 9 April (Ikei 1974: 68; Furukawa 1988: 151; Lin 1997: 116- 
7; Azuma 2002: 94-5). For instance, Kishi’s letter expressed his cabinet’s preparedness 
to approve the fourth private trade agreement ‘within the scope of our national laws and 
on the basis of the non-recognition of the (Chinese) government’ (Soeya 1998: 38). As 
for the official announcement, Aichi clarified that Tokyo had ‘no intention to recognize 
Communist China’ and reiterated that the Japanese government would cautiously 
support the fourth private trade agreement within the scope of national laws ‘so that the 
establishment of the trade representative would not be misunderstood as de facto 
recognition’ (Ibid.). More importantly, in this statement, Aichi alluded to the treatment 
of the Communist Chinese flag in Japan as follows: ‘By the way, as far as the 
Government of Japan is concerned, since we do not recognize Communist China, we 
naturally cannot invest the private trade representative with the right to fly the national 
flag of Communist China’ (Ikei 1974: 76-7, author’s translation). These were the ‘face- 
saving’ arrangements that were devised for Chiang Kai-shek by the good offices of 
Washington (Cohen 1989: 52; Azuma 2002: 94). In any case, these ‘snap shots’ of
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external pressure on the Kishi cabinet do not provide the sufficient condition for Kishi’s 
de-recognition of the Communist Chinese flag since they greatly overlook the domestic 
process o f ‘how’ Kishi’s decision was made ‘possible’ in Japan.
By focusing on the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and its coalition, the 
domestic aspect of Kishi’s de-recognition can be better illuminated. Here, Horinouchi 
Kensuke, the Japanese Ambassador to the Republic of China, played a crucial role as he 
articulated Japan’s de-recognition of the Communist Chinese flag in terms of Japan’s 
‘debt of gratitude’ to Chiang Kai-shek (Kusano 1980: 23-6, 30). Horinouchi, who had 
succeeded Yoshizawa Kenkichi as the Japanese ambassador to Taipei in November 
1955, was back in Japan for his official duty to attend an international conference in 
March, Horinouchi had established a special relationship with Prime Minister Kishi over 
the years. During the late 1930s and early 1940s, Horinouchi and Kishi had been 
acquainted with each other as Vice Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Commerce 
respectively (Ibid.: 30). In addition, when Prime Minister Kishi visited Taiwan in June 
1957 as the first prime minister ever to do so, it was Ambassador Horinouchi who had 
accompanied the Prime Minister (Ibid.). As a result, Ambassador Horinouchi had gained 
the unique position in which he could directly communicate with the Prime Minister 
(Ibid.). The following paragraphs show how Ambassador Horinouchi discursively 
created the possibility of de-recognizing the national flag of the Peoples’ Republic of 
China, thereby enabling Kishi to abandon the initial arrangement of acquiescing in the 
hoisting of the flag over Beijing’s trade mission in Japan.
As of 12 March, when the joint meeting of Prime Minister, Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs, International Trade and Industy, and Justice took place, the possibility of de­
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recognizing the Communist Chinese flag had not existed as an option in the decision­
making process of the Japanese government. In this meeting, they agreed to take the 
following position that made no mention of the flag issue (Nikkei Shinbun 13 March 
1958 quoted by Kusano 1980: 22, author’s translation): ‘The Government does not 
recognize Communist China. Nor do we give diplomatic privileges to the private trade 
representative. However, under the principle of expanding trade with Communist China, 
we will do our utmost for the establishment of the private trade representative.’ The tone 
of the agreement was still lenient towards Beijing, and it was due to the fact that four 
out of five ministers did not anticipate the escalation of Taipei’s objection while all five 
ministers agreed on the positive impact of trade with Beijing on the Japanese economy 
(Kusano 1980: 22-3).
It was on 15 March that Ambassador Horinouchi took the initiative and drew 
attention to the national flag issue in a meeting with the Chief of the First Section of the 
Asia Bureau, Okada Akira, and the Chief of the Asia Bureau, Sakagaki Osamu. The 
dilemma surrounding the issue, in their eyes, was that the complete deprivation of 
Communist China’s right to fly its national flag in Japan would provoke the Mao regime 
while granting that right would surely lead to the severing of relations with the Chiang 
regime (Ibid.: 24). It was at this critical juncture that Ambassador Horinouchi, a highly 
respected senior diplomat, persuaded his colleagues to pay heed to Taipei by repeatedly 
emphasizing the ‘debt of gratitude’ the Japanese must repay for Chiang Kai-shek’s 
‘magnanimous’ postwar Japan policy (Ibid.: 23). As a result, they agreed to actively 
reject Communist China’s legal right to fly its national flag while keeping the hitherto 
existing practice of acquiescing in the actual hoisting of the five-star flag in Japan (Ibid.:
215
24). Consequently, the three Japanese officials agreed to provide the following 
explanation to Taipei regarding the Communist Chinese flag: ‘Japan-China trade never 
binds Japan to recognize Communist China. It is not meant to give diplomatic privileges 
to the representative of Communist China, either. Nor does it oblige us to grant 
Communist China the right to fly its national flag in Japan’ (Ibid.: 23, author’s 
translation). Although this explanation still could not satisfy Nationalist China that 
unilaterally severed trade relations with Japan on 18 March (Ibid.: 24), Horikoshi 
successfully constructed the initial formulation of de-recognizing the Communist 
Chinese flag through the discourse of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ 
postwar Japan policy. It was Horinouchi’s problematization of the five-star flag in terms 
of Japan’s repayment of its ‘debt of gratitude’ to Chiang Kai-shek that enabled Japan to 
take preventive action towards Beijing’s economic attempt to promote political relations 
with Tokyo.
By 29 March, despite of twists and turns between Japan and ‘China’, Prime 
Minister Kishi, Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichiro, Chief Cabinet Secretary Aichi 
Kiichi, Ambassador Horiuchi had agreed on the following five points (Ibid.: 25): 1) To 
maintain friendly relations between Japan and the ROC since the Japanese have the 
‘sense of gratitude’ for President Chiang’s ‘momentous’ measures towards postwar 
Japan; 2) To express Japan’s hope that Taipei understands Tokyo’s economic need to 
have trade relations with the PRC; 3) To calmly resume trade relations with Communist 
China rather than risking to make them excessively attractive by restricting such trade;
4) To maintain hitherto relations with Communist China—that is, continuing to abide by 
the principle of non-recognition; 5) To request the Nationalist Chinese government to
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fully understand Japan’s trade with mainland China including the issue of flying the 
Communist Chinese flag in Japan. In addition, the Japanese leaders had decided to give 
Taipei the following oral message regarding the national flag issue: ‘While Communist 
China will establish its private trade representative here only in the distant future, we 
will do our utmost to take measures against the hoisting of the national flag in the 
meantime’ (Ibid.: 25, author’s translation). As shown above, this shift—that Japan will 
no longer acquiesce in the hoisting of the Communist Chinese flag (Ibid.: 25)—was 
articulated by the Japanese ‘sense of gratitude’ for Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘momentous’ 
measures. In other words, as Kishi later recalled agreeing with Horinouchi that seeking 
Taipei’s understanding should be Japan’s top priority (Ibid.: 30), it was a victory for the 
discourse coalition of ‘returning virtue for malice’ in Japan—not only because it 
deconstructed Beijing’s version of ‘China’ but also because it was the repayment of a 
‘debt of gratitude’ Chiang Kai-shek accepted (Ibid.: 25).
Finally, Kishi’s policy change was also facilitated by the Japanese public opinion 
that was sympathetic towards Chiang Kai-shek’s regime (Ibid.: 33). In fact, Communist 
China’s subsequent cancellation of the fourth private trade agreement in April as well as 
its unilateral suspension of all business dealings with Japan following the Nagasaki flag 
incident in May failed to arouse a public outcry in Japan against Kishi’s China policy 
(Jain 1982: 39). Communist China, which was in the initial stage of the ‘Great Leap 
Forward’ at the time, used the Nagasaki flag incident as a pretext to influence Japan’s 
public opinion right in the middle of the first national election since the formation of the 
‘1955 system’ (Rose 1998: 45; Soeya 1998: 39). Notwithstanding such ‘intervention’ in 
the election of May 1958, the ruling LDP comfortably defeated the main opposition, the
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Japan Socialist Party (JSP), by more than 120 votes. The LDP victory, in a sense, 
confirmed popular support for Kishi’s pro-Taiwan policy or the repayment of a "debt of 
gratitude’ to Chiang Kai-shek (Hara 2003: 162). Thus, it was another indication of how 
deeply the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse resonated among the Japanese at the 
time.
In short, the fourth private trade agreement and the subsequent Nagasaki flag 
incident demonstrated the hegemonic position of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ 
discourse and its coalition following the formation of the ‘1955 system’. Such 
dominance consequently devastated the delicate ‘separation of politics and economics’ 
as well as Japan’s informal trade relations with mainland China. By the same token, 
Beijing’s construction of ‘China’ was destroyed by the discourse of ‘returning virtue for 
malice’ and its coalition as they helped ‘re-unify’ politics and economics as well as 
China in the eyes of the Japanese. It was not until the years of the Ikeda cabinet in the 
early 1960s that Beijing once again challenged the hegemonic coalition of the discourse 
over another crisis of recognition.
4.5 The heyday of ‘returning virtue for malice’ II: reconstructing ‘China’ in the 
1960s
Kurashiki Rayon Company, Zhou Hongqing, and the ‘second Yoshida letters ’ 1963-4. 
The sale of the Kurashiki Rayon Company’s vinylon plant to Communist China in 
August 1963 and the so-called Zhou Hongqing incident of October 1963 brought 
another crisis of recognition to Japan. In August 1963, the Japanese government 
approved the export of a vinylon plant to mainland China by the Kurashiki Rayon
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Company with a five year deferred payment plan provided by the Export-Import Bank 
of Japan {Nippon Yushutsunyu Ginko). Taipei objected strongly as it considered the use 
of a quasi-govemmental credit agency to finance sales amounted to Tokyo’s ‘economic 
aid’ to Beijing based on de facto recognition (Mendel 1969: 515-6, 1970: 199; Jain 
1982: 70; Mendl 1978: 22; Lin 1984: 171-2; Soeya 1995: 169, 1998: 96; Shimizu 2001: 
177). In September, tension was raised as Taipei recalled Ambassador Chang Li-sheng 
from Tokyo after Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato commented to American journalists that 
he had not taken seriously the prospect of Nationalist China’s recovery of the mainland 
even though he had heard the ‘rumor’. In October, the diplomatic crisis further escalated 
as Nationalist China disputed Japan’s handling of the Zhou Hongqing incident, in which 
a member of a technical mission from mainland China sought political asylum at the 
Soviet Embassy in Tokyo but ended up returning to mainland China three months later. 
In order to manage the precipitation of diplomatic crisis with the Chiang Kai-shek 
regime, Prime Minister Ikeda dispatched two major proponents of ‘returning virtue for 
malice’—Ono Banboku and Yoshida Shigeru—to Taipei in October 1963 and February 
1964 respectively. Ultimately, it took Tokyo two versions of the so-called ‘second 
Yoshida letter’—the ‘official’ documents economically precluding Japan’s subsequent 
plant sales to Communist China (in the publicized version of the letter dated 7 May 
1964) as well as politically expressing Tokyo’s moral support for Chiang Kai-shek’s 
recovery of mainland China (in the hitherto secret document dated 4 April 1964)—to 
restore its diplomatic relations with Taipei (Furuya 1977b: 162-7; Lin 1984: 202-8, 
1987: 83-4; Tanaka 1991: 216-7; Shimizu 2001). The production of the ‘second 
Yoshida letters’, as the following paragraphs show, was facilitated by the discourse of
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‘returning virtue for malice’ and its coalition. It is the intent of this section to show the 
resilience of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse and its coalition as the author 
explicates the successful reconstruction of ‘China’ in the face of recognition crisis in the 
early 1960s.
In the meantime, the production of the ‘second Yoshida letters’ can be 
internationally attributed to Washington’s intervention to settle the diplomatic crisis 
between the two client states while Taipei threatened to sever relations with Tokyo 
(Cohen 1989: 53-4). For instance, in December 1963, Assistant Secretaiy of State Roger 
Hilsnian put pressure on the Nationalist Chinese side by warning that Taipei’s strong 
action against Tokyo would make it difficult for Washington to win Tokyo’s support for 
‘free China’ in the UN (Ibid.: 53). Furthermore, the American ambassador to the ROC, 
Admiral Jerauld Wright, warned Chiang Kai-shek that the severing of Taipei’s 
diplomatic relations with Tokyo would have a ‘serious if not disastrous effect’ on 
Taipei’s international position and result in the advancement of Beijing’s relations with 
Tokyo (Ibid.: 53-4). In the meantime, the international environment surrounding Taipei 
deteriorated as France diplomatically recognized Communist China in January 1964. 
Consequently, Chiang Kai-shek restrained himself and Tokyo concurrently did what it 
could to bring the diplomatic crisis to an end (Ibid.)—that is, by issuing the ‘second 
Yoshida letters’ in the spring of 1964. In other words, while such an external factor as 
Washington’s pressure on its clients constitute a necessary condition for the resolution 
of the diplomatic crisis, it still does not sufficiently explain how the crisis was overcome 
since it largely neglects to interpret how the production of the ‘second Yoshida letters’ 
was made possible.
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Domestically, the ‘second Yoshida letters’ were the products of Foreign Minister 
Ohira Masayoshi, who drafted them in close consultation with Yoshida (Sato et al. 
1990: 215-6; Yatsugi 1973: 238; Besshi 1983: 107; Tanaka 1991: 57), in order to 
appease the discourse coalition of ‘returning virtue for malice’. More specifically, 
Ohira’s policy of appeasement was designed to bridge his mentor Prime Minister 
Ikeda’s China policy and its opposition within the ranks of the LDP and the cabinet— 
constituted by such influential figures as former Prime Ministers Yoshida Shigeru and 
Kishi Nobusuke, Minister of Justice Kaya Okinori, and former Deputy Prime Minister 
Ishii Mitsujiro (Furukawa 1988: 222; Besshi 1983: 106-7; Lin 1997: 173-4). Ohira was 
also under the pressure of other supporters of the CPSJC like Vice President of the LDP 
Ono Banboku and former Director of the Defense Agency Funada Naka. In fact, Ono 
and Funada (1970: 58-63) are the ones the Ikeda government dispatched to Taipei (10) 
at the inception of the crisis after Chang Chun (1980: Ch. 14) expressed Taipei’s 
objection to Ono and Kishi regarding the sale of Kurashiki Rayon’s vinylon plant. 
Furthermore, over the course of the Zhou Hongqing incident, it was Kaya, Ohira’s 
former superior in the Ministry of Finance during the prewar era (Sato et al 1990), who 
made Ohira’s job difficult. Kaya prolonged the incident by attempting to persuade 
Zhou—the ‘defector’ who had repeatedly changed his mind and finally expressed his 
wish to return to mainland China—to defect to Taiwan (Furukawa 1988: 221-2; Lin 
1984: Ch. 7). Moreover, Ohira could hardly ignore Ishii, Chair of the CPSJC, who first 
formally raised the issue of Yoshida’s visit (11) to Taiwan as he paid a visit to Prime 
Minister Ikeda in January 1964 (Soeya 1995: 170, 1998: 97). As a result, the Ikeda 
government began calling for re-establishing friendly relations with Nationalist China
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through the discourse of Japan’s ‘debt of gratitude’ to Chiang Kai-shek (Eto 1967: 150). 
Such an attempt to re-construct Japan’s diplomatic recognition of ‘China’ soon 
materialized as Yoshida’s visit to Taiwan and the two letters which Yoshida sent to 
Chang Chun after the trip. Accordingly, for the Ikeda government, the two letters were 
meant to give a “‘cooling-off’ period’ not Only to Taipei (Soeya 1995: 119, 172, 1998: 
58, 98-9), but also the discourse coalition that represented Chiang Kai-shek in the 
domestic politics of Japan.
More transnationally, the making of the ‘second Yoshida letters’ was facilitated 
by the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’—through which Yoshida, a retired 
premier, ‘privately’ communicated with Chiang Kai-shek. For instance, as soon as the 
Japanese government approved the sale of the Kurashiki vinylon plant, Chiang 
contacted Yoshida—former Prime Minister at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty of 
Peace in April 1952—and engaged him in the familiar discourse of ‘returning virtue for 
malice’. In his telegram to Yoshida—who was expected to wield influence on his 
protege, Prime Minister Ikeda (Chang 1980: 184, 198)—Chiang framed his message 
with the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’. In this telegram, Chiang stated as 
follows (Yatsugi 1973: 238, author’s translation):
‘China adopted the policy of “returning virtue for malice” immediately 
after the war. However, what Japan recently did to China was derived 
from that of “returning malice for virtue”. If Japan continues to have 
such an attitude, China has no choice but to remember Japan’s malice 
from the past.’
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Yoshida’s reply, as it requested Chiang to understand the sale of the vinylon plant to 
Communist China based on the ‘separation of politics and economics’, repeatedly stated 
(Ibid., author’s translation):
6 We have not forgotten about our “debt of gratitude” to Mr. President.’
Moreover, when Yoshida ‘privately’ visited Chiang with a letter from Prime Minister 
Ikeda (12) in February 1964, Yoshida gave Emperor Hirohito’s best regards and 
expressed his gratitude for Chiang’s virtue (Chang 1980: 204). After Chiang asked 
Yoshida to give his best regards to Hirohito, he continued to engage Yoshida in the 
discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ by making the following remark (Ibid.: 204-6, 
author’s translation):
‘Repatriating three million Japanese soldiers from China was the 
manifestation of the friendly spirit that China traditionally has had for 
Japan....It would not only be fruitless but dangerous if one only cared 
about Japan’s economic development without paying heed to the 
restoration of China. That is why China and Japan must cooperate 
closely. We must co-exist and co-prosper. Otherwise, we could not 
expect stability in Asia....if we do not solve the problem of mainland 
China by exterminating communist bandits and recovering the freedom 
of the people, then it would be extremely difficult for Japan to secure
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present prosperity....Prime Minister Ikeda’s claim that there are “two 
Chinas” led to the low tide of Sino-Japanese relations last year....This 
claim that there are “two Chinas” enabled Ikeda to collaborate with the 
communist bandits. The problem regarding the sale of the Kurashiki 
plant occurred as a result....Then, there came the Zhou Hongqing 
case....Frankly speaking, I am deeply disappointed with these outcomes 
of my Japan policy from the past.’
Chiang then drew Yoshida’s attention to the Sunist roots of ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ 
as follows (Ibid.: 207, author’s translation):
‘In The Destiny o f  China (Zhongguo zhi Cunwang Wenti) that Mr. Sun 
Yat-sen wrote in 1917, he called for defending the Pacific through 
Sino-American-Japanese collaboration. In other words, he meant to 
tell us that we must unite and guard against the Russian empire. That 
traditional spirit is still with us.’
Chiang then concluded by briefly demanding Yoshida to repay ‘a debt of gratitude’ in 
the following fashion (Ibid., author’s translation):
‘I hope Your Excellency will encourage the Japanese government to 
give moral and spiritual support to the Chinese government.’
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As shown above, the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ provided the moral 
foundation on which Chiang demanded Yoshida to politically consolidate Tokyo’s 
recognition of Taipei as the legitimate government of China. More importantly, the 
Chiang-Yoshida talks that were morally framed by the ‘returning virtue for malice5 
discourse eventually culminated in the production of the two ‘second Yoshida letters’ of 
4 April and 7 May 1964—which were sent to the Secretary General of the Office of the 
President, Chang Chun, who had closely accompanied Yoshida during his trip to 
Taiwan (Ibid.: 208-9).
The ‘second Yoshida letter’ of 4 April 1964 complemented the 1952 Treaty of 
Peace between the Republic of China and Japan in the eyes of Chiang Kai-shek (Ibid.: 
210; Lin 1984: 205, 1987: 84; Shimizu 2001: 180). In fact, Chiang later commented on 
the significance of the letter as follows (Lin 1984: 84, author’s translation):
‘The Yoshida letter and the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty (Treaty of Peace 
between the Republic of China and Japan) are interrelated. At the time,
Mr. Yoshida and I mutually understood that the Yoshida letter was a 
supplementary document to the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty. This letter 
was produced because both the Japanese Government—that Mr.
Yoshida represented—and the Government of the Republic of China— 
under my rule—felt the need to supplement the Sino-Japanese Peace 
Treaty, which we felt was still insufficient several years after the 
conclusion of the Treaty. Therefore, repealing this Yoshida letter today
225
would necessarily result in the abrogation of the Sino-Japanese Peace 
Treaty.’
However, this supplementary document, the existence of which the Japanese 
government still denies to this date (Shimizu 2001: 179), remained secret until it was 
‘re-discovered’ by the Japanese journalists who were putting together a 15-volume 
biography of Chiang Kai-shek in 1976 (Chang 1980: 211; Furuya 1977b: 162-7; Tanaka 
1991: 216-7). Nonetheless, in this short secret letter, Yoshida acknowledged the receipt 
of the ‘outline of Communist China policy’ (Zhonggong duice yaogang or Chukyo 
taisaku yoko) as the following (Furuya 1977b: 165; Lin 1984: 204-5; Shimizu 2001: 
179, author’s translation):
‘Dear Yueh-chun (Chang Chun): I am sure that you have read the letter I 
sent to you the other day, I would like to take this opportunity to 
acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 4 March along with the 
minutes of the talks and the outline o f  Communist China policy. In the 
third round of the talks, my remark was about Indonesia rather than 
India. Please correct it. I am writing to inform you that there is no other 
error.’
Now, in order to adequately understand the significance of this letter, it is necessary to 
examine it in conjunction with the ‘outline of Communist China policy’—the existence
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of which has recently been confirmed by the de-classification of Japanese diplomatic 
archives (Mainichi Shinbun 29 May 2000; Shimizu 2001: 179-80; Ishii 2002: 18-20).
The ‘outline of Communist China policy’, which Yoshida jointly drafted with 
Chang Chun (1980: 208-10) during his visit to Taiwan, was composed of the following 
five points (Furuya 1977b: 164; Chang 1980: 209-10; Lin 1984: 203-4; Shimizu 2001: 
178-9, author’s translation):
‘1) In order for 600 million Chinese people to peacefully co-exist and 
trade with free nations, thereby contributing to world peace and 
prosperity, it is vital for us to bring those people into the free world by 
liberating them from communist rule; 2) In order to achieve that goal,
Japan and the Republic of China must cooperate substantively to realize 
mutual peace and prosperity and to set a concrete example of liberalism 
for the people of mainland China, thereby inducing them to forsake the 
communist regime and expel communism out of the continent; 3) If 
circumstances surrounding mainland China and the world permit the 
Republic of China to have a successful counterattack on the mainland,
Japan must give spiritual and moral support to the counterattack policy 
of 70% politics and 30% militaiy; 4) Japan must oppose the so-called 
‘two Chinas’ plan; 5) The Japanese government must strictly refrain 
from taking such measures as giving economic aid to mainland China 
while restricting its trade with the continent to that on a purely private 
basis.’
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Accordingly, Yoshida (on behalf of the Ikeda government) agreed to the principle of 
‘one China’—before ‘switching back’ to that of ‘two Chinas’ in the letter of 7 May 
(Mainichi Shinbun 29 May 2000; Ijiri 2001).
The ‘second Yoshida letter’ of 7 May was initially known to be the ‘second 
Yoshida letter’ of 1964—second after the Yoshida letter of 24 December 1951—in 
Japan until the existence of the letter of 4 April was revealed in the mid 1970s (Chang 
1980: 211; Furuya 1977b: 162-7; Tanaka 1991: 216-7; Shimizu 2001: 179; Nakajima 
2002: 145). The letter of 7 May was written in reply to Chan Chun’s letter of 10 April 
1964, in which Chang made the following request (Shimizu 2001: 181, author’s 
translation):
‘We would once again like you to advise Prime Minister Ikeda to 
guarantee us that the Japanese government will not give credit to 
Communist China through any governmental bank again and that it 
will henceforth abide by the principle of non-intervention in regard to 
its private trade with Communist China.’
In the reply letter of 7 May, Yoshida—with Prime Minister Ikeda’s tacit approval 
(Soeya 1995: 171; 1998: 98)—made the following two promises according to the 
Mainichi Shinbun on 5 August 1965 (Ibid.):
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‘1) Concerning the matter of restricting the financing of plant exports 
to Communist China on a purely private basis, study will be made so 
as to reflect your (Nationalist government’s) intention; 2) Within this 
year (Showa 39 [1964]), Nichibo’s chemical fiber plant export to 
Communist China through the Export-Import Bank shall not be 
approved.’
It has been argued that the phrase ‘within this year’ indicated that the Ikeda 
government—in the name of Yoshida—intended to resume its ‘two Chinas’ policy (13) 
and approve Export-Import Bank credits in the following year even though Prime 
Minister Ikeda fell ill and resigned before the ‘cooling-off year’ was over (Soeya 1995: 
172, 1998: 98-9; Mainichi Shinbum 29 May 2000). In any case, in this letter, Yoshida 
also requested Taipei to speed up the process of re-normalizing diplomatic relations 
with Tokyo—such as dispatching an ambassador to Japan immediately (Lin 1984: 205- 
6). Subsequently, in the following month of June, Taipei dispatched its new ambassador, 
Wei Tao-ming, to Tokyo. As a result, the diplomatic crisis finally came to an end.
In sum, although the re-noimalization of relations between Taipei and Tokyo 
through the production of the ‘second Yoshida letters’ can be partially attributed to 
Washington’s pressure on Taipei, the resolution of the diplomatic crisis was also 
partially facilitated by the re-construction of ‘China’ through the hegemonic discourse 
of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and its coalition. More specifically, following the sale of 
the Kurashiki vinylon plant and the Zhou Hongqing incident in the fall of 1963, 
domestic pressure from the hegemonic discourse coalition contributed to Prime Minister
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Ikeda’s decision to dispatch a representative of the discourse coalition—Ikeda’s mentor, 
former Prime Minister Yoshida—to Taiwan in early 1964. In addition to the pressure 
from the discourse coalition, it was the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ that 
provided the moral foundation for the Chiang-Yoshida talks which eventually led to the 
production of two ‘second Yoshida letters’ in the spring of 1964. Accordingly, the 
hegemonic discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and its coalition facilitated the 
production of the ‘second Yoshida letters’, thereby re-constructing Japan’s diplomatic 
recognition of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘China’ and making the Ikeda government’s attempt 
to exercise its ‘two Chinas’ policy ‘impossible’.
4.6 Conclusion
Between 1952 and 1964, the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ diffused into 
Japan and formed a coalition that eventually gained and maintained the hegemonic 
position in Japanese politics. Interestingly, the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ 
initially diffused through the prewar Japanese imperialists whom the American 
occupation authorities had ‘depurged’ or ‘unleashed’ as ‘watch dogs’ at the inception of 
the Cold War. Subsequently, the diffusion of the discourse as well as the formation of 
the discourse coalition coincided with the making of the ‘1955 system’—especially the 
establishment of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, many influential members of 
which later participated in the Committee for the Promotion of Sino-Japanese 
Cooperation—by suturing the ‘iron triangle’ of Japan. As a result, the storyline that 
Chiang Kai-shek is the benefactor to whom the Japanese must repay a ‘debt of
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gratitude’ became official and facilitated Japan’s diplomatic recognition of the Chiang 
regime as ‘China’ under US hegemony during this period.
In the meantime, two diplomatic crises critically tested the hegemonic position 
of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and its coalition in Japan. They were brought by the 
development of Communist China’s ‘private’ trade with Japan as well as the outbreak of 
‘incidents’ in the late 1950s and early 1960s respectively. First, the discourse coalition 
of ‘returning virtue for malice’ devastated Communist China’s challenge through the 
fourth private trade agreement and the Nagasaki flag incident in the spring of 1958. In 
this first diplomatic crisis, Beijing’s attempt to gain Japan’s recognition of its national 
flag was destroyed by Prime Minister Kishi and other members of the discourse 
coalition in Japan. Consequently, as the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and its 
coalition helped to bring the ‘re-unification’ of politics and economics into Japan’s 
China policy, Communist China’s use of economic means to achieve political ends 
resulted in the severing of (economic) relations with Japan. Second, the next diplomatic 
crisis was triggered by the sale of the Kurashiki vinylon plant to Communist China and 
the Zhou Hongqing incident, both of which took place in the fall of 1963. Eventually, 
this second diplomatic crisis was successfully managed by the production of the two 
‘second Yoshida letters’ of 1964, which was facilitated by the discourse of ‘returning 
virtue for malice’ and its coalition in Japan. As a result, the Ikeda government was 
forced to keep its ‘private’ trade with Beijing strictly private and to show support for 
Chiang Kai-shek’s recovery of the mainland based on the principle of ‘one China’. In 
short, these crucial cases of the de-construction and re-construction of ‘China’
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demonstrated the hegemonic position of the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ 
and its coalition in the 1950s and the early 1960s.
Accordingly, the dominance of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse and its 
coalition in Japan during this period overshadowed the possibility of recognizing 
Communist China, which actually took place only eight years afterwards. In the next 
chapter, the author thus shows the realization of that possibility in terms of the decline 
of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse and its coalition in Japan between 1964 
and 1972. Simply put, the next chapter demonstrates how the ‘1955 system’ and the 
‘San Francisco system’ degenerated over the ‘China question’ in the following eight 
years.
Notes
1) For the ‘reverse course’, see Chapter 3.
2) For the concept of ‘discourse coalitions’, see Ch. 1.
3) Ogata’s entourage included his former colleague, Kaji Ryuichi of the Asahi 
Shinbun, who later became a proponent of ‘returning virtue for malice’ (Chen 1988: 
48-9).
4) Foreign Minister Okazaki Katsuo was Yoshizawa’s junior colleague who had 
assisted Yoshizawa at the Japanese Consulate in Shanghai in the 1920s when 
Yoshizawa served as Minister Plenipotentiary (Yoshizawa 1958: 93).
5) However, there were four according to another account by a member of the ‘Ishii 
mission’, Yatsugi Kazuo (1973: 184) of the National Policy Research Association 
(Kokusaku Kenkyukai), who persuaded Ishii to lead a mission to Taipei in order to
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counter-balance informal relations between Tokyo and Beijing (Ibid.: 12-14). 
Yatsugi recalls that Ishii expressed his words of appreciation to Chiang for the 
following four decisions (Ibid.: 184): 1) Chiang’s objection to the abrogation of the 
Japanese imperial institution at the Conference of Cairo; 2) Chiang’s declaration of 
‘returning virtue for malice’ and the safe repatriation of the Japanese soldiers and 
civilians from China immediately after the war; 3) Chiang’s enunciation to renounce 
the right to demand war reparations from Japan; 4) Chiang’s arrangement to 
repatriate Japanese prisoners of war before any other country. Yatsugi further points 
out that Ishii failed to thank Chiang for the ‘fifth virtue’—that Chiang turned down 
Douglas MacArthur’s offer for Nationalist China to dispatch its occupation forces to 
Kyushu, Japan—because he had not been informed of it at the time of the meeting 
(Ibid.).
6) Yatsugi Kazuo (1973: 17-18), Secretary General of the CPSJC, recalls that he was 
the one who proposed the idea of establishing the CPSJC to Chiang Kai-shek. 
Yatsugi persuaded Chiang by referring to Sun Yat-sen’s relationships with Toyama 
Mitsuru and other prewar Japanese activists known as ‘China adventurers’ (Tairiku 
ronin) (Ibid.)—for whom ‘the struggle to build a new East Asia was a cause that 
transcended personal or national boundaries’ (Jansen 1980: 374). Chiang then 
gleefully reacted and patted on his knee even before his interpreter began translating 
Yatsugi’s (1973: 18) comment. Chiang Kai-shek immediately consulted his Japan 
hand, Chang Chun, who volunteered to take charge of the Chinese side on the spot 
(Ibid.).
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7) According to Yatsugi Kazuo (1973), Chiang Kai-shek also expressed his desire to 
see Tokyo normalize its diplomatic relations with Seoul when the Tshii mission’ 
paid a visit to Taipei in the summer of 1956 just as Chiang had discussed the 
significance of Japan’s anti-communist alliance with South Korea when the ‘Ono 
mission’ visited him in the summer of 1955. In his meeting with Yatsugi (Ibid.: 21-
2), Chiang expressed his desire to see Tokyo normalize its diplomatic relations with 
Seoul in the presence of Foreign Minister George K. C. Yeh who had just come back 
from South Korea on the day before the meeting. Interestingly, Yatsugi’s subsequent 
consultation with Kishi Nobusuke and Ishii Mitsujiro eventually led to the formation 
of the Committee for the Promotion of Korean-Japanese Cooperation (Nikkan 
Kyoryoku Iinkai) in the late 1960s. The Committee sent observers to the CPSJC 
(Nikka Kyoryoku Iinkai) in 1970 (Ikei 1980).
8) On this trip, Kishi reportedly encouraged Chiang Kai-shek to re-conquer mainland 
China (Eto 1967: 139; Ikei 1974: 59; Mendl 1978: 19), even though he later denied 
the allegation (Hara 2003: 160).
9) The signatory organizations are as follows (Soeya 1998: 38): 1) The Japan 
Association for the Promotion of International Trade (Nippon Kokusai Boeki 
Sokushin Kyokai); 2) The Diet Members’ League for the Promotion of Japan-China 
Trade (Nitchu Boeki Sokushin Giin Renmei); 3) The Japan-China Import-Export 
Union (Nitchu Yushutsunyu Kumiai).
10) Incidentally, there were anti-Japanese demonstrations in the capital inspired by the 
Nationalist government (Mendel 1969: 517,1970: 200).
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11) Yoshida had promised Chen Chien-chung, Chief of the Sixth Section of the Central 
Committee, that he would visit Taiwan on behalf of Prime Minister Ikeda if Yoshida 
failed persuading the Prime Minister to pay a visit to Taipei (Chang 1980: 199-200).
12) On this occasion, Yoshida also explained to Chiang why the Prime Minister was 
unable to pay a visit (Ibid.: 208).
13) Yoshida has admitted to Eto Shinkichi, the Sinologist, that he had attempted to 
operate a ‘two Chinas’ policy by taking one issue at a time under the given 
circumstances (Mainichi Shinbun 29 May 2000)—that both Taipei and Beijing 
adhered to the ‘one China’ principle.
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5
The decline of ‘returning 
virtue for malice’ and US 
hegemony in East Asia 
1964-72
‘When I  became Prime Minister...the Japan-China problem was also a domestic 
problem that had to be solved...President Nixon suddenly visited China over the heads 
o f the Japanese... it presented a great opportunity for Japan, and I  just seized that 
opportunity. ’
(Tanaka Kakuei quoted by Hayasaka 1987: 223)
‘Chiang Kai-shek will not accept “two Chinas”. He will announce the severing o f  
diplomatic relations with the Japanese government as soon as Japan and the People’s 
Republic o f China normalize relations. ’
(Zhou Enlai quoted by Wang 2003:273)
‘We didn’t think that our diplomatic relations with Japan would be severed...we didn’t 
think that Communist China would agree to normalize relations with Japan while Japan 
maintained its diplomatic relations with Taiwan. ’
(Lin Chin-ching quoted by Sankei Shinbun Sengoshi Kaifu Shuzaihan 1999: 295)
5.1 Introduction
On 29 September 1972, immediately after normalizing relations with the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) in the east wing of the Great Hall of the People, Japanese 
Foreign Minister Ohira Masayoshi held a press conference at the Nationalities Culture
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Palace and stated the following (Sato et al 1990: 305; Jain 1982: 263-4; Takeuchi 
1993: 202-8):
‘As a result of the normalization of Japan-China relations, the Japan- 
Taiwan peace treaty has lost its raison d ’etre, and in the Japanese 
government’s view it is recognized that this treaty has come to an end.’
This statement—in which Ohira never once alluded to the ‘severing of relations’ 
(danko) with the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan (Ishii 2003b: 374)—initially sent 
a confusing message to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Taipei. In fact, Taipei 
immediately instructed its embassy in Tokyo to inquire the Japanese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs whether or not Tokyo really meant to sever diplomatic relations with 
Taipei (Huang 1995: 208). It was after Kaya Okinori, a senior pro-Taipei member of the 
ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), confirmed with Hogen Shinsaku, a vice foreign 
minister, on Taipei’s behalf that the Nationalist government declared its decision to 
sever diplomatic relations with Japan—finally and more clearly (Ibid.).
In this ‘farewell’ statement of 29 September, Nationalist China held the 
Japanese government responsible for the severing of diplomatic relations as it 
concurrently maneuvered to maintain ‘friendship’ (economic relations) with Japanese 
people. It did so by separating the Japanese state and society through the moral 
discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ as follows (Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
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Republic of China 1973: 3-6; Zhonghua Minguo Waijiaobu 1973: 4-5; Zhonghua 
Minguo Shishi Jiyao Bianji Weiyuanhui 1983: 744-6):
‘The Government of the Republic of China... declares its decision to sever 
diplomatic relations with the Japanese Government, and wishes to point 
out that the Japanese Government shall assume full responsibility for the 
rupture...President Chiang Kai-shek, in the interest of peace and stability 
for China and Japan...adopted the policy of returning kindness for 
malevolence (yide baoyuan) after Japan’s surrender.. .the Tanaka 
Government has unilaterally nullified the Sino-Japanese peace treaty, 
recognized the Chinese Communist regime...these actions not only 
demonstrate ungratefulness and perfidy (wangen fuyi), bringing shame to 
the Japanese nation, but also run counter to the wishes of the great 
majority of the Japanese people...the Tanaka Government can not affect 
the gratitude and respect of the Japanese people toward the great kindness 
{deyi) of President Chiang Kai-shek. With all those Japanese people... the 
Government of the Republic of China will continue to maintain 
friendship.’
In a sense, this statement was a reply to the following request of the Japanese 
government, which Vice Foreign Minister Hogen had made to Ambassador P’eng
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Meng-ch’i in Tokyo earlier on the same day (Lin 1984: 303, Lin 1987: 116, author’s 
translation):
‘Given the fact that both the Nationalist government and the Communist 
government adhere to the principle of one China, we deeply regret that it 
is now impossible to maintain diplomatic relations with the ROC after 
having normalized relations with the PRC. However, the Japanese 
Government still wishes to maintain pragmatic relations (Jitsumu kankei) 
such as trade and economic relations on the private level.. .That is why we 
are requesting the Nationalist government to take all the necessary 
measures for the security of Japanese expatriates and their assets in 
Taiwan...’
Accordingly, while Nationalist China morally held Japan and its ‘ungratefulness and 
perfidy’ responsible for the severing of diplomatic relations, Tokyo logically held 
Taipei and its adherence to the principle of ‘one China’ responsible for their diplomatic 
break-up. As a result, economic relations between the two nations were pragmatically 
maintained as diplomatic relations were severed in spite of the fact that Tokyo never 
(clearly) de-recognized Taipei.
How was such ‘severing of relations’ possible in September 1972 if the 
discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and its coalition were so robust that Tokyo’s 
recognition of Taipei was facilitated as this study argues? The conventional approach
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highlights the significance of the ‘international environment’ such as the impact of the 
United States on Japan by grossly reducing the severing of Japan-ROC relations to the 
normalization of Japan-PRC relations (Kosaka 2000: 524, 528; Iriye 1997: 164-5; Ikei 
1982: 302; Hosoya 1993: 156; Tanaka 1991: 61). It mainly argues that Japan dutifully 
followed the United States that reversed its policy towards ‘China’ as Washington 
shockingly announced President Nixon’s forthcoming visit to Beijing in July 1971. 
However, while such change as the American initiative to play the ‘China card’ may 
partially explain why Japanese leaders decided to visit Beijing, it is empirically 
inaccurate to state that Tokyo dutifully followed Washington in finding a secure basis 
for its China policy. In fact, it was Washington that followed In the footsteps of Tokyo 
as Japan-ROC relations were severed more than six years ahead of US-ROC relations 
which were finally terminated in January 1979—nearly seven years after Nixon’s visit 
to Beijing. Therefore, in order to more fully understand the severing of diplomatic 
relations between Tokyo and Taipei, it is necessary for us to look beyond the coercive 
impact of the American hegemon on the Japanese client.
This chapter sheds light on the consensual aspect of American hegemony in 
East Asia by focusing on the severing of diplomatic relations between such client states 
as Japan and Nationalist China that constituted US hegemony. By doing so, this chapter 
provides the following answer for the aforementioned question: The hegemonic 
position of the pro-Taipei coalition formed around the discourse of ‘returning virtue for 
malice’ in the domain of Japanese domestic politics—which sustained Tokyo’s 
diplomatic recognition of Taipei—declined relatively between 1964 and 1971, and the
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eventual loss of its hegemonic position in 1972 contributed to the ‘severing of relations’ 
between Tokyo and Taipei. Furthermore, notwithstanding such decline and loss of the 
hegemonic position triggered by the lack of clear and timely consent between Tokyo, 
Taipei, and Washington, this chapter also shows that the discourse of ‘returning virtue 
for malice’ and its coalition still helped to make Japan’s support for the ROC in the UN 
possible and Tokyo’s (clear) de-recognition of Taipei zw-possible in the critical years of 
1971 and 1972. Having said that, this chapter also counterfactually argues that it would 
have been more difficult for the ‘severing of relations’ between Tokyo and Taipei to 
take place in 1972 if there was clear and timely consent between Tokyo, Taipei, and 
Washington and Nationalist China had managed to remain in the UN in 1971 as a 
result.
Put differently, this chapter analyzes the process o f the de-generation of 
American hegemonic apparatuses in East Asia such as the ‘San Francisco system’ and 
the ‘1955 system’ (Dower 1993b)—the generation of which the author discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 4 respectively—as well as the resilience of the ‘returning virtue for 
malice’ discourse in spite of its decline. First, this chapter probes the degeneration of 
the ‘1955 system’ by highlighting the relative decline of the discourse coalition of 
‘returning virtue for malice’ in terms of the bifurcation of the ruling Liberal Democratic 
Party over the ‘China question’ during this period. Second, this chapter then examines 
the limits of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse and the ‘San Francisco system’ 
by drawing on recent findings and materials as it sheds light on how Washington and 
Tokyo were defeated over the Chinese representation issue at the UN in 1971. Third, in
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spite of its decline, this chapter stresses the resilience of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ 
discourse as it shows how the discourse made it impossible for Tokyo to allude to the 
‘severing of relations’, which nonetheless led to Taipei’s de-recognition of Tokyo in 
1972. Finally, this chapter reiterates that the erosion of American hegemony in terms of 
the ‘1955 system’ as well as the ‘San Francisco system’, which the discourse of 
‘returning virtue for malice’ and its coalition constituted, accelerated over the Chinese 
representation issue in the UN in 1971.
5.2 The bifurcation of the ‘1955 system’: ‘China’ in the LDP 1964-72
On the eve of the normalization of Japan-China relations in September 1972, the ruling 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan—whose dominance in Japanese politics 
constituted the so-called ‘1955 system’—sent a mission to Beijing. Its mission was to 
lay the groundwork for the forthcoming visit of the new president of the LDP, Tanaka 
Kakuei. While this mission to Beijing epitomized the erosion of the ‘returning virtue 
for malice’ discourse and its coalition within the ruling party, it also demonstrated their 
resilience as the ‘inter-party’ talks between the LDP and the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) were surprisingly conducted in the same discourse that had helped to block 
Tokyo’s recognition of Beijing for two decades.
The mission was led by Kosaka Zentaro, former Foreign Minister, who had 
chaired the LDP Council for the Normalization of Japan-China Relations (Nitchu 
Kokko Seijoka Kyogikai) the scene of which pro-Taipei hawks dominated over the 
‘very long’ summer of 1972 (Kosaka 1981: 172,1994: 86). The mission was composed
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of 24 members including pro-Taipei elements of the Party (Ibid.: 87). During the first 
round of talks with CCP leaders, conceivably under the pressure of the pro-Taipei 
representatives, Kosaka (1981: 176, 1994: 87) unwisely pointed out the existence of the 
strong intra-party coalition that advocated Japan’s ‘debt of gratitude’ to ‘President 
Chiang Kai-shek’ and his ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy. In the end, 
Kosaka desperately followed up his remark by indicating that an agreement on the 
principle of ‘one China’ nonetheless had been reached within the ruling party (Ibid.).
On the following day, Liao Chengzhi, the Communist Chinese official who 
acted as the ‘personal representative’ of Premier Zhou Enlai (Radtke 1990: 4-5), 
furiously replied to Kosaka’s remark In the following fashion (Tagawa 1973: 372-6, 
author’s translation):
‘During the 15 September 1972 meeting...Mr. Kosaka introduced the 
debate that took place on the Council for the Normalization of Japan- 
China Relations for us. In this introduction, he particularly emphasized the 
opinion of a minority group within the Council, which opposed the Tanaka 
cabinet’s policy to normalize relations with the People’s Republic of 
China at an early date. In other words, it was the view of the so-called 
“pro-Taiwan group” which was against the majority of the Council as Mr. 
Kosaka pointed out...Introducing such a view however does not 
contribute to Prime Minister Tanaka’s forthcoming visit to China. 
Furthermore, it could even subvert his visit to promote the normalization
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of relations between China and Japan...Is it an attempt to create ‘two 
Chinas’ or ‘one China, one Taiwan’?...According to Mr. Kosaka’s 
introduction, those who advocated the maintenance of hitherto existing 
relations with Taiwan referred to Japan’s debt o f gratitude to Chiang Kai- 
shek for returning virtue for malice—that is, preventing Japan from 
becoming a divided nation as Chiang refrained from sending occupation 
forces to Japan after the war. I must say that their reference is groundless 
and they are ignorant of histoiy...The view of the minority group on the 
Council that the Japanese are indebted to the Chiang Kai-shek clique, 
whose hands are soaked with Chinese blood, just is not acceptable for the 
Chinese people.’
Furthermore, on the late night of 19 September, Premier Zhou Enlai requested 
Kosaka to see him immediately in the Great Hall of the People. The subject of this 
unexpected meeting was another LDP mission that was visiting Taipei at the time. 
Earlier on the same day, Shilna Etsusaburo, head of the mission in Taipei, had just held 
a talk with Premier Chiang Ching-kuo and discussed the future of diplomatic relations 
between Tokyo and Taipei—through the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ (Ishii 
et al. 2003: 133-43). Here, Zhou complained indignantly about Shilna’s remark as the 
following (Kosaka 1981: 186-7, author’s translation):
‘In Taiwan, Special Envoy Shiina said that diplomatic relations between 
Japan and Taiwan would continue even after the normalization of relations
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between Japan and China...It is a completely differently story from the 
one you told us. We are troubled by these divergent views on such a 
fundamental issue.5
Zhou then drew attention to Shima's earlier comment, which had called the principle of 
‘one China5 into question in the following fashion (Wang 2003: 277, author's 
translation):
‘There is not a single state that continues to recognize the Nationalist 
government after normalizing relations with (Communist) China...It 
makes sense logically (given the principle of one China), but it doesn't 
have to be that way politically.5
The Premier of the PRC then challenged Shiina's argument by showing the following 
support for the new Japanese cabinet which had embraced the ‘one China’ discourse 
(Ibid.: 277-8, author's translation):
"What kind of logic is the separation of logic and politics?.. .Both Prime 
Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira have said that it is impossible 
for Japan to simultaneously maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan if 
Japan and China establish diplomatic relations.. .This Is a logical 
consequence as well as a political consequence. It is based on this
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standpoint (the inseparability of logic and politics) that we will welcome 
Prime Minister Tanaka’s visit to China and negotiate the normalization of 
relations between China and Japan.’
In reply, Kosaka strongly (but wrongly) denied that Shiina would make such a 
comment as he had been informed that Prime Minister Tanaka’s letter Shiina conveyed 
did not even mention diplomatic relations between Tokyo and Taipei (Kosaka 1981: 
186-7,1994: 87-88, author’s translation):
‘He couldn’t have possibly made such a comment. We have exhaustively 
exchanged our views within the LDP just as we introduced them to you.
The exchange of views reflected the process of discussion in our party.
What we told you (about the normalization of relations with the PRC 
based on the principle of one China) is the conclusion of that discussion.’
However, unlike Kosaka’s attempt to justify his position, the ‘conclusion’ 
reached within the LDP was not so conclusive especially regarding the status of 
Tokyo’s diplomatic relations with Taipei. Rather, the Executive Council (Somukai) of 
the LDP had only passed a compromise platform called the Basic Policy on the 
Normalization of Japan-China Relations (.Nitchu Kokko Seijoka Kihon Hoshin) on 8 
September 1972 (Takemi 1981: 63, 1993: 5; Shiina Etsusaburo Tsuitoroku Kankokai 
1982: 147; Lee 1976: 116). It was drafted by the Council for the Normalization of
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Japan-China Relations, which Kosaka had been appointed to chair following the July 
1972 presidential election of the LDP. The //^conclusive nature of the platform was 
epitomized in the following preamble of the Policy (Shiina Etsusaburo Tsuitoroku 
Kankokai 1982: 145-54; Takemi 1981: 62-3, author’s translation):
‘Our government should take the following points into consideration when 
it negotiates the normalization of relations with China. Particularly, in 
view of the close relations between our nation and the Republic of China, 
negotiations should be conducted giving due consideration to the 
continuation of hitherto existing relations (Tokuni, wagakuni to Chuka 
Minkoku to no fukai kankei ni kangami, jurai no kankei ga keizoku 
sareruyo jubun hairyo no ue kosho subeki dearu).’
It is important to note that there was no agreed interpretation on ‘hitherto existing 
relations’ {jurai no kankei)—whether or not they included diplomatic relations—within 
the LDP. (1) In other words, the interpretation of the phrase was iridescently left in the 
eyes of the beholder. As a result, while ‘hitherto existing relations’ did not include 
diplomatic relations in the eyes of pro-Beying conservatives, they did include 
diplomatic relations in the eyes of pro-Taipei members of the ruling party (Besshi 1980: 
16 n. 36).
As demonstrated above, despite the fact that a general agreement on the 
normalization of relations with Beijing had been reached within the LDP, the ruling
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party of Japan nonetheless remained deeply divided over what to do about Tokyo’s 
relations with Taipei. The cleavage within the ruling party was so serious that it spilled 
over internationally and astonished the leaders of Communist China as mentioned 
above. As a result, the Communist Chinese leaders had to engage with the domestic 
politics of Japan in China and even form a ‘coalition’ with the new leaders of the LDP 
in Japan. More discursively, the CCP leaders went along with the new Tanaka 
administration that advocated the inevitability of severing relations with Taipei by 
blaming the logic (or anticipated consequence) of the ‘one China’ principle on both 
sides of the Taiwan Strait—despite the fact that it was, first of all, logically impossible 
for Deijmg to negotiate with Tokyo given that Tokyo had maintained diplomatic 
relations with Taipei since 1952. (2) In the meantime, the Japanese conservatives who 
were against severing relations with Nationalist China ceaselessly invoked Japan’s 
‘debt of gratitude’ to Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan 
policy. The depth of such division between the two discourse coalitions cannot be 
adequately understood unless one traces it back to the 1960s.
In this section, the author thus examines the ‘China question’ in the LDP 
between 1964 and 1972. During this period, the ‘1955 system’ gradually eroded as the 
ruling party increasingly bifurcated over ‘China’. Such bifurcation of the hegemonic 
apparatus was manifested by the rivalry between two groups representing ‘China’ 
within the LDP—the pro-Taipei group and the pro-Beijing group (Fukui 1969, 1970; 
Soeya 1995, 1998; Uchida 1965; Ogata 1965; Lee 1976; Takemi 1981). This study 
attaches more importance to the former since the composition of the pro-Taipei group
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largely overlapped with that of the Committee for the Promotion of Sino-Japanese 
Cooperation, participants of which circulated the discourse of ‘returning virtue for 
malice’ as mentioned in the previous chapter. In effect, this section sheds light on the 
relative and gradual decline of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse and its 
coalition within the ruling party of Japan by tracing this rivalry that culminated in the 
serious division over the Chinese representation issue at the UN in 1971 and the 
emergence of a pro-Beijing administration in 1972.
Pro-Taipei and pro-Beijing groups: discourses and intra-party politics 1964. After 
Ikeda fell ill in November 1964, it was Sato Eisaku, former Prime Minister Kishi 
Nobusuke’s younger brother and a major proponent of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ 
discourse (Eto 2003), who assumed the post of premiership in Japan. The first Sato 
cabinet was nearly identical with the previous cabinet as Sato kept all the ministers of 
the last Ikeda cabinet except for Chief Cabinet Secretary Hashimoto Tomisaburo and 
Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Takeshita Noboru (Sato and Matsuzaki 1986: 312; 
Takeshita 1991: 31-2). In fact, the new Prime Minister initially announced that he 
planned on running the nation along the lines of the Ikeda cabinet (Uchida 1965: 266). 
By the same token, Prime Minister Sato indicated that he would adopt a China policy 
along the lines of Ikeda’s as follows (Ibid.; Eto 1967: 152; Furukawa 1988: 232): 1) 
Japan must not interfere with the domestic affairs of ‘China’ when each of ‘two Chinas’ 
claims that there is only ‘one China’; 2) Although Japan has concluded the Treaty of 
Peace with the Nationalist government, the Japanese nation should not be overly
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obligated to the kindness Chiang Kai-shek showed at the end of the war. Sato’s odd 
precaution against the hegemonic position of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse 
and its coalition reflected his modest stance as the successor of Ikeda who had 
attempted to exercise a ‘two Chinas’ policy in the name of the ‘separation of politics 
and economics’. In fact, recently declassified Japanese diplomatic archives indicate that 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the final year of the Ikeda government had conducted 
a study on a ‘one China, one Taiwan’ formula for the ‘China question’ in the UN as 
well as that on how to promote relations with Beijing by overcoming the powerful 
discourse of postwar Japan’s ‘debt of gratitude’ to Chiang Kai-shek (Sho Kai-seki ongi- 
rori) (Ishii et a l 2003: 366-8). 'While Sato humbly took over Ikeda and his China policy 
by de-mobilizing the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’, he nonetheless provoked 
other members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to take action before the new 
Japanese Prime Minister paid a customary visit to Washington.
The Asian Problems Study Group (APSG or Afia Mondai Kenkyukai) (3) was 
formed in December 1964— under the leadership of Kaya Okinori, a staunch supporter 
of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse and its coalition—with an initial 
membership of 98 LDP Diet members (Fukui 1969: 313-7, 1970: 251-4). On 22 
December, after only two meetings, the Group presented the following advice in its 
interim report to Prime Minister Sato and other leaders of the LDP (Uchida 1965: 267- 
8; Fukui 1969: 316, 1970: 253): ‘1) The People’s Republic of China must not be 
admitted to the United Nations so long as it persists in its “aggressive” intentions; 2) 
For reasons of Japan’s own security, among other things, Taiwan must be kept from
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communist take-over; 3) The problem of China’s representation in the United Nations 
must continue to be regarded as an “important” question, requiring a two-thirds 
majority vote for adoption; 4) Trade with mainland China must be conducted on the 
basis of the separation of politics and economics without involving the use of Export- 
Import Bank credits or terms more favorable than those applicable to Japan’s trade with 
South Korea, Taiwan or other “Free World” nations.’ While some of these issues had 
been discussed between Tokyo and Washington when Secretary of State Dean Rusk 
visited Japan earlier that year, these multilateral as well as bilateral issues simply 
reflected what concerned Japan at the time. For example, issues regarding Communist 
China’s aggression and Japan’s own security were drawn from the first atomic 
explosion set off by Beijing in October 1964 and two Taiwan Strait crises in the 1950s. 
As for those related to the ‘China seat’ in the UN and bilateral trade relations, they were 
derived from an explosive increase in the number of member states in the UN as a result 
of decolonization as well as two bilateral diplomatic crises in the late 1950s and early 
1960s. In any case, the APSG strove to influence the leaders of the LDP so that they 
would make decisions to defend the status quo on the China issue and prevent Taiwan 
from falling into the hands of Beijing (Fukui 1969: 316,1970: 254).
Pro-Beijing members of the LDP led by Utsunomiya Tokuma and others 
announced that they also intended to organize a study group on the day afler the APSG 
presented its interim report (Uchida 1965: 268). The Asian-African Problems Study 
Group (AAPSG or Ajia Afurika Mondai Kenkyukai) was formed by 104 members (4) on 
28 January 1965, and it nominated two prominent pro-Beijing members of the LDP—
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Matsumura Kenzo and former Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichiro (5)—as its advisors 
(Ibid.: 270; Fukui 1969: 311, 1970: 250; Soeya 1995: 1 }f>, 1998: 55). Interestingly, the 
basic points of reference for the AAPSG vis-a-vis ‘China’ and Japan’s China policy 
were completely opposite of those of the APSG as follows (Uchida 1965: 268; Soeya 
1998: 55-6): ‘1) China must become a member of the (Jutted Nations,, which would ease 
tensions in Asia; 2) Therefore, Japan must not support tjie “important question” formula
i
of the China issue at the United Nations; 3) Governmental contacts with China must be 
pursued through such channels as ambassadorial talks (in a third countiy); 4) Japan- 
China trade must be expanded though governmental contacts.’ In addition, pro-Beijing 
leaders of the AAPSG—like Matsumura and Tokuma—mobilized the Group through a 
‘sense of guilt’ as they drew on the history in which Japan betrayed and mistreated 
mainland China and Asian nations in the process of modernization (Ogata 1965: 392, 
394-6). Furthermore, the pro-Beijing group also shared the narrative storyline that ‘the 
United States has failed to appreciate Asian nationalism, that the situation in Asia calls 
for solutions by Asians, and that Japan can play a greater role in international society by 
obtaining a freer hand’ from American control (Ibid.: 396). At any rate, although the 
AAPSG was not a dominant force in the LDP under Sato’s leadership, its pro-Beijing 
stance nonetheless had emerged as the force that could not be disregarded as it sought 
Beijing’s entry into the UN as well as Japan’s diplomatic recognition of Communist 
China (Fukui 1969: 311-3).
The relative distribution of these groups’ capabilities within the ruling party is 
difficult to assess since members of both groups cut across the factional divisions of
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intra-party politics (Fukui 1969: 319, 1970: 256; Soeya 1995: 116; 1998: 56), but it can 
still be largely categorized in terms of the mainstream and anti-mainstream factions of 
the LDP (Ogata 1965; Fukui 1969, 1970; Soeya 1995, 1998; Takemi 1981). For 
instance, according to Ogata (1965: 395), the pro-Taiwan APSG comprised the 
mainstream Sato, Kishi, and Ishii factions while the pro-Beijing AAPSG was composed 
of younger House of Representatives from the anti-mainstream Miki and Kono factions 
(Ogata 1965: 395). For another example, according to Fukui (1969: 326, 1970: 261), 
while the APSG mainly consisted of the four mainstream factions—the Sato, Fukuda 
(formerly Kishi), Miki, and Ishii factions—of the LDP under Sato’s presidency, the 
AAPSG largely comprised the anti-mainstream factions—the former Kono faction 
(succeeded by Nakasone) and the Matsumura (formerly Matsumura-Miki) faction—of 
the ruling party. Furthermore, according to Soeya (1995: 117, 1998: 56), the APSG 
members came from the five mainstream factions—the Sato, Kishi-Fukuda, Ishii, 
Kawashima (formerly Kishi), and Miki factions—of the Sato government, while the 
AAPSG members were from the anti-mainstream factions. More extremely, while the 
APSG had no members from the anti-mainstream Matsumura faction (Fukui 1969: 319, 
1970: 257; Uchida 1965: 275), the AAPSG had no members from the mainstream 
Kishi-Fukuda and Ishii factions—two major backers of the Sato cabinet (Ibid.; Soeya 
1995: 116-7; 1998: 56). As a result, the APSG—an intra-party element of the ‘returning 
virtue for malice’ discourse coalition, which closely associated with the Committee of 
the Promotion of Sino-Japanese Cooperation, an inter-elite variant—still had an edge in 
influencing the Sato cabinet.
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The ‘second Yoshida letter’ and a ‘new conservative party’ 1965-8. As a matter of fact, 
under the pressure of the APSG (Uchida 1965: 272-4), Prime Minister Sato indicated 
that the Japanese government was morally bound by the ‘second Yoshida letter’ of 7 
May 1964 (Eto 1967: 155-6; Besshi 1995: 50; Lin 1997: 184)—whose production was 
facilitated by the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse and its coalition as mentioned 
in the previous chapter. It was on 8 February 1965 that Sato made his statement before 
the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives following his government’s 
refusal to provide Export-Import Bank funds for the export of Nichibo’s plant to 
Communist China. Sato also denied the use of Export-Import credits for die export of 
Hitachi Shipbuilding Company’s freighter to mainland China on 11 February. These 
decisions Sato made under the pressure of the APSG were in accordance with the 
‘second Yoshida letter’ of 7 May 1964, in which Yoshida ‘privately’ agreed ‘restricting 
the financing of plant exports to Communist China to a purely private basis’ (Soeya 
1998: 98). The Hitachi case, in particular, was a ‘testing ground for Sato’s China 
policy’ since he could have approved the use of governmental funds on the ground that 
the ‘second Yoshida letter’ applied to plant exports only (Soeya 1995: 173; 1998: 99). 
Nevertheless, in return, Beijing not only cancelled contracts with Hitachi and Nichibo 
(Uchida 1964: 273-4), but also terminated negotiations for 40 other plant imports from 
Japan (Soeya 1995: 173, 1998: 99). Henceforth, the Sato government antagonized 
Beijing and the AAPSG which in turn began harshly criticizing Sato’s foreign policy— 
such as giving a 150 million-dollar loan to Taipei in April 1965. In any case, the APSG 
successfully blocked the expansion of Japan’s ‘private’ trade with mainland China by
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pressurizing Prime Minister Sato to recognize and abide by the ‘second Yoshida letter’ 
of 7 May 1964— which remained ‘effective’ until the eve of Tokyo’s normalization of 
relations with Beijing in 1972 (Zhao 1993: 140; Besshi 1995: 50; Shimizu 2001: 184).
In the meantime, as the cleavage between the two groups deepened, members of 
the AAPSG seriously considered defecting from the LDP at one point (Welfield 1988: 
213; Furukawa 1988: 250-3). Prior to the presidential election of the LDP in 1966, 
leaders of the AAPSG—like Matsumura—began openly discussing the possibility of 
forming a new conservative party (Welfield 1988: 213). The deterioration of the 
relationship between the two groups could be seen in the fact that their political 
debates—over such issues as the co-sponsoring of the ‘important question’ resolution to 
keep Taipei in the UN (Fukui 1972: 21)—often got heated to the extent that their 
‘voices were raised, fists brandished, bottles of beer and soft drink upset in unseemly 
scuffles, pieces of sushi hurled across rooms’ (Welfield 1988: 213). Meanwhile, 
members of the AAPSG started secret negotiations with the Democratic Socialist Party 
(Ibid.). They also set up the Consultative Group on the Promotion of Party Rectification 
(Shukuto Suishin Kyogikai) in order to challenge Sato and the pro-Taipei group in the 
presidential election and ‘purify’ the party (Ibid.; Furukawa 1988: 249-50). 
Nonetheless, the pro-Beijing group gave up its ‘dream’ and decided to remain in the 
LDP after its candidate, Fujiyama Aiichiro, was defeated by Sato—supported by the 
pro-Taiwan group—in the presidential election of the party in December 1966 and the 
ruling party managed to maintain its conservative representation in the lower house 
elections of January 1967 (Ibid.: 250-3; Welfield 1988: 213).
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Although it gave up the ‘dream’ of forming a new conservative party, the anti­
mainstream pro-Beijing group did not cease to challenge the pro-Taiwan Sato 
government. For instance, in the LDP presidential election year of 1968, the pro-Beijing 
Consultative Group on the Promotion of Party Rectification formed itself into the New 
Policy Council (Shinseisaku Konwakai) in Februaiy. In the second general meeting in 
March, the Council criticized the foreign policy of the Sato administration that had 
clearly leaned to the right (Furukawa 1988: 270-1). The Prime Minister had not only 
decided to give a 200 million-dollar loan to South Korea in the summer of 1967, but 
also visited Taiwan, South Vietnam, and the United States (6) in the midst of the 
Vietnam War in the fall of the same year. At any rate, in this general meeting, the 
Council unanimously agreed to advise Sato to make the following revisions in regard to 
his China policy (Ibid.: 271): 1) The administration must invalidate the ‘Yoshida letter’ 
(of 7 May 1964) and approve the use of Export-Import Bank funds for trade with 
mainland China; 2) The Japanese government must not co-sponsor the ‘important 
question’ resolution regarding the Chinese representation issue in the UN. However, 
Sato was able to ignore the New Policy Council’s policy advice as the Prime Minister 
was re-elected as the president of the ruling party with the support of the mainstream 
pro-Taipei group. The pro-Beijing group’s challenge against the pro-Taipei Sato 
administration was again unsuccessful because it failed to come up with a single unified 
candidate who could make a strong case against Sato’s China policy (Furukawa 1988: 
271-3).
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International sites o f intra-party politics: Beijing and Washington 1969. Despite such a 
setback, the pro-Beijing group boldly attempted to reassert its position as it issued the 
joint communique on ‘private5 trade with mainland China where the Cultural 
Revolution had come to an end (Lee 1976: 83-4). The communique that Dietman Fund 
Yoshimi jointly declared with his Chinese counterpart, Liu Xiwen, in April 1969 
denounced the pro-Taipei Sato government ‘for stepping up its effort to follow US 
imperialism, for participating in the conspiracy to create “two Chinas55 and for 
barefacedly adopting a policy of hostility toward China5 (Ibid.: 84). On this occasion, 
Fund further acknowledge the following (Ibid.): ‘1) The Japanese government was 
responsible for the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations; 2) The Japan-Taiwan peace 
treaty was illegal; and 3) The US-Japan security treaty constituted a threat to China and 
thus an important obstacle to Sino-Japanese cooperation.5 Moreover, Fund agreed to 
state ‘that the Government of the People's Republic of China is the only legitimate 
government representing the Chinese people, that Taiwan Province is an inseparable 
part of China's territoiy, that this must be the basis for understanding the promotion of 
the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China, and that it opposes 
the conspiracy of creating “two Chinas" in any form5 (Ibid.). This joint communique 
naturally created a controversy in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. For instance, 
leaders of the pro-Taipei APSG such as Kaya Okinori harshly criticized Furui for 
promoting ‘subservient trade5 (dogeza boeki) and doing Taipei and Washington 
injustice against the will of the Japanese government (Ibid.; Furukawa 1988: 285). 
Moreover, like Kaya, FunadaNaka—another exponent of the ‘returning virtue for
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malice1 discourse and its coalition—criticized Fund's attack on the US-Japan Security 
Treaty (Lee 1976: 84). Accordingly, the intra-party cleavage within the LDP continued 
to intensify and even spilled into the international arena, and it forebode the escalation 
of such a trend.
In fact, the pro-Taipei .group’s retaliation took the form of a joint communique 
issued by Prime Minister Sato and President Richard M. Nixon of the United States in 
the same year. In November 1969, Sato, who visited Washington mainly to discuss the 
‘reversion’ of Okinawa (or Liuqiu) to Japan with Nixon, strategically committed Japan 
to the stability of Asia under US hegemony by alluding to Korea and Taiwan. More 
specifically, in this joint communique, Sato agreed to Include the following ‘Korea 
clause’ and the ‘Taiwan clause’ (US Department of State 1969: 555-8): ‘The President 
and the Prime Minister specifically noted that the continuing tension over the Korean 
peninsula. The Prime Minister deeply appreciated the peace-keeping efforts of the 
United Nations in the area and stated that the security of the Republic of Korea was 
essential to Japan’s own security. The President and the Prime Minister shared the hope 
that Communist China would adopt a more cooperative and constructive attitude in its 
external relations. The President referred to the treaty obligations of his country to the 
Republic of China which the United States would uphold. The Prime Minister said that 
the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important 
factor for the security of Japan.’ Furthermore, during this visit, Sato declared that Japan 
would regard an armed attack on Taiwan or South Korea as a threat to the security of 
the Far East and it would take prompt and positive action so that Washington could use
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its military bases in Japan to meet the threat (Lee 1976: 85). Additionally, Sato 
criticized Communist China that it was Beijing’s responsibility to revise its rigid 
posture in international society (Ibid.). In reply, Zhou Enlai, (7) Premier of Communist 
China, condemned the Sato government that it was promoting the ‘revival of 
militarism’ in Japan as well as ‘its old dream of a “Greater East Asia Coprosperity 
Sphere’” (Ibid.: 86; Furukawa 1988: 291-2). Henceforth, Beijing’s anti-Sato campaign 
intensified and escalated to the extent that Furui Yoshimi, a prominent figure of the pro- 
Beijing group, was even overtly accused of being a Sato apologist and forced to make a 
‘self-criticism’ by his Chinese counterpart during their ‘trade’ talks in the spring of 
1970 (Ibid.: 294-7; Lee 1976: 90-1). Thus, the Sato-'Nixon communique triggered the 
deterioration of relations between the pro-Beijing group and Communist China. 
Consequently, it presented the pro-Taipei group with an opportunity to capitalize on 
Beijing’s criticisms and ‘hang’ the pro-Beijing group in terms of intra-party politics 
(Furukawa 1988: 299-301).
The transformation o f  ‘China * in the LDP J970-2. - Nevertheless, the pro-Beijing group 
continued to revolt against Sato’s China policy from both inside and outside of the 
LDP. In October 1970, leaders of the pro-Beijing group like Utsunomiya Tokuma and 
Tagawa Seiichi planned to organize a new supra-partisan dietmen’s league to promote 
the normalization of diplomatic relations with Beijing (Furukawa 1988: 307). More 
specifically, they planned to transform the Diet Members’ League for the Promotion of 
Japan-China Trade (Nitchu Boeki Sokushin Giin Renmei)—which had been inactive
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since the Nagasaki flag incident of 1958—into the Diet Members’ League for 
Promoting the Normalization of Japan-China Diplomatic Relations (Nitchu Kokko 
Kaifuku Sokushin Giin Renmei) (Ibid.). In December, the new Diet Members’ League 
was established with Fujiyama Aiichiro of the ruling LDP as its chairman and four 
leaders of opposition parties as vice-chairmen (Lee 1976: 94). Its membership consisted 
of 255 representatives and 124 councillors—including 95 from the LDP—surpassed a 
simple majority of the National Diet (Ibid.). As Western nations such as Canada and 
Italy recognized Beijing in the fall of 1970, it deplored the Japanese government’s 
‘anachronistic’ relations with Taipei and urgently called for Japan’s diplomatic 
normalization with Beijing (Ibid.: 94-5). It was certainly ironic that one fifth of the LDP 
dietmen cooperated with opposition parities against Sato, the president of their own 
party (Ibid.: 95). In the meantime, within the ruling party, the AAPSG had set up a 
consultative group on China and had got 55 Diet members to sign the petition 
requesting the Sato government not to cosponsor the ‘important question’ resolution 
against Beijing’s entry into the UN (Ibid.: 95). In order to appease the pro-Beijing 
group, the Sato administration appointed Noda Takeo as the Chair of a 45-member 
Subcommittee on the China Question (Chugoku Mondai Shoiinkai) under the 
Investigation Committee on Foreign Affairs (Gaiko Chosakai) (Ibid.; Furukawa 1988: 
310-1; Takemi 1981: 35). In hindsight, considering the fact that the Subcommittee was 
later upgraded to be a full-fledged committee in March 1971 and further reorganized to 
form the Council for the Normalization of Japan-China Relations (Nitchu Kokko Seijoka 
Kyogikai) in July 1972 under Tanaka Kakuei’s presidency (Furukawa 1988: 311, 375;
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Lee 1976: 97; Takemi 1981: 36), the formation of the Subcommittee on the China 
Question can be seen as the first sign of a major shift in the LDP’s China policy (Ibid.: 
35).
It was over the Chinese representation issue in the UN that Sato, Japan’s 
longest-serving Prime Minister, and the pro-Taipei group finally suffered irreparable 
damage as their policy to keep Taipei alive in the UN failed in October 1971 (Lee 1976: 
104; Ogata 1988: 43; Hosoya 1993: 157). It slapped Sato and the pro-Taipei group in 
their faces by showing that the tide was turning against them in international society. 
For example, in the previous year, more than half of UN member states had supported 
Beijing’s entry at the cost of Taipei’s exit in contrast to Tokyo’s pro-Nationalist stance. 
More conspicuously, President Nixon of the United States had also announced his plan 
to visit Beijing in July 1971 ‘over the heads of the Japanese’. Meanwhile, within the 
ruling party of Japan, the Chinese representation issue continued to be debated fervently 
between the pro-Taipei and pro-Beijing groups. For instance, in September 1971, in an 
attempt to counterbalance the pro-Beijing group, the pro-Taipei group held two 
meetings via the Consultative Group on Diplomatic Problems (Gaiko Mondai 
Kondankai) (Takemi 1981: 38-9). The Group had been organized by 49 LDP dietmen 
under the leadership of Ishii Mitsujiro six months earlier (Ibid.: 38). In these meetings, 
which were attended by as many as 70 LDP members of the National Diet, influential 
members of the mainstream pro-Taipei group—such as Kishi Nobusuke, Kaya Okinori, 
and Nadao Hirokichi—advocated that Japan should collaborate with Washington and 
co-sponsor US-drafted resolutions to keep Taipei’s seat in the UN (Ibid.: 38-9). In any
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case, it was in the meetings of the Committee on the China Question (Chugoku Mondai 
Chosakai)—which had just been upgraded from the subcommittee status—the pro- 
Taipei and pro-Beijing groups clashed hardest (Ibid.: 39; Fukui 1972: 24; Furukawa 
1988: 345). Between late August and early September 1971, Noda Takeo, the Chair of 
the Committee, and anti-mainstream factional leaders such as Miki Takeo and Ohira 
Masayoshi, strongly opposed the idea of co-sponsoring the so-called ‘reverse important 
question’ resolution—which required a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly to 
expel Taipei (while the original ‘important question’ resolution required the same two- 
thirds majority to admit Beijing) (Ibid.: 344-5; Fukui 1972: 24-5). Furthermore, in a 
Committee meeting in September 1971, leaders of the pro-Beijing group like Fujiyama 
Aiichiro and Tagawa Seiichi objected to co-sponsoring the ‘reverse important question’ 
resolution by criticizing it as an attempt to create ‘two Chinas’ (Furukawa 1988: 345-7). 
On the other hand, in the same meeting, leading members of the pro-Taipei group such 
as Kaya Okinori and Foreign Minister Fukuda Takeo emphasized that Japan should 
keep its ‘international faith’ (kokusai shingi) with Nationalist China and opposed the 
idea of expelling Taipei from the UN while they declined to object to Beijing’s entry 
(Ibid.). As a result of these fierce and inconclusive debates between the two groups over 
the Chinese representation issue, the matter was left up to Sato, the LDP president who 
advocated that Japan must faithfully repay its ‘debt of gratitude’ to Chiang Kai-shek’s 
‘returning virtue for malice’ Japan policy after the war (Eto 2003: 191). Therefore, 
when Sato decided to co-sponsor two UN resolutions based on the ‘reverse important 
question’ and ‘complex’ dual representation formulas, (8) he virtually held himself
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accountable for making the decision against the pro-Beijing group (Takeshita 1991: 65). 
In the end, Sato and his pro-Taipei supporters lost ground to the anti-mainstream pro- 
Beijing leaders who subsequently formed a new ruling coalition. By then, the majority 
of Sato’s own faction had even been taken over by Tanaka Kakuei who succeeded Sato 
as the president of the ruling party and prime minister of Japan. Tanaka took over from 
Sato as he promised the anti-mainstream pro-Beijing leaders that he would normalize 
relations with Beijing if they helped him defeat Fukuda Takeo, Tanaka’s biggest rival 
and Sato’s favorite, in the presidential election of the LDP in July 1972 (Nakasone 
1992: 294-6,2004: 98-100; Miki 1989: 216-21).
In short, the hegemonic position of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse 
and its coalition—which herein took the form of the pro-Taipei group within the ruling 
party—was seriously undermined by Taipei’s exit from the UN in the fall of 1971 
before losing ground further a year later. Interestingly, in the process of this relative 
decline, the pro-Taipei group—composed of members of the mainstream factions or 
proponents of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse—shifted their ‘one China’ 
policy to a ‘two Chinas’ policy as the debates over the Chinese representation issue 
showed. Conceivably, the adoption of the ‘two Chinas’ policy was preventive to the 
extent that the pro-Taipei group anticipated the consequence of ‘one (Nationalist) 
China’ in that Beijing’s own principle of ‘one China’ would theoretically make 
normalization with Tokyo impossible as long as Tokyo maintained diplomatic relations 
with Taipei. Furthermore, such a shift concurrently indicated that Chiang Kai-shek’s 
‘China’ and Japan’s ‘debt of gratitude’ could no longer be authoritatively ‘fixed’ by the
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‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse coalition in Japanese politics. Arguably, such 
erosion of the ‘1955 system’—which led to the severing of Japan-ROC diplomatic 
relations—could have been avoided if there was clear and timely consent between 
Tokyo, Taipei, and Washington as the following section shows.
5.3 Japan and the fall of ‘China* under US hegemony: the impact of the UN 1971-2
On the eve of his official announcement to co-sponsor the ‘reverse important question’ 
and ‘complex’ dual representation resolutions on 22 September 1971, Japanese Prime 
Minister Sato Eisaku cited the following ‘debt of gratitude’ to Chiang Kai-shek in 
making his decision vis-a-vis the Chinese representation question at the UN (Takeshita 
1991: 65, author’s translation):
‘At the end of the war, the Soviet Union detained 600,000 Japanese 
soldiers in Siberia. On the contrary, Chiang Kai-shek made the 
announcement of “returning virtue for malice” (uramini mukuiruni 
tokuwo motte suru) and repatriated all the Japanese troops from China. 
Additionally, unlike the Soviet Union that advocated for the divisive 
occupation of Japan at the time, Nationalist China, along with the United 
States and Great Britain, opposed that idea. We must not forget this debt 
o f gratitude to Chiang Kai-shek for preventing us from sadly becoming a 
divided nation like Germany and Korea. In the next General Assembly 
meeting of the UN, the “reverse important question resolution” will
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probably be defeated, and Nationalist China could well be expelled from 
the UN as a result. Nonetheless, Japan will keep its faith with Nationalist 
China as long as I’m in power. The next prime minister could proceed 
with his China policy based on what the UN will decide.’
Therefore, while there were other factors at work (Ikeda 2004: 298-314, Nakanishi 
1999: 149, 2006: 151; Ito 2003: 82), the discourse of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning 
virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy certainly facilitated Tokyo’s co-sponsorship for 
the two US-drafred resolutions to save Taipei’s General Assembly seat in the UN. 
Although the dual representation resolution ironically never came up for a vote as 
Taipei walked out of the UN after the defeat of the ‘reverse important question’ 
resolution, it was nonetheless the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ that enabled 
Sato to legitimate his decision to co-sponsor and vote for the latter.
In the meantime, the legitimacy of the Sato cabinet was put to a test as anti­
mainstream leaders, such as Ohira Masayoshi, Miki Takeo, and Nakasone Yasuhiro, 
opposed the idea of co-sponsoring the ‘reverse important question’ and dual 
representation resolutions with the United States (Ogata 1988: 41-2; Ikeda 2004: 309). 
Most conspicuously, Ohira, who went on to negotiate normalization with Beijing as 
Japan’s Foreign Minister one year later, linked the UN issue with the normalization of 
Japan-PRC relations as he announced his candidacy for the president of the ruling party 
on 1 September 1971 as follows (Sato e ta l  1990: 281; Furukawa 1988: 344-5):
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‘...if Beijing should receive the world’s blessing and become a member 
of the United Nations, Japan, too, should work for a normalization of 
relations with Beijing....the majority opinion at the United Nations has 
rapidly inclined toward recognizing the right of Beijing to represent 
China... .1 judge that the time is now ripe for the government to correctly 
assess this situation and make, as it were, an ultimate decision on the 
China issue....I should ask the government to refrain from actions, such 
as supporting the scheme for inverse substantive issue designation in the 
United Nations... ’
Ohira’s warning against the Sato cabinet and co-sponsoring of the ‘reverse important 
question’ resolution was but an indication of how the ruling party was divided over the 
Chinese representation issue at the UN, even though the discourse of ‘returning virtue 
for malice’ and its coalition still constituted the hegemonic position in Japanese 
conservative politics. As a result, Prime Minister Sato had to assume the political 
responsibility for making his decision to support the ‘reverse important question’ 
resolution (and the dual representation resolution) against his intra-party opposition. In 
effect, Sato’s decision to repay a ‘debt of gratitude’ to Chiang Kai-shek presented an 
opportunity for anti-mainstream faction leaders like Ohira, Miki, and Nakasone as they 
prepared to form a new hegemonic coalition around the shared goal of normalizing 
relations with Beijing and the principle of ‘one China’.
As a matter of fact, the legitimacy of the Sato cabinet was decisively 
undermined by the defeat of the ‘reverse important question’ resolution at the UN in
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October 1971 (Lee 1976: 104; Ogata 1988: 42-3; Hosoya 1993: 157). The resolution, 
that was tactically drafted to prevent die rival Albanian resolution from passing with the 
simple majority it had already won in the previous year, was defeated by the narrow 
margin of four votes (55 to 59, with 15 abstentions and 2 absent) in the General 
Assembly. In the meantime, the Albanian resolution—designed to admit Beijing to the 
UN at the expense of the expulsion of Taipei—passed by an overwhelming majority (76 
to 35, with 17 abstentions and 3 absent) of the General Assembly. Consequently, 
Beijing replaced Taipei as the representative of ‘China’ in the General Assembly and a 
permanent member of the Security Council. In the ruling party of Japan, the defeat of 
the ‘reverse important question’ resolution accelerated the anti-mainstream leaders’ 
pursuit for a new hegemonic coalition around the issue of normalization with Beijing 
and the discourse of ‘one China’. Eventually, such rejuvenation of the pro-Beijing 
group led to the ‘fall’ of the Sato administration and the pro-Taipei group that had 
formed the hegemonic coalition around the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’.
Nevertheless, given the resilience of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse 
and its coalition mentioned earlier, it can be argued that the proponents of the ‘returning 
virtue for malice’ discourse could have held onto their hegemonic position in Japanese 
conservative politics even after 1972 if Taipei had managed to remain in the UN in 
1971. On the one hand, one could argue that Tanaka Kakuei and the anti-mainstream 
faction leaders—such as Ohira, Miki Takeo, and Nakasone Yasuhiro—of the LDP 
would have found one way or another to form a coalition in order to defeat Fukuda 
Takeo, the leader of the largest faction, in the presidential election of July 1972. On the
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other hand, it nonetheless would have been more difficult for Tanaka and the anti­
mainstream faction leaders to form a new pro-Beijing coalition against Fukuda, (9) a 
major proponent of ‘returning virtue for malice’, around the issue of normalization if 
Taipei had remained in the UN. Besides, even after the new pro-Beijing coalition came 
into power in July 1972, Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira still feared 
the pro-Taipei elements of their own party, ‘who were in a position to seriously 
embarrass, if not overthrow, Tanaka and his cabinet’ (Fukui 1977: 97). hi fact, the new 
Prime Minister was still timid about visiting Beijing immediately after forming his 
cabinet even though he had promised his political allies to do so (Takeiri 1972: 140, 
2003: 199). Thus, although it no longer occupied the hegemonic position, the discourse 
coalition of ‘returning virtue for malice’ was still formidable within the ruling party of 
Japan (Nikaido 1992: 67; Baba 1998: 114; Gotoda 1998: 299-300). In sum, if the ROC 
had managed to remain in the UN in 1971, it would have been more difficult for Japan 
to normalize relations with the PRC and the severance of Japan-ROC diplomatic 
relations could very well have been avoided in 1972 as a result.
In this section, the author thus examines how Taipei failed to remain in the UN 
in 1971 by drawing on the recent finding that Taipei had actually acquiesced in 
Washington’s ‘complex’ dual representation formula—by which Beijing would enter 
the UN as one of two representatives of ‘China’ and replace Taipei as a permanent 
member of the Security Council (Wang 2000; Ishii 2003a: 27; Takahashi and 
Wakayama 2003a, 2003b; US Department of State 2004). First, the author shows how 
Chiang Kai-shek initially refused to give his consent to Washington’s ‘complex’ dual
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representation formula that was not designed to protect Taipei’s Security Council seat 
while he agreed to acquiesce in another ‘simple’ version in which the Security Council 
seat was guaranteed. Second, this section demonstrates how Tokyo also hesitated to 
grant its consent to Washington’s secret diplomacy without grasping where Chiang Kai- 
shek stood on dual representation. Third, the author sheds light on pragmatic diplomacy 
through which Washington informally collaborated with ‘flexible’ Nationalist Chinese 
diplomats in spite of Chiang Kai-shek’s rigid attitude towards the ‘complex’ dual 
representation formula. Finally, in addition tb Washington’s half-hearted commitment, 
this section suggests that Chiang’s consent to the ‘complex’ dual representation 
resolution was nonetheless so ambiguous and belated that it not only delayed the 
process of obtaining co-sponsorship from countries like Japan, but also suspended the 
lobbying campaign to keep Taipei in the UN. In short, this section shows such lack of 
clear and timely consent between Washington, Tokyo, and Taipei led to the de­
formation or decline of US hegemony, which in turn had a negative impact on the 
hegemonic position of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ and its coalition in the domain of 
Japanese politics.
Without Taipei’s consent: Washington’s ‘two Chinas ’ policy at the UN, part I  From 
1945 until 1971, Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist regime on Taiwan occupied the so- 
called ‘China seat’ as an original member and one of the five permanent members of the 
Security Council in the United Nations. Between 1951 and 1960, Taipei represented 
‘China’ under the auspices of the ‘Western bloc’ led by the United States. During that
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period, Washington and its allies managed to rally a majority of member states in 
support of a ‘moratorium’ against Beijing’s admission to the UN. In the meantime, the 
political clout of the ‘West’ over the ‘rest’ was nonetheless chipped away as the number 
of UN member states increased from 60 to 104 in the same decade. It was a result of 
decolonization and the admission of numerous ‘Third World’ states to the General 
Assembly. The ‘Western’ nations then realized that the ‘moratorium’ procedure could 
no longer be sustained. Thus, in 1961, the Kennedy administration adopted the 
ingenuity of the Japanese Foreign Ministry and proposed that the Chinese 
representation issue be considered an ‘important question’ which required a two-thirds 
vote of the General Assembly for any resolution on seating to pass (Kosaka 1981; 161- 
4, 1994; 68-9; Omura 1971: 21). For the following decade, the US-led ‘important 
question’ resolution kept Taipei in and Beijing out of the UN. Nevertheless, during this 
decade, Washington and its allies further lost their relative edge in the parliamentary 
politics of the UN as the number of General Assembly membership increased by nearly 
two dozens. Consequently, in 1970, the rival Albanian resolution, which was designed 
to expel Taipei and admit Beijing, gained momentum and received over half of the vote 
(51 to 49 with 25 abstentions) in the General Assembly for the first time. Moreover, in 
the summer of 1971, the international tide further turned against Taipei when US 
President Richard M. Nixon’s abrupt announcement of his forthcoming visit to Beijing 
‘shocked’ the members of the ‘free world’. It was at this critical juncture that 
Washington and Tokyo along with others co-sponsored the ‘reverse important question’ 
resolution (10) and the dual representation resolution at the United Nations.
270
The US position on Chinese representation at the UN in 1971 was ‘intimately 
connected with the process of rapprochement’ between Washington and Beijing (Ross 
1995: 42). In April 1971, President Nixon dispatched his personal representative, 
Robert D. Murphy, to inform Chiang Kai-shek of a new dual-representation formula— 
which ‘would not involve ROC’s seat in the Security Council’ (US Department of State 
2004: 670)—to keep Taipei in the UN (Ibid.: 666-74; Shen 1982: 52). Nixon appointed 
a personal envoy to bypass the State Department for the ‘need of secrecy’ (US 
Department of State 2004: 659 n. 2). However, after ascertaining from Chiang Kai-shek 
his opinion on the new formula, Nixon ducked the issue until his National Security 
Advisor Henry Kissinger came back from his secret trip to Beijing in July 1971 (Ibid.: 
64-5; Chien 2005: 148-50). It was after Nixon learned from Kissinger that the Chinese 
representation issue would not jeopardize the upcoming presidential visit to Beijing that 
Washington seriously embarked on campaigning for the ‘simple’ dual representation 
formula—by which Beijing could come in the General Assembly simply as another 
representative of ‘China’ but not as a permanent member of the Security Council 
(Kissinger 1979: 773-4). More precisely, it was Nixon’s announcement on 15 July 1971 
of his plan to visit Beijing that ‘freed the Department (of State) to move forward with 
the dual representation initiative’ (US Department of State 2004: 915-6). Accordingly, 
Washington’s formal diplomacy to keep Taipei in the UN was interrupted and delayed 
by its own informal diplomacy with Beijing in 1971.
In Taipei, Chiang Kai-shek insisted that Washington’s dual representation 
formula ‘must by all means protect the ROC’s seat in the Security Council’ while he 
still hoped the important question resolution to be the principle instrument to bar
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Beijing’s admission to the UN (Chien 2005: 147; US Department of State 2004: 671). 
On 23 April 1971, Chiang had a ‘face-to-face exchange of views’ with Nixon’s personal 
representative, Robert Murphy, at Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall ‘without arousing too 
much attention’ (Ibid.: 667). In this exchange, Chiang agreed with Muiphy’s view that 
the ‘simple’ dual representation formula would in effect prevent Beijing from joining 
the UN because the PRC would adhere to its own principle of ‘one China’ and refuse to 
enter the world body as long as the ROC was a member of the UN (Ibid.: 671). At the 
same time, Chiang expressed his concern to Murphy that Beijing might enter the UN if 
the Security Council seat should be given to Communist China (Ibid.). Chiang warned 
Murphy that Beijing’s admission to the UN would render Taipei’s continued presence 
in the UN untenable because ‘yielding of the ROC’s seat in the Security Council to the 
Peiping (Beijing) regime would undermine the legal foundation of the ROC’s very 
existence’ (Ibid.: 670). Chiang further warned Murphy that Taipei would therefore have 
to vote against a UN resolution based on the ‘simple’ dual representation formula 
(Ibid.). The best he could do, Chiang told Murphy, was not to request Taipei’s allies to 
vote against it (Shen 1982: 52). In this way, Chiang reluctantly agreed to acquiesce in 
the ‘simple’ dual representation formula on the condition that Washington did not 
support Beijing’s admission to the UN (Ibid.). Over the course of the meeting with 
Murphy, Chiang nonetheless stressed that the important question resolution should be 
introduced again in addition to the new formula since the Beijing regime stood 
condemned as an ‘enemy of the UN’ and ‘any attempt to admit it into the organization 
must be considered as an important question’ (US Department of State 2004: 669). At
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the end of the meeting, Chiang and Murphy designated the future channels of 
communication on this matter (Ibid.: 674; Chien 2005: 148). Notwithstanding such an 
arrangement, Taipei was virtually left uninformed by Washington for nearly three 
months after this meeting (Ibid.: 148-50; Shen 1982: 67; US Department of State 2004: 
739).
Therefore, Taipei had already held Washington in suspicion by the time it found 
out that the ‘three-month delay’ was due to Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing as it was 
revealed by Nixon’s announcement of 15 July 1971. Such suspicion only multiplied as 
the ROC Ambassador, James Chien-hung Shen (1982: 65-7) had a meeting with 
Secretary of State William P. Rogers on 19 July. In this meeting, Rogers not only came 
short of offering an apology for Kissinger’s secret visit to Beijing (Shen 1982: 66), but 
also boldly proposed the ‘complex’ dual representation formula by which Beijing takes 
over Taipei as a permanent member of the Security Council while it shares Chinese 
representation with Taipei in the General Assembly (Ibid.: 67; US Department of State 
2004: 735 n. 2; Chien 2005: 150). Furthermore, in order to amplify Secretary Rogers’ 
proposal to Ambassador Shen in Washington, Ambassador Walter P. McConaughy 
subsequently met with Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo, President’s son, in Taipei (US 
Department of State 2004: 736). In this meeting on 23 July, while Chiang complained to 
the American Ambassador that ‘there had been no reply since Amb. Muiphy returned to 
the US’, he also re-emphasized ‘the paramount importance which his government 
attached to the Security Council issue’ (Ibid.: 739). Much like his father with Murphy 
three months earlier, the Vice Premier warned his American counterpart that the
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People’s Republic of China’s entry into the UN Security Council would ‘negate the 
legal existence of the Republic of China’ as he referred to ‘the specific provision of the 
Charter that the “Republic of China” is to occupy the permanent seat of China on the 
SC’ (Ibid.). However, McConaughy was unable to give Chiang anything definite in 
response as the US Ambassador was ‘not fully posted’ on Murphy’s secret talks with 
his father three months earlier (Ibid.: 741). Meanwhile, Chiang Kai-shek’s son assented 
that Taipei could reluctantly live with the ‘simple’ dual representation formula (Ibid.). 
Accordingly, following the ‘three-month delay’, Taipei refused to give its consent to 
Washington’s secret diplomacy and its ‘complex’ dual representation formula for the 
Chinese representation issue at the UN, even though Nationalist China once again 
reluctantly agreed to acquiesce in the ‘simple’ dual representation formula.
In addition to Taipei’s distrust in Washington’s clumsy ‘two Chinas’ policy, the 
lack of consent across the Pacific was due to Chiang Kai-shek’s authoritarian style of 
decision-making. According to Fang Chin-yen, who was long responsible for Taipei’s 
activities regarding the issue of Chinese representation at the UN, Chiang Kai-shek was 
‘visibly upset’ when the ‘complex’ dual representation formula was set forth (Takahashi 
and Wakayama 2003a: 64, 2003b: 30). Moreover, according to Fang’s recollection, 
Chiang was ‘very formal and slow’ in dealing with the issue (Ibid.). The problem, in 
Fang’s view, was Chiang’s authoritarian style of decision-making that made it difficult 
for Nationalist Chinese diplomats like him to put forward any alternative proposal 
(Ibid.). In fact, it was ‘extremely difficult’, according to Yang Hsi-k’un who served 
Chiang as Vice Foreign Minister, because ‘the motives behind such a proposal could
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easily be misunderstood’ by the President (US Department of State 2004: 585). In the 
case of the Chinese representation issue, it was especially so since Chiang had taken ‘a 
direct personal interest’ in it and would ‘not leave it to others’ according to Liu Chieh, 
Chiang’s Permanent Representative to the UN (US Department of State 2004: 580). 
Consequently, as Yang Hsi-k’un ‘most confidentially’ disclosed, ‘there was little 
imagination “at higher levels’” of the Nationalist government vis-a-vis the Chinese 
representation issue (US Department of State 2004: 585).. Thus, the process of reaching 
consent between Taipei and Washington for taking action at the UN was further delayed 
(Shen 1982: 53).
Without Tokyo *s consent: Washington's 'two Chinas ’ policy at the UN, part II  In 
Tokyo, Japanese leaders also hesitated to give their consent to the Nixon 
administration’s covert diplomacy regarding the ‘China question’ at the UN. For 
instance, on 31 July 1971, Prime Minister Sato (1997: 388) complained to US 
Ambassador Armin Meyer that the Prime Minister could only trust formal diplomatic 
channels as Sato felt that Nixon was dispatching too many secret emissaries and special 
envoys. Moreover, on 1 September, Sato was further puzzled by Washington’s 
wavering UN strategy as Ambassador Meyer informed him that the United States would 
now submit the ‘simple’ dual representation formula ahead of the ‘reverse important 
question’ resolution rather than the other way around (Ibid.; US Department of State 
2004: 797-8; Kusuda 2001: 637). On the previous day, by referring to DR—which 
stood for ‘dual representation’—as the ‘direct resolution’, Myer had just confused
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Foreign Minister Fukuda who thought it was Washington’s new initiative (Ibid.: 638-9). 
The incident had left the impression on the Japanese side that Myer, who whispered to 
one of the Japanese officials to make an appointment to see Prime Minister Sato on the 
following day, was not fully informed of the Chinese representation issue at the UN 
(Ibid.). Accordingly, the Japanese leaders were very skeptical about giving their consent 
to the Nixon administration’s UN policy, which appeared to be uncoordinated and 
confusing to them in Tokyo, as the White House prematurely carried it out without fully 
informing its own State Department.
In the meantime, pro-Taipei conservatives in Tokyo feared possible domestic 
consequences of supporting Taipei in the UN General Assembly as they urged the 
Nationalist Chinese not to walk out of the world body even if a ‘two Chinas’ 
arrangement was adopted. For example, by July 1971, former Prime Minister Kishi 
Nobusuke, the doyan of the ‘returing virtue for malice’ discourse coalition in Japan, and 
his colleagues had reached the consensus that Taipei must be first persuaded not to walk 
out of the UN before they could politically commit themselves to supporting Nationalist 
China (Wang 2000: 354). Furthermore, Prime Minister Sato, Kishi’s younger brother, 
also attempted to persuade Taipei not to walk out of the UN when he met with Chiang 
Kai-shek’s Japan hand, Chang Chun (Ibid.: 367; Chang 1980: 249). Chang, who had 
been circulating the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ with the Japanese for 
more than two decades, was visiting Tokyo from late July until early August for a 
Committee for the Promotion of Sino-Japanese Cooperation (CPSJC, Nikka Kyoryoku 
Iinkai, or Zhong-Ri Hezuo Cejin Weiyuanhui) meeting. Here, Sato attempted to appease
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Chang Chun by suggesting that Japan would cooperate with Nationalist China in the 
UN and do what it could to help Taipei preserve the Security Council seat (Ibid.; Sato 
1997: 388). In this way, the Sato cabinet was straining every nerve to avoid the worst 
scenario or ‘political suicide’ in which Taipei voluntarily walks out of the UN to 
demonstrate its discontent with a ‘two Chinas’ formula in spite of Tokyo’s effort to help 
Taipei remain in the UN (Wang 2000: 362).
However, the Sato cabinet could not quite grasp how Taipei would react to the 
possibility of creating ‘two Chinas’ in the UN because the Chiang Kai-shek regime 
persistently refused to consider such a possibility that would challenge its status as ‘the 
legitimate government of China’. For instance, Prime Minister Sato discussed the 
Chinese representation issue with Chang Chun, who was visiting Tokyo for a CPSJC 
meeting in the summer of 1971 as mentioned earlier (Sato 1997: 388; Chang 1980: 248- 
9). Nevertheless, Sato (1997: 388) could only guess that Taipei would oppose the idea 
of giving its Security Council seat to Beijing, even though it might acquiesce in the 
admission of the PRC into the General Assembly as long as the ROC’s permanent 
membership in the Security Council was kept intact. Moreover, on 30 August, Sato 
attempted to gather further information from Matsuno Raizo, the dietman who had just 
returned from Taipei where he had discussed the Chinese representation issue with 
Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Chun (Ibid.: 410). Matsuno, son of Tsuruhei who had 
helped former Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke to formalize postwar Japan’s ‘debt of 
gratitude’ to Chiang Kai-shek in the 1950s, could only speculate that Taipei would most 
likely accept the ‘simple’ dual representation formula that would not involve its
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Security Council seat (Ibid.). Furthermore, in September, Hori Shigeru, the Secretary 
General of the LDP, wrote a letter to Chiang Kai-shek and dispatched a Japanese 
dietman to Taipei to find out how Chiang would cope with the ‘reverse important 
question’ resolution—the passage of which could create ‘two Chinas’ in the UN (Hori 
1972: 89-90). Chiang, nonetheless, declined to comment hypothetically on such a 
situation and kept the Japanese guessing on his stance towards creating ‘two Chinas’ at 
the UN (Ibid.: 90). As shown above, in spite of their attempts to feel Taipei out, the 
Japanese leaders had to keep on guessing where Chiang Kai-shek stood on the Chinese 
representation issue. For that reason, Tokyo still had reservations about actively 
supporting Taipei at the UN.
In search o f consent: ‘flexible ’ mandarins and Uncle Sam. Interestingly, while Taipei 
kept Tokyo guessing, Nationalist Chinese diplomats used Japan as a trump card to 
persuade the United States and kick-start their lobbying campaign at the UN. For 
example, on 7 July 1971, Foreign Minister Chou Shu-kai told Ambassador Walter 
McConaughy that Tokyo had apparently decided to support the ‘simple’ dual 
representation formula and the ‘reverse important question’ resolution ahead of the 
United States (Wang 2000: 346). At the same time, the Nationalist Chinese Foreign 
Minister urged the US government to make its decision and join Tokyo’s lobbying 
campaign at the UN, which Taipei intended to support behind the scenes (Ibid.). 
Furthermore, on 13 July, Ambassador James Shen told Assistant Secretary of State 
Marshall Green that the Japanese ‘strongly opposed to including reference to the SC
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seat in a dual representation (DR) resolution’ as Tokyo was said to be ‘more optimistic 
about passage’ of the ‘simple’ dual representation resolution than Washington (US 
Department of State 2004: 729). Shen also expressed his ‘hope that the US would not 
feel it absolutely necessary to include the SC in order to pass a DR res(olution) since the 
Japanese do not think so’ (Ibid.). Additionally, on 26 July, Liu Chieh, Nationalist 
China’s Permanent Representative to the UN, requested Secretary of State Rogers to 
prepare draft resolutions in consultation with Taipei and suggested that they could 
consider the ‘reverse important question’ and ‘simple’ dual representation resolutions 
proposed by the Japanese (Ibid.: 752). Moreover, on 30 July, Foreign Minister Chou 
once again attempted to wield influence on Washington by stating to Ambassador 
McConaughy that Tokyo had already agreed with Taipei to support the ‘reverse 
important question’ resolution and ‘simple’ dual representation formula (Wang 2000: 
362). Accordingly, the Nationalist Chinese urged Washington to adopt the ‘simple’ dual 
representation formula—that would not affect Taipei’s Security Council seat—and start 
lobbying for Taipei at the UN. Nevertheless, their strategy to play Tokyo off against 
Washington unfortunately fell short of influencing the US to adopt the policy of their 
preference and take action at the UN accordingly.
Meanwhile, the Nationalist Chinese diplomats also used ‘domestic pressure’ in 
order to dissuade Washington from adopting the ‘complex’ dual representation formula 
as its final policy. For instance, in his meeting with Ambassador McConaughy on 30 
July 1971, Foreign Minister Chou Shu-kai, confidentially requested Washington not to 
make any official statement against Taipei’s permanent membership on the Security
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Council since such a statement would make it domestically impossible for Taipei to 
even participate in the UN General Assembly in the fall (Wang 2000: 362), The Foreign 
Minister herein mentioned that he had already been heavily criticized by the Foreign 
Relations Committee of the Legislative Yuan and pessimistically speculated that his 
government would not be able to concede its Security Council (SC) seat to Beijing 
(Ibid.). On the following day, when Chou met with McConaughy again, the Foreign 
Minister further requested Washington to ‘adopt (the) most passive possible public 
position on (the) SC issue5 (US Department of State 2004: 764 n. 3; Wang 2000: 366). 
Foreign Minister Chou also warned the American Ambassador that any implication of 
Washington’s position against Taipei’s permanent membership on the Security Council 
would create a major controversy in Taiwan and his government would immediately 
come under the attack of the Legislative Yuan, the Control Yuan, and the media along 
with others (Ibid.). Then, as Chou continued, his government would be forced to take 
radical action regarding the Chinese representation issue at the UN (Ibid.). Furthermore, 
in late August, when Frederick F. Chien, Director of North American Affairs at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, met with William H. Gleysteen of the US Embassy in 
Taipei, Chien requested the American government to begin with the ‘simple’ dual 
representation formula despite the fact that Washington’s allies were said to insist on 
giving Taipei’s Security Council seat to Beijing as a condition for their support at the 
UN (Ibid.: 372). Here, Chien reasoned that it would bring grave domestic consequences 
to the Nationalist government if Washington and its allies co-sponsored the ‘complex’ 
dual representation resolution including the Security Council seat (Ibid.). Nonetheless,
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like their strategy to play the 4Japan card’, the Nationalist Chinese diplomats’ tactics to 
play the ‘two-level games’ of domestic and international politics still came short of 
convincing Washington to promote the ‘simple’ dual representation formula at the UN, 
On the contrary, while they played the ‘Japan card’ and ‘two-level games’ in 
their official capacities, these Nationalist Chinese diplomats were ‘flexible’ enough to 
collaborate with Washington by separating their informal diplomacy from Chiang Kai- 
shek’s formal foreign policy. On 13 July 1971, Ambassador James Shen informally told 
Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green not to listen to his official hard-line 
objection against Washington’s ‘complex’ dual representation formula because it was 
‘just for the record’ (US Department of State 2004: 730; Wang 2000: 348-9). Moreover, 
on the same day, Vice Foreign Minister Yang Hsi-k’un confidentially informed US 
Ambassador Walter McConaughy that Yang had been internally trying to persuade 
those at higher levels, including Chiang Kai-shek, of the importance of ‘flexibility and 
pragmatism’ in dealing with the Chinese representation issue at the UN (Ibid.: 351). 
The Vice Foreign Minister also revealed that he had personally told Chiang Kai-shek 
that walking out of the UN would mean ‘political suicide’ for Taipei since such an 
action would only lead to the isolation of itself in the international community (Ibid.; 
US Department of State 2004: 586). Vice Foreign Minister Yang then strongly 
requested Ambassador McConaughy to keep their conversation secret because any 
revelation of ‘extremely sensitive’ contents would bring ‘unfavorable consequences’ to 
the prospects of informal diplomacy as well as Yang’s personal position (Wang 2000: 
351-2). Furthermore, on 26 July, Foreign Minister Chou Shu-kaiprivately informed
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Ambassador McConaughy that Chiang Kai-shek might take the Foreign Minister’s 
advice and agree to Washington’s ‘complex’ dual representation formula by gambling 
on the chance that Beijing might not even take the Security Council seat if Taipei 
retained membership in the General Assembly (Ibid.: 357; US Department of State 
2004: 748 n. 3). More conspicuously, on 10 September, in response to Washington’s 
official decision to recommend seating Beijing in the Security Council (Ibid.: 805-6), 
Foreign Minister Chou orally made several statements to show that his informal 
position was more ‘flexible and pragmatic’ than his formal written response (Ibid.: 808; 
Wang 2000: 378). The “‘hard line” written response’ of the Government of the 
Republic of China (GRC) Chou read ‘called the decision “particularly regrettable” and 
reiterated the traditional position of the GRC: to admit the Chinese Communists to the 
UN would violate the Charter’ of the United Nations (Ibid.; US Department of State 
2004: 808). Chou’s formal reply also indicated that ‘(t)he moment such a resolution was 
tabled, his government would have to issue a public statement to it in the strongest 
terms’ (Ibid.; Wang 2000: 378). In the meantime, the Nationalist Chinese Foreign 
Minister informally indicated that he did want Washington’s ‘complex’ dual 
representation resolution to succeed (Ibid.; US Department of State 2004: 808). Chou 
also implied that ‘if the margin of support for the resolution should appear dangerously 
narrow, Taipei might adopt a more positive role in working for it off stage’ (Ibid.; 
Wang 2000: 378). Accordingly, while Taipei formally made a strong objection to 
Washington’s ‘complex’ dual representation formula, these ‘flexible’ diplomats 
informally consented to the US and gambled on the possibility that Beijing just might
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not come in the UN even as a permanent member of the Security Council as long as 
Taipei remained in the General Assembly. Nevertheless, there were still limits to what 
these Nationalist Chinese officials could accomplish informally insofar as their 
authoritarian leader was against their project formally (Ibid.: 353; Takahashi and 
Wakayama 2003a: 64, 2003b: 30).
In fact, the Americans had to accommodate the Nationalist Chinese 
collaborators with their informal project as Washington was ‘careful not to overreact’ 
whenever Taipei formally objected to the ‘complex’ dual representation formula (US 
Department of State 2004: 808; Wang 2000: 378). For example, in September 1971, 
Washington began to view its own public announcements on the Chinese representation 
issue at the UN ‘in terms of the difficulties they might create for Taipei’ (Ibid.: 378-9; 
US Department of State 2004: 808). Washington even prepared to give the Nationalist 
Chinese ‘adequate advance notification’ of its public announcements and ‘coordinate 
the exact wording’ of such announcements with the Government of the Republic China 
(Ibid.). For Washington, the most important thing then was ‘to make it as easy as 
possible for the GRC’ to collaborate with the United States ‘behind the scenes’ for the 
passage of the ‘complex’ dual representation resolution at the UN (Ibid.; Wang 2000: 
378). As a matter of fact, Foreign Minister Chou Shu-kai agreed to ‘personally work 
actively in New York’ by making himself available to UN ambassadors in order to 
obtain co-sponsorships and voting support (US Department of State 2004: 809-10; 
Wang 2000: 381). However, the Nationalist Chinese Foreign Minister also expressed 
‘great concern’ for the possibility of explicitly instructing ROC Ambassadors to support
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the ‘complex’ dual representation resolution ‘for reasons of internal politics’ (Ibid.: 
380-1; US Department of State 2004: 809). As a result, in spite of Washington’s effort 
to work with the ‘flexible’ diplomats, the informal nature of their collaboration still 
prevented them from sending clear signals to friendly countries at the UN (Wang 2000: 
380-1).
Ambiguous consent at the last minute: the defeat o f ambivalent hegemony. It was at this 
juncture that Washington publicly shifted its position from promoting the ‘simple’ dual 
representation formula to revising it into the ‘complex’ version recommending that 
Taipei’s Security Council seat go to Beijing (US Department of State 2004: 916; 
Kissinger 1979: 774). On 16 September 1971, President Nixon held a press conference 
and addressed his administration’s position to sponsor the ‘complex’ dual representation 
and ‘reverse important question’ resolutions at the UN as the following: ‘To put...our 
policy in clear perspective, we favor the admission of the People’s Republic to the 
United Nations and that will mean, of course, obtaining a Security Council seat. We 
will vote against the expulsion of the Republic of China, and we will work as 
effectively as we can to accomplish that goal’ (Public Papers of the Presidents of the 
United States, Richard Nixon, 1971: 950). During this press conference, Nixon received 
a question regarding a statement made by Dr. Walter Judd on the previous day (Ibid.). 
Judd, Chairman of the Committee of One Million Against the Admission of Communist 
China to the United Nations, had argued that ‘the expulsion of the Nationalist 
Government would not be legal under the Charter without a vote of the Security
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Council making such a recommendation to the General Assembly’ (Ibid.). In reply, 
Nixon desperately stated that there were ‘different legal opinions’ with regard to the 
expulsion procedure (Ibid.). Nixon’s evasive response manifested his administration’s 
apprehension about having to veto the expulsion of Taipei in the Security Council (US 
Department of State 2004: 755-6). Washington feared that exercising a veto in such a 
manner could dangerously kindle the debate on the Charter revision—the escalation of 
which could lead to the abrogation of veto power or the enlargement of the Security 
Council by the addition of new permanent members such as Japan, India, and West 
Germany with or without the right of veto (US Department of State 2004: 679-80). 
Accordingly, by publicly conceding to recommend the ‘complex’ dual representation 
formula, Washington not only unveiled its ambivalent commitment to the Chinese 
representation issue at the UN but also exposed the limits to which it would venture to 
prevent the expulsion of Taipei from the UN.
In spite of Washington’s ambivalent and half-hearted commitment, Taipei gave 
its consent to the ‘complex’ dual representation formula—finally yet only tacitly. In 
fact, according to the following testimony by Fang Chin-yan, Taipei’s consent was so 
overdue and ambiguous that it subsequently caused confusion in the chain of command, 
thereby distracting its directives from adequately reaching its diplomatic posts around 
the world (Takahashi and Wakayama 2003a: 64, 2003b: 30):
‘At the time, we sent out two directives to our overseas diplomatic posts.
First we sent one saying that we would aim to “shoot down” the Albanian
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draft, just as in previous years. Then, after the United States came out with 
its (“complex”) dual-representation proposal, we hurriedly sent out a 
second directive saying that the ROC itself opposed this proposal but that 
our friends were free to decide on their own positions. But in the 
meantime our diplomatic posts around the world had already gone ahead 
with operations in line with the first directive. This confusion contributed 
to the passage of the Albanian resolution.’
Here, the second directive was ‘extremely significant’ (Ibid.). It indicated that ‘Chiang 
Kai-shek effectively abandoned his own version of the one-China policy by tacitly 
accepting the idea of (“complex”) dual representation’ at this final juncture (Ibid.; Ishii 
2003a: 27). More precisely, although Chiang Kai-shek had already ‘abandoned’ his 
‘one China’ policy by agreeing to acquiesce in the ‘simple’ dual representation formula 
in April 1971, Chiang’s tacit acceptance of the ‘complex’ dual representation resolution 
was remarkable to the extent that he decided to take more risk to remain in the UN. For 
Chiang, consenting to the ‘complex’ dual representation formula was highly risky 
because Beijing was more likely to come in the UN if the Security Council seat was 
given while Washington was unlikely to veto the expulsion of Taipei in the Security 
Council. Nevertheless, Taipei’s chance of remaining in the international community 
unfortunately did not improve dramatically if it did at all since Chiang’s consent not 
only came at the last minute but remained ambiguous (Takahashi and Wakayama 
2003a: 64,2003b: 30).
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As for Japan, Prime Minister Sato finally announced his decision to co-sponsor 
the ‘complex’ dual representation and ‘reverse important question’ resolutions with 
Washington on 22 September as mentioned above. Earlier in the same month, former 
Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, Sato’s older brother and the peak Taiwan lobby, had 
strongly pushed his younger brother to co-sponsor both resolutions while Japan’s ruling 
party remained deeply divided over the Chinese representation issue at the UN (Ikeda 
2004: 310). At the same time, Kishi had lobbied the American Embassy in order to 
prevent the United States from making further concession to Communist China (Ibid.: 
309-11). He feared that such concession would politically damage the pro-Taipei group 
in Japan as well as the prospects of his protege, Fukuda Takeo, as a candidate to 
succeed Prime Minister Sato (Ibid.). Furthermore, in his meeting with Nixon just before 
the UN voting, Kishi emphasized the political risk Sato was taking and requested the 
American President, for whom he had provided political and financial resources as early 
as 1960 (Ito 2003: 103 n.18), to exert the ‘maximum influence’ on wavering UN 
member states (Ibid.: 83). Kishi also shared with Nixon his view on Chiang’s attitude 
towards the Chinese representation issue at the UN (Ibid.). Accordingly, leaders of the 
‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse coalition such as Kishi helped to obtain mutual 
consent between Tokyo, Taipei, and Washington. However, the ambivalent and 
ambiguous traces of such consent at the last minute were just not enough to convince 
UN delegates to support Taipei’s seat in the world body—especially in the face of the 
following challenges from both inside and outside.
In contrast to ambivalent and ambiguous attitudes in Washington, Taipei, and 
Tokyo, Communist China publicly reiterated its principle of ‘one China’ by announcing
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that Beijing would not join the UN unless Taipei was first expelled from the world body 
(Kissinger 1979: 774; Wang 2000: 371; Roy 2003: 134; Ito 2003: 83). On the one hand, 
Nationalist Chinese officials were subsequently encouraged to believe that Beijing 
would not enter the UN even if the dual-representation proposal was approved by the 
General Assembly (Takahashi and Wakayama 2003a: 64, 2003b: 30). On the other 
hand, the appeal that Washington’s ‘complex’ dual representation formula had for UN 
member states was effectively offset by Beijing’s ‘one China’ discourse (US 
Department of State 2004: 916). In any case, lobbying efforts by the supporters of the 
Albanian resolution to expel Taipei and admit Beijing consequently gained momentum 
as Washington’s conciliatory posture towards Beijing and the ‘one China’ discourse 
made Taipei more dispensable at the UN.
Furthermore, in October 1971, the White House announced National Security 
Advisor Kissinger’s second visit to Beijing without notifying its own UN mission that 
was strenuously making lobbying efforts in the General Assembly (Tucker 2001: 263- 
4). This announcement as well as the actual visit took place in the midst of last minute 
lobbying at the UN, even though Kissinger had been correctly informed by the State 
Department regarding the period in which the General Assembly vote on Chinese 
representation would take place (Ross 1995: 43). In the meantime, Secretary of State 
Rogers strongly objected that Kissinger’s October visit to Beijing would interfere with 
American diplomacy to keep Taipei in the UN (Ibid.; US Department of State 2004: 
844-5). Whether it was deliberate or not, the timing of Kissinger’s second visit to
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Beijing seriously undercut lobbying efforts to preserve Taipei’s seat in the UN (Ibid.; 
Tucker 2001: 264).
In the end, on 25 October 1971, the ‘reverse important question’ resolution, a 
‘two Chinas’ formula which preventively required a two-thirds vote of the General 
Assembly to expel Taipei, was defeated by only four votes before the Albanian 
resolution based on Beijing’s ‘one China’ principle gained more than a two-thirds 
majority of the General Assembly. As a result, the ‘complex’ dual representation 
resolution, for which Washington, Tokyo, and Taipei spent most of their time to 
prepare, ironically did not even come up for a vote as the passage of the Albanian 
resolution made it unnecessary. In this way, the Chinese Communists finally entered the 
UN as Beijing’s discourse of ‘one China’ defeated Washington’s discourse of ‘two 
Chinas’ in international society. In the meantime, the Chinese Nationalists, sensing that 
their expulsion was imminent, walked out of the UN General Assembly before the 
Albanian resolution came to a vote. Although Beijing’s entry might not have 
represented the loss of US power in a ‘structural’ sense for it was not unwelcome by the 
United States (Foot 1995: 23-4), Washington’s failure to prevent Taipei’s exit for the 
first time since the end of the war certainly meant the decline of American hegemony in 
a consensual sense. In other words, the Chinese representation issue at the UN in 1971 
manifested how the constitution of US hegemony began to wane at the end of the ‘first’ 
Cold War (Hook et a l 2001: 30, 2005: 32). Needless to say, such de-legitimation of 
‘China’ under US hegemony, due to the lack of clear and timely consent between
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Washington, Tokyo, and Taipei, subsequently had a major impact on Japan’s 
recognition of ‘China’.
5.4 ‘Returning virtue for malice9 and the ‘end9 of the ‘San Francisco system9: 
making Tokyo9s de-recognition of Taipei impossible 1972
After the crushing defeat of the United States and Japan over the Chinese representation 
issue at the UN, the ‘San Francisco system’—which had kept Communist China 
isolated and contained for two decades—came to an ‘end’ as the ‘Shanghai 
communique was jointly issued by President Richard M. Nixon of the United States and 
Premier Zhou Enlai of the Peoples’s Republic of China on 28 February 1972 (Mye 
1992: 355-6). It was an ‘end’ in the sense that the communique marked ‘a complete 
shift away from the self imposed policy of mutual exclusion that the two governments 
had pursued since the Korean War’ (Ibid: 356). By the same token, the communique 
brought an ‘end’ to the extent that this shift in Washington’s Cold War strategy known 
as ‘detente’ significantly reversed NSC 13/2 of October 1948—which George F. 
Kennan had definitively set in motion for the US to fight against the communists from 
its Japanese bastion since the Toss’ of China had become imminent. Consequently, 
although the US-Japan Security Treaty was kept intact, the significance of Japan as the 
linchpin of US hegemony in East Asia was transformed as Washington played the 
‘China card’ in order to end the Vietnam War in an honorable fashion (Iriye 1992: 351; 
Ross 1995: 40; Burr 1999: 30).
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In the process, veiy much like the communist camp that circulated the ‘revival 
of Japanese militarism’ discourse as they embarked on the Korean War in the 1950s, it 
was now the United States that used the same discourse to achieve rapprochement with 
Communist China ‘over the heads of the Japanese’ two decades later. In Beijing, 
President Nixon and his National Security Advisor Kissinger articulated the US-Japan 
Security Treaty in terms of the need to deter Japanese military expansion and nuclear 
weapons development (Ito 2003: Chs. 3 and 5; Schaller 2001a: 55-6, 2001b: 383-9; 
Curtis 2002: 138-43; Goh 2005: 176-9). The Communist Chinese leaders were 
persuaded by the discourse, and Beijing’s view on the US-Japan Security Treaty and the 
security of East Asia as a whole was deeply influenced as a result (Tucker 2001: 253). 
Accordingly, Washington and Beijing found a common ground for maintaining the US- 
Japan Security Treaty (Ito 2003: 50), thereby keeping a ‘lid’ on Japanese militarism 
(Curtis 2002: 141; Soeya 1997: 11, 2003: 333-4, 339-43, 2005: 107-12; Ito 1998: 121- 
2).
Interestingly, it was also through the ‘revival of Japanese militarism’ discourse 
that Washington obtained its space for maintaining its relations with Taipei (Ito 2003: 
93). While Kissinger linked the withdrawal of all American forces from Taiwan to the 
peaceful resolution of the conflict across the Taiwan Strait, Zhou Enlai demanded that 
Washington acknowledge the ‘one China’ principle and reassure that Japan does not 
replace the United States after its withdrawal horn Taiwan (Ibid.; Ogata 1988: 33-4). In 
the final form of the Shanghai communique, in which the two sides uniquely expressed 
their differences (Tucker 2001: 255-7), the Chinese side stated ‘the liberation of Taiwan 
is China’s internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere’ while the
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US side declared that 4(i)t affirms its interest in a peaceful settlement o f  the Taiwan 
question by the Chinese themselves’ (Ross: 1995: 268-9). The latter premise created a 
basis for Washington’s possible military intervention in the Taiwan Strait if Beijing 
uses force to ‘liberate’ Taiwan (Roy 2003: 131-2). In other words, Washington is not 
obliged to respect the Communist Chinese claim that Taiwan is an internal matter if 
Beijing does not respect the American premise that the ‘Taiwan question’ must be 
resolved peacefully (Ibid.). It has been argued that it is the delicate balance between the 
former ‘Chinese civil war principle’ (Chugoku naisen gensoku) and the latter ‘peaceful 
settlement principle’ (heiwa kaiketsu gensoku)—or the ‘1972 system’—that has 
stabilized the tension in the Taiwan Strait since February 1972 (Wakabayashi 1997, 
2000, 2002). Put differently, Washington’s discourse of nuclear Japan’s militaiy 
expansion to Taiwan and Beijing’s discourse of ‘one China’ have constituted that 
balance or the ‘1972 system’.
In this section, given such transformation of the situation in East Asia, the 
author examines the severing of diplomatic relations between Tokyo and Taipei in 
September 1972 by focusing on the discourse of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for 
malice’ postwar Japan policy. The author emphasizes the resilience of the ‘returning 
virtue for malice’ discourse in spite of its loss of the hegemonic position in Japanese 
politics. Notwithstanding such decline of the discourse coalition that had helped to 
sustain Tokyo’s diplomatic recognition of Taipei, the author stresses how the discourse 
still played an indispensable role in making Tokyo’s de-recognition of Taipei 
impossible. By drawing on the recent finding that Tokyo never once alluded to the
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‘severing of relations’ (danko) with Taipei in 1972 (Ishii 2003a: 27; Takahashi and 
Wakayama 2003a, 2003b), this section highlights how the discourse of ‘returning virtue 
for malice’ still delimited what could or could not be said about Japan-ROC relations. 
Moreover, the author’s analysis in this section shows that the discourse even subverted 
Japan-PRC relations as it was combined with the possibility of creating ‘two Chinas’. In 
the process, the author focuses on the last Japanese official visit to Taipei before the 
normalization of Japan-PRC relations in September 1972. Given the resilience of the 
‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse, this section suggests that there was a Tost 
opportunity’ for Taipei to further deter the normalization of relations between Tokyo 
and Beijing—against which Taipei severed diplomatic relations with Tokyo in 
September 1972.
The resilience o f  ‘returning virtue for malice’ and a *lost opportunity’: the Shiina 
mission to Taipei 1972. A Japanese delegation led by Shiina Etsusaburo was dispatched 
to Taipei on the eve of normalization just as the Kosaka mission was sent to Beijing as 
mentioned earlier. On 19 September 1972, only ten days before normalization, Special 
Envoy Shiina paid a visit to Premier Chiang Ching-kuo and informed him of the LDP 
platform that Tokyo’s negotiations with Beijing would be conducted in such a way that 
it could maintain ‘hitherto existing relations’ (jurai no kankei) with Taipei ‘including 
diplomatic relations’ (Sato et al. 1992: 299; Takahashi and Wakayama 2003a: 66-7, 
2003b: 31-2; Ishii et a l 2003: 136). Shiina, a major proponent of Japan’s ‘debt of 
gratitude’ to Chiang Kai-shek (Shiina Etsusaburo Tsuitoroku Kankokai 1982: 137-40,
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144), also carried a letter from Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, which made absolutely 
no mention of ‘severing relations’ (danko) because it had been completely deleted at the 
final stage of drafting (Ogura 2003: 231-2). Even after the normalization of relations 
with Beijing, the Japanese government merely announced that the bilateral treaty of 
peace between Tokyo and Taipei came to an ‘end’ without alluding to the ‘severing of 
relations’ as mentioned earlier (Ishii 2003b: 372-5; Takahashi and Wakayama 2003a: 
69, 2003b: 33).
This ‘unexpected aspect of the break’ has been attributed to the following two 
reasons (Takahashi and Wakayama 2003a: 68, 2003b: 32). First, Tokyo wanted the 
break to be initiated by Taipei. It has been argued that ‘(c)ircumstances on Japan’s side 
kept it from abrogating the 1952 Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and 
Japan’ (Ibid). In other words, for the purpose of ‘normalizing’ relations with Beijing 
advantageously, Tokyo tactically maintained that the Treaty of Peace with Taipei had 
already ended the state of war and settled the issue of reparations between Japan and 
‘China’ in 1952 (Ibid.). According to this logic, Tokyo could not de-recognize Taipei 
for it strove to achieve ‘normalization’ with Beijing while it concurrently maintained 
the validity of peace with Taipei (Ibid.). By doing so, Japan attempted to preclude the 
issue of reparations which it claimed Chiang Kai-shek had already foregone 20 years 
earlier (Zhu 2003: 413-6). Second, it has been suggested that Tokyo refrained from 
abrogating the Treaty of Peace with Taipei because it feared that Taipei might declare a 
return to the state of war and retaliate against Japan (Takahashi and Wakayama 2003a: 
69, 2003b: 33). As a matter of fact, according to the recent publication of the minutes of
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the peace negotiations between Prime Minister Tanaka and Premier Zhou Enlai in 
Beijing, Japan expressed its concern and Tokyo’s fear was taken into consideration for 
using the expression (ending) the ‘abnormal state of affairs’—rather than (ending) the 
‘state of war’—between Japan and ‘China’ prior to 1972 (Ishii et al. 2003: 72). 
However, it can also be argued that these are discursive effects of ‘returning virtue for 
malice’ as it played an indispensable role for the settlement of war reparations as well 
as the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan in 
1952 as .demonstrated in Chapter 3 of this study.
As a matter of fact, in spite of its decline, the discourse of ‘returning virtue for 
malice’ not only helped to prevent the Japanese from referring to the ‘severing of 
relations’ with Taipei, but also helped creating an opportunity for pro-Taipei actors to 
subvert the normalization of relations with Beijing in 1972. For instance, when Shiina 
met with Premier Chiang Ching-kuo—who had begun to take over power from his 
ailing father—on 19 September, the Special Envoy never once alluded to the ‘severing 
of relations’ between Tokyo and Taipei while the meeting was conducted in the 
discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ (Ibid.: 138-9; Takahashi and Wakayama 
2003b: 32). According to former Ambassador Nakae Yosuke’s notes—the only set of 
minutes available on the Japanese side, which has recently been made public (Ishii et 
al 2003: 133-43), Chiang Ching-kuo made the following remark just six days before 
the Japanese Prime Minister’s visit to Beijing (Ibid.: 138-9, author’s translation):
‘..the relationship between China and Japan is special. President Chiang
Kai-shek is veiy interested in issues related to Japan. He has been so
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interested in Sino-Japanese relations that he has once drawn attention to 
the question of whether Japan should see China as a friend or an enemy.
It was before the Japanese militarists instigated your nation to go to war 
against China. He supported the Japanese imperial institution and 
opposed the divisive occupation o f Japan by four Allied powers. 
Subsequently, he approved the signing of the “Peace Treaty between the 
Republic of China and Japan”. These facts are unfailing results of the 
historical vision with which he approached issues related to Japan. The 
underlying assumption of his vision is that we cannot mutually secure 
prosperity in Japan and peace in Asia as a whole unless the Japanese 
government takes pro-“Republic of China” and anti-“communist” 
positions. Recently, Chiang Kai-shek has re-emphasized that the issues 
related to Japan must be viewed not only from Japan but also from Asia 
as a whole.’
Accordingly, Chiang Ching-kuo expected the pro-Taiwan group of the LDP to 
reproduce Japan’s recognition of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘China’ through the discourse of 
‘returning virtue for malice’ in spite of the fact that the discourse coalition had already 
lost the hegemonic position in Japanese politics. On the other hand, Shiina was much 
more careful as he made the following reply to Chiang Kai-shek’s son (Ibid.; Takahashi 
and Wakayama 2003b: 32):
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‘I have listened keenly to what you have said about overcoming various 
difficulties. I feel even more strongly that we are at a critical juncture. 
Looking at all the situations in Asia and around the world, I believe it 
will be difficult to eliminate every contradiction in connection with the 
Japan-ROC issue, but we will exert our utmost efforts to avoid missteps’
Considering the fact that Shiina highlighted the LDP policy of maintaining ‘hitherto 
existing relations’ with Taipei ‘including diplomatic relations’ in the same meeting, 
Shiina’s notions of ‘contradiction’ and ‘missteps’ can be interpreted as the implications 
of his delicate strategy to reproduce Japan’s recognition of ‘one (Nationalist) China’ by 
paradoxically promoting a ‘two Chinas’ policy. In other words, Shiina not only avoided 
the ‘immoral’ act of mentioning the ‘severing of relations’ with Chiang Kai-shek’s 
‘China’, but also attempted to subvert the normalization of Japan-PRC relations based 
on the ‘one China’ principle.
In fact, the Shiina mission did have a subversive effect on the normalization of 
Japan-PRC relations. Immediately after the Shiina-Chiang meeting in Taipei, Zhou 
Enlai held an emergency meeting with Kosaka Zentaro in Beijing, in which Zhou 
strongly complained about Tokyo’s ambivalent Chinas policy as mentioned earlier. 
Moreover, when Prime Minister Tanaka visited Beijing later in the same month, he 
personally expressed his concern to Primier Zhou that he could be accused of violating 
the platform of his own party if  he agreed to normalize relations based on the principle 
of ‘one China’ (Ishii et a l 2003: 72). As a matter of fact, after Tanaka arrived at
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Tokyo, the Prime Minister had to report to the LDP headquarters directly from the 
airport to explain his ‘violation’ of the party platform. The pro-Taipei dietmen of the 
LDP, like Special Envoy Shiina whom Taipei fully trusted (Sankei Shinbun Sengoshi 
Kaifu Shuzaihan 1999: 293-5), were disturbed by the fact that Prime Minister Tanaka 
and Foreign Minister Ohira normalized Japan-PRC relations at the cost of Japan-ROC 
diplomatic relations (Shiina Etsusaburo Tsuitoroku Kankokai 1982; 193). In any case, 
the Shiina-Chiang meeting conducted in the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ 
had a considerable impact on the normalization of relations between Tokyo and 
Beijing.
Having said that, the Shiina-Chiang meeting also presented an opportunity for 
Taipei to help prevent ‘one (Communist) China’ from emerging in 1972. As former 
Ambassador Nakae who sat in the meeting recalls: ‘Breaking off ties (with the ROC) 
was not Japan’s original intention. The root cause of this outcome was the unyielding 
“one China” policy’ (Takahashi and Wakayama 2003a: 61, 2003b: 28; Koeda 2000: 
230). Thus, if  Chiang Ching-kuo who later identified with Taiwan in the 1980s 
addressed the ‘idea of stressing Taiwan’ (Takahashi and Wakayama 2003a: 65, 2003b: 
31)—or paradoxically abandoning the discourse of ‘one China’ in order to realize it— 
in 1972, then it would have been more difficult for Tokyo to accept Beijing’s principle 
of ‘one China’. For instance, if Chiang Ching-kuo made an announcement then to 
clearly delimit the scope of the Japan-ROC peace treaty to Taiwan in terms of ‘all 
territories which are now under the control of the Government of the Republic of 
China’ as the Japanese side attempted in 1952, the Tanaka cabinet would have been
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seriously held back by the possibility of having to compensate Beijing for the cost of 
repairing the damage done on the Chinese mainland during the war. Moreover, if Taipei 
delimited the scope of the Japan-ROC peace treaty of 1952 to Taiwan, it would have 
been more difficult for Tokyo to recognize that the treaty would come to an ‘end’ as a 
result of the normalization of relations between Japan and mainland China in 1972. In 
addition, the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse still helped to make Tokyo’s de­
recognition of Taipei morally impossible in spite of its decline. Of course, if Taipei 
tactically abandoned the principle of ‘one China’, then there would have been no reason 
for it to severe diplomatic relations with Tokyo. In this way, Taipei’s adoption of ‘two 
Chinas’ tactics during Shiina’s visit in 1972 could have helped to avoid the severing of 
relations with Tokyo while Beijing’s own ‘one China’ principle would have made it 
more difficult for itself to normalize relations with Tokyo in 1972.
By doing so, Taipei could have helped Shiina and his colleagues further deter 
Japan’s normalization of relations with the PRC based on Beijing’s ‘one China’ 
principle, that was secretly planned by a very small group of Japanese elites—namely, 
Prime Minister Tanaka, Foreign Minister Ohira, and Hashimoto Hiroshi of the Foreign 
Ministry—against the wishes of many at the Foreign Ministry as well as the LDP 
(Hashimoto 2003). Nevertheless, in reality, Taipei’s adherence to its own version of the 
‘one China’ principle unfortunately necessitated itself to clearly de-recognize Tokyo in 
the end. Given that the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ resiliently helped to 
make Tokyo’s de-recognition of Taipei impossible and Beijing’s discourse of ‘one 
China’ helped to make the creation of ‘two Chinas’ impossible, there was a ‘lost
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opportunity’ for Taipei to unilaterally abandon its own ‘one China’ discourse and yet 
trilaterally re-emerge as the legitimate government of ‘China’ that Japan could not de­
recognize in 1972.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter attributed the severing of Japan-ROC relations in 1972 to the decline of the 
‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse and its coalition within the ruling party of Japan, 
that had constituted the core of the ‘1955 system’. It traced how the LDP was 
increasingly divided—between the mainstream pro-Taipei group and the anti­
mainstream pro-Beijing group—over Japan’s China policy between 1964 and 1972. 
Importantly, such bifurcation manifested the gradual erosion of the ‘1955 system’ 
through which the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and the coalition of 
Japanese conservatives—with the imperial past—maintained their hegemonic position 
and reproduced Japan’s recognition of ‘China’ under US hegemony. The pro-Taipei 
group—a major derivative of the discourse coalition of ‘returning virtue for malice’— 
eventually lost ground to the pro-Beijing group as a result of its unsuccessful support 
for Taipei to remain in the UN in 1971. Consequently, the pro-Taipei coalition within 
the ruling party of Japan could no longer authoritatively define ‘China’ in terms of 
Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy.
Having said that, this chapter argued that it would have been more difficult for 
the severing of Japan-ROC relations to take place in 1972 if Taipei had managed to
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remain in the UN in the fall 1971. Drawing on recent findings and materials, this 
chapter examined the Chinese representation issue at the UN in 1971 by highlighting 
the constitution of US hegemony in terms of consent between Washington, Tokyo, and 
Taipei. It showed that the constitution of US hegemony waned as Taipei and Tokyo 
failed to give clear and timely consent to Washington’s ‘complex’ dual representation 
formula for the ‘China question’ at the UN. In this way, this chapter attributed the loss 
of Taipei’s seat in the UN to the lack of consent that had constituted US hegemony 
while it stressed the tremendous impact it had on the ‘returning virtue for malice’ 
discourse coalition in the domain of Japanese domestic politics.
Finally, while such lack of consent also indicated die decline of the ‘San 
Francisco system’, the present chapter nonetheless emphasized the resilience of 
‘returning virtue for malice’ as the discourse still delimited what could and could not be 
said about Japan-ROC relations. In fact, in 1972, the Japanese government never once 
alluded to the ‘severing of relations’ with Taipei. This chapter stressed that the 
‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse helped to make it impossible for Tokyo to make 
any mention of ‘severing relations’. Furthermore, by focusing on the last Japanese 
official trip to Taipei in September 1972, it argued that there was a Tost opportunity’ for 
Taipei to make the normalization of Japan-RRC relations more difficult by adopting a 
‘two Chinas’ strategy, thereby dialectically helping to reproduce Japan-ROC relations 
against Beijing’s ‘one China’ policy. Nevertheless, Taipei’s preoccupation with its own 
‘one China’ discourse made such an outcome impossible. In short, while this chapter 
demonstrated that there were limits to the discursive power of ‘returning virtue for
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malice' without the hegemonic position of its coalition in the domestic politics of Japan, 
the discourse and its coalition were still resilient enough to help reproduce Tokyo’s 
recognition of Taipei if it was supported by Taipei’s preventive ‘two Chinas’ policy.
Notes
1) In the closing segment of the final meeting of the Council for the Normalization 
of Japan-China Relations on 8 September 1972, Nakagawa Ichiro and Ishihara 
Shintaro, proponents of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse, demanded 
the Council make the following amendments to the draft of the platform (Shiina 
Etsusaburo Tsuitoroku Kankokai 1982: 153-4): 1) Changing ‘negotiations could 
preferably be conducted’ (kosho saretai) to ‘negotiations should be conducted’ 
(kosho subeki dearu); 2) Changing ‘hitherto existing relations’ (jurai no kankei) 
to ‘hitherto existing relations of all kinds including diplomatic relations’ (gaiko 
wo fukumeta jurai no subete no kankei). However, the Council under the 
chairmanship of Kosaka, whose position had earlier been threatened by the pro- 
Taipei members’ no-confidence motion (Takemi 1981: 61), hastily passed the 
former without making any reference to the latter as Kosaka was extremely 
anxious to bring the Council to a close (Shiina Etsusaburo Tsuitoroku Kankokai 
1982: 153-4).
2) In contrast to the logic of the ‘one China’ principle, Beijing officially began its 
negotiations with Tokyo on 25 September 1972 even though Tokyo maintained 
its diplomatic relations with Taipei until 29 September 1972. Furthermore, in
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the summit meeting of 28 September 1972, Beijing agreed with Tokyo’s plan to 
continue its economic relations with Taipei even after normalization (Ishii et al 
2003: 69-74). Here, Premier Zhou even actively recommended the Japanese to 
take the initiative of opening trade offices in Taiwan first (Ibid.; Ishii 2003b: 
373). Accordingly, Communist Chinese leaders had to loosen their ‘one China’ 
principle or temporarily accept the ‘two Chinas’ policy of the LDP over the 
course of normalization in the fall of 1972. Consequently, as Foreign Minister 
Ohira’s statement in the 29 September press conference shows, Japan-ROC 
diplomatic relations came to an ‘end’ only after the normalization of Japan-PRC 
diplomatic relations.
3) The Asian Problems Study Group subsequently contributed to the establishment 
of the ‘Asian Parliamentary Union’ (APU) in February 1965 and the 
organization of the first APU conference in Tokyo ten months later (Fukui 
1969: 316, 1970: 253). Interestingly, the second APU conference, which took 
place in South Korea in September 1966, coincided with the rival Asia-African 
Problems Study Group’s visit to Communist China and North Korea (Ibid.). A 
delegation of the Asian Problems Study Group—led by former Prime Minister 
Kishi Nobusuke—attended the APU conference in South Korea (Ibid.). The 
APU closely collaborated with the Asian People’s Anti-Communist League, 
which was founded by Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee in 1954 (Ibid.).
4) This number for the AAPSG is somewhat deceiving because many participants 
did not completely share the Group’s view on Japan’s China policy while the
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mainstream APSG had the capacity to assemble 140 to 150 participants at any 
time (Uchida 1965: 274-5).
5) Fujiyama had earlier patronized the Committee for the Promotion of Sino- 
Japanese Cooperation, a pro-Taiwan forum, as head of the Chamber of 
Commerce. He used to have a very close relationship with former Prime 
Minister Kishi, the doyen o f the Taiwan lobby, whom he not only financially 
supported but also politically served as Foreign Minister (Furukawa 1988: 254). 
Fujiyama later began to keep his distance from Kishi who failed to keep his 
promise that he would help Fujiyama become the prime minister once he 
stepped down (Ibid).
6) In Washington, Sato had signed the joint communique of 15 November 1967, in 
which the Prime Minister and President Lyndon B. Johnson referred to the 
‘China threat’ that they felt required closer US-Japan cooperation. They 
emphasized the fact that Communist China was developing its nuclear arsenal 
and agreed to create favorable conditions hi Asia so that the ‘China threat’ could 
be managed (Soeya 1995:114,1998: 54; Lin 1984: 218).
7) In retaliation to the Sato-Nixon communique (Furukawa 1988: 302), Zhou also 
enunciated that Beijing would not trade with those Japanese firms that met the 
following ‘four conditions’ in April 1970 (Soeya 1998: 113): ‘1) Trading firms 
and manufacturers supporting aggression by Taiwan and South Korea; 2) 
Trading firms and manufacturers with large investments in Taiwan and Korea;
3) Enterprises supplying arms and ammunition to US imperialism for
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aggression against Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; and 4) US-Japan joint 
enterprises and subsidiaries of US firms in Japan.’ As a result, especially after 
Nixon’s announcement of his intention to visit China in July 1971, business 
circles began to distance themselves from the pro-Taipei conservative coalition 
including the Committee for the Promotion of Sino-Japanese Cooperation (Ikei 
1980: 22-6; Takemi 1984: 87-8,1994: 4).
8) The dual representation formula was designed for admitting. Beijing as another 
representative of ‘China’ in the UN General Assembly along with Taipei. While 
die ‘simple’ version of the formula did not touch upon Taipei’s permanent 
membership in the Security Council, the ‘complex’ version Tokyo decided to 
co-sponsor recommended that Taipei’s Security Council seat go to Beijing.
9) Fukuda, the then foreign minister, had supported Prime Minister Sato’s attempt 
to save Taipei’s General Assembly seat in the UN as a way of repaying a ‘debt 
of gratitude’ to Chiang Kai-shek (Fukuda 1995: 176-7). Nevertheless, he later 
adopted ‘duck diplomacy’ {ahiru gaiko)—the making of behind-the-scene 
overtures despite its calm appearance ‘just as a duck may outwardly look serene 
while it busily uses its feet under water’ (Lee 1976: 106)—towards Beijing after 
Taipei was ‘expelled’ from the UN in October 1971 (Fukuda 1995: 177-8). The 
best-known example is the so-called ‘Hori letter’ that was drafted by the 
Sinologist, Nakajima Mineo (2002: 83-99), and Prime Minister Sato’s secretary, 
Kusuda Minoru (2001: 657-8), and signed by LDP Secretary General Hori 
Shigeru. This letter Tokyo Governor Minobe Ryokichi conveyed expressed
305
Japanese hopes for diplomatic negotiations with Beijing on Fukuda’s (1995: 
178, 192) behalf. However, Premier Zhou Enlai dismissed the letter in 
November 1971.
10) Just as the earlier ‘important question’ resolution was conceived by a group of 
Japanese diplomats, the ‘reverse important question’—declaring the expulsion 
of Taipei, rather than the admission of Beijing, was an important question which 
was subject to a two-thirds majority vote in the UN General Assembly—was 
also suggested by the Japanese government apparently (US Department of State 
2004: 634,688).
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Conclusion
6.1 Introduction
This final chapter first summarizes the main argument along with theoretical and 
methodological themes of this study in general terms. It intellectually locates the main 
argument of this critical constructivist work—that is, Japan’s recognition of the 
Nationalist regime on Taiwan as ‘China’ under US hegemony was culturally shaped by 
the moral discourse of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ (yide baoyuan) 
postwar Japan policy—within the field of international relations (IR). At the same 
time, it highlights the significance of this critical constructivist study in the literature of 
Japanese IR in the context of ‘regionalization’ that is said to be taking place in the 
discipline of IR. It also reiterates the methodological aspect of this critical 
constructivist research by referring to the literature on Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning 
virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy before moving onto the following specific 
implications of this study.
By way of a conclusion* the second part of this final chapter more specifically 
discusses the implications of this genealogical study. One of the implications is on the 
possible transformation of hegemony as well as collaboration between client states 
under hegemony as this study indicated that different groups and cultures attach 
different meanings to what constitutes the world. Another implication of this research 
is on the potentialities of change for common sense as this diachronic analysis de-
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naturalized the unity and continuity of common sense such as the discourse of 
‘returning virtue for malice’. There are also implications of this genealogical study on 
the empowerment and disempowerment of discourse across time as it drew on the 
concept of ‘discourse coalitions’ to analyze the rise and fall of the ‘returning virtue for 
malice’ discourse during the Cold War era. This genealogical investigation as a way of 
reading the history of bilateral relations between Tokyo and Taipei has an additional 
implication in terms of a historical lesson vis-a-vis the principle of ‘one China’—that 
is, a ‘two Chinas’ policy exercised by the legitimate government of China could have a 
deterring effect on the rival Chinese regime that seeks external legitimacy by adhering 
to the principle of ‘one China’. Finally, this final chapter concludes by recommending 
one of the ways in which further study can be conducted.
6.2 General summary
This study addressed how Japan’s diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China on 
Taiwan was made possible under US hegemony in East Asia. In order to complement 
the realist variant of rationalist research that attempts to explain why Tokyo 
diplomatically recognized Taipei in terms of American pressure and the Cold War 
structure, this critical constructivist study sought to understand how the diplomatic 
recognition was shaped by the Nationalist Chinese discourse of Chiang Kai-shek’s 
‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy. It demonstrated that the moral 
discourse represented Chiang Kai-shek as the benefactor to whom the Japanese should 
repay their ‘debt of gratitude’, thereby culturally attaching a particular meaning to the 
Chiang Kai-shek regime and enabling Japan to recognize Taiwan as ‘China’ under US
308
hegemony. Put differently, by complementing realist explanation—rather than 
abandoning the accumulation of knowledge based on such explanation (Wendt 2000: 
171-2)—the critical constructivist study pragmatically treated that reasons can also be 
causes following the dominant position in the philosophy of social science (Davidson 
1963; Smith 2000a; Wight 2002).
In terms of Japanese IR, this critical constructivist study drew on the early 
Japanese idealist conception of ‘reality’—that it is not only given but also reproduced 
on an eveiyday basis (Maruyama 1964: 172-3)—to push Japanese IR beyond the 
classical realist-idealist debate. As the evolution of the debate over the years shows that 
US hegemony has increasingly been taken for granted by Japanese IR scholars as well 
as decision-makers. The prime example of such intellectual ‘immobilism’—drawing on 
the concept that has been applied to the domestic and international politics of Japan 
(Stockwin et a l 1988; Stockwin 2003; Hook et al. 2001, 2005)—is the domination of 
realism (Kosaka 1963, 1995). Over the years, Japanese realists have successfully 
‘normalized’ Japan’s mercantilist diplomacy under the American nuclear umbrella 
known as the ‘Yoshida doctrine’ (Nagai 1985), based on which Japan’s international 
relations have been conducted and explained since the ‘Yoshida cabinet’ of the 1940s 
(Edstrom 1999). This critical constructivist study attempted to help overcome such 
intellectual ‘immobilism’ by laying bare the constitution of hegemony (Walker 1984; 
Cox 1996; Halliday 2000; Reus-Smit 2004)—such as that of US hegemony in East 
Asia. By shedding light on the discursive use of traditional practices the Japanese 
adopted under Chinese hegemony (Brown 1955), this critical constructivist study 
culturally created the possibility of intellectual ‘mobilism’ in Japanese IR by
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particularizing US hegemony in East Asia. In this sense, by bringing critical 
constructivism in, this study presented one of the ways in which Japanese IR can be 
mobilized to meet the challenge of ‘regionalization’ in the discipline of IR in a new era 
(Waever 1998, 1999).
In terms of methodology and the literature on Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning 
virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy, this study has provided an additional angle to 
the literature by adopting discourse analysis (Milliken 1999, 2001). In contrast to the 
traditional decision-making approach that brought the debate between those arguing for 
Chiang’s beliefs and those arguing for his calculations given the international 
environment he faced, this genealogical study has been empirically trace the link 
between Japan’s recognition of ‘China’ under US hegemony and Chiang’s postwar 
Japan policy. By re-conceptualizing Chiang’s postwar Japan policy as discourse across 
time, this genealogical study has been able to additionally contribute a way of reading 
the history of Japan’s recognition of the Republic of China through the discourse of 
Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy. As far as case 
studies are concerned, this discourse analysis selected the so-called ‘crucial cases’ 
(Eckstein 1975; George 1979a), ip which Japan’s recognition of the ROC on Taiwan as 
‘China’ was discursively (reproduced in times of diplomatic crises during the Cold 
War (Ikei 1973, 1982, 1992; Hosoya 1993). By executing the ‘process tracing’ 
procedure to examine the possible ‘congruence’ between Tokyo’s recognition of Taipei 
and the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ (George 1979b; George and 
McKeown 1985; Bennett and George 2001), this discourse analysis revealed how 
Japan’s recognition of ‘China’ and US hegemony in East Asia were constituted. Such
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‘inside-out’ empirical examination complemented the ‘outside-in’ rationalist approach 
that largely sacrificed such historical richness for parsimony by assuming the unitary 
process through which the actor took rational action depending on the situation it faced.
6.3 By way of a conclusion: specific implications
First, this genealogical study on relations between non-Western client states has 
presented one of the cases in which the world has been and is being interpreted 
differently by different groups and cultures (Milliken 1999: 243-4, 2001: 153). In 
effect, this genealogical study has also contributed to concretizing one of the possible 
ways in which the world can be transformed as mentioned earlier (Ibid.). On the other 
hand, this study can be seen as a lesson the hegemon can learn to achieve stability as 
well as durability by relying less on coercion (Ikenberry 2001; Ikenberry and 
Mastanduno 2003). In other words, while the ‘Westphalian system’ has not been the 
only form of hierarchy and stability in the world, international relations in East Asia 
have historically been more cooperative than those in the West (Fairbank 1968; Garver 
1993: 9-15; Zhao, S. 1997: Ch. 7; Hook et al 2001: 25-7, 2005: 27-9; Zhang 2001; 
Kang 2003). From this perspective, the present study has shown one of the ways in 
which discourses, or cultural ‘codes of intelligibility’ (Weldes et a l 1999), based on 
traditional practices in East Asia—such as Japan’s ‘debt of gratitude’ for Chiang Kai- 
shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy drawing on moral reciprocity 
(Lebra 1976)—can be put to use in order to promote cooperation between client states 
under hegemony.
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Second, this genealogical study addressed key questions such as what works as 
common sense for different societies and where discourse comes from (Milliken 1999, 
2001; Yee 1996). By retroducing common sense or the hegemonic discourse over time 
(Weldes et al 1999; Laffey and Weldes 2004), this genealogical study showed how 
Chinese and Japanese political actors drew on hegemonic practices from the past such 
as those from the ‘Chinese world order’ based on moral governance to construct their 
discourse. More immediately, this genealogical study suggested that the discourse of 
‘returning virtue for malice’ was modified from the classical discourse of ‘Sino- 
Japanese cooperation’ and practiced through the prewar Sunist roots of Japan-‘China’ 
relations. On the other hand, in addition to providing evidence that a nearly identical 
discourse was used vis-a-vis Russia during the prewar era, this genealogical study also 
delineated multiple points of emergence for the discourse of ‘returning virtue for 
malice’ as such in the postwar era. In other words, this genealogical investigation not 
only delineated the decent and emergence of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse 
but also de-naturalized the unity and continuity of the common sense, thereby 
suggesting potentialities for contemporary change.
Third, by taking advantage of the genealogical method, this discourse analysis 
showed how the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ involved the power relations 
in which unity with the past and order was artificially created (Milliken 1999: 243; 
2001: 152-3). From such an instrumentalist point of view, this study on the discourse of 
‘returning virtue for malice’ attempted to identify the proponents of the discourse as 
well as their locations in terms of the network of social power (Hughes 2002: 2, 2005: 
248). Such an attempt necessitated this study to search for the political actors—namely,
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Nationalist Chinese and Japanese conservative elites—who deliberately constructed the 
‘fit’ between the discourse of the present and hegemonic practices of the past as 
mentioned above (Laffey and Weldes 1997: 203; Neumann 2002: 630; Hemmer and 
Katzenstein 2002: 596). As a result, the attempt to identify the political actors and their 
locations across time revealed that the discourse diffused to form its own ‘discourse 
coalition’ (Fischer 2003). It was embedded in the apparatus called the ‘1955 system’— 
which was interconnected with the ‘San Francisco system’ under US hegemony (Dower 
1993b). Consequently, the discourse gained the hegemonic position and took on its own 
force. Accordingly, this genealogical study has presented a case in which ruling elites 
of the state authoritatively spoke for the state, thereby hegemonizing their discourse 
over others (Weldes 2003: 17). More specifically, as a leading discourse analyst calls 
for more research to be conducted on the aspect of institutionalization (Ibid.), this 
genealogical study has traced the institutional location of a particular discourse and its 
rivalry with others—in terms of the bifurcation of the ‘1955 system’ for instance. As a 
result, this study has extended the understanding of the ‘politics of discourses’—that is 
about ‘which discourses are likely (although not predetermined) to win in contests of 
meaning and identity construction’ (Ibid.).
Fourth, by the same token, the concept of ‘discourse coalitions’ enabled this 
study to account for change over time such as the decline of the hegemonic discourse 
that has been overlooked by many genealogists (Howarth 2000; Howarth et a l 2000). 
In contrast to many of ‘quasi-structuralist’ genealogies that focus on the continuity of 
the hegemonic discourse in IR (Milliken 1999: 246-8, 2001: 155-7), this genealogical 
study highlighted the de-hegemoniztion or dislocation of the hegemonic discourse
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(Howarth 2000; Howarth et al. 2000). For instance, this diachronic discourse analysis 
showed how Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist regime on Taiwan ceased to be ‘China’ 
after 1972 by demonstrating the dislocation of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ 
discourse coalition within the domain of Japanese conservative politics. In this way, 
this genealogical analysis shed light on the overlooked process of disempowerment and 
how it could be identified in terms of the relationship between the proponents of the 
hegemonic discourse and the configuration of power within the domain of domestic 
politics.
Fifth, historical lessons can also be learned from this study—especially 
regarding the severing of relations in 1972. Insomuch as the discourse of ‘returning 
virtue for malice’ and its coalition helped to make Tokyo’s unilateral announcement of 
the ‘severing of relations’ impossible by delimiting what can be said about Japan-ROC 
relations, Taipei had a better chance of maintaining diplomatic relations with Tokyo by 
abandoning its own ‘one China’ principle or avoiding the unilateral severing of 
relations itself (Huang 1998). Similarly, if Taipei had managed to remain in the UN in
1971 (solely or jointly with Beijing) as a result of giving clear and timely consent to the 
possibility of creating ‘two Chinas’, it would have been more difficult for any 
presidential hopeful of the ruling party of Japan to make an issue out of the ‘China 
question’ or the pro-Beijing group to come into power in 1972. Nevertheless, the 
paradox of one of the lessons we can learn from the case of diplomatic severance in
1972 is that the ‘two Chinas’ policy of the legitimate government of China could have a 
deterring effect on another Chinese regime that seeks legitimacy by adhering to the 
principle o f ‘one China’.
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Finally, despite the fact that it lost the hegemonic position, the discourse of 
‘returning virtue for malice’ still awaits future research as it continues to live today. In 
Japan, there are physical representations of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for 
malice’ postwar Japan policy such as the Chiang Kai-shek Shrine and the Monument 
for Honoring His Excellency Chiang Kai-shek’s Virtue as mentioned earlier in this 
study. The former was erected to deify the Late President following his death in 1975. 
The latter was built to mark the centennial of Chiang Kai-shek’s birth in 1986. 
Moreover, descendants of the pro-Taipei group like Abe Shinzo and Funada Hajime 
have ‘inherited’ not only their seats in the National Diet (Stockwin 2003: 148-9), but 
also their ‘debt of gratitude’ to Taipei (Lin et al 1996). However, in the wake of 
‘Taiwanization’ or the democratization of Taiwan, which was accelerated by the 
Chiang regime’s Toss of external legitimacy’ in the early 1970s (Wakabayashi 1992: 
182, 274-6, 2002: 90-2; Rigger 1999: 111, 179), the successors of the ‘returning virtue 
for malice’ discourse in Japanese politics have been put into a dilemma because ruling 
Taiwanese elites themselves have already begun ‘de-recognizing’ Chiang Kai-shek’s 
place in history. For instance, Lee Teng-hui (2003: 178), former President of Taiwanese 
origin, has publicly rebuffed Chiang’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan 
policy in order to call for Japan’s recognition of Taiwan as ‘Taiwan’ rather than 
‘China’. Therefore, further study is needed to analyze the rivalry between the 
proponents of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse and others in the context of 
Taiwanization as well as its impact on Japan in the contest for the hegemonic position 
in Japanese politics and the struggle for Tokyo’s diplomatic recognition of Taipei.
315
Bibliography
Accinelli, Robert (2005) ‘In pursuit of a modus vivendi: the Taiwan issue and Sino- 
American rapprochement, 1969-1972’, in William C. Kirby, Robert S. Ross, and 
Gong Li (eds.) Normalization o f US-China Relations: An international history, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Center, pp. 9-55.
Adler, Emanuel (1997) ‘Seizing the middle ground: constructivism in world politics’, 
European Journal o f International Relations 3 (3): 319-63.
 (2002) ‘Constructivism and International Relations’, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas
Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (eds.) Handbook o f International Relations, London: 
Sage Publications, pp. 95-118.
Aldous, Christopher (1997) The Police in Occupation Japan: Control, corruption, and 
resistance to reform, London: Routledge.
Angel, Robert Charles (2001) ‘Post-war reconstruction of the Japan Lobby in 
Washington: the first fifteen years’, Japan Forum 13: 77-90.
Arisue, Seizo (1987) Shusen Hishi Arisue Kikancho no Shuki (A Secret Hisory of the 
End of the War: The Memoirs of Chief Liaison Officer Arisue Seizo), Tokyo: Fuyo 
Shobo.
316
Ashida, Hitoshi (1951) ‘Japan: communists’ temptation’, Contemporary Japan 20: 15- 
24.
Awaya, Kentaro (1994a) ‘Tokyo Saiban ni miru sengo shori’ (Postwar settlement in the 
Tokyo War Crimes Trial), in Awaya Kentaro et at (eds.) Senso Sekinin, Sengo 
Sekinin: Nippon to Doitsu wa do chigauka (Taking Responsibility for the War and 
after the War: Differences between Japan and Germany), Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 
pp. 73-122.
 (1994b) Tokyo Saiban eno Michi (The Road to the Tokyo War Crimes Trial),
Tokyo: NHK Shuppan.
 (1995) ‘Fuin sareta senso sekinin: Tokyo Saiban to sengo Nippon’ (Sealing war
responsibility: the Tokyo Trial and postwar Japan), in Haboho Kenkyukai (ed.) 50- 
nenme no Senso Sekinin (War Responsibility at 50), Tokyo: Seiunsha, pp. 5-26.
Azuma, Hideki (2002) Nitchu Teikei no Rekishiteki Keifu (A Historical Genealogy of 
Sino-Japanese Cooperation: A macro-analysis), Tokyo: Bungeisha.
Baba, Akira (1983) Nichu Kankei to Gaiko Kiko no Kenkyu: Taisho, Showa-ki (A Study 
of Japan-China Relations and Diplomatic Institutions: The Taisho and Showa 
periods), Tokyo: Hara Shobo.
Baba, Shuichiro (1998) Ran wa Yusan ni Ari: Nikaido Susumu Kikigaki (Orchids of the 
Hidden Mountains: Interviews with Nikaido Susumu), Fukuoka: Nishi Nippon 
Shinbunsha.
Baerwald, Hans H. (1959) The Purge of Japanese Leaders under the Occupation, 
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Beloff, Max (1953) Soviet Policy in the Far East 1944-1951, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Bennett, Andrew and Alexander L. George (2001) ‘Case studies and process tracing in 
history and political science: similar strokes for different foci’, in Colin Elman and 
Miriam Fendius Elman (eds.) Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, political 
scientists, and the study o f international relations, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belfer 
Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University, pp. 137-66.
Besshi, Yukio (1980) ‘Nitchu kokko seijoka no seiji katei: seisaku ketteisha to sono 
kodo no haikef (The political processes of the normalization of relations between 
Japan and China: decision-makers and the backgrounds of their actions), Kokusai 
Seiji 66: 1-18.
 (1983) ‘Sengo Nitchu kankei to hiseishiki sesshokusha’ (Informal contact-makers
in Japan-China relations, 1949-1971), Kokusai Seiji 75: 98-113.
 (1995) ‘Nitchu no kokko seijoka: Bunka Daikakumei no eikyo (The normalization
of relations between Japan and China: the influence of the Cultural Revolution), in 
Kojima Tomoyuki (ed.) Ajia Jidai no Nitchu Kankei (Japan-China Relations in the 
Asian Century), Tokyo: Saimaru Shuppan, pp. 36-68.
Bix, Hebert P. (2000) Hirohito and the Making o f Modem Japan, New York: 
HaperCollins Publishers.
Blakeslee, George H. (1953) Far Eastern Commission: A study in international 
cooperation 1945 to 1952, Washington, DC: US Department of Department.
Boyle, John Hunter (1972) China and Japan at War 1937-1945: The Politics o f 
Collaboration, Stanford University Press.
Brown, Delmer M. (1955) Nationalism in Japan: An introductory historical analysis, 
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Buckley, Roger (1992) US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy 1945-1990, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Bunker, Gerald E. (1972) The Peace Conspiracy: Wang Ching-wei and the China war, 
1937-1941, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
319
Burr, William (1999) (ed.) The Kissinger Transcripts: The top secret talks with Beijing 
and Moscow, New York: The New Press.
Campbell, David (1998) Writing Security: United States foreign policy and the politics 
of identity, rev. edn., Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Carlsnaes, Walter (2002) ‘Foreign policy’, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth 
A. Simmons (eds.) Handbook o f International Relations, London: Sage Publications, 
pp. 331-49.
Carabine, Jean (2001) ‘Unmarried motherhood 1830-1990: a genealogical analysis’, in 
Margaret Wetherell, Stephanie Taylor, and Simeon J. Yates (eds.) Discourse as Data: 
A guide for analysis, London: Sage Publications in association with The Open 
University, pp. 267-310.
Chang, Ch’i-yun (1984), Xian Zongtong Jianggong Quanji, Di San-ce (The Complete 
Works of Late President Chiang, Vol. 3), Taipei: Zhongguo Wenhua Daxue 
Chubanbu.
Chang, Chun (1980) Wo yu Riben Qishinen (Seventy Yeans between Japan and Me), 
Taipei: Zhong-Ri Guanxi Yanjiuhui.
 (1988) ‘Xian Zongtong Jiang Zhongzheng Xiansheng yu xiandai Zhong-Ri guanxi’
(Former President Chiang Kai-shek and Modem Sino-Japanese relations), in Chen
320
P’eng-jen (ed.) Jin Bainen lai Zhong-Ri Guanxi (Sino-Japanese Relations of the Last 
Hundred Years), Taipei: Shuiniu Chubanshe, pp. 79-86.
Chang, Chun and Huang Shao-ku (1968) Jiang Zongtong wei Ziyouzhengyi yu Heping 
er Fendou Shulue (The Outline of President Chiang’s Struggle for Liberal Justice and 
Peace), Taipei: Zhongyang Wenwu Gongyingshe.
Chang, Hsin-hai (1948) ‘The treaty with Japan: a Chinese view’, Foreign Affairs 26 (3): 
505-14.
Chang, Jaw-ling Joanne (2005) ‘Taiwan’s policy toward the United States, 1969-1978’, 
in William C. Kirby, Robert S. Ross, and Gong Li (eds.) Normalization ofUS-China 
Relations: An international history, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Asia Center, pp. 209-51.
Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2004) ‘Social constructivisms in global and European politics: a 
review essay’, Review o f International Studies 30 (2): 229-44.
Chen, Chieh-ju (1993) Chiang Kai-shek’s Secret Past: The memoir o f his second wife, 
Chen Chieh-ju, Boulder: Westview Press.
Chen, Jian (2001) Mao’s China and the Cold War, Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press.
Chen, Ku-t’ ing (1971) Riben Luncong (Collected Writings on Japan), Taipei: Zhonghua 
Congshu Bianshen Weiyuanhui.
Chen, P’eng-jen (ed.) (1988) Jin Bainen lai Zhong-Ri Guanxi (Sino-Japanese Relations 
of the Last Hundred Years), Taipei: Shuiniu Chubanshe.
 (ed.) (1999) Jindai Zhong-Ri Guanxishi Lunji (Collected Writings on the History
of Modem Sino-Japanese Relations), Taipei: Wunan Tushu Chuban Gonsi.
Chen, Ruiyun (1995) Daoge Kuilei: Wang Jingwei de Lingxiumeng (The Treacherous 
Puppet: Wang Ching-wei’s dream of leadership) Taipei: Rizhen Chubanshe.
Chen, Shui-fong (1988) Riben Xiandaishi (The Modem History of Japan), Taipei: 
Taiwan Shangwu Yinshuguan.
Chen, Te-jen and Yasui Sankichi (eds.) (1989) Son Bun, Koen ‘Dai Ajia Shugi’ 
Shiryoshu: 1924-mn 11-gatsu Nippon to Chugoku no kiro (Collected Materials on 
Sun Yat-sen’s Speech ‘Pan Asianism’: Japan and China at the crossroads of 
November 1924), Tokyo: Horitsu Bunkasha 
Chen, Zhaobin (2000) Sengo Nippon no Chugoku Seisaku: 1950-nendai Higashi Ajia 
kokusai seiji no bunmyaku (Postwar Japan’s China Policy: In the context of 
international politics of East Asia in the 1950s), Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai.
322
Chiang, Kai-shek (1939) ‘Gao Riben guomin shu’ (A message to the Japanese nation), 
in Zhongguo Guomindang Zhongyang Zhixing Weiyuanhui Xuanehuanbu (ed.), 
Lingxiu Kangzhan Yanlunji (A Collection of the Leader’s Speeches on the War of 
Resistance), pp. 108-12.
 (1947) Bo wo Motte Bo ni Mukuyuru Nakare (Do not Return Violence for
Violence), Tokyo: Hakuyosha.
 (1952) Selected Speeches and Messages o f President Chiang Kai-shek 1949-52,
Taipei: Office of the Government Spokesman.
 (1967) ‘Nippon no kokumin ni tsugu’ (A message to the Japanese nation), in
Tamajima Nobuyoshi (ed.) Chugoku no Nipponkan (The Chinese Perception of 
Japan), Tokyo: Kobundo, pp. 86-7.
 (1971a) ‘Kangzhan shengli dui quanguo junmin ji quanshijie renshi guangbo
yanshuo’ (The speech broadcast to the soldiers and civilians of the nation and the 
peoples of the world in the hour of victorious resistence), in Zhong-Ri Guanxi 
Yanjiuhui (ed.) Zhong-Ri Guanxi Lunwenji (A Collection of Essays on Sino-Japanese 
Relations), Taipei: Zhengzhong Shuju, pp. 11-14.
 (1971b) ‘Kosen shori ni atari zenkoku gunmin oyobi sekaijinshi ni tsugu’ (The
speech broadcast to the soldiers and civilians of the nation and the peoples of the
323
world in the hour of victorious resistence), in Zhong-Ri Guanxi Yanjiuhui (ed.) 
Zhong-Ri Guanxi Lunwenji (A Collection of Essays on Sino-Japanese Relations), 
Taipei: Zheng-zhong Shuju, pp. 123-7.
- —(1984) “Kangzhan shengli gao quanguo junmin ji quanshijie renshi shu5 (The text 
of the message to the soldiers and civilians of the nation and the peoples of the world 
in the hour of victorious resistence), in Chang Ch’i-yun (ed.) Xian Zhongtong 
Jianggong Quanji Di Sance (The Complete Works of the Late President Chiang Vol. 
3), Taipei: Zhongguo Wenhua Daxue Zhonghua Xueshuyuan, pp. 3271-2.
— (1993) ‘Kosen ni shori shi zenkoku no gunmin, oyobi sekai no hitobito ni tsugeru 
enzetsu’ (The speech broadcast to the soldiers and civilians of the nation and the 
peoples of the world in the hour of victorious resistence), in Takeuchi Minoru (ed.) 
Nitchu Kokko Kihon Bunkenshu Gekan (A Collection of Basic Documents on Japan- 
China Relations Vol. 2), Tokyo: Sososha, pp. 126-30.
— (2005) ‘Kosen ni shori shi zenkoku no gunmin, oyobi sekai no hitobito ni tsugeru 
enzetsu’ (The speech broadcast to the soldiers and civilians of the nation and the 
peoples of the world in the hour of victorious resistence), in Takeuchi Minoru and 
Nijuisseiki Chugoku Soken (eds.) Nitchu Kokko Bunkenshu (A Collection of 
Documents on Japan-China Relations), Tokyo: Sososha, pp.261-6.
324
Chiang, Wei-kuo (1991) Jiang Zhongzheng Xiansheng zai Shijieshang de Diwei (Mr. 
Chiang Kai-shek’s Place in World History), Taipei: Liming Wenhua Shiye Gongsi.
Chien, Fu (2005) Qian Fu Huiyilu Juan Yi (The Memoirs of Frederick F. Chien Vol.
1), Taipei: Tianxia Yuanjian Gufen Youxian Gongsi.
Chigono, Michiko (1984) ‘Son Bun wo meguru Nipponjin: Inukai Tsuyoshi no tai 
Chugoku ninshiki’ (The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen: Inukai Tsuyoshi’s perception of 
China), in Hirano Ken’ichiro (ed.) Kindai Nippon to Ajia: Bunka no koryu to masatsu 
(Modem Japan and Asia: Cultural exchange and friction), Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku 
Shuppankai.
Chin, Hsiao-yi (ed.) (1985) Zhongguo Xiandaishi Cidian: Renwu bufen (The Dictionary 
of Modem Chinese History: People), Taipei: Jindai Zhongguo Chubanshe.
 (ed.) (1990) Zhongguo Xiandaishi Cidian: Shishi bufen, yi (The Dictionary of
Modem Chinese History: Events, part 1), Taipei: Jindai Zhongguo Chubanshe
China Handbook Editorial Board (1950) China Handbook 1950, New York: Rockport 
Press.
 (1952) China Handbook 1952-53, Taipei: China Publishing.
Chu, Ch’en (1993) Sun Zhongshanyu Jiang Zhongzheng de Minzuzhuyi Sixiang (The 
Nationalist Thought of Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek), Taipei: Liming Wenhua 
Shiye Gongsi.
Chu, Yun-han and Jih-wen Lin (2001) ‘Political development in 20th-century Taiwan: 
state-building, regime transformation and the construction of national identity’, The 
China Quarterly 165: 102-29.
Cohen, Warren I. (1989) ‘China in Japanese-American relations’, in Akira Iriye and 
Warren I. Cohen (eds.) The United States and Japan in the Postwar World, 
Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, pp. 36-60.
Cohen, Warren I., Chen Jian, John W. Garver, Michael Sheng, and Odd Arne Westad 
(1997) ‘Symposium: rethinking the lost chance in China’, Diplomatic History 21:71- 
115.
Collcutt, Martin (1991) ‘The legacy of Confucianism in Japan’, in Gilbert Rozman (ed.) 
The East Asian Region: Confucian heritage and its modern adaptation, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, pp. 111-54.
Connors, Lesley (1987) The Emperor's Advisor: Saionji Kinmochi and prewar 
Japanese politics, London: Croom Helm and Nissan Institute for Japanese Studies, 
University of Oxford.
326
Cortazzi, Hugh (2001) ‘Britain and Japan, 1951: San Francisco and Tokyo’ in Roger 
Dingman et a l S a n  Francisco: 50 years on (Part One), London: The Suntoiy Centre, 
pp 55-66.
Cox, Robert W. (1994) ‘Approaches from a historical materialist tradition’, Mershon 
International Studies Review 38: 366-7.
 (1996) ‘Gramsci, hegemony, and international relations: an essay in method
(1983)’, in Robert W. Cox with Timothy J. Sinclair (ed.) Approaches to World 
Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 124-43.
Crawford, Robert M. A. and Darryl S. L. Jarvis (eds.) International Relations—Still an 
American Social Science?: Toward diversity in international thought, Albany: State 
University of New York Press.
Cumings, Bruce (1993) ‘Japan’s position in the world system’, in Andrew Gordon (ed.) 
Postwar Japan as History, Berkley: University of California Press, pp. 34-63.
Curtis, Gerald L. (2002) ‘US relations with Japan’, in Ezra F. Vogel et al (eds.) The 
Golden Age o f the US-China-Japan Triangle 1972-1989, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Asia Center, pp. 135-63.
Davidson, Donald (1963) ‘Actions, reasons, and casuses’, Journal o f Philosophy 60: 
685-700.
327
Davis, Glenn and John G. Roberts (1996) An Occupation without Troops: Wall Street's 
half-century domination o f Japanese politics, Tokyo: Yenbooks.
Deans, Phil (1997) Japan-Taiwan Relations, 1972-1992: Virtual diplomacy and the 
Separation o f Politics and Economics, PhD Dissertation Submitted to the Department 
of Politics, University of Newcastle upon Tyne.
 (2002a) ‘The Taiwan question: reconciling the irreconcilable’, in Marie Soderberg
(ed.) Chinese-Japanese Relations in the Twenty-first Century: Complementary and 
conflict, pp. 88-102.
 (2002b) ‘Taiwan in Japan’s foreign relations: informal politics and virtual
diplomacy’, in Quansheng Zhao (ed.) Future Trends in East Asian International 
Relations, Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, pp. 151-76.
De Bary, WM. Theodore, Wing-tsit Chan, and Burton Watson (eds.) (1960) Sources o f 
Chinese Tradition Vol. 7, New York: Columbia University Press.
Ding, Qiujie and Song Ping (eds.) (2000) Sho Kai-seki Shokanshu 1912-1949 Chu (A 
Collection of Chiang Kai-shek Letters 1912-49 Vol. 2), Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo,
Ding, Yongrong and Sun Zhaiwei (1992) Nanjing Zhengfu Bengkui Shimo (The Whole 
Circumstances of the Collapse of the Nanjing Government), Taipei: Babilun 
Chubanshe.
328
Dingman, Roger (1975) ‘Yoshida Shokan (1951) no kigen: Nippon wo meguru Eibei no 
koso’ (The origins of the ‘Yoshida letter’ (1951): the Anglo-American dispute over 
Japan), Kokusai Seiji 53: 121-40.
Doty, Roxanne Lynn (1993) ‘Foreign policy as social construction: a post-positivist 
analysis of U.S. counterinsurgency policy in the Philippines’, International Studies 
Quarterly 37: 297-320.
 (1996) Imperial Encounters: The politics o f representation in North-South
relations, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Dower, John W. (1979) Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese 
experience, 1878-1954, Cambridge: Harvard University Concil on East Asian 
Studies.
 (1993a) Japan in War and Peace: Selected essays, New York: The New Press.
 (1993b) ‘Peace and democracy in two systems: external policy and internal
conflict’, in Andrew Gordon (ed.) Postwar Japan as History, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, pp. 3-33.
 (1999) Embracing Defeat: Japan in the aftermath o f World War II, New York: W.
W. Norton & Company.
Drifte, Reinhard (1983) The Security Factor in Japan’s Foreign Policy, 1945-1952, 
East Sussex: Saltire Press.
Dulles, John Foster (1952) ‘Security in the Pacific’, Foreign Affairs 30 (2): 175-87.
Dulles Papers (1952) Memorandum on Japan and China, 11 January.
Eastman, Lloyd E. (1986) ‘Nationalist China during the Nanking decade 1927-1937’, in 
John K. Fairbank and Albert Feuerweker (eds.) The Cambridge History o f China 
Vol. 13: Republican China 1912-1949 Part 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 116-67.
Eckstein, Harry (1975) ‘Case study and theory in political science’, in Fred I. 
Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.) Handbook o f Political Science Vol. 7: 
Strategies o f inquiry, Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing 
Company, pp. 79-137.
Eden, Anthony (1960) Full Circle: The memoirs o f Anthony Eden, London: Cassell.
Edstrom, Bert (1999) Japan’s Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine: From Yoshida to 
Miyazawa, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Eto, Jun (ed.) (1995) Senryo Shiroku (The Archival History of the Occupation), Tokyo: 
Kodansha.
Eto, Shinkichi (ed.) (1967) Chuka Minkoku wo Meguru Kokusai Kankei, 1949-1965 
(International Relations Surrounding the Republic of China, 1949-1965), Tokyo: 
Zaidan Hojin Ajia Seikei Gakkai.
 (1968) Higashi Ajia Seijishi Kenkyu (A Study of East Asian Political History),
Tokyo: Tokyo Diagaku Shuppankai.
 (1980, 2004) ‘Sengo kokusaikankyo niokeru Chugoku: sori no shiseihoshin
enzetsu wo chushin ni (China in the postwar international environment: centering on 
Japanese prime ministers’ addresses on their government policies), in Eto Shinkichi 
et al. (eds.) (1980) Inoki Masamichi Sensei Taikan Kinen Ronbunshu: Nippon no 
Amen, Sekai no Heiwa (The Security of Japan and World Peace: Collected essays in 
commemoration of the retirement of Professor Inoki Masamichi), Tokyo: Hara 
Shobo, also in Eto Shinkichi (2004) Eto Shinkichi Chosakushu Dai San-kan: 
Nijusseiki Nitchu Kankeishi (The Collected Writings of Eto Shinkichi Vol. 3: The 
history of Japan-China relations during the twentieth century), Tokyo: Toho 
Shuppan, pp. 229-53.
 (1986) ‘China’s international relations 1911-1931’ in John K. Fairbank and Alfred
Feuerwerker (eds.) The Cambridge History of China Vol. 13: Republican China 
1912-1949 Part 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.74-115.
331
Eto, Shinkichi and Marius B. Jansen (1982) ‘Introduction: Miyazaki Toten, the dream 
and the life’, in Miyazaki Toten, My Thirty-three Years' Dream: The autobiography 
of Miyazaki Toten, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. xiii-xxviii.
Evangelista, Matthew (1997) ‘Domestic structure and international change’, in Michael 
W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry (eds.) New Thinking in International Relations 
Theory, Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 202-28.
Evans, Peter B., Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnum (eds.) (1993) Double-Edged 
Diplomacy: International bargaining and domestic politics, Berkeley: University of 
California Press.
Fairbank, John King (ed.) (1968) The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's 
foreign relations, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Fearon, James and Alexander Wendt (2002) ‘Rationalism v. constructivism: a skeptical 
view’, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (eds.) Handbook of 
International Relations, London: Sage Publications, pp. 52-72.
Feis, Herbert (1957) Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The war they waged and the peace 
they sought, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Fierke, Karin M. (2001) ‘Critical methodology and constructivism’, in Karin M. Fierke 
and Knud Erik Jorgensen (eds.) Constructing International Relations: The next 
generation, London: M. E. Sharpe, pp. 115-35.
Fierke, Karin M. and Knud Erik Jorgensen (eds.) (2001) Constructing International 
Relations: The next generation, London: M. E. Sharpe.
Finn, Richard B. (1992) Winners in Peace: Mac Arthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan, 
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Fischer, Frank (2003) Reframing Public Policy: Discursive politics and deliberative 
practices, New York: Oxford University Press.
Foot, Rosemary (1995) The Practice o f Power: US relations with China since 1949, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Fu, Ch’i-hsueh (1972) Zhongguo Waijiaoshi Xiace (The Diplomatic History of China 
Vol. 2), Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu Yinshuguan.
Fu, Jaw-hsiang (1993) Ye Gongchao Zhuan: Ye Gongchao deyisheng (A Biography of 
George K. C. Yeh: The life of George K. C. Yeh), Taipei: Maolian Wenhua Jijin.
Fujii, Shozo (1966) Sonbun no Kenkyu: Tokuni minzokushugi riron no hatten wo 
chushin toshite (A Study of Sun Yat-sen: Centering specifically on the development 
of nationalist ideology), Tokyo: Keiso Shobo.
333
Fujiwara, Ki’ichi (1999) ‘Kokusai Seiji Riron no ima’ (Theoiy of international politics 
today), in Aera Mook (ed.) Shin Kokusai Kankeigaku ga Wakaru (Understanding 
New International Relations), Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, pp. 58-62.
Fukuda, Takeo (1995) Kaiko Kyujunen (Ninety Years of My Life), Tokyo: Iwanami 
Shoten.
Fukui, Haruhiko (1969) Jiyuminshuto to Seisaku Ketteri (The Liberal Democratic Party 
and Policy-making), Tokyo: Fukumura Shuppan.
“ — (1970) Party in Power: The Japanese Liheral-Democrats and Policy-making, 
Berkeley: University of California Press.
 (1972) ‘Jiminto no gaiko seisaku to sono kettei katei: Chugoku mondai wo chushin
toshite’ (Foreign policy of the Liberal Democratic Party and its decision-making 
processes: centering on the China question), Kokusai Mondai April: 15-27.
 (1977) ‘Tanaka goes to Peking: a case study in foreign policymaking’, in T. J.
Pempel (ed.) Policymaking in Contemporary Japan, Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
pp. 60-102.
Funabashi, Yoichi (1991a) ‘Japan and the new world order’, Foreign Affaris 70 (5): 58- 
74.
 (ed.) (1991b) Nippon Senryaku Sengen: Shibirian taikoku wo mezashite (Japan’s
Civilian Manifesto: Becoming a global civilian power), Tokyo: Kodansha.
 (ed.) (1994) Japan’s International Agenda, New York: New York University
Press.
Funada, Naka (1970) Aoyama Karma (Shooting the Breeze in Aoyama), Tokyo: 
Isshinkai.
Furui, Yoshimi (1972) ‘Nitchu fukko no kaji tori’ (At the helm of the normalization of 
relations between Japan and China), in Jiji Tsushinsha Seijibu (ed.) Dokumento 
Nitchu Fukko (Documents on the Normalization of Relations between Japan and 
China), Tokyo: Jiji Tsushinsha, pp. 57-74.
Furukawa, Mantaro (1988) Nitchu Sengo Kankeishi (A History of Japan-China 
Relations in the Postwar Era), Tokyo: Hara Shobo.
Furuya, Keiji (1975) Sho Kai-seki Hiroku 1: Higeki no Chugoku Tairiku (The Secret 
Files of Chiang Kai-shek Vol. 1: The tragedy of Mainland China), Tokyo: Sunkei 
Shinbunsha.
 (1976) Sho Kai-seki Hiroku 9: Manshu Jihen (The Secret Files of Chiang Kai-shek
Vol. 9: The Manchurian Incident), Tokyo: Sankei Shinbunsha.
 (1977a) Sho Kai-seki Hiroku 14: Nippon Kofuku (The Secret Files of Chiang Kai-
shek Vol. 14: Japan surrenders), Tokyo: Sunkei Shinbunsha.
 (1977b) Sho Kai-seki Hiroku 15: Tairikku Dakkan no Chikai (The Secret Files of
Chiang Kai-shek Vol. 15: The vow to regain the Mainland), Tokyo: Sunkei 
Shinbunsha.
 (1979) ‘Mocha Jiang Jieshi Xiansheng zhi Ribenguan’ (Paying a tribute to the
memory of Mr. Chiang Kai-shek and his perception of Japan), in Zhoghua Minguo 
Shiliao Yanjiu Zhongxin (ed.) Xianzongtong Jianggong Youguan Lunshu yu Shiliao 
(Essays and Historical Materials related to the Late President Chiang), Taipei: 
Zhonghua Minguo Shiliao Yanjiu Zhongxin, pp. 249-65.
 (1981) Chiang Kai-shek: His life and times, New York: St. John’s University.
 (1992) ‘Sho Kai-seki no jidai’ (The Chiang Kai-shek era), in Uno Seiichi (ed.)
Sonbun kara Ritoki e: Nikka hachijunen no kiseki (From Sun Yat-sen to Lee Teng- 
hui: The locus of Japan-ROC relations at 80), Tokyo: Waseda Shuppan, pp. 28-42.
Gaddis, John Lewis (1982) Strategies o f Containment: A critical appraisal of postwar 
American national security policy, New York: Oxford University Press.
 —(1997) We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War history, New York: Oxford
Univeristy Press.
336
Gaimusho (1954) Nippon Gaiko Hyakunen Shoshi (The Concise History of One 
Hundred Years of Japanese Diplomacy), Tokyo: Yamada Shorn.
Gaimusho Hyakunenshi Hensan Iinkai (1969) Gaimusho no Hyakunen Gekan (One 
Hundred Years of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Vol. 2), Tokyo: Hara Shobo.
Garver, John W. (1993) Foreign Relations o f the People's Republic o f China, 
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
George, Alexander L. (1979a) ‘Case studies and theory development: the method of 
structure, focused comparison’, in Paul Gordon Lauren (ed.) Diplomacy: New 
approaches in history, theory, and policy, New York: The Free Press, pp. 43-68.
 (1979b) ‘The causal nexus between cognitive beliefs and decision-making
behavior: the “operational code” belief system’, in Lawrence S. Falkowski (ed.) 
Psychological Models in International Politics, Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 95-124.
George, Alexander L. and Timothy J. McKeown (1985) ‘Case studies and theories of 
organizational decision making’, Advances in Information Processing in 
Organizations 2 (1): 21-58.
Gilpin, Robert (1981) War and Change in World Politics, New York: Cambridge 
University Press.
Goh, Evelyn (2005) Constructing the US Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: From 
‘red menace ’ to ‘tacit ally \ Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
Goldstein, Carol (1986) ‘Unofficial ties that bind: Chiang memorial meeting underlines 
Tokyo-Taipei links’, Far Eastern Economic Review 25 September: 16-18.
Goncharov, Sergei N., John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai (1993) Uncertain Partners: Stalin,
Mao, and the Korean War, Standford: Standford University Press.
Gotoda, Masaharu (1998) Jo to Ri: Gotoda Masaharu Kaikoroku Jo (Passion and 
Rationality: The Memoirs of Gotoda Masaharu Vol. 1), Tokyo: Kodansha.
Gourevitch, Peter A. (1978) ‘The second image reversed: the international sources of 
domestic politics’, International Organization 32 (4): 881-911,
Griggs, Steven and David Howarth (2002) ‘The work of ideas and interests in public 
policy’, in Alan Finlayson and Jeremy Valentine (eds.) Politics and Post- 
structuralism, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 97-111.
Guo, Xuyin (1993) Guomindang Paixi Douzhengshi, (A History of Factional Struggles 
in the Nationalist Party), Taipei: Guiguan Tushu Gongsi.
Hall, Stuart (1985) ‘Signification, representation, ideology: Althusser and the post­
structuralist debates’, Critical Studies in Mass Communication 2 (2): 91-114.
 (1992) 4The West and the rest: discourse and power5, in Stuart Hall and Bram
Gieben (eds.) Formations o f Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press/The Open 
University, pp. 275-320.
 (1997) ‘The work of representation5, in Stuart Hall (ed.) Representation: Cultural
Representations and Signifying Practices, London: Sage/The Open University, pp. 
13-64.
——(2001) ‘Foucault: power, knowledge, and discourse5, in Margaret Wetherell et al 
(eds.) Discourse Theory and Practice’. A Reader, London: Sage/The Open University, 
pp. 72-92.
Halliday, Fred (2000) ‘Culture and international relations: a new reductionism?5, in 
Michi Ebata and Beverly Neufeld (eds.) Confronting the Political in International 
Relations, London: MacMillan Press, pp. 47-71.
Hansen, Lene (2006) Security as Practice: Discourse analysis and the Bosnian War, 
London: Routledge.
Hara, Yoshihisa (1995) Kishi Nobusuke: Kensei no Seijika (Kishi Nobusuke: The power 
politician), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.
 (ed.) (2003) Kishi Nobusuke Shogenroku (The Records of Kishi Nobusuke5s
Testimony), Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbunsha.
339
Hata, Ikuhiko (1961) Nichu Sensoshi (A History of the Sino-Japanese War), Tokyo: 
Kawade Shobo Shinsha.
 (1976) Shiroku, Nippon Saigunbi (The Remilitarization of Japan: Historical
records), Tokyo: Bungei Sunju Shinsha.
 (1994) Showa Tenno Itsutsu no Ketsudan (Showa Emperor’s Five Decisions),
Tokyo: Bungei Shunju.
Hatano, Sumio (1988) ‘Nippon Rikugun no Chugoku ninshiki: 1920 nendai kara 30 
nendai e* (The Japanese Army’s perception of China: from the 1920s to the 30s), in 
Inouye Kiyoshi and Eto Shinkichi (eds.) Nitchu Senso to Nitchu Kankei: Rokokyo 
Jiken 50 shunen Nitchu gakujutsu toronkai kiroku (The Japan-China War and Japan- 
China Relations: The record of the Japan-China academic debate in commemoration 
of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident after 50 years), Tokyo: Hara Shobo, pp. 225-38.
 (1995) ‘Nitchu Senso no isan to fusai’ (The legacy and debt of the Japan-China
War), in Masuda Hiroshi and Hatano Sumio (eds.) Ajia no nakano Nippon to 
Chugoku: Yuko to masatsu no gendaishi (Japan and China in Asia: The contemporary 
history of friendship and friction), Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha.
Hatsuse, Ryuhei (1980) Dentoteki Uyoku Uchida Ryohei no Kenkyu (A Study of the 
Traditional Rightest Uchida Ryohei), Fukuoka: Kyushu Daigaku Shuppankai.
340
Hayasaka, Shigezo (1987) Hayasaka Shigezo no Tanaka Kakuei Kaisoroku (The 
Tanaka Kakuei Memoirs by Hayasaka Shigezo), Tokyo: Shogakkan.
Heginbotham, Eric and Richard J. Samuels (1999) ‘Mercantile realism and Japanese 
foreign policy’, in Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (eds.) Unipolar 
Politics: Realism and state strategies after the Cold War, New York: Columbia 
University Press, pp. 182-217.
Heiwa Mondai Danwakai (1950, 1995) ‘Santabi heiwa nitsuite’ (On peace for the third 
time), Sekai December, also in Kitaoka Shin’ichi (ed.) Sengo Nippon Gaiko Ronshu: 
Kowa ronso kara Wangan Senso made (A Collection of Essays on Japanese 
Diplomacy during the Postwar Era: From the Peace Treaty debate to the Gulf War), 
Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, pp. 71-98.
Hemmer, Christopher and Peter J. Katzenstein (2002) ‘Why is there no NATO in Asia?: 
Collective identity, regionalism, and the origins of multilateralism’, International 
Organization 56 (3): 575-607.
Ho, Ying-qin (1976) Zhongguo yu Shijie Qiantu (China and the Prospects of the 
World), Taipei: Zhengzhong Shuju.
Hoffmann, Stanley (1977) ‘An American social science: international relations’, 
Daedalus 106: 41-60.
341
Hollis, Martin and Steve Smith (1990) Explaining and Understanding International 
Relations, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Honzawa, Jiro (1998) Taiwan Robi (The Taiwan Lobby), Tokyo: Datahouse.
Hook, Glenn D. (1996) Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan, 
London: Routledge.
Hook, Glenn D., Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Hughes, and Hugo Dobson (2001) 
Japan’s International Relations: Politics, economics, and security, London: 
Routledge.
 (2005) Japan’s International Relations: Politics, economics, and security, 2nd edn.,
London: Routledge.
Hoon, Shim Jae (1988) ‘A question of history: plots and myths of decades past return to 
haunt the KMT’ Far Eastern Economic Review 14 April: 34-5.
Hoopes, Townsend (1973) The Devil and John Foster Dulles, Boston: Little, Brown.
Hoph, Ted (1998) ‘The promise of constructivism in international relations theory’, 
International Security 23 (1): 171-200.
Hori, Shigeru (1972) ‘“Hori shokan” no ikisatsu’ (The ‘Hori letter’ and its 
circumstances), in Jiji Tsushinsha Seijibu (ed.) Dokumento Nitchu Fukko (Documents
on the Normalization of Relations between Japan and China), Tokyo: Jiji Tsushinsha, 
pp. 81-95.
Horikoshi, Teizo (1957) ‘Dai ikkai Nikka Kyoryoku IinkaP (The first meeting of the 
Committee for the Promotion of Sino-Japanese Co-operation), Keidanren Geppo 
May: 14-17.
 (1959) ‘Taiwan to Okinawa hokokif (Reporting on Taiwan and Okinawa),
Keidanren Geppo February: 31-5.
Hosaka, Masayasu (1999) Sho Kaiseki (Chiang Kai-shek), Tokyo: Bungei Shunju.
 (2000) Yoshida Shigeru toiu Gyakusetsu (Yoshida Shigeru as a Paradox), Tokyo:
Chuo Koronsha.
 (2003) Sensokan naki Heiwaron (On Peace: In the absence of a view on war),
Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha.
Hosoya, Chihiro (1982) ‘Yoshida shokan to Bei-Ei-Chu no kozu’ (The ‘Yoshida letter’ 
and the structure of US-Britain-China relations), Chuo Koron November: 72-88.
 (1984) San Furanshisuko Kowa eno Michi (The Road to the San Francisco Peace
Treaty), Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha.
 (1986) ‘San Furanshisuko Kowa Joyaku to kokusai kankyo’ (The San Francisco
Peace Treaty and the international environment), in Watanabe Akio and Miyasato
343
Seigen (eds.) San Furanshisuko Kowa (The San Francisco Peace Treaty), Tokyo: 
Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, pp. 1-16.
 (1989) ‘From the Yoshida Letter to the Nixon Shock’, in Akira Iriye and Warren I.
Cohen (eds.) The United States and Japan in the Postwar World, Lexington: The 
University Press of Kentucky, pp. 21-35.
 (1993) Nippon Gaiko no Kiseki (The Locus of Japanese Diplomacy), Tokyo: NHK
Books.
Hosoya, Chihiro, Saito Makato, Imai Seiichi, and Royama Michio (eds.) (1971) Nichi- 
Bei Kankeishi: Kaisen ni Itaru Jyunen (1931-41) 1: Seifu shuno to gaiko kikan (A 
Histoy of Japan-US Relations: The ten years that led to the outbreak of war (1931-41) 
Vol. 1: State leaders and diplomatic institutions), Tokyo: Tokyo Digaku Shuppankai.
Howarth, David (2000) Discourse, Buckingham: Open University Press.
Howarth, David, Aletta J. Norval, and Yannis Stavrakakis (eds.) (2000) Discourse 
Theory and Political Analysis, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Hsiau, A-chin (2000) Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism, London: 
Routledge.
Hsu, Chao-yen (2000) Taiwan no Sentaku: Ryogan Mondai to Ajia no Mirai (Taiwan’s 
Options: The cross-straits problem and the future of Asia), Tokyo: Heibonsha.
344
Hsu, Chieh-lin (1990) ‘The Republic of China and Japan’, in Yu San Wang (ed.) 
Foreign Policy o f the Republic o f China on Taiwan: An unorthodox approach, New 
York: Praeger.
 (1991) Riben Xiandaishi (The Modem History of Japan), Taipei: San Min Shuju.
Hu, Wei-chen (2001) Meiguo dui-Hua ‘Yige Zhongguo’ Zhengce zhi Yanbian: Cong 
Nikesen dao Kelindun (The Evolution of US ‘One China’ Policy: From Nixon to 
Clinton), Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu Yinshuguan.
Huang, Jen-yu (1994) Cong Dalishi de Jiaodu Du Jiang Jieshi Riji (Reading the Chiang 
Kai-shek Diary from the Macro-Historical Point of View), Taipei: Shibao Wenhua.
Huang, Kang (ed.) (1998) Shijie Xiangguan Geguo yu Zhonghua Minguo Zhongduan 
Shiliao Guanxi zhi Shulun: 1949-nen 10-yue -  1998-nen 2-yue (The Republic of 
China and Its Termination of Ambasadorial and Consular Relations with Nations of 
the World: October 1949 -  February 1998), Taipei: Guoli Zhengzhi Daxue Guoji 
Guanxi Yanjiu Zhongxin.
Huang, T’ien-ts’ai (1995) Zhong-Ri Waijiao de Renyu Shi (The People and Events of 
Sino-Japanese Diplomacy: The records of Huang T’ien-ts’ai’s assignments in 
Tokyo), Taipei: Lianjing Chuban Shiye Gongsi.
Huang, Wen-hsiung (1996) Chugokujin no Uso, Taiwanjin no Urami (Chinese Lies, 
Taiwanese Resentment), Tokyo: Kobunsha.
 (2004) Rekishi kara Kesareta Nipponjin no Bitoku (Japanese Virtues Hidden from
History), Tokyo: Seishun Shuppansha.
Hughes, Christopher R. (1997) Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National identity and 
status in international society, London: Routledge.
 (2000) ‘Post-nationalist Taiwan5, in Michael Leifer (ed.) Asian Nationalism,
London: Routledge, pp. 63-81.
 (2002) ‘Interpreting nationalist texts: a post-structuralist approach5, paper for the
British International Studies Association conference in London, 16-18 December.
 (2005) ‘Interpreting nationalist texts: a post-structural approach5, Journal o f
Contemporary China 14 (43): 247-67.
Hughes, Christopher W. (1999) Japan's Economic Power and Security: Japan and 
North Korea, London: Routledge.
 (2004) Japan’s Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power?, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Iechika, Ryoko (1998a) ‘Sengo Nitchu kankei no kihon kozo: mubaisho kettei no yoin5 
(The basic structure of postwar Japan-China relations: main causes of no
346
compensation policy’), in Matsusaka Daigaku Gendaishi Kenkyukai (ed.) Gendaishi 
no Sekai e (The World of Modem History), Kyoto: Koyo Shobo, pp. 248-263.
 (1998b) ‘Sho Kai-seki no gaiko semyaku to Nippon: “annai jogai” kara “itoku
hoen” made’ (Chiang Kai-shek’s foreign policy strategy and Japan: from ‘internal 
stabilization for external resistence’ to ‘returning virtue for malice’), Chikaki niArite 
33: 5-20.
 (2003) Nitchu Kankei no Kihon Kozo: Futatsu no mondaiten, kokonotsu no
ketteijiko (The Basic Structure of Japan-China Relations: Two problems and nine 
decisions), Tokyo: Koyo Shobo.
Igarashi, Takeshi (1985) ‘Reisen to Kowa’ (The Cold War and the Peace Treaty), in 
Watanabe Akio (ed.) Sengo Nippon no Taigai Seisaku: Kokusai kankei no henyo to 
Nippon no yakitwari (The Foreign Policy of Postwar Japan: The transformation of 
international relations and Japan’s role), Tokyo: Yuhikaku, pp. 32-57.
 (1995) Sengo Nichi-Bei Kankei no Keisei: Kowa, Anpo to Reisengo no shiten ni
tatte (The Formation of Japan-US Relations in the Postwar Era: the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty, the Japan-US Security Treaty, and the post-Cold War world), Tokyo: 
Kodansha.
Iguchi, Sadao (1971) The Taiwan problem and US-China relations’, in Kajima Institute 
of International Peace (ed.) Japan in Current Affairs, Tokyo: The Japan Times, pp. 
109-25.
Ijiri, Hidenori (2001) ‘Nitchutai eno shinshikaku’ (Japan-China-Taiwan in new 
perspectives), Chugoku21 10: 61-74.
Ikawa, Satoshi and Kobayashi Hiroshi (2003) Hilo Arite: Toyama Mitsuru to Genyosha 
(Being Human: Toyama Mitsuru and the Dark Ocean Society), Fukuoka: Kaichosha.
Ikeda, Naotaka (2004) Nichi-Bei Kankei to Futatsu no Chugoku V Ikeda, Sato, Tanaka 
naikakuki (Japan-US Relations and Two Chinas’: During the Ikeda, Sato, and 
Tanaka cabinets), Tokyo: Bokutakusha.
Ikei, Masaru (1973) Nippon Gaikoshi Gaisetsu (An Introduction to Japanese Diplomatic 
History), Tokyo: Keio Tsushin.
 (1974) ‘Sengo Nitchu kankei no ichi kosatsu: Ishibashi, Kishi naikaku jidai wo
chushin toshite’ (A view on postwar Japan-China relations: centering on the eras of 
the Ishibashi and Kishi cabinets), Kokusaiho Gaiko Zasshi 73 (3): 44-87.
 (1980) ‘Nikka Kyoryoku Iinkai: sengo Nittai kankei no ichi kosatsu’ (The
Commission for the Promotion of Sino-Japanese Co-operation: a study of postwar 
Japan-Taiwan relations), HogakuKenkyu 53: 1-28.
348
 (1982) Zoho Nippon Gaikoshi Gaisetsu (An Introduction to Japanese Diplomatic
History: Second and revised edition), Tokyo: Keio Tsushin,
 (1988) ‘Chomon Gaiko no Kenkyu: Sho Kai-seki Soto no shikyo to Nippon no
taio’ (A study of condolatory-call diplomacy: Japan’s response to the death of 
President Chiang Kai-shek), Hogaku Kenkyu 61 (5): 117-36.
 (1992) Santei Nippon Gaikoshi Gaisetsu (An Introduction to Japanese Diplomatic
History: Third edition), Tokyo: Keio Tsushin.
Ikenberry, G. John (2001) After Victory: Institutions, strategic restraint, and the 
rebuilding o f order after major wars, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Ikenberry, G. John and Michael Mastanduno (eds.) (2003) International Relations 
Theory and the Asia-Pacific, New York: Columbia University Press.
Inaba, Masao (1970) Okamura Yasuji Taisho Shiryo Jokan: Senjo kaisohen (General 
Okamura Yasuji Papers Vol. 1: The recollections of battlefields), Tokyo: Hara 
Shobo.
Inoguchi, Takashi (2005) Kokusai Seiji no Mikata: 9.11 go no Nippon gaiko (A 
Perspective on International Politics: Japanese diplomacy after 11 September), 
Tokyo: Chikuma shobo.
Inukai, Ken (1984) Yosuko wa Imamo Nagareteiru (The Yangtze River is Still 
Flowing), Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha.
 (1988) Tnukai Tsuyoshi’, in Shiroyama Saburo (ed.) Chichi no Eizo (The Paternal
Image), Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, pp. 1-25.
Iokibe, Makoto (1985) America no Nippon Senryo Seisaku Jo (US Occupation Policy 
towards Japan Vol. 1), Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha.
----- (ed.) (1999) Sengo Nippon Gaikoshi (The Diplomatic History of Japan), Tokyo:
Yuhikaku.
 (ed.) (2006) Sengo Nippon Gaikoshi: Shinhan (The Diplomatic History of Japan:
Second edition), Tokyo: Yuhikaku.
Iriye, Akira (1965) After Imperialism: The search for a new order in the Far East, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
 (1966) Nippon no Gaiko: Meiji Ishin kara Gendai made (Japanese Diplomacy:
From the Meiji Restoration to the Present), Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha.
 (1991) Shin Nippon no Gaiko: Chikyuka Jidai no Nippon no sentaku (New
Japanese Diplomacy: Japan’s choices in the era of globalization), Tokyo: 
Chuokoronsha.
 (1992) Across the Pacific: An inner history o f American-East Asian relations,
Chicago: Imprint Publications, Inc.
 (1997) Japan and the Wider World: From the mid-Nineteen Century to the present,
New York: Longman.
Ishii, Akira (1985) ‘Taiwan ka Pekin ka: sentaku ni kuryo suru Nippon’ (Taiwan or 
Beijing?: Japan at the crossroads of choice), in Watanabe Akio (ed.) Sengo Nippon no 
Taigai Seisaku: Kokusai kankei no henyo to Nippon no yakuwari (Postwar Japan’s 
Foreign Policy: Japan’s role in the transformation of international relations), Tokyo: 
Yuhikaku, pp. 62-85
 (1986) ‘Chugoku to Tainichi Kowa: Chuka Minkoku Seifu no tachiba wo chushin
ni’ (China and the Peace Treaty with Japan: the viewpoint of the Government of the 
Republic of China), in Watanabe Akio and Miyasato Seigen (eds.) San Furanshisuko 
Kowa (The San Francisco Peace Treaty), Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, pp. 
293-316.
 (1987a) ‘Chugoku no tai-Nichi senryo seisaku’ (China’s occupation policy towards
Japan), Kokusai Seiji 85: 25-40.
 (1987b) ‘Chugoku ni otta mugen no baisho’ (The unlimited reparations that Japan
owes to China), Chuo Koron August: 164-71.
351
■—(1988) ‘Nikka Heiwa Joyaku no koshokatei: Nippongawa Daiichiji Joyaku Soan 
wo megutte’ (The negotiation process of the Treaty of Peace between the Republic of 
China and Japan: the circumstances surrounding the First Draft of the Japanese side), 
Chugoku: Shakai to bunka 3: 203-10.
— (1989) ‘Nikka Heiwa Joyaku teiketsu kosho wo meguru jakkan no mondai’ (A few 
questions surrounding the negotiations to conclude the Treaty of Peace between the 
Republic of China and Japan), Kyoyogakka Kiyo 21: 77-94.
— (1993) ‘Nippon no sengoshori wa ikani nasaretaka’ (How Japan’s postwar 
settlement was carried out), Gaiko Forum October: 82-9.
— (1998) ‘Chugoku no ugoki’ (China’s move), in Iokibe Makoto and Kitaoka 
Shin’ichi (eds.) Kaisen to Shusen: Taiheiyo Senso no Kokusai Kankei (The Beginning 
and End of the War: International relations of the Pacific War), Tokyo: Johobunka 
Kenkyusho, pp. 143-68.
■—(2001) ‘Ikkan shiteita “futatsu no Chugoku” seisaku’ (‘two Chinas’ policy that was 
consistent), Leviathan 29: 155-8.
—(2002) ‘1960-nendai zenhan no Nittai kankei; Shu Hokei jiken kara hankyo 
sanbobu setsuritsu koso no suishin e’ (Japan-Taiwan relations during the first half of
the 1960s: from the Zhou Hongqing incident to the joint plan for establishing an anti­
communist headquarters), Kokusaiho Gaiko Zasshi 101 (2): 1-29.
 (2003a) ‘Tokyo, Taipei, and Beijing: 1972 revisited’, Japan Echo June: 26-7.
 (2003b) ‘Nikka Heiwa Joyaku teiketsu kara Nitchu kokko kaifuku e: “futatsu no
Chogoku” seisaku kara “hitotsu no Chugoku” seisaku eno choyaku’ (From the 
conclusion of the Japan-ROC Peace Treaty to the normalization of Japan-China 
relations: from ‘two Chinas’ to ‘one China’), in Ishii Akira et al (eds.) Nitchu Kokko 
Seijoka, Nitchu Heiwa Joyaku Teiketsu Kosho, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, pp. 353-77.
Ishii Akira, Zhu Jianrong, Soeya Yoshihide, and Lin Xiaoguang (eds.) (2003) Nitchu 
Kokko Seijoka, Nitchu Heiwa Joyaku Teiketsu Kosho (The Normalization of Japan- 
China Relations and the Negotiations for the Japan-China Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.
Ishii, Itaro (1950) Gaikokan no Issho (The Life of a Diplomat), Tokyo:Yomiuri 
Shinbunsha.
Ishii, Mitsuj iro (1976) Kaiso Hachijuhachinen (The Recollections of Eighty-eight 
Years), Tokyo: Karucha Shuppansha.
 (1998) ‘Ishii Mitsujiro Nikki’ (The Ishii Mitsujiro Diary), This is Yomiuri July:
202-235,
353
Ito, Go (1998) ‘Nich-Bei-Chu kankei niokeru “Taiwan mondai”: Bei-Chu wakai to sono 
eikyo’ (The ‘Taiwan issue’ in Sino-American-Japanese relations: Sino-American 
rapprochement and its impact), Kokusai Seiji 118: 118-32.
 (2003) Alliance in Anxiety: Detente and the Sino-American-Japanese triangle,
New York: Routledge.
Ito, Satoshi (1995) ‘Tenno, tennosei, to kokusai yoron: tenno oyobi tenno sei wo sekai 
wa do miteitaka’ (The emperor, the imperial institution, and opinions in international 
society: how the world saw the emperor and the imperial institution), in Fujiwara 
Akira et ah (eds.) Showa 20-nen/1945-nen: Saishin shiryo wo motoni tettei kensho 
suru (The 20th Year of Enlightening Peace and the Year 1945: The close examination 
of the latest materials), Tokyo: Shogakkan, pp. 270-3.
Iwami, Takao (2000) Jimintoni Iitaikotoga Yamahodo aru (Many Things to Tell the 
Liberal Democratic Party), Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbumsha.
Iwanaga, Kenkichiro (1985) Sengo Nippon no Seito to Gaiko (The Political Parties and 
Diplomacy of Postwar Japan), Tokyo: Tokyo Digaku Shuppankai.
Jain, R. K. (1982) China and Japan 1949-1980, 2nd edn., New Delhi: Radiant 
Publishers.
Jansen, Marius B. (1954) The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press.
 (1970) ‘Pan-Asianism’, in Marlene J. Mayo (ed.) The emergence of Imperial
Japan: Self-defense or calculated aggression?, Lexington: D.C. Health and Company, 
pp. 55-8.
 (1980) ‘Japan and the Chinese Revolution of 1911’, in John K. Fairbank and
Kwang-Ching Liu (eds.) The Cambridge History o f China Vol. 11: Late Ching, 1800- 
1911, part 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 339-74.
Jervis, Robert (1985) ‘Pluralistic rigor: a comment on Bueno de Mesquita’, 
International Studies Quarterly 29 (2): 145-9.
 (1991) ‘Models and cases in the study of international conflict’, in Robert L.
Rothstein (ed.) The Evolution o f Theory in International Relations, Columbia, South 
Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, pp. 61-81.
 (1996) ‘Perception, misperception, and the end of the Cold War’, in William
C.Wohlforth (ed.) Witnesses to the End o f the Cold War, Baltimore: The John 
Hopkins University Press, pp. 220-39.
Kaji, Ryuichi (1962) Ogata Taketora (Ogata Taketora), Tokyo: Jiji Tsushinsha.
Kamimura, Shinichi (1971a) Nippon Gaikoshi 17: Chugoku nashonarizumu to Nikka 
kankei no tenkai (The Diplomatic History of Japan 17: Chinese nationalism and the 
development of Japan-ROC relations), Tokyo: Kajima Kenkyusho Shuppankai.
 (1971b) Nippon Gaikoshi 20: Nikka Jihen, ge (The Diplomatic History of Japan
20: The Sino-Japanese War 1937-41, part 2), Tokyo: Kajima Kenkyusho Shuppankai.
Kan, Hideki, Sakamoto Kazuya, Tanaka Akihiko, Toyoshita Narahiko, and Sasaki 
Yoshitaka (2002) ‘Yoshida gaiko wo minaosu: shin shiryo ga akasu Nichi-Bei kosho 
no butaiura’ (Reconsidering Yoshida diplomacy: the backstage of Japan-US 
negotiations revealed by new archives), Roma January: 94-113.
Kang, David (2003) ‘Hierarchy and stability in Asian international relations’, in G. John 
Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (eds.) International Relations Theory and the 
Asia Pacific, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 163-89.
Kase, Miki (1999) Daitoryo ate Nipponkoku Shusho no Gokuhi Fairu (Secret Files on 
Japanese Prime Ministers’ Letters to Presidents of the United States), Tokyo: 
Mainichi Shinbunsha.
Kato, Yoko (1995) ‘Haisha no Kikan: Chugoku kara no Fukuin, Hikiage Mondai no 
Tenkai (The return of the vanquished: the development of issues concerning the
demobilization and repatriation of the Japanese in China), Kokusai Mondai 109: 110- 
25.
Katzenstein, Peter J., Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner (1998) ‘International 
Organization and the study of world politics’, International Organization 52 (4): 
645-85.
 (eds.) (1999) Exploration and Contestation in the Study o f World Politics,
Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Katzenstein, Peter J. and Yutaka Tsujinaka (1995) ‘“Bullying”, “buying”, and 
“binding”: US-Japanese transnational relations and domestic structures’, in Thomas 
Risse-Kappen (ed.) Bringing Transnational Relations Back in: Non-state actors, 
domestic structures, and international institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 79-111.
Kawada Isao Jijoden Kankokai (1965) Kawada Isao Jijoden (The Biography of Kawada 
Isao), Tokyo: Kawada Isao Jijoden Kankokai.
Kawashima, Shin (2000) ‘Rekishigaku kara mita sengo hosho’ (A historiographical 
view on postwar compensation), in Okuda Yasuhiro and Kawashima Shin (eds.) 
Kyodo Kenkyu Chugoku Sengo Hosho: Rekishi, Ho, Saihan (A Joint Project on
Postwar Compensation for China: History, law, and judgment), Tokyo: Akashi 
Shoten, pp. 13-47.
Kaya, Okinori (1976) Senzen Sengo Hachijunen (Eighty Years before and after the 
War), Tokyo: Keizai Oraisha.
Kayano, Nagatomo (1946) Tnukai Misshi, Kayano Nagatomo no Nisshi’ (The diary of 
Kayano Nagatomo, the emissary for Inukai) Chuo Koron August: 82-8.
Kennan, George F. (1967) Memoirs 1925-1950, New York: Pantheon Books.
Keohane, Rober O. (1989) International Institutions and State Power: Essays in 
international relations theory, Boulder: Westview Press.
Kibata, Yoichi (1986) ‘Tai-Nichi Kowa to Igirisu no Ajia seisaku’ (The Peace Treaty 
with Japan and British policy towards Asia), in Watanabe Akio and Miyasato Seigen 
(eds.) San Furanshisuko Kowa (The San Francisco Peace Treaty), Tokyo: Tokyo 
Daigaku Shuppankai, pp. 165-191.
Kim, Samuel S. (1994) ‘Taiwan and the international system: the challenge of 
legitimation’, in Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson (eds.) Taiwan in World 
Affairs, Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 145-79.
Kimura, Hiroshi (1993) Nichi-Ro Kokkyo Koshoshi: Ryodo mondai ni ikani torikumu ka 
(A History of the Russo-Japanese Terrotorial Dispute: How was the territorial 
problem tacked?), Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha.
Kishi, Nobusuke (1982) Nijusseki no Rida tachi (The Leaders of the Twentieth 
Century), Tokyo: Sankei Shuppan.
Kishi, Nobusuke, Yatsugi Kazuo, and Ito Takashi (1981) Kishi Nobusuke no Kaiso (The 
Recollections of Kishi Nobusuke), Tokyo: Bungei Shunju.
Kissinger, Henry (1979) White House Years, Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
Kitaoka, Shin’ichi (1995) ‘Sengo Nippon no gaiko shiso’ (Japanese diplomatic thought 
during the postwar era), in Kitaoka Shin’ichi (ed.) Sengo Nippon Gaiko Ronshu: 
Kowa ronso kara Wangan Senso made (A Collection of Essays on Japanese 
Diplomacy during the Postwar Era: From the Peace Treaty debate to the Gulf War), 
Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, pp. 5-42.
 (2000) ‘Futsu no KunV e (Becoming a ‘Normal Nation5), Tokyo: Chuo Koron
Shinsha.
Kobayashi, Kichiya (1991,) Sorini Narenakatta Otokotachi: Gyakusetsuteki shidosharon 
(Men Who Could Not Become Prime Minister: Paradoxical lessons for leaders), 
Tokyo: Keizaikai.
359
Kobayashi, Yoshinori (2000) Taiwan-ron (On Taiwan), Tokyo: Shogakkan.
Koeda, Yoshito (2000) ‘Nikka danko, Nitchu kokko seijoka kankeisha intabyuh’ (The 
severing of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Republic of China and the 
normalization of relations between Japan and the Peoples’ Republic of China: 
Interviews with parties concerned), in Tamura Shigenobu et ol. (eds.) Nikka Danko to 
Nitchu Kokko Seijyoka (The Severing of Diplomatic Relations between Japan and the 
Republic of China and the Normalization of Relations between Japan and the 
Peoples’ Republic of China), Tokyo: Nansosha, pp. 229-52,
Kosaka, Masataka (1963, 1995) ‘Genjitsu Shugisha no heiwaron’ (A realist’s view on 
peace), Chuo Koron January, also in Kitaoka Shin’ichi (ed.) Sengo Nippon Gaiko 
Ronshu: Kowa ronso kara Wangan Senso made (A Collection of Essays on Japanese 
Diplomacy during the Postwar Era: From the Peace Treaty debate to the Gulf War), 
Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, pp. 207-24.
 (1964) ‘Saisho Yoshida Shigeru ron’ (On Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru), Chuo
Koron Februaiy: 76-111.
 (1968) Saisho Yoshida Shigeni (Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru), Tokyo: Chuo
Koronsha.
 (2000) Kosaka Masataka Chosakushu Dai Yonkan (The Collected Writings of
Kosaka Masataka Vol. 4), Tokyo: Toshi Shuppan.
Kosaka Zentaro (1981) Are kara Korekara: Taikenteki sengo seijishi (Since Then, from 
Now on: A personal history of postwar politics), Tokyo: Bokuyosha.
 (1994) Giin Gaiko Yonjunen: Watashino rirekisho (Forty Years of Parliamentarian
Diplomacy: My personal history), Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha.
Kratochwil, Friedrich V. (2000) ‘The politics of place and origin: an inquiry into the 
changing boundaries of representation, citizenship, and legitimacy’, in Michi Ebata 
and Beverly Neufeld (eds.) Confronting the Political in International Relations, 
London: Macmillan Press, pp. 185-211.
Ku, Cheng-kang (1968) ‘Zhong-Ri guanxi yu Zhong-Ri Hezuo Cejin Weiyuanhui’ 
(Sino-Japanese relations and the Committee for the Promotion of Sino-Japanese Co­
operation), in Bainian lai Zhong-Ri Guanxi Lunwenji (Collected Essays on the Last 
Hundred Years of Sino-Japanese Relations), Taipei: Zhong-Ri Wenhua Jingji Xiehui, 
pp. 13-39.
 (1971) ‘Zhong-Ri liangguo baowei Yazhou ziyou minzhu heping de gongtong
zeren’ (The mutual responsibility of the Republic of China and Japan to defend 
liberal democratic peace in Asia), in Zhong-Ri Guanxi Yanjiuhui (ed.) (1971) Zhong-
361
Ri Guanxi Lunwenji Di Yiji (Collected Essays on Sino-Japanese Relations Vol. 1), 
Taipei: Zhong-Ri Guanxi Yanjiuhui, pp. 33-9.
Ku, Wei-chun (1989) Gu Weijun Huigulu Di Jiujuan (The Memoirs of V. K. 
Wellington Koo Vol. 9), Taipei: Zhonghua Shuju.
Kubek, Anthony (1963) How the Far East Was Lost: American policy and the creation 
o f Communist China 1941-1949, Chicago: Henry Reneiy Co.
Kung, Te-cheng (1988) ‘Jiang Jieshi Xiansheng yu Dongfang Wenhua’ (Mr. Chiang 
Kai-shek and Oriental Culture), in Chen P’eng-jen (ed.) Jin Bainen lai Zhong-Ri 
Guanxi (Sino-Japanese Relations of the Last Hundred Years), Taipei: Shuiniu 
Chubanshe, pp. 99-101.
Kurata, Nobuyasu (1992) ‘Nikka Kyoryoku Iinkai no rekishiteki yakuwari’ (The 
historical role of the Committee for the Promotion of Sino-Japanese Cooperatrion), in 
Uno Seiichi (ed.) Son Bun kara Ri Toki e: Nikka hachijunen no kiseki (From Sun Yat- 
sen to Lee Teng-hui: The locus of Japan-ROC relations at 80), Tokyo: Waseda 
Shuppan, pp. 333-49.
Kusano, Atsushi (1980) “Dai yonji Nitchu boeki kyotei to Nikka funso’ (The fourth 
Japan-PRC trade agreement and the Japan-ROC dispute), Kokusai Seiji 66: 19-35.
Kusuda, Minoru (2001) Kusuda Minoru Nikki: Sato Eisaku Sori shuseki hishokan no 
2000-nichi (The Kusuda Minoru Diary: 2000 days as the first secretary of Prime 
Minister Sato Eisaku), Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha.
Kwan, Siu-hing (1974) Japanese and Chinese Attitudes towards the Idea o f a Sino- 
Japanese Special Relationship, Thesis Presented for the Degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy, University of London.
Laffey, Mark and Jutta Weldes (1997) ‘Beyond belief: ideas and symbolic technologies 
in the study of international relations’, European Journal o f International Relations 
3(2): 193-237.
 (2004) ‘Methodological reflections on discourse analysis’, Qualitative Methods
Spring: 28-30.
Lebra, Takie Sugiyama (1976) Japanese Patterns of Behavior, Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press.
Lee, Chae-jin (1976) Japan Faces China: Political and economic relations in the 
postwar era, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Lee, Shou-kung (1968) ‘Guofii Sun Zhongshan xiansheng Zhong-Ri liangguo hezuo zhi 
zhuzhang’ (Father of China Mr. Sun Yat-sen’s argument for Sino-Japanese bilateral 
cooperation), in Bainian lai Zhong-Ri Guanxi Lunwen-ji (Collected Essays on the
363
Last Hundred Years of Sino-Japanese Relations), Taipei: Zhong-Ri Wenhua Jingji 
Xiehui, pp. 63-89,
Lee, T’ai-Ching (1992) Zhongshan Xiansheng Dayazhou Zhuyi Yanjiu: Lishi Huiguyu 
Dangdai Yiyi (A Study of Mr. Yat-sen’s Pan-Asianism: Historical reflection and 
contemporary meaning), Taipei: Wenshizhe Chubanshe.
Lee, Teng-hui, Fukada Yusuke, Chin Mei-ling, and Ikebe Ryo (2003) ‘Nipponjin toshite 
tomoni tatakatta senka no hibi: biza wa nakutemo hanashi wa dekiru’ (The days of 
battles we fought together as Japanese: talking without visas), Shokun January: 170- 
81.
Li, Hongxi, Zhou Bing, and Liu Xihai (eds.) (1995) Ri-Jiang Hetan Midang Xianggang 
Miyue (Secret Files on Peace Negotiations between the Japanese and Chiang: Secret 
meetings in Hong-Kong), Taipei: Fengyun Shidai Chuban.
Li, Enmin (2001) Tenkanki no Chugoku, Nippon to Taiwan: 1970-nendai Chu-Nichi 
Minkan Keizai Gaiko no Keii (China, Japan, and Taiwan in a Period of Transition: 
the evolution of Sino-Japanese informal economic relations in the 1970s), Tokyo: 
Ochanomizu Shobo.
Lin, Chin-ching (1984) Ume to Sakura: Sengo no Nikka Kankei (Plum and Cherry 
Blossoms: Japan-ROC relations in the postwar era), Tokyo: Sankei Shuppan.
364
 (1987) Sengo no Nikka Kankei to Kokusaiho (Japan-ROC relations and
International Law in the Postwar Era), Tokyo: Yuhikaku.
 (1992a) ‘Nikka danko wo furikaette’ (Revisiting the severing of diplomatic
relations between Japan and the Republic of China), Mondai to Kenkyu 21(2): 1-11.
 (1992b) ‘Ni“tchu” kokko nijyunen to Chuka Minkoku’ (Twenty years of Japan-
‘ China’ relations and the Republic of China), Seiron October: 72-80.
 (1997) ‘Nikka kankei no kaiko to tenbo’ (Japan-ROC relations in retrospect and
prospect), in Nakamura Katsunori (ed.) Unmei Kyodotai toshiteno Nippon to Taiwan: 
Posuto Reisen jidai no kokka senryaku (Japan and Taiwan, the Union of Shared 
Destiny: National policies in the post Cold War era), Tokyo: Tentensha, pp. 359-66.
Lin, Chin-ching and Chen Shui-liang (eds.) (1996) Taibei, Dongjing, Beijing (Taipei, 
Tokyo, Beijing), Taipei: Liming Wenhua Shiye Gufen Youxian Gongsi.
Lin, Daizhao (1997) Sengo Chu-Nichi Kankeishi (A Postwar History of Sino-Japanese 
Relations), Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobo.
Liu, Jie (1995) Nitchu Sensoka no Gaiko (Diplomacy during the Sino-Japanese War), 
Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan.
Lo, Ming-che (1999) ‘Taiwan eno keizai kyoryoku’ (Economic aid to Taiwan), in 
Nagano Shin’ichiro and Kondo Masaomi (eds.) Nippon no Sengo Baisho: Ajia keizai
365
kyoryoku no shuppatsu (Japan’s Postwar Reparations: The departure for economic 
aid to Asian economies), Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, pp. 157-69.
Lowe, Peter (2000) ‘Uneasy readjustment, 1945-58’, in Ian Nish and Yoichi Kibata 
(eds.) The History o f Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000 Vol. II: The political- 
diplomatic dimension, 1931-2000, London: Macmillan Press, pp. 174-200.
 (2001) ‘Looking back: the San Francisco Peace Treaty in the context of Anglo-
Japanese relations, 1902-52’, in Roger Dingman et al, San Francisco: 50 Years on 
(Part One), London: The Suntory Centre, pp. 67-78.
Lundestad, Geir (1986) ‘Empire by invitation?: the United States and Western Europe, 
1945-1952’, Journal o f Peace Research 23: 263-77.
 (1999) ‘Empire by invitation in the American century’, Diplomatic History 23 (2):
189-217.
Ma, Shu-li (1997) Shiri Shier-nian (My Twelve-Year Mission in Japan), Taipei: 
Lianjing Chuban Shiye Gongsi.
Maruyama, Masao (1960) ‘Introduction’, in I. I. Morris, Nationalism and the Right 
Wing in Japan: A study o f post-war trends, Westport: Greenwood Press.
 (1964) Zohoban Gendai Seiji no Shiso to Kodo (Thought and Behavior in Modem
Japanese Politics: Second and revised edition), Tokyo: Miraisha.
366
Mastny, Vojtech (1996) The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin years, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Masuda, Hiroshi (1993) Anadorazu, Kanshosezu, Hirefusazu: Ishibashi Tanzan no tai- 
Chugoku gaikoron (Neither Contempt, Interference, nor Kowtow: Ishibashi Tanzan’s 
view on diplomacy with China) Tokyo: Soshisha.
 (1999) “Koshoku tsuiho’ (The purge under the American occupation of Japan), in
Kitaoka Shinichi and Iokibe Makoto (eds.) Senryo to Kowa: Sengo Nippon no 
shuppatsu (Occupation and Peace: The departure for postwar Japan), Tokyo: 
Seiunsha.
Masumi, JmTnosuke (1988) Nippon Seijishi 4: Senryo kaikaku, Jiminto shihai (The 
Political History of Japan 4: Occupation reform and Japan under LDP rule, Tokyo 
Diagaku Shuppankai.
 (1995) ‘Sengoshi no kigen to iso’ (The origins and phases of postwar history), in
Nakamura Masanori et al. Sengo Nippon: Senryo to sengo kaikaku dai nikan—senryo 
to kaikaku (Postwar Japan: Occupation and Postwar Reform Volume 2—occupation 
and reform), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.
 (1998) Showa Tenno to sono Jidai (Showa Emperor and His Times), Tokyo:
Yamakawa Shuppansha.
367
Matsumoto, Ayahiko (1996) Taiwan Kaikyo no Kakehashi ni: Jma akasu Nittai danko 
hiwa (Bridging the Taiwan Straits: Disclosing the secrets of the severance of 
diplomatic relations between Japan and Taiwan), Tokyo: Kenbun Books.
Matsumoto, Ken’ichi (2000) Takeuchi Yoshimi ‘Nippon no Ajia Shugi’ Seidoku 
(Reading ‘Japan’s Pan-Asianism’ by Takeuchi Yoshimi), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.
Matsumoto, Shigehara (2001) Showashi eno Ichi Shogen (A Testimony to the History 
of the Showa Era), Tokyo: Tachibana Shuppan.
Matsumura, Kenzo (1999) ‘Bei-Chu no choteisha tare’ (Japan as a mediator of the US 
and China), in Kimura Tokio et al (eds.) Matsumura Kenzo: Shiryohen (Matsumura 
Kenzo: A collection of his writings, speeches, and interviews), Tokyo: Zaidan Hojin 
Sakuradakai.
Maull, Harms W. (1990) ‘Germany and Japan: the new civilian powers’, Foreign Affairs 
69 (5): 91-106.
May, Ernest R. (1992) ‘The US Government, a Legacy of the Cold War’, in Michael J. 
Hogan (ed.) The End o f the Cold War: Its meaning and implications, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 217-228.
McNelly, Theodore H. (1987) ‘“Induced revolution”: the policy and process of 
constitutional reform in occupied Japan’, in Robert E. Ward and Yoshikazu
368
Sakamoto (eds.) Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation, Honolulu: University 
of Hawaii Press, pp. 76-106.
Mearsheimer, John J. (1995, 1998) ‘A realist reply’, International Security 20 (1): 82- 
93, also in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. 
Miller (eds.) Theories o f War and Peace, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 
pp. 427-38.
Mendl, Wolf (1978) Issues in Japan’s China Policy, London: Macmillan for the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs.
Mendel, Jr., Douglas H. (1969) ‘Japanese policy and views toward Formosa’, Journal o f 
Asian Studies 28 (4): 513-34.
 (1970) The Politics o f Formosan Nationalism, Berkeley: University of California
Press.
 (1975) ‘Japanese public views on Taiwan’s future’, Asian Survey 15 (3): 215-20.
Mikanagi, Kiyohisa (1991) ‘Ban’nen no Yoshida Shigeru Shi’ (Mr. Yoshida Shigeru in 
his later years), in Yoshida Shigeru Kinen Jigyo Zaidan (ed.) Ningen Yoshida Shigeru 
(Yoshida Shigeru, the Human Being) Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, pp. 578-603.
Miki, Mutusko (1989) Shin Nakuba Tatazu: Otto Miki Takeo tono gojunen (Politics 
with Faith: Fifty years with my husband Miki Takeo), Tokyo: Kodansha.
369
Mil liken, Jennifer (1999) ‘The study of discourse in international relations: a critique of 
research and methods, European Journal o f International Relations 5 (2): 225-54.
 (2001) ‘Discourse study: bringing rigor to critical theory’, in Karin M. Fierke and
Knud Erik Jorgensen (eds.) Constructing International Relations: The next 
generation, London: M. E. Sharpe, pp. 136-59.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (ed.) (1973) Statements and 
Communiques: July 1972-June 1973, Taipei: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic 
of China.
Miura, Yoichi (1996a) Yoshida Shigeru to Sanfarunshisuko Kowa Jokan (Yoshida 
Shigeru and the San Francisco Peace Treaty Vol. 1), Tokyo: Otsuki Shoten.
 (1996b) Yoshida Shigeru to Sanfarunshisuko Kowa Gekan (Yoshida Shigeru and
the San Francisco Peace Treaty Vol. 2), Tokyo: Otsuki Shoten.
Miyasato, Seigen (1990) ‘John Foster Dulles and the peace settlement with Japan’, in 
Richard H. Immerman (ed.) John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 189-212.
Miyazaki, Toten (1967) Sanjyusan’nen no Yume (Thirty-three Years’ Dream), Tokyo: 
Heibonsha.
Miyazawa, Klichi (1991) Sengo Seiji no Shogen (Testimony to Postwar Politics), 
Tokyo:Yomiuri Shinbunsha.
Morris, I. I. (1960) Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan: A study o f post-war 
trends, London: Oxford University Press.
Morton, William F. (1980) Tanaka Giichi and Japan's China Policy, Folkestone: 
Dawson Publishing.
Nadao, Hirokichi (1988) ‘Sho Kai-seki Sensei no itoku wo kensho surukoto no imi’ 
(The meaning of honoring Chiang Kai-shek’s virtue), in Chen P’eng-jen (ed.) Jin 
Bainen lai Zhong-Ri Guanxi (Sino-Japanese Relations of the Last Hundred Years), 
Taipei: Shuiniu Chubanshe, pp. 119-24.
Nagai, Yonosuke (1985) Gendai to Senryaku (Modernity and Strategy), Tokyo: Bungei 
Shunju.
Nagano, Shin’ichiro (1999) ‘Baisho kenkyu no shiten’ (The study of reparations in 
perspective), in Nagano Shin’ichiro and Kondo Masaomi (eds.) Nippon no Sengo 
Baisho: Ajia keizai kyoryoku no shuppatsu (Japan’s Postwar Reparations: The point 
of departure for its economic aid in Asia), Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, pp. 1-6.
Nakajima, Mineo (1972) ‘Yuko no ki jukusureba koso: “tadaima shissochu” no seifu ga 
jukuryo subaki mittsu no mondaiten’ (Because the time is ripe for friendship: three
371
issues that must be considered by the government ‘on the run’), Bengei Shunju 
October: 92-100.
 (1992) ‘Nitchu nijunen de akiraka ni natta koto’ (What has been made clear
between Japan and China twenty years on), Seiron October: 82-91.
 (2002) “‘Nitchu Yuko” toiu Genso’ (The Illusion Called ‘Friendship between
Japan and China’), Tokyo: PHP Kenkyusho.
Nakajima, Shingo (2006) Sengo Nippon no Boei Seisaku: ‘Yoshida rosen’ wo meguru 
seiji, gaiko, gunji (Postwar Japan’s Defense Policy: Politics, diplomacy, and military 
affairs along the ‘Yoshida line’), Tokyo: Keio Gijuku Daigaku Shuppankai.
Nakamura, Masanori (1989) Shocho Tennosei eno Michi: Beikoku taishi Guru to so no 
shuhen (The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the making of the 
‘symbol emperor system’), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.
 (1992) The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the making o f the
‘symbol emperor system * 1931-1991, Armonk: M. E. Sharp.
Nakamura, Yuetsu (1995) Paidan: Taiwangun wo tsukutta Nippongun shokotachi (The 
Baituan: The Japanese military officers who built the Taiwanese forces), Tokyo: 
Fuyo Shobo.
Nakanishi, Hiroshi (1999, 2006) ‘Jiritsuteki kyocho no mosaku: 1970-nendai no Nippon 
gaiko’ (The search for autonomous collaboration: Japanese diplomacy in the 1970s), 
in Iokibe Makoto (ed.) Sengo Nippon Gaikoshi (The Diplomatic History of Postwar 
Japan), Tokyo: Yuhikaku, pp. 143-86, also in Iokibe Makoto (ed.) Sengo Nippon 
Gaikoshi: Shinban (The Diplomatic Histoiy of Japan: Second edition), Tokyo: 
Yuhikaku, pp. 145-90.
Nakasone, Yasuhiro (1992) Seiji to Jinsei: Nakasone Yasuhiro kaikoroku (Politics and 
Life: The memoirs of Nakasone Yasuhiro), Tokyo: Kodansha.
 (2004) Jiseiroku: Rekishi hotei no hikoku toshite (My Recollections: As a
defendant in the court of history), Tokyo: Shinchosha.
Nakata Steffensen, Kenn (2000) ‘Post-Cold War changes in Japanese international 
identity: implications for Japan’s influence in Asia’, in Marie Soderberg and Ian 
Reader (eds.) Japanese Influences and Presences in Asia, Richmond: Curzon Press.
Neumann, Iver B. (1999) Uses o f the Other: ‘The East' in European identity formation, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press.
 (2002) ‘Returning practice to the linguistic turn: the case of diplomacy’,
Millennium: Journal o f international studies 31 (3): 627-51.
373
NHK Shuzaihan and Usui Katsumi (1995) Cho Gakuryo no Showashi Saigo no Shogen 
(Chang Hsueh-liang’s Final Testimony to the History of the Showa Era), Tokyo: 
Kadokawa Shoten.
Nikaido, Susumu (1992) ‘Chunankai no ichiya’ (One night at Zhongnanhai), Seiron 
October: 62-71.
Nish, Ian (1968) The Story o f Japan, London: Faber and Faber.
 (1990, 1996) ‘An overview of relations between China and Japan, 1895-1945’, The
China Quarterly 124: 601-23, also in Christopher Howe (ed.) China and Japan: 
History, trends, and prospects, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 23-45.
Nishi, Yoshiaki (1962) Higeki no Shonin: Nikka Wahei Kosaku Hishi (A Witness of a 
Tragedy: A Secret History of Japan-ROC Peace Operations), Tokyo: Bunkensha.
Nishimura, Kumao (1971) Nippon Gaikoshi 27: San Furanshisuko HeiwaJoyaku (The 
Diplomatic History of Japan 27: The San Francisco Peace Treaty), Tokyo: Kajima 
Kenkyusho Shuppankai.
Nitchu Yuko Kyokai (ed.) (2000) Nitchu Yuko Undo Gojunen (Fifty Years of the Japan- 
China Friendship Movement), Tokyo: Toho Shuppan.
Noda, Nobuo (2000) ‘Joshiki kara hanarenu “shin ni riberaru” na ronkyaku5 (The ‘real 
liberal’ who never lost touch with common sense: a commentary), in Kosaka
374
Masataka, Kosaka Masataka Chosakushu Daiyonkan (The Collected Writings of 
Kosaka Masataka Vol. 4), Tokyo: Toshi Shuppan, pp. 583-95.
Nomura, Koichi (1997) Sho Kaiseki to Mo Takuto: Sekaisenso no nakano kakumei 
(Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong: Revolutions in the World War), Tokyo: Iwanami 
Shoten.
Norman, E. Herbert (1944) ‘The genyosha: a study in the origins of Japanese 
imperialism*, Pacific Affairs 17: 261-84.
 (1970) ‘Ultranationalist societies’, in Marlene J. Mayo (ed.) The Emergence o f
Imperial Japan: Self-defense or calculated aggression?, Lexington: D.C. Health and 
Company, pp. 47-53.
Office of the Government Spokesman (1952) Selected Speeches and Messages o f 
President Chiang Kai-shek 1949-52, Taipei: Office of the Government Spokesman.
Ogasawara, Kiyoshi (1971) ‘Sho Kai-seki wo sukutta Nippon shokodan: haizan no 
Kokumin seifu gun ni jyuyuyonen, ongi ni mukuiru beku kenshin shita gunji komon 
83-nin no suketto tachi’ (The group of Japanese officers that saved Chiang Kai-shek: 
83 military advisors who dedicated more than ten years of their service to the 
defeated Nationalist army in order to repay a debt of gratitude), Bungei Shunju 
August: 158-66.
375
Ogata, Sadako (1965) ‘Japanese attitude toward China’, Asian Survey 5 (8): 389-98.
 (1988) Normalizing with China: A comparative study o f US and Japanese
processes, Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California.
Ogata Taketora Denki Kankokai (1963) Ogata Taketora (Ogata Taketora), Tokyo: 
Asahi Shinbunsha.
Ogura, Kazuo (2003) ‘Wakare no gaiko no dorama: Nitchu kokko seijyoka no tai- 
Taiwan gaiko to iwayuru “Tanaka shinsho” wo megutte’ (The drama of farewell 
diplomacy: Japan’s diplomacy towards Taiwan at the time of the normalization of 
Japan-China relations and the so-called ‘Tanaka letter’), in Ishii Akira et al. (eds.) 
Nitchu Kokko Seijoka, Nitchu Heiwa Joyaku Teiketsu Kosho (The Normalization of 
Japan-China Relations and the Negotiations for the Japan-China Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, pp. 226-33.
Oka, Yoshitake (1970) ‘Prologue’, in Marlene J. Mayo (ed.) The Emergence o f Imperial 
Japan: Self defense or calculated aggression?, Lexington: D. C. Heath and 
Company, pp. 1-12.
 (1993) Oka Yoshitake Chosakushu Dai Rokkan: Kokuminteki dokuritsu to kokka
risei (Collected Writings of Oka Yoshitake Vol. 6: National independence and state 
rationality), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.
376
Okubo, Denzo (1972) Wasurete naranu Rekishi no Ichi Peji: Toku wo motte Urami ni 
Mukuyuru (A Page in History We Must Not Forget: Returning virtue for malice), 
Tokyo: Shinjo Koronsha.
Omura, Tatsuzo (1961) Futatsu no Chugoku (Two Chinas), Tokyo: Kobundo.
 (1971) Chugoku wa Hitotsu: Matta nashi no Nitchu Kokko (One China: No time
left for Japan-China Relations), Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha.
Ono, Banboku (1955) ‘Sho Soto ni manabu’ (Learning from President Chiang), Bungei 
Shunju December: 52-3.
 (1962) Ono Banboku Kaisoroku (The Memoirs of Ono Banboku), Tokyo:
Kobundo.
Otake, Hideo (1992) Futatsu no Sengo, Doitsu to Nippon (Two Postwar Experiences: 
Germany and Japan), Tokyo: NHK Books.
O’Tuathail, Gearoid and John Agnew (1992) ‘Geopolitics and discourse: practical 
geopolitical reasoning in American foreign policy’, Political Geography 11 (2): 190- 
204.
Ozawa, Ichiro (1993) Nippon Kaizo Keikaku (Blueprint for a New Japan), Tokyo: 
Kodansha.
377
 (1994) Blueprint for a New Japan: The rethinking o f a nation, Tokyo: Kodansha
International Ltd.
 (1995) ‘Futsu no kuni ni nare’ (Becoming a normal nation), in Kitaoka Shin’ichi
(ed.) Sengo Nippon Gaiko Ronshu: Kowa ronso kara Wangan Senso made (A 
Collection of Essays on Japanese Diplomacy during the Postwar Era: From the Peace 
Treaty debate to the Gulf War), Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, pp. 461-81.
 (2006) ‘Nippon ga susumu beki michi’ (The path that Japan should take), in Iokibe
Makoto, Ito Motoshige, Yakushiji Katsuyuki (eds.) 90-nendai no Shogen Ozawa 
Ichiro Seiken Dasshuron (Seizing power: Ozawa Ichiro in testimony of the 90s), 
Tokyo; Asahi Shinbunsha, pp. 179-202.
P’eng, Ming-min and Huang Chao-t’ang (1976) Taiwan no Hoteki Chii (The Legal 
Status of Taiwan), Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai.
Pepper, Suzanne (1999) Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945-1949, 
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Phillips, Nelson and Cynthia Hardy (2002) Discourse Analysis: Investigating processes 
of social construction, London: Sage Publications.
Price, Richard (1995) ‘A genealogy of the chemical weapons taboo’, International 
Organization 49 (1): 73-103.
378
 (1997) The Chemical Weapons Taboo, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Price, Richard and Christian Reus-Smit (1998) ‘Dangerous liaisons?: critical 
international theory and constructivism’, European Journal o f International Relations 
4 (3): 259-94.
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Richard Nixon, 1971, Washington, 
DC: United States Government Printing Office.
Putnam, Robert D. (1988) ‘Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level 
games’, International Organizations 42: 429-60.
Pyle, Kenneth B. (1996a) The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era, 
Washington: The AEI Press.
 (1996b) The Making o f Modem Japan, Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company.
Radtke, Kurt Werner (1990) China's Relations with Japan, 1945-83: The role o f Liao 
Chengzhi, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Rankin, Karl Lott (1964) China Assignment, Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Records of the Far Eastern Commission, 1945-1955.
Reus-Smit, Christian (2004) American Power and World Order, Cambridge: Polity 
Press.
379
Rigger, Shelley (1999) Politics in Taiwan; Voting for democracy, New York: 
Routledge.
Rose, Caroline (1998) Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations: A case study in 
political decision-making, London: Routledge.
 (2005) Sino-Japanese Relations: Facing the past, looking to the future?, London:
Routledge.
Ross, Robert S. (1995) Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China 1969- 
1989, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Roy, Denny (2003) Taiwan: A political history, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Saco, Diana (1997) ‘Gendering soverignty: marriage and international relations in 
Elizabethan times’, European Journal o f International Relations 3 (3): 291-318.
Saionji, Kinkazu (1991) Saionji Kinkazu Kaikoroku ‘Sugisarishi Showa ’ (‘The Bygone 
Showa’: The Memoirs of Saionji Kinkazu), Tokyo: Ipec Press.
Sakamoto, Kazuya (2000) Nichi-Bei Domei no Kizuna: Anpo Joyaku to Sogosei no 
Mosaku (The Ties of the Japan-US Alliance: the Security Treaty and the Search for 
Reciprocity), Tokyo: Yuhikaku.
 (2001) The Asahi Shinbun, 15 November.
Sakamoto, Yoshikazu (1987) ‘Nippon Senryo no kokusai kankyo’ (The international 
context of the occupation of Japan), in Sakamoto Yoshikazu and R.E. Ward (eds.) 
Nippon Senryo no Kenkyu (Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation), Tokyo: 
Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, pp. 3 -45.
Sakata, Masatoshi (1986) ‘Kowa to kokunai seiji: Nitchu boeki mondai tono kanren wo 
chushin ni’ (The Peace Treaty and domestic politics: the trade problem between 
Japan and China as a case in point), in Watanabe Akio and Miyasato Seigen (eds.) 
San Furanshisuko Kowa (The San Francisco Peace Treaty), Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku 
Shuppankai, pp. 87-112.
Sankei Shinbun ‘Sengoshi Kaifu’ Shuzaihan (ed.) (1999) Sengoshi Kaifu Showa 40- 
nendaihen (Unsealing Postwar History: the Showa 40s), Tokyo: Fusosha.
Sato Eisaku (1997) Sato Eisaku Nikki Dai Yonkan (The Sato Eisaku Diary Vol. 4), 
Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha.
Sato, Seizaburo (1974) ‘Bakumatsu, Meiji shoki niokeru taigai ishiki no shoruikei’ (The 
typology of the Japanese perception of the outside world in the late Takugawa and 
early Meiji periods), in Sato Seizaburo and Roger Dingman (eds.) Kindai Nippon 
Taigai Taido (The External Behavior of Modem Japan), Tokyo: Tokyo Digaku 
Shuppankai, pp. 1-34.
381
 (1992) ‘Shi no Choyaku’ wo Koete: Seiyo no shogeki to Nippon (Beyond the
‘Deadly Jump9: The western impact and Japan), Tokyo: Toshi Suppan.
Sato, Seizaburo, Ken9ichi Koyama, and Shunpei Kumon (1990) Postwar Politician: The 
life of former Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira, Tokyo: Kodansha International Ltd.
Sato, Seizaburo and Matsuzaki Tetsuhisa (1986) Jiminto Seiken (The Liberal 
Democratic Party in Power), Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha.
Schaller, Michael (1985) The American Occupation o f Japan: The origins o f the Cold 
War in Asia, New York: Oxford University Press.
 (1990) The United States and China in the Twentieth Century, New York: Oxford
University Press.
 (1997) Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation, New
York: Oxford University Press.
 (2001a) ‘The United States, Japan and China at Fifty9, in Akira Iriye and Robert A.
Wampler (eds.) Partnership: The United States and Japan 1951-2001, Tokyo: 
Kodansha International, pp. 33-61.
 (2001b) ‘Detente and the strategic triangle: or, “drinking your Mao Tai and having
your Vodka, too999, in Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin (eds.) Re-examining the
Cold War: US-China diplomacy, 1954-1973, Cambridge: Harvard University Asia 
Center, pp. 361-89.
Schmidt, Brian C. (1998) The Political Discourse o f Anarchy: A disciplinary history o f 
international relations, Albany: State University of New York Press.
 (2002) ‘On the history and historiography of international relations’, in Walter
Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (eds.) Handbook o f International 
Relations, London: Sage Publications, pp. 3-22.
Schonberger, Howard B. (1986) ‘Peacemaking in Asia: the United States, Great Britain, 
and the Japanese decision to recognize Nationalist China 1951-2’, Diplomatic History 
10: 59-73.
 (1989) Aftermath o f War: Americans and the remaking o f Japan, 1945-1952, Kent:
The Kent University Press.
Schoppa, Leonard J. (1997) Bargaining with Japan: What American pressure can and 
cannot do, New York: Columbia University Press.
Seagrave, Sterling (1985) The Soong Dynasty, New York: Harper & Row.
Seki, Hiroharu (1963) ‘Manshu Jihen zenyashi 1927-1931’ (A history of the 
developments leading to the Manchurrian Incident 1927-1931), in Nippon Kokusai 
Seiji Gakkai Taiheiyo Senso Genin Kenkyubu (ed.) Taiheiyo Senso eno Michi 1:
383
Manshu Jihen Zenya (The Road to the Pacific War 1: On the eve of the Manchurrian 
Incident), Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, pp. 285-440.
Shen, Chien-hung (1982) Shi-Mei Ba-nen Jiyao: Shen Jianhong Huiyilu (Eight Years as 
the Ambassador to the United States: The memoirs of James C. H. Shen), Taipei: 
Lianjing Chuban Shiye Gongsi.
Shigemitsu, Mamoru (1997) Shigemitsu Mamoru: Gaiko kaisoroku (Shigemitsu 
Mamoru: The memoirs of a diplomat), Tokyo: Nippon Tosho Senta.
Shiina Etsusaburo Tsuitoroku Kankokai (ed.) (1982) Kiroku Shiina Etsusaburo Gekan 
(Shiina Etsusaburo on Record Vol. 2), Tokyo: Shiina Etsusaburo Tsuitoroku 
Kankokai.
Shikanai, Nobutaka (1988) ‘“Sho Kai-seki Hiroku” to Watashi’ (‘The Secret Files of 
Chiang Kai-shek’ and I), in Chen P’eng-jen (ed.) Jin Bainen lai Zhong-Ri Guanxi 
(Sino-Japanese Relations of the Last Hundred Years), Taipei: Shuiniu Chubanshe, pp. 
131-8.
Shimada, Masao and Tian Jianong (1997) Sengo Nitchu Kankei Gojunen: Nitchu soho 
no kadai wa hatasaretaka (Fifty Years of Japan-China Relations during the Postwar 
Era: Have the problems between Japan and China been solved?), Tokyo: Toho 
Shuppan.
384
Shimada, Toshihiko (1962) ‘Manshu Jihen no tenkai, 1931-2’ (The development of the 
Manchurian Incident, 1931-2), in Nippon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai Taiheiyo Senso 
Gen’in Kenkyubu (edj Taiheiyo Senso eno Michi 2: Manshu Jihen (The Road to the 
Pacific War Vol. 2: The Manchurrian Incident), Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, pp. 1-188.
Shimizu, Urara (1996) ‘Nittai gaiko kankei danzetsu no seiji katei’ (The political 
process of the severance of Japan-Taiwan diplomatic relations), Mondai to Kenkyu 
25:94-114.
 (2001) "’Dai Niji Yoshida Shokan (1964)” wo meguru Nitchutai kankei no tenkai’
(The ‘Second Yoshida Letter (1964)’ and the development of China-Taiwan-Japan 
relations in the 1960s), Tsukuba Daigaku Chiiki Kenkyu 19: 175-87.
Shindo, Eiichi (1979) ‘Bunkatsu sareta ryodo: Okinawa, Chishima, soshite Anpo’ 
(Disintegrated Territories: Okinawa, the Kurile Islands, and the US-Japan Security 
Treaty), Sekai April: 31-51.
 (1986a) Ashida Hitoshi Nikki Dai Nikan (The Ashida Hitoshi Diary Vol. 2),
Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.
 (1986b) Ashida Hitoshi Nikki Dai Nanakan (The Ashida Hitoshi Diary Vol. 7),
Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.
 (1999) Haisen no Gyakusetsu: Sengo Nippon wa do tsukuraretaka (The Paradox of
Defeat: How postwar Japan was made), Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo.
Shiozawa, Minobu (1983) Unmei no Sentaku: Sonotoki Yoshida Shigeru, Makkasa, Sho 
Kaiseki wa (The Fatal Choice: Yoshida Shigeru, MacArthur, and Chiang Kai-shek at 
the decisive moment), Tokyo: Kameo Shuppan.
Sims, Richard (1973) Modern Japan, London: the Bodley Head.
 (1995) ‘Japan’s rejection of alliance with France during the Franco-Chinese
dispute of 1883-1885’, Journal o f Asian History 29, 109-48.
 (1998) French Policy towards the Bakuju and Meiji Japan 1854-95, Richmond:
Japan Libraiy.
 (2001) Japanese Political History since the Meiji Renovation 1868-2000, London:
Hurst & Company.
Sissons, D.C.S. (1961) ‘The Pacific Clause of the Japanese Constitution’, International 
Affairs 37: 45-59.
Smith, Steve (1995) ‘The self-images of a discipline: a genealogy of international 
relations theory’, in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.) International Relations Theoiy 
Today, Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 1-37.
 (2000a) ‘Wendt’s world’, Review o f International Studies 26 (1): 151-63.
386
 (2000b) ‘The discipline of international relations: still an American social
science?’, British Journal o f Politics and International Relations 2 (3): 374-402.
 (2000c) ‘International theory and European integration’, in Morten Kelstrup and
Michael C. Williams (eds.) International Relations Theory and the Politics o f 
European Integration: Power, security, and community, London: Routledge, pp. 33- 
56.
 (2002a) ‘Historical sociology and international relations theory’, in Stephen
Hobden and John M. Hobson (eds.) Historical Sociology o f International Relations, 
Cambridge: Cambrige University Press, pp. 223-43.
 (2002b) ‘Alternative and critical perspectives’, in Frank P. Harvey and Michael
Brecher (eds.) Critical Perspectives in International Studies: Millennial reflections 
on international studies, Ann Arbor: University of Michican Press, pp. 27-44.
Snyder, Richard C., H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin (1954) Decision-making as an 
Approach to the Study o f International Politics, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press.
 (eds.) (1962) Foreign Policy Decision-making: An approach to the study o f
international politics, New York: The Fress Press of Glencoe.
  With Valerie M. Hudson, Derek H. Chollet, and James M. Goldgeier (2002)
Foreign Policy Decision-making (Revisited), New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Soeya, Yoshihide (1995) Nippon Gaiko to Chugoku 1945-1972 (Japan’s Diplomacy and 
China 1945-1972), Tokyo: Keio Gijuku Daigaku Shuppankai.
 (1997) c1970-nendai no Bei-Chu kankei to Nippon gaiko (Sino-American relations
and Japanese diplomacy in the 1970s), in Nippon Seiji Gakkai (ed.) Kiki no Nippon 
Gaiko: 70-nendai (Japanese Diplomacy in Crisis: the 1970s), Tokyo: Iwanami 
Shoten, pp. 3-20.
 (1998) Japan’s Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978, Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
 (2001) ‘Taiwan in Japan’s Security Considerations’, The China Quarterly 165:
130-146.
 (2002) ‘Chen, Zhaobin, Sengo Nippon no Chugoku Seisaku: 1950-nendai Higashi
Ajia kokusai seiji no bunmyaku, Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 2000, 315 peji’ 
(Review on Chen Zhaobin, Postwar Japan’s China Policy: In the context of 
international politics of East Asia in the 1950s, Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 
2000, 315 pages), Kokusai Seiji 131: 151-5.
 (2003) ‘Bei-Chu wakai kara Nitchu kokko seijoka e: sakuso suru Nippon-zo’
(From Sino-American rapprochement to the normalization of relations between Japan 
and China: the complicated image of Japan), in Ishii Akira et al. (eds.) Nitchu Kokko 
Seijoka, Nitchu Heiwa Joyaku Teiketsu Kosho (The Normalization of Japan-China 
Relations and the Negotiations for the Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship), 
Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, pp. 333-51.
 (2005) Nippon no \Midoru Paw ah’ Gaiko: Sengo Nippon no sentaku to koso
(Japan’s ‘Middle-Power’ Diplomacy: The choices and plans Japan made during the 
postwar era), Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo.
Song, Chu (1990) Zhongguo Guomindangshi (A History of the Nationalist Party of 
China), Jilin: Jilin Wenshi Chubanshe.
Song, Zhiyong (1993) ‘Shusen zenya niokera Chugoku no tai-Nichi seisaku’ (China’s 
Japan policy at the the end of the war), Shien 54 (1).
Stockwin, J. A. A. (1999) Governing Japan: Divided Politics in a Major Economy, 
Oxford: Blackwell.
 (2003) Dictionary o f the Modern Politics o f Japan, London: RoutledgeCurzon.
Stockwin, J. A. A., Alan Rix, Aurelia George, James Home, Daiichi Ito, and Martin 
Collick (1988) Dynamic and Immohilist Politics in Japan, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
389
Stony, Richard (1957) The Double Patriots: A study of Japanese nationalism, London: 
Chatto and Windus.
Strauss, Julia C. (1998) Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: State building in 
Republican China, 1927-1940, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 (2003) ‘Creating “virtuous and talented” officials for the Twentieth Century:
discourse and practice in Xinzheng China’, Modern Asian Studies 37 (4): 831-50.
Sun, Fo (1944) ‘The Mikado must go5, Foreign Affairs 2?> (1): 17-25.
Suzuki, Tadakatsu, ed. (1973) Nippon Gaikoshi 26: Shusen kora Kowa made (The 
Diplomatic History of Japan 26: From the End of the War to the Peace Treaty), 
Tokyo: Kajima Kenkyusho Shuppankai.
Tagawa, Seiichi (1973) Nitcu Kosho Hiroku: Tagawa Nikki 14-nen no shogen (The 
Secret Record of Negotiations between Japan and China: The 14-year testimony of 
the Tagawa Diary), Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha.
Tai, Kuo-hui (1988) Taiwan: Ningen, rekishi, shinsei (Taiwan: People, history, mind), 
Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.
Tai, T’ien-chao (2001) Taiwan Sengo Kokusai Seijishi (A History of Taiwan’s 
International Relations during the Postwar Era), Tokyo: Kojinsha.
390
Takahashi, Masaharu and Wakayama Juichiro (2003a) ‘“Nitchu” ka “Nittai” ka de 
yureta Nippon gaiko: tojisha ga akashita sanjunenme no shinjijitsu (Japanese 
diplomacy between ‘Japan-China’ and ‘Japan-Taiwan’: new facts disclosed by 
participants 30 years on’, Chuo Koron April: 60-74.
 (2003b) ‘The untold story of Japan’s break with Taiwan’, Japan Echo June: 28-34.
Takatsuna, Hirofumi (1997) ‘Nitchu kankeishi niokeru Son Bun no “Dai Ajia Shugi”: 
senzen hen’ (Sun Yat-sen’s ‘Pan Asianism’ in the history of Japan-China relations: 
the prewar period), Chikaki niArite 32: 58-78.
Takeda, Kiyoko (1988) The Dual-Image o f the Japanese Emperor, New York: New 
York University Press.
Takeiri, Yoshikatsu (1972) ‘Koshite dekita Nitchu kokko no honegumi’ (How we laid 
groundwork for the normalization of relations between Japan and China), in Jiji 
Tsushinsha Seijibu (ed.) Dokumento Nitchu Fukko (Documents on the Normalization 
of Relations between Japan and China), Tokyo: Jiji Tsushinsha, pp. 138-51.
 (2003) ‘Rekishi no haguruma ga mawatta, nagare kimeta Shu Shusho no handan:
“tokushi modoki” de hisona ketsui no hashi watashi’ (Turning the wheel of history: 
Premier Zhou’s crucial decision-making and my desperate intervention as a ‘special 
envoy’), in Ishii Akira et al (eds.) Nitchu Kokko Seijoka, Nitchu Heiwa Joyaku
391
Teiketsu Kosho (The Normalization of Japan-China Relations and the Negotiations 
for the Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, pp. 
197-211.
Takemae, Eiichi (1992) Senryo Sengoshi (The History of Postwar Japan under 
American Occupation), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.
Takemi, Keizo (1981) Jiyuminshuto to Nitchu kokko seijoka: fukugoteki seisaku kettei 
niokeru dakyo no kozo (The Liberal Democratic Party and normalization of relations 
between Japan and China: the structure of compromise in complex decision-making), 
Hogaku Kenkyu 54 (7): 32-70.
 (1984) ‘Kokko danzetsuki niokeru Nittai kosho Channeru no saihen katei’ (The
transformation of Japan-Taiwan negotiation-channels at the time of diplomatic 
severance), in Kamiya Fuji (ed.) Hokuto Ajia no Kinko to Doyo (Balance and Unrest 
in Northeast Asia), Tokyo: Keio Tsushin, pp. 75-111.
 (1994) ‘The role of the pro-ROC group in the LDP since 1972’, Journal o f the
School o f Political Science and Economics Tokai University 25: 1-26.
Takeshita, Noboru (1991) Shogen Hoshu Seiken (A Witness of the Conservative 
Government), Tokyo: Yomiuri Shinbunsha.
Takeuchi, Minoru (ed.) (1993) Nitchu Kokko Kihon Bunkenshu, Gekan (A Collection of 
Basic Documents on Japan-China Relations, Part 2), Tokyo: Sososha.
Takeuchi Minoru and Nijuisseiki Chugoku Soken (eds.) (2005) Nitchu Kokko 
Bunkenshu (A Collection of Documents on Japan-China Relations), Tokyo: Sososha.
Takeuchi, Yoshimi (ed.) (1963) Ajia Shugi (Pan Asianism), Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo.
Tamura, Shigenobu, Toyoshima Norio, and Koeda Yoshito (eds.) (2000) Nikka Danko 
to Nitchu Kokko Seijyoka (The Severing of Diplomatic Relations between Japan and 
the Republic of China and the Normalization of Relations between Japan and the 
Peoples’ Republic of China), Tokyo: Nansosha.
Tanaka, Akihiko (1991) Nitchu Kankei 1945-1990 (Japan-China Relations 1945-1990), 
Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai.
 (1997) Amen Hosho: Sengo gojunen no mosaku (Security: Fifty years of search
since the end of the war), Tokyo: Yomiuri Sinbunsha.
Thayer, Nathaniel B. (1969) How the Conservatives Rule Japan, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.
Tobe, Ryoichi (1983) ‘Nikka Jihen ni okeru pisu fira’ (Peace-feelers in the Sino- 
Japanese War, 1937-1941), Kokusai Seiji 75: 30-48.
 (1991) Pisu Fira: Shina Jihen wahei kosaku no gunzo (Peace Feelers: The profiles
of peace-making operations during the Sino-Japanese War), Tokyo: Ronsosha.
 (1999) Nippon Rikugun to Chugoku: ‘Shinatsu’ ni miru yume to satetsu (The
Japanese Army and China: China hands’ expectations and disappointments), Tokyo: 
Kodansha.
Tominomori, Eiji (2000) Sugao no Saisho: Nihon wo ugokashita seijika hachiju-san nin 
(Prime Ministers in Profile: Eighty-three statesmen who led Japan), Tokyo: Asahi 
Sonorama.
Tomlinson, John (1991) Cultural Imperialism: A critical introduction, Baltimore, Johns 
Hopkins University Press.
Tong, Hsien-kuang (1952) Jiang Zongtong Zhuan (The Biography of President Chiang), 
Taipei: Zhonghua Wenhua Chuban Shiye Weiyuanhui.
Toyoshita, Narahiko (1995) ‘Yoshida gaiko to Tenno gaiko: Kowa kosho wo saikento 
sura” (Yoshida diplomacy and Imperial diplomacy: reconsidering the Peace Treaty 
Negotiations), Sekai November: 108-122.
 (1996) Anpo Joyaku no Seiritsu: Yoshida gaiko to Tenno gaiko (The Conclusion of
the US-Japan Security Treaty: Yoshida diplomacy and imperial Diplomacy), Tokyo: 
Iwanami Shoten.
394
 (ed.) (1999) Anpo Joyaku no Ronri: Sono seisei to tenkai (The Logic of the US-
Japan Security Treaty: The genesis and evolution), Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobo.
Truman, Harry S. (1955) The Memoirs o f Harry S. Truman Vol. 1: Year o f Decisions, 
New York: De Capo Press.
Tsiang, T. F. (1933) ‘Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations, 1870-1894’, The Chinese 
Social and Political Science Review 17: 1-106.
Tsou, Tang (1963) America’s Failure in China 1941-50, Chicago: The Chicago 
University Press.
Tsujinaka, Yutaka (1994) ‘Kokunai seiji kozo to gaikoku robi: Nichi-Bei ni okeru tai- 
aitekoku robi no hikaku bunseki’ (Domestic structures and foreign lobbies), 
Leviathan 14: 7-27.
Tucker, Nancy Bemkoph (1983) Patterns in the Dust: Chinese- American Relations and 
the Recognition o f Controversy 1949-1950, New York: Columbia University Press.
 (1996) ‘Continuing controversies in the literature of US-China relations since
1945’, in Warren I. Cohen (ed.) Pacific Passage: The Study o f American-East Asian 
Relations on the Eve o f the Twenty-First Centuiy, New York: Columbia University 
Press.
 (ed.) (2001) China Confidential: American diplomats and Sino-American
relations, 1945-1996, New York: Columbia University Press.
Uchida, Kenzo (1965) ‘Jiminto daigishi no Chugokukan’ (LDP Diet members’ views on 
China), Chuo Koron July: 266-75.
Umemoto, Tetsuya (1986) ‘Amerika Gasshukoku Gikai to Tai-Nichi Kowa’ (The 
United States Congress and the Peace Treaty with Japan), in Watanabe Akio and 
Miyasato Seigen (eds.) San Furanshisuko Kowa (The San Francisco Peace Treaty), 
Tokyo: Tokyo Digaku Shuppankai, pp. 145-164.
Uno, Shigeaki (1962) ‘Chugoku no Doko’ (China’s move), in Nippon Kokusai Seiji 
Gakkai Taiheiyo Senso Gen’in Kenkyubu (ed.) Taiheiyo Senso eno Michi 2: Manshu 
Jihen (The Road to the Pacific War Vol. 2: The Manchurrian Incident), Tokyo: Asahi 
Shinbunsha, pp. 189-288.
 (1982, 1995) ‘Chugoku Tairiku niokeru “shusen” (haisen) to Kokkyo naisen’ (The
‘end of the war’ (defeat) and the civil war between the Nationalists and Communists), 
in Eto Jun (ed.) Senryo Shiroku Dai Nikan: Teisen to gaikoken teishi (The Historical 
Records of the Occupation of Japan Vol. 2: The cease-fire and the suspension of 
diplomatic rights), Tokyo: Kodansha, pp. 13-28, also in Eto Jun (ed.) Senryo Shiroku, 
Jo: Kofiiku bunsho choin keii, Teisen to gaikoken teishi (The Historical Records of
396
the Occupation of Japan, part 1: The process of signing the instrument of surrender, 
the cease-fire, and the suspension of diplomatic rights), Tokyo: Kodansha, pp. 393- 
408.
Urano, Tatsuo (1999) ‘Nippon no sengo baisho to keizai kyoryoku’ (Japan’s postwar 
reparations and economic aid), in Nagano Shin’ichiro and Kondo Masaomi (eds.) 
Nippon no Sengo Baisho: Ajia keizai kyoryoku no shuppatsu (Japan’s Postwar 
Reparations: The point of departure for its economic aid in Asia), Tokyo: Keiso 
Shobo, pp. 7-22.
US Department of State (1976) Foreign Relations o f the United States 1950 Vol. VI: 
East Asia and the Pacific, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing 
Office.
 (1977) Foreign Relations o f the United States 1951 Vol. VI: Asia and the Pacific,
part 7, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office.
 (1985) Foreign Relations o f the United States 1952-54, Vol. XIV: China and
Japan, part 2, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office.
 (2004) Foreign Relations o f the United States 1969-1976, Vol. V: United Nations
1969-1972, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office.
US National Archives (1972) Public Papers o f the President o f the United States 
Richard Nixon 1971: Containing the public messages, speeches, and statements o f 
the President, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office.
Usui, Katsumi (1971) Nitchu Gaikoshi: Hokubatsu no jidai (A Diplomatic History of 
Japan-China Relations: The Northern Expedition era), Tokyo: Hanawa Shobo.
Von Wright, Georg Henrik (1971) Explanation and Understanding, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press.
Wachman, Alan (1994) Taiwan: National identity and democratization, Armonk: M. E. 
Sharpe.
Wada, Haruki (1995) Chosen Senso (The Korean War), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.
 (1999) Hoppo Ryodo Mondai (The Question of Sovereignty over the Northern
Territories: history and future), Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha.
Waever, Ole (1996) ‘The rise and fall of the inter-paradigm debate’, in Steve Smith et 
ah (eds.) International Theory: Positivism and beyond, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 149-85.
 (1998, 1999) ‘The sociology of a not so international discipline: American and
European developments in international relations’, International Organization 52 (4):
687-727, also in Katzenstein et al (eds.) Exploration and Contestation in the Study o f 
World Politics, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, pp. 47-87.
 (2002) ‘Identity, communities, and foreign policy: discourse analysis as foreign
policy theory’, in Lene Hansen and Old Waever (eds.) European Integration and 
National Identity: The challenge o f the Nordic states, London: Routledge, pp. 20-49.
Wakabayashi, Masahiro (1992) Taiwan: Bunretsu kokka to minshuka (Taiwan: The 
divided nation and democratization), Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai.
 (1997) ‘Taiwan minshuka to Chu-Tai kankei no kincho’ (The democratization of
Taiwan and the tension in China-Taiwan relations), in Amako Satoshi (ed.) Chugoku 
wa kyoika (Is China a Threat?) Tokyo: Keisho Shobo, pp. 163-78.
 (2000) “‘Taiwan mondai” no atarashii naijitsu: “naisen” wa dokomade yokai
shitaka’ (The new reality of the ‘Taiwan problem’: to what extent has the ‘civil war’ 
been dissolved?), in Takagi Seiichiro (ed.) Datsu-Reisenki no Chugoku Gaiko to Ajia 
Taiheiyo (Chinese Foreign Policy and the Asia-Pacific in the Post-Cold War Era), 
Tokyo: Nippon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyusho, pp. 297-317.
 (2002) ‘Bunretsu kokka no tochi: Taiwan no sengo’ (Governing a divided nation:
postwar Taiwan), in Akagi Osamu and Yasui Sankichi (ed.) Higashi Ajia Seiji no
Dainamizumu (The Dynamics of East Asian Politics), Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, pp. 85- 
103.
Wakamiya, Yoshibumi (1995) Sengo Hoshu no Ajiakan (The Postwar Conservative 
View of Asia), Tokyo: The Asahi Shinbun.
 (1999) The Postwar Conservative View of Asia: How the political right has
delayed Japan's coming to terms with its history of aggression in Asia, Tokyo: LTCB 
International Library Foundation.
Waley, Arthur (1938) The Analects o f Confucius, New York: Vintage Books.
Walker, R. B. J. (1984) ‘World Politics and Western Reason: Universalism, Pluralism, 
Hegemony’, in R. B. J. Walker (ed.) Culture, Ideology, and World Order, Boulder: 
Westview Press.
 (1990) ‘The Concept of Culture in the Theoiy of International Relations’, in
Jongsuk Chay (ed.) Culture and International Relations, New York: Praeger 
Publishers.
Wang, Ching-hung (2000) Caifang Lishi: Cong Huafu dang'an kan Taiwan 
(Interviewing History: Taiwan according to classified files in Washington), Taipei: 
Yuanliu Chuban Gongs i.
Wang, Dongfang (1992) ‘Wendan Chen Bulei’ (Chen Bulei, the word processor), in 
Wang Weili (ed.) Jiang Jieshi de Wenchen Wujiang (Chiang Kai-shek’s High 
Ranking Civilian Officials and Military Officers), Taipei: Babilun Chubanshe, pp. 
27-45.
Wang, Shujun (2001) Zhang Xueliang Shiji Zhuanqi (Zhang Xueliang: A century of 
legendary life), Hong Kong: Ming Jing Chubanshe.
Wang, Taiping (2003) ‘Tanaka Son ho-Chu inaeno Shu Sori no tai-Nichi apurochi’ 
(Premier Zhou’s approach to Japan before Prime Minister Tanaka’s visit to China), in 
Ishii Akira et al (eds.) Nitchu Kokka Seijoka, Nitchu Heiwa Joyaku Teiketsu Kosho 
(The Normalization of Japan-China Relations and the Negotiations for the Japan- 
China Treaty of Peace and Friendship), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, pp. 266-81.
Wang, Zhongchun (2005) ‘The Soviet factor in Sino-American normalization, 1969- 
1979’, in William C. Kirby, Robert S. Ross, and Gong Li (eds.) Normalization ofUS- 
China Relations: An international history, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Asia Center, pp. 147-74.
Watanabe, Akio (1985) ‘Sengo Nippon no Shuppatsuten’ (The point of departure for 
postwar Japan), in Watanabe Akio (ed.) Sengo Nippon no Taigai Seisaku: Kokusai 
kankei no henyo to Nippon no yakuwari (The Foreign Policy of Postwar Japan: The
401
transformation of international relations and Japan’s role), Tokyo: Yuhikaku, pp. 4- 
31.
 (1999) ‘Sengo Nippon no keiseisha toshiteno Yoshida Shigeru: Kenpo to Kowa’
(Yoshida Shigeru as a reformer of postwar Japan: the Constitution and the Peace 
Treaty), in Kitaoka Shin’ichi and Iokibe Makoto (eds.) Senryo to Kowa: Sengo 
Nippon no shuppatsu (Occupation and Peace: The departure for postwar Japan), 
Tokyo: Seiunsha.
Weldes, Jutta (1993) Constructing National Interests: The logic o f U. S. national 
security in the post-war era, A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate 
School of the University of Minnesota for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
 (1996) ‘Constructing national interests’, European Journal o f International
Relations 2 (3): 275-318.
 (1999) Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban missile
crisis, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
 (2003) ‘Discussion paper on “Discourse and Identity’”, paper for the conference
‘Identity Matters...and How’, Ohio State University, May.
Weldes, Jutta, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson, and Raymond Duval (eds.) (1999) 
Cultures o f Insecurity: States, communities, and the production o f danger, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Weldes, Jutta and Diana Saco (1996) ‘Making state action possible: the United States 
and the discursive construction of “the Cuban problem”, 1960-1994’, Millennium: 
Journal o f international studies 25 (2): 361-95.
Welfield, John (1988) An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance 
System, London: The Athlone Press.
Wendt, Alexander (1992) ‘Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of 
power politics’, International Organization 46: 391-425.
 (1999) Social Theory o f International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
 (2000) ‘On the via media: a response to the critics’, Review o f International
Studies 26 (1): 165-80.
 (2001) ‘What is international relations for? Notes toward a postcritical view’, in
Richard Wyn Jones (ed.) Critical Theory and World Politics, London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, pp. 205-24.
Westad, Odd Arne (1993) Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American rivalry and the 
origins o f the Chinese civil war, New York: Columbia University Press.
 (ed.) (2000) Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, interpretations, theory,
London: Frank Cass Publishers.
Wetherell, Margaret, Stephanie Taylor, and Simeon J. Yates (eds.) (2001a) Discourse 
Theory and Practice: A reader, London: Sage Publications Ltd.
 (eds.) (2001b) Discourse as Data: A guide for analysis, London: Sage Publications
Ltd.
White, Nathan W. (1971) An Analysis o f Japan’s China Policy under the Liberal 
Democratic Party, 1955-70, A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy in Political Science in the Graduate Division of the University of 
California, Berkeley.
Whiting, Allen S, (1960) China Crosses the Yalu: The decisions to enter the Korean 
War, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Wight, Colin (2002) ‘Philosophy of social science and international relations’, in Walter 
Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (eds.) Handbook o f International 
Relations, London: Sage Publications, pp. 23-51.
Wilbur, C. Martin (1976) Sun Yat-sen: Frustrated patriot, New York: Columbia 
University Press.
 (1983) The Nationalist Revolution in China 1923-1928, New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Wilbur, Martin C., and Julie Lien-ying How (1989) Missionaries o f Revolution: Soviet 
Advisors and Nationalist China 1920-1927, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Woodhead, H. G. W. (ed.) (1939) The China Year Book 1939, London: Simpkin 
Marshall Limited.
Wu, Aitchen K. (1950) China and the Soviet Union: A study o f Sino-Soviet relations, 
London: Methuen & Co. Ltd.
Xingzhengyuan Xinwenju (1948) Riben Peichang (Japanese Reparations), Taipei: 
Xingzhengyuan Xinwenju.
Yahuda, Michael (1996) The International Politics o f the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995, 
London: Routledge.
 (2004) The International Politics o f the Asia-Pacific: Second and revised edition,
London: RoutledgeCurzon.
Yang, Sung-p’ing (1992) Zhanhou Riben zhi Dongbeiya Waijiao Zhengce (Japan’s 
Northeast Asian Policy in the Postwar Era), Taipei: Caituan Faren Zhong-Ri Wenjiao 
Jijinhui.
Yang, Pi-chuan (2000) Jiang Jieshi de Yingzi Bingtuan: Baituan Wuyu (Chiang Kai- 
shek’s Shadow Army: The tale of the White Group), Taipei: Qianwei Chubanshe.
Yatsugi, Kazuo (1973) Waga Ronin Gaiko wo Kataru (Discussing My Masterless- 
Samurai Diplomacy), Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha.
Yee, Albert S. (1996) ‘The causal effects of ideas on policies’, International 
Organization 50 (1): 69-108.
Yin, Yanjun (1994) ‘Kairo Kaidan to Chugoku Kokuminseifii no tai-Nichi baisho 
seisaku’ (The Conference of Cairo and Nationalist China’s policy towards Japanese 
reparations), Hitotsubashi Ronso 111 (2).
 (1995) ‘Yoshida shokan to Taiwan’ (The Yoshida letter and Taiwan), Kokusai Seiji
110: 175-88.
— --(1996) Chunichi Senso Baisho Mondai: Chugoku Kokuminto no senji, sengo tai 
Nichi seisaku wo chushin ni (The Question of Sino-Japanese War Reparations: 
Centering on Nationalist China’s Japan policy during and after the war), Tokyo: 
Ochanomizu Shobo.
406
Yomiuri Shinbun Seibu Honsha (ed.) (2001) Toyama Mitsuru to Genyosha: Dai Ajia 
moyuru manazashi (Toyama Mitsuru and the Dark Ocean Society: Pan Asianism, the 
burning desire), Fukuoka: Kaichosha.
Yoshida, Shigeru (1957) Kaiso Junen Dai Sankan (The Recollections of Ten Years Vol. 
3), Tokyo: Shinchosha.
 (1967) Nippon wo Kettei shita Hyakunen (The Decisive Century for Japan),
Tokyo: Nippon Keizai Shinbunsha.
Yoshitsu, Michael M. (1982) Japan and the San Francisco Peace Settlement, New 
York: Columbia University Press.
Yoshizawa, Kenkichi (1958) Gaiko Rokujunen (Sixty Years of Diplomacy), Tokyo: 
Jiyu Ajiasha.
Yoshizawa, Seijiro (1973) Nippon Gaikoshi 28: Kowago no gaiko I-tai-Rekkoku 
kankei, jo  (The Diplomatic History of Japan 28: Diplomacy after the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty I—relations with the Allied Powers, part 1), Tokyo: Kajima Kenkyusho 
Shuppankai.
Yu, Ho-ching (1970) Zhong-Ri Heyue de Yanjui (A study of the Treaty of Peace 
between the Republic of China and Japan), Taipei: Jiaxin Shuini Gongsi Wenhua 
Jijinhui.
407
Yu, Xinchun (1989) Son Bun no Kakumei Undo to Nippon (Sun Yat-sen’s 
Revolutionaiy Movement and Japan) Tokyo: Rokko Shuppan.
Yuan, Keqin (2001) Amerika to Nikka Kowa: Bei, Nichi, Tai Kankei no Kozu (The US 
and the Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan: The structure of 
US-Japan-Taiwan relations), Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobo.
Zang, Shijun (1997) Zhanhou Ri, Zhong, Tai Sanjiao Guanxi (Triangular Relations 
between Japan, China, and Taiwan), Taipei: Qianwei Chubanshe.
Zhang, Lingao (1995) Wo zai Jiang Jieshi Shicongshi de Rezi (The Days I Spent in the 
Office of Chiang Kai-shek’s Chamberlains), Taipei: Zhouzhi Wenhua Chuban.
Zhang, Yongjin (2001) ‘System, empire and state in Chinese international relations’, in 
Michael Cox, Tim Dunne and Ken Booth (eds.) Empires, Systems and States: Great 
transformations in international politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zhao, Jun (1997) Dai Ajai Shugi to Chugoku (Pan-Asianism and China), Tokyo: Aki 
Shobo.
Zhao, Quansheng (1993) Japanese Policymaking: The politics behind politics: informal 
mechanisms and the making o f China policy, New York: Oxford University Press.
Zhao, Suisheng (1997) Power Competition in East Asia: From the old Chinese world 
order to post-Cold War regional multipolarity, London: Macmillan Press.
408
Zhongguo Guomindang Zhongyang Zhixing Weiyuanhui Xuanchuanbu (1939) Lingxiu 
Kangzhan Yanlunji (Leader’s Speeches on the War of Resistence)
Zhonghua Minguo Shiliao Yanjiu Zhongxin (ed.) (1979) Xianzongtong Jianggong 
Youguan Lunshuyu Shiliao (Essays and Historical Materials related to Late President 
Chiang), Taipei: Zhonghua Minguo Shiliao Yanjiu Zhongxin.
Zhonghua Minguo Shishi Bianji Weiyuanhui (ed.) (1983) Zhonghua Minguo Shishi 
Jiyao (Chugao): Zhonghua Minguo 61-nen (1972) 7 zhi 9-yuefen (The Historical 
Events of the Republic of China (First Draft): July-September 1972), Taipei: 
Zhonghua Minguo Shiliao Yanjiu Zhongxin.
Zhonghua Minguo Waijiaobu (ed.) (1973) Waijiaobu Shengmingji Gongbao Huibian: 
Zhonghua Minguo 61-nen 7-yue zhi 62-nen 6-yue (The Compilation of Statements 
and Communiques by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China: July 1972- 
June 1973), Taipei: Zhonghua Minguo Waijiaobu.
Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui (ed.) (1966a) Zhong-Ri Waijiao Shiliao 
Congbian (8): Jinshan Heyueyu Zhong-Ri Heyue de Guanxi (The Archival Series of 
Sino-Japanese Diplomacy Vol. 8: The relationship between the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty and Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty), Taipei: Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti 
Yanjiuhui.
409
 (1966b) Zhong-Ri Waijiao Shiliao Congbian (9): Zhonghua Minguo Duiri Heyue
(The Archival Series of Sino-Japanese Diplomacy Vol. 9: The Republic of China’s 
Peace Treaty with Japan), Taipei: Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui. 
Zhonghua Minguo Xingzhengyuan Xinwenju (1952) ‘Jiang Zongtong Minguo Sishinian 
Liuyue Shibari Shengming quanwen’ (The full text of President Chiang’s Statement 
on 18 June 1951), in Zhonghua Minguo Xingzhengyuan Xinwenju, Zhonghua 
Minguo Nianjian (The Republic of China Yearbook), Taipei: Zhonghua Minguo 
Xingzhengyuan Xinwenju.
Zhong-Ri Guanxi Yanjiuhui (ed.) (1971) Zhong-Ri Guanxi Lunwenji Di Yiji (Collected 
Essays on Sino-Japanese Relations Vol. 1), Taipei: Zhong-Ri Guanxi Yanjiuhui.
 (ed.) (1978) Zhang Yuejun Xiansheng dui-Ri Yanlun Xuanji (The Selection of Mr.
Chang Chun’s Speeches on Japan), Taipei: Zhong-Ri Guanxi Yanjiuhui.
 (ed.) (1991) Zhang Yuejun Zhuanlue yu Nianpu (The Short Biography and
Chronicle of Chang Chun), Taipei: Zhong-Ri Guanxi Yanjiuhui.
Zhu, Jianrong (1992) ‘Chugoku wa naze baisho wo hoki shitaka: seisaku kettei katei to 
kokumin e no settoku’ (Why did China waive reparations?: the process of policy­
making and national propaganda), Gaiko Forum October: 27-40.
■—(2003) ‘Senjin no kaitaku Nijuisseiki eno shisha: Nitchu kokko seijoka to Heiwa 
Yuko Joyaku wo saikensho suru igF (The frontiers of forerunners, implications for 
the Twenty-first Century: the significance of re-examining the normalization of 
Japan-China relations and the Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship), in Ishii 
Akira et al (eds.) Nitchu Kokko Seijoka, Nitchu Heiwa Joyaku Teiketsu Kosho (The 
Normalization of Japan-China Relations and the Negotiations for the Japan-China 
Treaty of Peace and Friendship), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, pp. 405-23.
